

EVALUATION OF EXTERNALLY FUNDED REGIONAL INTEGRATED
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES (RIDEPS) IN TANZANIA:
CASE STUDIES OF KIGOMA, TANGA AND IRINGA
REGIONS

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THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

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
SCHOOL OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

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To my parents,

My father, Alifa Ngasongwa

and

My late mother, Chiku Hadija Waziri Kahemele

and

the other peasants in Tanzania.

ABSTRACT

The importance of regional integrated development programmes and projects (RIDEPs) as public policy instruments of rural change in Tanzania cannot be over-emphasised. Since the early seventies RIDEPs have played a significant role as public interventions which have been purposefully directed towards increasing agricultural production and improvement in the quality of life of the rural people in a number of regions in the country.

Soon after the launching of the administrative decentralisation programme in July 1972, the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), the then newly created super ministry responsible for all rural development matters, formulated and adopted a RIDEP policy and strategy. One of the key elements of this policy was to encourage donor participation in the preparation and implementation of regional integrated development plans.

Although donor response in the preparation and writing of the RIDEP plans was enormous, culminating in each region having its own plan ready (i.e. on the shelf) by the late seventies, follow-up funding was realised for only ten of the twenty of the Tanzanian regions. In the later years, the rate of donor dropout became a serious problem so that by 1986 only three RIDEPs were still running with donor support.

The present study is an *ex-post* evaluation of externally funded regional integrated development programmes and projects of three regions in Tanzania (Kigoma (World Bank), Tanga (West Germany) and

Iringa (EEC)). A review of evaluation methods is undertaken to establish their link with and relevance to the objectives and hypotheses of the study. The chosen methods and indicators of the study are discussed and their appropriateness is demonstrated. The chosen methods are 'before and after' comparisons, 'with and without' comparisons and village sample surveys. These evaluation methods are considered more appropriate to the circumstances of Tanzania than others such as cost-benefit analysis, financial investment analysis, planning-programming-budgeting system, etc., which usually resort to computerised analyses. Given resource constraints (funds, manpower with the appropriate skills and equipment), simple methods are to be preferred to the more sophisticated ones, if the reliability of the conclusions is similar.

Each regional integrated development programme or project is discussed and evaluated. A detailed examination of (1) the objectives, (2) appropriateness of the planning methodology and (3) extent of implementation of each RIDEP is carried out and analysed to determine their achievements and failures. The purpose of the evaluation activity is to pinpoint the achievements and the reasons for the non-achievements of the RIDEPs when compared with their stated objectives. Through the evaluation exercise strengths and weaknesses of the RIDEPs as instruments of rural change are identified and recommendations are advanced to improve the effectiveness of the on-going RIDEPs and, most importantly, of RIDEPs as a methodology of rural development planning and implementation in Tanzania.

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I must, however, declare that I am personally responsible for the final version of this thesis and that includes its shortcomings.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Abstract	ii
Acknowledgements	iv
List of Tables	xii
List of Maps	xvi
List of Charts	xvii
List of Appendix Tables	xviii
List of Appendix Maps	xix
Abbreviations	xix
PART I: BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND THE METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY	
Summary	xxiii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 Regionalism and Regional Planning: Tanzanian experience	4
1.2.1 Kigoma Region	7
1.2.2 Tanga Region	14
1.2.3 Iringa Region	19
1.3 The Objectives of the Study	23
1.4 The Hypotheses of the Study	24
1.5 Conclusion	32
Footnotes	32

CHAPTER 2: THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction	33
2.2 Conceptual Framework for Integrated Rural Development in Tanzania	34
2.2.1 Rural Development and Integrated Rural Development	34
2.2.2 The History of Approaches to Development	43
2.2.3 Tanzanian Agricultural Development	50
2.2.4 Regional Planning and Popular Participation	55
2.3 The Theoretical Underpinnings of Evaluation	60
2.3.1 The Disparate Origins of Evaluation	61
2.3.2 Methodological Background of Evaluation	73
2.3.3 The Choice of the Methodology of the Study	81
2.3.4 Criteria and Preconditions of Evaluation	88
2.4 Conclusion	92
Footnotes	95

CHAPTER 3: THE METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

3.1 Introduction	98
3.2 The Indicators Used in the Study	100
3.3 Documentary Sources of Information	106
3.4 Primary Sources of Data Collection: The Village Surveys	110
3.5 Techniques of Data/Information Interpretation and Presentation	120
3.6 The Limitations of the Study	124

Footnotes	125
-----------	-----

CHAPTER 4: CONTEXT FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT
PLANNING IN TANZANIA

4.1 Introduction	127
4.2 The National Economy: Recent Trends	131
4.2.1 Trends in Agricultural Production	136
4.2.2 Trends in Industrial Production	142
4.2.3 Production Infrastructure	144
(a) Transport and Communication System	145
(b) Construction	149
4.2.4 Social Infrastructure	151
(a) Education	152
(b) Health	158
(c) Water supplies	162
4.3 The Rural Development Strategy, 1972-86	163
4.3.1 The Decentralisation of Government Administration in Tanzania	166
4.3.2 Villagisation and Socialist Rural Development	195
4.4 Conclusion	203
Footnotes	204

PART II: DISCUSSION OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS: EVALUATION
OF THE EXTERNALLY FUNDED RIDEPS IN TANZANIA

CHAPTER 5: EVALUATION OF THE KIGOMA RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(THE KIGOMA RIDEP)

5.1 Introduction	206
5.2 Project Design, Objectives and Targets	211
5.2.1 Appraisal, Objectives and the Strategy	212
5.2.2 Manpower Inputs and Equipment	223
5.2.3 Management Structure for the RIDEP Administration	224
5.2.4 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)	228
5.2.5 Schematic Representation of the RIDEP Linkages and Interrelationships	230
5.3 The Evaluation of the Planning Methodology and its Appropriateness	235
5.4 Extent of Implementation of the RIDEP Objectives and Targets	247
5.4.1 Agricultural Production and Productivity	249
(a) Improved Seeds	250
(b) Chemical Inputs	250
(c) The Agricultural Trials and Training Centre (ATTC)	253
5.4.2 Quality of Life Indicators	257
(a) Education	260
(b) Health	265
(c) Rural Water Supplies	268
(d) Feeder Roads	271
(e) Popular Participation	274
5.5 Conclusion	276

Footnotes	279
-----------	-----

CHAPTER 6: EVALUATION OF THE TANGA RIDEP

6.1 Introduction	283
6.2 Project Design, Objectives and Targets	285
6.2.1 The RIDEP Objectives and Targets for the Development of the Productive Sectors in Tanga Region	293
6.2.2 The RIDEP Objectives and Targets for the Development of the Social Services	301
6.3 Evaluation of the Planning Methodology, Design and Appropriateness of the Tanga RIDEP Plan	307
6.4 Extent of Implementation of the Tanga RIDEP Objectives and Targets	317
6.4.1 Agricultural Production and Productivity	320
6.4.2 Quality of Life Indicators	326
(a) Education	326
(b) Health	330
(c) Rural Water Supplies	330
(d) Other Infrastructural Developments	331
(e) Popular Participation	332
6.5 Conclusion	335
Footnotes	338

CHAPTER 7: EVALUATION OF THE IRINGA RIDEP

7.1 Introduction	339
7.2 The Iringa RIDEP Design, Objectives and Targets	344
7.3 Evaluation of the Planning Methodology, Design and its Appropriateness	375
7.4 Extent of Implementation of the RIDEP Objectives and Targets	379
7.4.1 Management Structure and Monitoring and Evaluation Activities	382
7.4.2 Agricultural Production and Productivity	385
(a) Improved seeds	386
(b) Fertilisers	387
(c) Production of Pyrethrum	388
(d) Rehabilitation of Smallholder Irrigation Schemes	389
(e) Oxenisation	392
(f) Reforestation	392
7.4.3 Infrastructural Development	394
(a) Buildings	394
(b) Provision of Livestock Facilities	395
(c) Roads and Bridges	396
(d) Training and Recruitment of Extension Staff	397
(e) Land use planning	399
7.5 Conclusion	400
Footnotes	405

CHAPTER 8: REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE FOR TESTING OF THE
HYPOTHESES OF THE STUDY: THE RIDEP IMPACTS
AND EXPERIENCE IN TANZANIA AND CONCLUSIONS

8.1 Introduction	406
8.2 The Testing of the Hypotheses of the Study: A Review of the Evidence	407
8.3 Inferences and Recommendations	425
8.4 Outstanding Issues	430
8.5 General Conclusions	432
REFERENCES	441
APPENDIX A	1
APPENDIX B	4
APPENDIX C	11
APPENDIX D	18

LIST OF TABLES

Table No.

1.1 Donor Agency/Country Assistance to Regional Integrated Development Planning	6
1.2 Exchange Rate of the Tanzanian Shilling against Selected Currencies as at June, 1974-1987	12

1.3	National Consumer Price Index and Domestic Inflation in Tanzania 1974-1987	12
3.1	Guideline of Evaluation Tasks of the Study	100
4.1	Gross Domestic Product by Industrial Origin at 1976 Prices (Percentages)	130
4.2	Value of Trade between Tanzania and Foreign Countries, 1976-86 (Current Tshs Million)	132
4.3	Production of Cash Crops, 1976-86 (tons)	138
4.4	Purchases of Major Food Crops by the National Milling Corporation (NMC), 1976-86 (tons)	138
4.5	Value of Export Commodities sold to Foreign Countries (Current Tshs Million)	139
4.6	Trends in Domestic Production of Selected Building Materials, 1976-86 (tons)	150
4.7	Primary School Enrolment, 1976-86	154
4.8	Provision of Health Facilities in Tanzania, 1976-86	159
4.9	The Development of Health Manpower, 1976-86	161
4.10	Actual Development Expenditure by Ministries and Parastatals and Regions, 1972-86 (Current Tshs Million)	180
4.11	Actual Recurrent Expenditure by Ministries and Regions, 1973-86 (Current Tshs Million)	181
4.12	Gross Regional Product Per Capita in Tanzania regions (Tshs)	184
4.13	Regional Distribution of Resources in 1974/75 and 1983/84	186
4.14	Progress of the Villagisation Programme, 1970-76	198

5.1	Project Coverage of Villages, 1975-81	211
5.2	Estimated Costs of Expenditure of the Kigoma RIDEP (US\$ '000)	214
5.3	Kigoma RIDEP proposed and actually implemented project components	215
5.4	Targets of Distribution of Fertilisers (tons)	216
5.5	Expected Crop Improvement Targets by the end of RIDEP	218
5.6	Kigoma RIDEP's Targets for the Education Sector	218
5.7	Appraisal Targets for the Water Component	221
5.8	Accomplishments of the Kigoma RIDEP as at November 1981	248
5.9	Distribution of Project-Financed Fertilisers (tons)	251
5.10	Insecticides Supplied by the Kigoma RIDEP	253
5.11	Comparison of Projected with Actual Production Coefficients at the (RIDEP) Project Year 4	254
5.12	Construction Status of the ATTC as of November 1981	254
5.13	Comparison of RIDEP and TFYP Targets for the Education Component in Kigoma Region	261
5.14	The RIDEP Expenditures: Appraisal Estimates and Estimated Actuals (Tshs '000)	263
5.15	Kigoma Region Health Facilities as in March 1974	266
6.1	Tanga RIDEP Plan Proposed Projects with Estimated Costs (Tshs)	287
6.2	Production of Main Crops in Tanga Region, 1961-64 to 1973 (tons)	295
6.3	Targets for Crop Production in Tanga Region, 1979/80	296

6.4	Targets for Animal Production under the Tanga RIDEF Plan (1975-80) (tons)	299
6.5	Estimates of Required Number of Jobs to be Created in Handicrafts and Small-Scale Industries during the Tanga RIDEF Plan Period	299
6.6	Status of Primary Schools, Classrooms and Teachers Houses in Tanga Region as at July 1974	301
6.7	Health Facilities in Tanga Region as at July 1974	304
6.8	Cost Estimates for the Health Development Projects of Tanga RIDEF Plan, 1975-80	305
6.9	A List of the Tanga RIDEF Selected Projects for Implementation as at July 1975	318
6.10	Extent of Implementation of the Tanga RIDEF as at October 1980	321
7.1	ODG/UNDP Proposed Development Projects, Iringa Region Third Five Year Plan, 1976-81	352
7.2	The Proposed Farming Systems by Planning Areas in Iringa Region	358
7.3	Medium and Large-Scale Irrigation Projects in Iringa Region	362
7.4	Small-Scale Irrigation Projects in Iringa Region	364
7.5	Livestock Production Priorities According to Agro-ecological Zones	366
7.6	Priority Ranking for the Livestock Projects for the Third Five Year Plan, 1976-81	369
7.7	The Hierarchical Organisation of Rural Production	

Infrastructure Inputs to be Provided under the RIDEP	372
7.8 Targets and Accomplishments of the IRADEP during Phase I (1977-81)	380
7.9 Targets and Accomplishments of the IRADEP during Phase II, 1982-86	381
7.10 IRADEP-assisted Smallholder Irrigation Schemes at June 1986	389
8.1 Schematic Representation of Evaluation Activities of the Study RIDEPs	407

LIST OF MAPS

Map No.

1.1 Tanzania: Administrative Division	2
1.2 Tanzania: Study Areas (Regions)	3
1.3 Kigoma Region: Agro-economic Zones	9
1.4 Kigoma Region: Administrative Division	10
1.5 Tanga Region: Agro-economic Zones	16
1.6 Tanga Region: Administrative Division	17
1.7 Iringa Region: Administrative Division	22
5.1 Kigoma Region: Population Density in 1974	209
5.2 Kigoma Region: Location of Project Villages	210
7.1 Iringa Region Showing Outreach of the WHO/UNICEF Nutrition Programme	345

7.2	Iringa Region Showing Planning Areas and Planning Sub-Areas	351
7.3	Iringa Region: Large, Medium and Small-scale Irrigation Projects	365
7.4	Tanzania: Expanded Southern Game-viewing Circuit	371
7.5	Iringa Region: Small-scale Irrigation Schemes during Phase II as at June 1986	391
7.6	Iringa Region Showing Roads Rehabilitated/Maintained during Phase II (1986)	398

LIST OF CHARTS

Chart No.

1.	Government Administrative Structure before Decentralisation of July 1972	171
2.	Government Administrative Structure after Decentralisation of July 1972 (Regional and District Structures)	172
3.	The Planning Institutional Structure and Process	175
4.	Government Administrative Structure as at July 1986	190
5.	Local Government Administrative Structure as at July 1986	191
6.	Kigoma Region Rural Development Programme-Project Organisation (Design)	225
7.	Kigoma RIDEP Organisational Structure (Actual Implementation)	227

8. Effect Linkages of the Kigoma RIDEP Components (Original Design Targets)	232
9. The Tanga RIDEP Organisational Structure	290
10. The Organisational Structure of Iringa RIDEP	384

LIST OF APPENDIX TABLES

Appendix Table No.

A.1 Interviewee Responses on Agricultural Production and Productivity in Sample Villages of Tanga Region	29
A.2 Income Levels of Households in the Sample Villages in Tanga Region	31
A.3 Pattern of Food Consumption/Intake per Family in eight Villages of Tanga Region as Reported by Interviewees (May - June 1986)	32
A.4 Status of Primary School Facilities and Teaching Staff in the Sample Villages in Tanga Region as at the end of June 1986	34
A.5 Status of Primary School Facilities and Teaching Staff in Tanga Region as at 31 January 1985	35
A.6 Status of School Furniture in Tanga Region as at 31 January 1986	36
A.7 Availability of Essential Drugs and Equipment in Dispensaries of the Sample Villages as Reported by Rural Medical Aides	37

A.8 State of Operational Utility of Water Supplies in the Sample Villages in Tanga Region	38
A.9 Existence and Annual Frequency of Decision-Making Institutions in eight Villages of Tanga Region from June 1985 - May 1986	40

LIST OF APPENDIX MAPS

Appendix Map No.

A.1 Tanga Region: Showing Location of Sample Villages	21
A.2 Village Layout of Magamba/Kwalukonge Ujamaa Village	27

ABBREVIATIONS

ATTC	- Agricultural Trials and Training Centre
BOT	- Bank of Tanzania
BRALUP	- Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning (now Institute of Resource Assessment - IRA) of the University of Dar es Salaam
CAT	- Coffee Authority of Tanzania
CCM	- Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CDTF	- Community Development Trust Fund
DDD	- District Development Director (now District Executive Director - DED)
EEC	- European Economic Community

- ERB - Economic Research Bureau of the University of Dar es Salaam
- GAPEX - General Agricultural Products Exporting Corporation
- GTZ - German Agency for Technical Cooperation
- FAO - Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
- IBRD - International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (The World Bank)
- IDA - International Development Association
- ILO - International Labour Organisation
- IRD - Integrated Rural Development
- Kilimo - Ministry of Agriculture
- MATI - Ministry of Agriculture Training Institute
- MDB - Marketing Development Bureau of Kilimo
- M&E - Monitoring and Evaluation
- NBC - National Bank of Commerce
- NEC - National Executive Committee (of CCM or TANU)
- NMC - National Milling Corporation
- PMO - Prime Minister's Office
- RC - Regional Commissioner
- RDC - Regional Development Committee
- RDD - Regional Development Director
- RDF - Regional Development Fund
- RIDEP - Regional Integrated Development Project/Programme/Plan
- TANU - Tanganyika African National Union
- TCA - Tanzania Cotton Authority
- TIRDEP - Tanga Integrated Rural Development Programme

- TRDB - Tanzania Rural Development Bank (now Cooperative and Rural
Development Bank - CRDB)
- TSA - Tanzania Sisal Authority
- Tsh - Tanzania shilling
- UKODA - United Kingdom Overseas Development Administration
- UNDP - United Nations Development Programme

PART I

BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND THE METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

PART I of this study is comprised of four chapters. The first chapter is entitled Background of the Study. It presents the introduction of the study and highlights the reasons for choosing the three RIDEPs, the objectives and the hypotheses of the study. Finally, operational definitions of key concepts used in the study are provided to facilitate understanding of the issues being discussed or described in the chapters that follow. This appears as Appendix A at the end of the thesis.

Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework and a literature review. The discussion aims at establishing the *raison d'être* of the study. A survey of the literature on evaluation is provided in order to demonstrate the rationale and relevance of study.

Chapter 3 discusses the methodology of the study. It reviews those evaluation methods and techniques which are relevant to its purpose and demonstrates how they are appropriate to the objectives of the study. The chosen methods and indicators of the study are discussed and so is the design of the village surveys undertaken in Tanga region, one of the three study regions. The data collection techniques employed in the study are described.

Finally, in Chapter 4 it is the economic situation in the country and the framework of regional planning are reviewed. A brief survey is made of recent economic trends in both the productive and social infrastructural sectors. The administrative and institutional changes are described, especially those since 1972, in order to provide a basis for understanding the purpose and scope of the present study. In essence, this chapter provides the context of the study since

regional and areal development interventions and their success or failures are greatly influenced by macro-economic decisions and/or activities undertaken by the centre.

PART II presents the regional case study research findings and is comprised of 4 chapters. The first three chapters - 5, 6 and 7 - are devoted to the presentation of the research findings for each of the three regional case studies where a set of hypotheses are tested. The integrated rural development project of each study region is examined in detail: its purposes and the appropriateness of the planning design and extent of implementation. The analysis uses the study indicators to measure the achievements of the projects and the extent to which they achieved the stated or implied targets.

Chapter 8 aggregates the experiences of planning and implementation of the three regional integrated rural development projects (RIDEPs) in relation to the hypotheses of the study. The chapter also contains a discussion of the recommendations of the study. The chapter ends with a section on general conclusions which summarises the findings and recommendations.

*There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to
fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and miseries.
On such a full sea are we now afloat,
And we must take the current when it
serves,
Or lose our ventures.*

William Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar*, 1599.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction


The present study sets out to evaluate the externally funded regional integrated development programmes (RIDEPs) of the three regions of Kigoma, Tanga and Iringa (see Maps 1.1 and 1.2). The Kigoma RIDEP had eight years of implementation, whilst the Tanga RIDEP has more than thirteen years continuous implementation. The Iringa RIDEP has more than ten years of implementation. The study seeks to examine the extent of the implementation of these RIDEPs in the light of their stated objectives. This is an *ex post* evaluation intended to identify observable outputs and effects of the RIDEPs on agricultural productivity, provision of economic and social infrastructure and popular participation in planning and implementation. As Belshaw (1982:292) noted no work had been attempted in Tanzania along these lines, though some preliminary work has been undertaken and documented (see for example, Belshaw, 1977a and 1982, and Loft, Hanak and Ndyeshobola, 1982, from now on to be referred to as Loft *et al.*). In pursuit of its objectives (detailed below) the study seeks to examine the extent of the implementation of the component projects of the concerned RIDEPs in order to identify the accomplishments and failures and their causal attribution with a view to ultimately putting forward recommendations for future regional planning and implementation in Tanzania.

To achieve this, the study uses a number of indicators to measure

Map 1.1: Tanzania: Administrative Division



Map 1.2: Tanzania: Study Areas (Regions)



the physical outputs of the RIDEPs. As we see in Chapter 3, the indicators aim to measure the RIDEP inputs, outputs and activities on agricultural production and productivity, and quality of life as a result of improved delivery of social infrastructural developments (i.e. provision of education, health and water supply facilities).

1.2 Regionalism and regional planning: Tanzanian experience in context

Tanzania, in collaboration with a number of donor agencies, has been implementing RIDEPs in several regions since the inception of its RIDEP policy and strategy in the early seventies (Belshaw, 1982; Kleemeier, 1984). In 1972 the Tanzania Government launched the implementation of the decentralisation programme, which aimed at devolving decision-making power, especially in planning and implementing development projects and programmes, to the regional authorities (see Chapter 4 for details). The Prime Minister's Office (PMO) - the 'super ministry' then responsible for rural development - began actively to formulate a policy and strategy which came to be popularly known as the RIDEP (regional integrated development programmes) policy and strategy.

This policy and strategy embraced two major objectives, namely (i) as the new way by which plans have to be prepared in the regions - one of the purposes of the decentralisation policy was coordination and integration of development planning in the regions and districts - and (ii) as a means to secure increased resources for investment in

the regional economies. Moreover, as regions were accomplishing the implementation of the villagisation programme so the demand increased for provision of the economic and social infrastructural facilities and services as promised by the Government. In fact, these have been in large measure the reason for embarking upon the villagisation programme, which entailed the resettling of a large majority of the rural population in planned and designated villages (see Chapter 4). Villagisation provided also for ujamaa production rationale.

In its search for increased resources for the rural development interventions in the regions, the PMO had actively sought support from donor agencies/countries to provide funding for planning and implementing regional integrated development programmes (RIDEPs). In the event, the external funding was secured for the preparation of plans for all the 20 regions (see Table 1.1), but only 10 regions got funding for implementation. These were Kigoma (1974-82), Mwanza and Shinyanga jointly (1978-83) and Tabora (1978-83) (IBRD), Arusha (1981-83) (USAID), Mtwara and Lindi (1981-84) (UKODA), Kilimanjaro (1979 to date) (Japan), Iringa (1977 to date) (EEC) and Tanga (1975 to date) (Federal Republic of Germany).

The RIDEPs of three regions have been chosen for investigation in this study in order to garner experiences and lessons for future regional planning and implementation (see Map 1.2). These three are among the longest implementing of the ten RIDEPs. For example, the Kigoma RIDEP had eight years of implementation; the Tanga RIDEP is over 13 years old and it still being supported by the West German Government, while the Iringa RIDEP has been on the ground for ten

Table 1.1: Donor Agency/Country assistance to regional integrated development planning 1972-86

Region	First RIDEP planning exercise		Implementation with Donor support (in full or part)		Second RIDEP planning exercise		Implementation with Donor support (in full or part)		Status of Implementation with Donor support as at December 1986
	Dates	Agency	Dates	Agency	Dates	Agency	Dates	Agency	
Arusha	1975	SIDA	-	-	1979-81	USAID	1981	USAID	Abandoned in 1983
Coast	1974-75	CIDA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dar es Salaam	1974-75	CIDA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dodoma	1974-75	CIDA	-	-	1978-81	UNDP	-	-	-
Iringa	1974-76	FAO/UNDP	1977	EEC	-	-	-	-	Support by EEC
Kagera	1974-75	DANIDA(a)	-	-	1981	IBRD	-	-	-
Kigoma	1973-74	IBRD	1974	IBRD	-	-	-	-	Ended in Dec. 1983
Kilimanjaro	1975-78	JICA	1979	JICA	-	-	-	-	Support by Japan
Lindi	1974-75	Finnplanco	-	-	1976-81	UKODA	1981	UKODA	Abandoned in 1984
Mara	1977-79	IBRD	-	-	1981	IBRD	-	-	-
Mbeya	1976	NORAD(a)	-	-	1981	DANIDA/FAO	-	-	-
Morogoro	1974-76	Netherlands	1977	Netherlands, Ireland and Switzerland	-	-	-	-	Piecemeal support by all three
Mtwara	1974-75	Finnconsult	-	-	1976-81	UKODA	1981	UKODA	Abandoned in 1984
Mwanza	1975-76	SIDA/IBRD	1978	IBRD	-	-	-	-	Ended in 1983
Rukwa	1975-79	BRALUP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ruvuma	1975-76	Yugoslavia	-	-	1980-81	IFAD	1981	IFAD	Ended in 1983
Shinyanga	1975-78	ILACO/IBRD	1978	IBRD	-	-	-	-	Ended in 1983
Singida	1975	India	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tabora	1975-77	Brokonsult/ IBRD	1978	IBRD/UKODA	-	-	-	-	Ended in 1983
Tanga	1972-75	GTZ (FRG)	1975	GTZ (FRG)	-	-	-	-	Support by FRG

Source: (i) Prime Minister's Office, Dodoma.

(ii) D.G.R. Belshaw, 1982, 'An evaluation of foreign assistance to Tanzania's decentralised regional planning programme' in *Applied Geography* (1982), 2, London: Butterworths, pp. 291-302, Tables 1&2.

Notes: (a) The RIDEP plans for these regions were rejected by the Tanzanian authorities on grounds of technical inadequacy and inappropriateness.

(b) Follow-up implementation was piecemeal and included, apart from The Netherlands, Ireland and Switzerland.

Key to abbreviations: BRALUP - Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning, University of Dar es Salaam; CIDA - Canadian International Development Agency; DANIDA - Danish International Development Agency; EEC - European Economic Community; FAO - UN Food and Agriculture Organization; GTZ - German Agency for Technical Cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG); IBRD - International Bank of Reconstruction and Development; IFAD - International Fund for Agricultural Development; ILACO - International Land Development Consultants, NV; JICA - Japan International Cooperation Agency; NORAD - Norwegian Agency for Development; SIDA - Swedish International Development Agency; UKODA - United Kingdom Overseas Development Administration; USAID - United States Agency for International Development.

years. There is a commitment by the EEC to continue funding the activities of the Iringa RIDEP up to 1992. The RIDEPs represent varied planning approaches (Belshaw, 1979b and 1982). The planning methodologies of the Kigoma and Tanga RIDEPs had economic growth and sector planning biases, whilst that of the Iringa RIDEP espoused a farming systems approach rooted on a systems analysis paradigm (see Chapter 7). These RIDEPs were also some of the earliest to be designed and implemented with technical and capital assistance from external donors.

Time horizon is essential in the present study since it is *ex-post*. The study concentrates its attention on the period between 1972 and 1986. The reason for the choice of 1972 is because this year marks the beginning of both the Tanzanian decentralisation programme, which elevated regional planning and created not only the impetus for regional integrated development planning, coordination and implementation across the country, but also the RIDEP policy and strategy with its significance in giving impetus to regional integrated development planning and securing increased resources for investment in the regional economies.

The RIDEPs' similarities and differences offer prospects for comparative analysis and lesson-learning. These three RIDEPs are being used in this study to examine the appropriateness and role of integrated rural development planning and implementation in an LDC committed to both growth and equity development objectives.

1.2.1 Kigoma Region

Kigoma Region is the most westerly region of Tanzania and is bordered to the north by Kagera Region and Burundi, to the east by Shinyanga and Tabora Regions, to the south by Rukwa Region and to the west by Zaire. In August 1986 Kigoma Region had a population (extrapolated from the 1978 Census) estimated to be around 810,000. However, at the time of the RIDEP appraisal mission in 1974 the region had a total population of 470,000 people.


Kigoma Region covers an area of 37,000 sq.km. which is 3.9 per cent of the total area of the country. The land mass ranges from 770 to 2,300 metres above sea level in the north. Seven agro-ecological zones were distinguished: (i) the Highlands, (ii) the Intermediate zone, (iii) the Miombo woodlands, (iv) the Lake-shore, (v) the Southern Highlands, (vi) Rolling Highlands and (vii) the Nguruka zone (Appraisal Report:9-12) (see Map 1.3).

Rainfall is between 600 mm and 1,600 mm per annum and mean temperatures range from 12°C to 28°C. Over the years both crop production and livestock rearing have been concentrated in the highlands as most of the lowland areas are infested with the tsetse fly.


The Region is administratively divided into three rural districts (Kigoma, Kasulu and Kibondo) and one urban subdistrict comprising the Kigoma/Ujiji townships (see Map 1.4).

Partly as a result of its historical past and partly because of its relative isolation Kigoma has remained one of the most underdeve-

Map 1.3: Kigoma Region: Agro-economic Zones



Map 1.4: Kigoma Region: Administrative Division



loped regions on the Tanzania Mainland. During the colonial era and the first decade of independence, the Region was the principal source of migrant labour for the other regions of the country, particularly in the sisal plantations in Tanga, Coast and Morogoro regions. Accordingly, Kigoma was robbed of its most active labour force members.

In 1974 the Tanzania Government obtained a loan from the International Development Association (IDA), an affiliate of the World Bank (IBRD), to implement an integrated rural development project, the Kigoma Rural Development Project (KRDP). [For the purpose of this study the KRDP will be known as the Kigoma RIDEP or simply the RIDEP]. This loan was to be used to accelerate Kigoma's pace of socio-economic development. The Kigoma RIDEP, as a multi-sectoral and integrated project, covered most of the key sectors of the regional economy. Its essential components included crop production and livestock development, provision of educational, health and water supply facilities and the expansion and maintenance of the Region's feeder road network.

The total cost envisaged in the RIDEP plan was Tshs 94,609,000 (about US\$ 13.5 million - in 1974 US\$ 1 = Tshs 7; see also Table 1.2 for details of exchange rate of the Tanzanian shilling for the period 1979-87 in comparison with the US dollar, £ Sterling and Deutsche Mark - DM) of which Tshs 37,584,000 or 39.7 per cent was to be the Tanzania Government's contribution to meet local costs. [Table 1.3 presents trends in the National Consumer Price Index (NCPI) and Domestic Inflation (DI) for ease of reference.] This amount would, it

Table 1.2: Exchange rate of the Tanzanian Shilling (a) against selected currencies at June of each year (b)

Year	US dollar	£ Sterling	Deutsche Mark (DM)
1974	7.00	20.00	n.a.
1979	8.24	17.93	4.48
1980	8.19	19.28	4.66
1981	8.31	16.21	3.47
1982	9.32	16.71	3.99
1983	12.24	18.70	4.81
1984	17.17	23.23	6.17
1985	17.73	22.45	5.74
1986	40.34	61.83	18.34
1987	63.48	101.58	34.71

Source: Bank of Tanzania.

Notes: (a) 1 Tanzanian shilling (Tsh) = 100 Tanzanian cents.

(b) Tanzania's fiscal year: 1st July - 30th June.

Table 1.3: National Consumer Price Index (NCPI) and Domestic Inflation (DI) in Tanzania 1974-1987 (a)

Year	(1977 = 100)	
	NCPI	% Change (DI)
1974	66.3	19.2
1975	83.9	26.5
1976	89.6	26.5
1977	100.0	11.6
1978	119.8	19.8
1979	135.7	13.3
1980	184.5	36.0
1981	226.4	22.7
1982	300.1	32.6
1983	357.8	19.2
1984	515.2	44.0
1985	660.3	28.2
1986	879.8	33.2
1987	1006.0	21.4

Source: MDB, 1987, **Annual Review of Agricultural Marketing**, Kilimo, Dar es Salaam, Table 4.

Note: (a) The NCPI measures living costs of families living in urban areas in Tanzania. This is a limitation as it measures only price movements of goods and services bought in urban areas. Such movements are undoubtedly different to the movements in the prices of agricultural and industrial inputs and other consumer goods in the regional rural economies.

was envisaged, cover costs for the implementation of the project during the first phase of five years, 1974-79, but there was a provision for extension to another two five-year phases. The Kigoma RIDEF was the first of its kind to be implemented in the country.

The principal objective of the Kigoma RIDEF was the doubling of the annual per capita income of the villagers from the 1975 level (pre-project level) of US\$ 20 (Tshs 160) to US\$ 40 (Tshs 320) at the end of the project period. To attain this goal and others, the RIDEF planned to concentrate on the following activities:-

- (i) Land clearing to rid selected areas of tsetse flies and thus render them more suitable for human habitation and agricultural activities;
- (ii) Construction of feeder roads and improvement of the delivery of social services (schools, dispensaries and rural water supply facilities);
- (iii) Provision of loans to creditworthy primary cooperative societies for crop inputs and production infrastructure such as fertilisers, insecticides, village warehouses, maize mills and simple fish catching and processing equipment; crops to be emphasised under the RIDEF were maize and beans as food crops and cotton and groundnuts as cash crops;
- (iv) Expansion of the Region's rural training centres;
- (v) Establishment of a livestock pilot project and an agricultural trials and training centre;
- (vi) Provision of vehicles, aerial photography and simple radio telephone equipment to facilitate transport and communication within the Region, and
- (vii) Provision of technical assistance by way of the IDA and IBRD technical staff and short-term consultancy.

The choice of the Kigoma RIDEF for investigation in this study is based on two reasons: (i) it was the first such project in the country and located in a least developed area in the country and also a more or less unresearched area and (ii) the fact that the World Bank and Economic Research Bureau experts have pronounced it a failure (see

Chapter 5 for details). Thus, in focusing attention on the Kigoma RIDEF, the study hopes to throw more light on the extent of its implementation and achievements and shortfalls. In the latter context, the experts based their conclusions on a terminal evaluation undertaken before the RIDEF was formally closed down. Also, the evaluation methodology employed emphasised the calculation of internal rate of return. Such a methodology leaves out of account the assessment of target impact (see Mosley, 1983).

1.2.2 Tanga Region

Tanga Region is situated in the northeastern part of Tanzania. The Region's northern border is an international boundary with Kenya; to the east is the Indian Ocean; in the west it is bordered by the Kilimanjaro and Arusha Regions and in the south by Morogoro and Coast Regions.

Tanga has an area of about 26,800 sq.km. It is characterised by greatly varying environmental conditions: flat or slightly rolling terrain ranging from the coastal strip to the inland plains; inland elevations reaching up to 2,400 metres above sea level in the Usambara mountains in the north-west, whilst in the west are the Nguru mountains which rise to 1,550 metres above sea level. Tanga Region's climate is mainly determined by distance from the Indian Ocean and altitude. Coastal areas have average rainfalls of 1,200-1,400 mm per annum, decreasing further inland where it is between 500 mm and 850 mm per annum. Rainfall increases with altitude and reaches means of

1,500-2,000 mm per year in the mountain areas. The Region manifests a bimodal rainfall pattern: short and long rains. The short rains, *vuli*, fall between October and January, whilst the long rains, *masika*, fall between March and June. Average temperatures range between 20°C and 32°C.

In general, the Region receives rainfall which can support a wide range of agricultural and livestock activities. TIRDEP (1975) identified four major agro-ecological zones, namely (i) the Coastal plains, (ii) the Inland plains, (iii) the Highlands and (iv) the Plateau/Steppe land which is found in central and western Handeni District. However, these were further subdivided into subzones, altogether totalling 11 as shown in Map 1.5.

Tanga Region had an estimated population of 1,278,000 in August 1986 which was growing at a rate of 2.9 per cent per year. The Region's population structure is characterised by an overall surplus of men over women (106:100) while nationally there is a surplus of women over men (105:100). This state of affairs is attributable mainly to immigration of workers into the Region to work in the sisal estates from the other regions, especially Kigoma, Rukwa, Tabora, Ruvuma and Mtwara. Administratively, the Region is divided into six districts of Tanga (an urban district), Muheza, Pangani, Korogwe, Lushoto and Handeni (see Map 1.6).

Under a programme of investment funds and technical assistance from the Federal Republic of Germany a development plan for the Tanga Region was launched in July 1975. The Tanga Region Development Plan was an outcome of the planning exercise carried out by a German Agency

Map 1.5: Tanga Region: Ecological Zones


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ECOLOGICAL ZONES LEGEND:-


- 1 Coconut / Cashewnut.
- 2 Coconut.
- 3 Intensive Fruit.
- 4 Cardamom / Tea.
- 5 Vegetable / Temperate fruits/ Tea - Coffee.
- 6 Sisal / Maize.
- 7 Cattle / Sisal.
- 8 Maize Plateau.
- 9 Beans/ Maize / Cattle.
- 10 Commuting / Rice / Cattle.
- 11 Extensive Grazing.

LEGEND

- International boundary.
- Regional boundary.
- District boundary.
- Road.
- River.
- District Town.



Source: TIRDEP.



for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) technical assistance team between 1972 and 1974. The main purpose of the Tanga Integrated Rural Development Programme (TIRDEP) plan was to delineate a development programme for the region for the period 1975-80.² There was also a provision for the continuation of the plan into a second phase 1980-85. The Tanga RIDEP plan had the following main objectives:-

- (i) Provision and equal distribution of basic services to all people;
- (ii) Achievement of an acceptable minimum standard of living for all people in respect of nutrition, housing and clothing i.e. a basic needs approach;
- (iii) Production of adequate quantities of food crops for the entire population;
- (iv) Optimal utilisation of existing land areas and generation of more surplus from agriculture;
- (v) Protection of the ecological balance and natural environment;
- (vi) Processing of local raw materials;
- (vii) Increase of all non-agricultural activities and skills;
- (viii) Generation of employment and application of labour intensive techniques, and
- (ix) Creation of a sound basis for a self-reliant, internally-oriented regional economy.

To achieve these objectives the Tanga RIDEP plan envisaged the implementation of 45 projects covering all the sectors of the regional economy such as agriculture and livestock, natural resources, marketing and processing of agricultural and natural resources products, transport and communications, social services and small industries and handicrafts. The funding for the implementation of these projects was mainly to come from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), through its capital assistance to Tanzania (given as loans). In addition, the FRG Government was expected to provide technical

assistance (grants and costs of expatriate personnel engaged in the RIDEF activities) and commodity assistance, especially for the supply of agricultural inputs, transport and office equipment. Although the implementation of these projects was planned to go hand in hand with the normal annual budgetary allocations to the regional government, the external funding was expected to be larger than the local contributions.

The Tanga RIDEF is the longest running project with over 13 years of continuous implementation (see Chapter 6). The RIDEF, apart from its envisaged concentration on the productive sectors, espoused a basic needs approach, especially in the provision of improved nutrition, housing and clothing as well as education, health and rural water supply. In this way, it provides a suitable case for the study of impact on the quality of life of the target population. Moreover, its purported stance of concentrating investments in the productive sectors, its institutional structure and implementation approach recommend the Tanga RIDEF for inclusion in the present study. In addition, its intended aim of spatial integration, that is, its coverage of all the districts of the region and local involvement, makes it an ideal case-study of attempts at beneficiary participation. The village surveys were designed to gather information, among others, on this aspect.

1.2.3 Iringa Region

Iringa Region is situated in the Southern Highlands and shares

borders with Dodoma and Singida regions in the north, Morogoro region in the east, Mbeya region in the west and Ruvuma in the south. The Region had in August 1986 (on the basis of the 1978 Census) an estimated population of 1,140,000. The population growth of the Region is 2.5 per cent per year. The 1978 National Census revealed that of the total population of 922,801 in that year, there were 492,745 women and only 430,056 men, thus giving a surplus of 62,689 women. This can be explained mainly by out-migration to other regions in search of work, especially to Tanga, Morogoro and Dar es Salaam.

The Region has an area of 56,940 sq.km. which is 6.0 per cent of the total area of the country. However, the Region had in 1986 only 5.1 per cent of the total Tanzanian population of 22,448,000. The Udzungwa, Kipengere and Livingstone mountain ranges are found in this Region with peaks at over 3,000 metres and elevations up to 2,400 metres above sea level are common. In the highest areas temperatures average 0-8°C during the period June to July, that is, at the end of the rainy season. On the whole, the highland areas experience a much cooler climate than the lowlands in the north of the Region. Rainfall varies between 300-700 mm in the drier northern areas and over 1,200 mm in the highlands. Iringa has five agro-ecological zones: (i) the Highlands, (ii) the Upper Plateaux, (iii) the Medium-dry Intermediate zone, (iv) the Dry Northern zone and (v) the Lake Nyasa-shore zone (UNDP/FAO/ODG, 1976). Overall, the region is well endowed with natural resources, especially in agricultural land.

Iringa Region is divided into five rural districts (Iringa Rural, Mufindi, Njombe, Ludewa and Makete) and one urban subdistrict (Iringa


Urban) (see Map 1.7). The region has a substantial agricultural potential and is one of the leading maize producing areas in the country (see Chapter 7).

The EEC has been supporting an agricultural development project (Iringa Region Agricultural Development Project - IRADEP) in the Region since July 1977. Although the IRADEP is not a RIDEP *per se*, it is an integrated project because over and above the crop and livestock activities, it also included provision of some production infrastructural facilities. Most significantly for the present study is the fact that it was based on the RIDEP plan formulated in 1974-75 by a technical assistance team provided by the FAO and UNDP. For this study the Iringa RIDEP was expected to provide additional experience when juxtaposed with the other RIDEPs of Kigoma and Tanga regions. In particular, the Iringa RIDEP represented an alternative planning methodology - the farming systems approach - to the other two, which were essentially multi-sectoral. Its concept of 'planning areas and planning sub-areas' appears both innovative and appropriate in grappling with the varied ecological and rainfall conditions in the region. In addition, the Iringa plan proposals had insisted on the need to adopt and apply an appropriate technology approach in improving agricultural production in the region.

The IRADEP has so far completed two four-year phases of implementation at a total cost of Tshs 261 million. Funding for the third phase 1987-91 has been obtained from the EEC. However, this Study has concentrated its attention on the period 1977-86. The main objective of the Iringa RIDEP was to increase agricultural and



Map 1.7: Iringa Region: Administrative Division



livestock production among smallholder farmers of Iringa Region. To achieve this objective the project aimed to carry out the following activities:-

- (i) Improvement of state of technical knowledge of the farmers;
- (ii) Use of agricultural inputs and especially ox-drawn implements at farmer level to be expanded;
- (iii) Draught-power and suitable implements to be used to expand the cultivated area, facilitate agricultural activities and improve cultivation methods;
- (iv) Provision of water for agricultural use;
- (v) Creation of preconditions for an increased production of meat, milk and eggs;
- (vi) The planting of wood of quick-growing species;
- (vii) Construction of various buildings to support project production oriented activities, and
- (viii) Improvement of feeder roads and mechanical services.

Its inclusion in the study is warranted by its distinct planning methodology, emphasis and implementation approach. In addition, its independent project management had crucial implications for institution-building, sustainability and the design and implementation of the monitoring and evaluation exercise.

1.3 The Objectives of the Study

The main purpose of this study is to investigate the relevance, effectiveness and impacts of the externally funded RIDEPS in a Third World country which aspires to socialist construction of its society. Specifically, the objectives are as follows:-

- (i) To investigate the appropriateness of the Technical Assistance Teams' plan proposals and thus assess their consistency with the Tanzanian socialist development objectives.

- (ii) To investigate the appropriateness of the RIDEP plan proposals i.e. their likelihood of achieving either/both the stated objectives of the Technical Assistance Teams and/or those of Tanzania.
- (iii) To examine the method of achieving the objectives (priorities, sequencing, timing) and its appropriateness.
- (iv) To study the extent of the implementation of the RIDEP plan proposals:
 - (a) success in funding;
 - (b) method of implementation;
 - (c) extent of implementation and how this had an impact on:
 - (aa) quality of life of the rural people,
 - (bb) agricultural productivity and rural incomes,
 - (cc) popular participation.
- (v) To evaluate selected projects under the foreign-financed projects/programmes as case studies in order to see whether they are consistent with the RIDEP plan proposals and the Tanzanian development philosophy.
- (vi) To compare the three RIDEP planning and implementation methodologies as a basis for explaining their effectiveness and efficiency in realising their objectives.
- (vii) To reach policy inferences and recommendations for future planning and implementation, and the future role of regional planning in Tanzania.

These objectives of the study may be represented in a series of hypotheses which will be used as a guide to the drawing of conclusions. The hypotheses are discussed in the next section.

1.4 The Hypotheses of the Study

The study aims to test the hypotheses as presented below. A brief discussion of each hypothesis is given to underline its theoretical significance to the objectives of the study.

X Hypothesis 1

Given the ideological commitment by Government to the belief that socialist agricultural and rural development is the most effective way to raise rural incomes and improve the quality of life of the rural people, RIDEPs concentrated their efforts in, and fostered, socialist modes of production and distribution.

This hypothesis seeks to test whether socialist agricultural and rural development as espoused by the Tanzanian development philosophy, and as implemented with the aid of the RIDEPs, has raised rural incomes and has led to the improvement of the quality of life of the rural people. To test this hypothesis it is necessary to show (i) how far the RIDEP plan proposals contain propositions which explicitly recognise the significance of socialist transformation of the rural economy, and which are likely to bring about its realisation, (ii) to what extent actual implementation of those projects has facilitated the realisation of the socialist principles of production and distribution in the villages, and (iii) how far has the realisation of socialist principles, which was achieved, led to increased rural incomes and improved quality of life of rural people.

In this regard, the study seeks to understand the dynamics of public sector interventions, especially RIDEPs, and production in the villages since these are the focus of the Tanzanian agricultural and rural development strategy. The study examines the investments in both the productive (agriculture) and social infrastructural

(education, health and rural water supplies) sectors in order to assess whether rural socialism and impact on the improvement of rural life are being achieved as articulated in the Tanzanian development philosophy. This philosophy is discussed in Chapter 4.

X Hypothesis 2

Development of the regions depends on (a) integrated rural development planning and implementation rather than on piecemeal projects or single-sector programme improvements and (b) RIDEPs are a reasonably appropriate modality for achieving this.

The second hypothesis is based upon the supposed benefits of regional planning and integrated rural development planning in achieving accelerated and balanced rural development. These include the value of comprehensive, integrated and area-specific development planning. Of equal significance is its emphasis on bottom-up planning and popular participation, this being one of the characteristics of IRDPs. Many writers consider regional planning as having critical significance both in the political and technical sense (Lichfield *et al*, 1975; Alden and Morgan, 1974; Belshaw, 1977 and 1984; Friedmann and Weaver, 1979 and Conyers, 1982; Conyers and Hills, 1984). This is examined further in Chapter 2. Regional planning is assumed to be able to facilitate the attainment of both political and economic objectives of a nation.

For those who are dissatisfied with development from above and

top-down targetry, regional planning and integrated rural development planning and implementation have a special appeal as they might facilitate the institutionalisation of mechanisms of planning development from below which should also strengthen popular participation (see, for example, Chambers, 1974 and 1983; Stohr and Taylor, 1981). In this regard, regional planning is considered to possess three important dimensions: (i) political and technical feasibility, (ii) appropriateness and (iii) popular participation in decision-making. To this end, the study examines the planning methods and techniques as exemplified by the RIDEPs in Tanzania and thus seeks to identify their relative strengths and weaknesses.

Piecemeal planning entails planning programmes and projects according to sectors e.g. agricultural projects, infrastructural projects, etc. The main handicap of this approach is its treatment of development as compartmentalised and unconnected efforts and ignores the multiplicity of needs of rural people. This is one major reason for some people being dissatisfied with only 'growth' theories and it has subsequently led to the birth of the 'growth with equity' concept (see, for example, Chenery *et al.*, 1974; ILO, 1976; Lipton, 1977). We return to this subject in Chapter 2.

X Hypothesis 3

Externally funded RIDEPs tend to be less participatory in the planning and implementation processes than similar locally planned and implemented programmes/projects.

The conception of locally planned development projects embraces regional planning in its totality, that is, it has to be done by and for the people of a region, a district and a village. In this sense, it assumes a hierarchical and participatory process, from the village as the lowest unit to the region and vice versa. It recognises that planning expertise can be available at the regional and district levels only, but assumes the existence of mechanisms which ensure that target population's views, needs and aspirations are sought and obtained. This conception does not mean the exclusion of expertise from outside the region (including external/expatriate expertise) as long as local people, including the experts, are fully involved in the plan identification and formulation.

This issue arises as a direct consequence of the dependence of the RIDEPs on foreign finance and expertise. Chambers (1983:145) has succinctly noted: "Dilemmas remain: from conflicting values and objectives; from times when outsiders' knowledge *is believed to be more valid than* rural people's knowledge for achieving what poor people want; from trade-offs between short and long-term costs and from outsiders' need to be true to themselves." (Italics ours). As it will be observed in Part II, especially in Chapters 5 and 6, "heroic assumptions" are hardly conducive to grassroots-level participation.

Furthermore, time and communication problems have inhibited external experts from conducting consultations with the local people, particularly the target population. The urge to get on with the job and finish it as quickly as possible has relegated popular participation to the wayside. However, in the Tanzanian development

strategy popular participation is considered crucial if the RIDEPs are to achieve their stated objectives. The significance of popular participation - involvement of the people in decision-making on matters affecting their well-being - lies in the fact that it (i) arouses the people's enthusiasm, commitment and personal identification to development programmes/projects, (ii) enables the obtaining of information on local conditions, needs and attitudes conducive to effective implementation and achievement of the stated objectives of the programmes/projects and (iii) is a basic right of the people to be democratically involved in the decision-making processes.

Conyers (1982:103) states that popular participation can be enlisted through (i) local consultation and surveys, (ii) use of extension staff, (iii) decentralised planning, (iv) local government and (v) community. Similar views are held by Chambers (1974) and Alden and Morgan (1974). In particular, Chambers (1974:85) considers that the extent of popular participation can be gauged when the analysis seeks to enquire (i) who participates: the villagers, their representatives, the government officials from the village to the national level, (ii) what institutions are involved in decision-making and (iii) what are the objectives and functions of popular participation. In the Tanzanian context, the need for popular participation in decision-making, especially in planning, was articulated for the first time in the Arusha Declaration and was further clarified and given impetus in the *Mwongozo* [TANU Guidelines of 1971]. From this conception of popular participation, one can

stipulate that the Rukwa RIDEP plan, which was prepared by a team of experts from BRALUP that included some experts born and raised in the region, was more participatory than the externally planned RIDEPs.

For popular participation to be realisable, there must exist institutions of popular participation and they must be used for that purpose. In Tanzania the decentralisation programme, the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975 and more recently the local government acts established participatory institutions from the village to the national level which provide for participatory decision-making (see Chapter 4). In assessing the extent of popular participation vis-a-vis regional planning in general and RIDEP planning and implementation in particular, the present study seeks to examine how far the grassroots participatory decision-making institutions existed and whether they were used by the RIDEPs. The relevance for the present Study is in the need for Tanzanian institution-building: if these institutions did not exist, it would be difficult for RIDEPs to use them, but given the legislation noted above one can see if RIDEPs sought to develop and use local institutions.

* Hypothesis 4

RIDEPs, because they focus on particular regions, have given greater regard to the natural resource base, local farming systems, and appropriate technology (including leading sector approach), all of which make them more likely to increase general production than national sectoral programmes.

This hypothesis arises from the need to fine-tune the planning design to specific natural endowments of a region or area. A rural household is a multi-enterprise and multi-purpose unit. This is dictated by the requirement to meet most of its basic needs from its own means of production (land and family labour). A farming systems and appropriate technology approach is crucial in assisting peasant producers to overcome the production constraints and thus achieve improved levels of production and living standards. Moreover, the notion of leading sector is appropriate in a community which is predominantly rural and agrarian.

Hypothesis 5

The National RIDEP strategy has accelerated the reduction of rural poverty in Tanzania.

This hypothesis is derived *ceteris paribus* from the basic premise and purpose of the Tanzanian development philosophy. Elimination or reduction of rural poverty is the *primum mobile* of Tanzania's agricultural and rural development strategy. The RIDEP policy and strategy is one very important aspect of that strategy. Implicit in this hypothesis is the stipulation that increased incomes, as a result of increased agricultural productivity and production, are the basis for the reduction of rural poverty. Increases in rural incomes are seen as being realised concurrently with the equity objective among the rural populace. In addition, increased agricultural production is

seen in its wider perspective: the need to achieve food self-sufficiency and improved nutritional level, and also earn foreign exchange. Thus it is necessary to examine agricultural production and productivity trends among some selected farmers in a few villages benefiting from the RIDEP interventions.

1.5 Conclusion

The purpose of this introductory chapter has been to provide the reader with a prelude for what to expect in the coming chapters of this study. The objectives and hypotheses of the study have been discussed to underline its purpose and emphasis. In the next chapter a review is given of the relevant literature on the nature of rural development planning, and methods of agricultural and rural development project and programme evaluation.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a discussion of the meaning of these terms, see Appendix A.
2. In 1972-75 the Third Five-Year Plan was scheduled to commence first in July 1974, then in July 1975 and, finally and actually in July 1976.

The economists explain to us the process of production under given conditions; what they do not explain to us, however, is how these conditions themselves are being produced, i.e. the historical movement that brings them into being.

Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*.

CHAPTER TWO

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Rural development in the Third World in general and in Tanzania in particular is an outcome of an international consensus to deal with the problem of rural poverty. Rural development theory is a component in the body of development theory which specifically grapples with development problems facing the rural inhabitants of the countries of the developing world. Rural development theory attempts to find solutions to the problems of hunger, poverty, disease, malnutrition and unemployment or underemployment facing the majority of these people. In 1973 these people totalled 1 billion (McNamara, 1973:16), whereas Todaro states that their number was 1.7 billion in 1981 (Todaro, 1981:276).

This is an *ex-post* evaluation study of three regional integrated rural development projects in Tanzania. In this chapter a review of the literature on integrated rural development, and on monitoring and evaluation will be undertaken with the aim of assisting the reader to identify the premises and the *raison d'être* of the study. Integrated rural development interventions became in the seventies and early eighties one of the crucial means of rural change in the Third World for both the donor community and the recipient national governments. Experience with the implementation of IRDPs or RIDEPs has suggested the need to institutionalise monitoring and evaluation activities for early-warning on problems and improvement of their

management and effectiveness.

In the literature on monitoring and evaluation (M&E) these two concepts of this relatively new discipline are often treated as almost the same thing and with the same purposes and functions. In practice, however, they are quite distinct. As an evaluative study, the discussion will later concentrate on evaluation of agricultural and rural development policies, programmes and projects. Although this is an *ex-post* evaluation, *ex-ante* evaluation of the planning designs and method to determine their internal logic - consistency and appropriateness - will also be undertaken (the methodology is outlined in Chapter 3).

2.2 Conceptual Framework for Integrated Rural Development in Tanzania.

The purpose of this section is to present a brief review on the literature on rural development and integrated rural development, the history of approaches to development, Tanzania's agricultural development and, regional and popular population in order to create a framework for understanding the objectives of the present study.

2.2.1 Rural Development and Integrated Rural Development

In the Third World in general and in Tanzania in particular, the rural populations form the overwhelming majority. In Asia it is about 70 per cent in Asia, over 75 per cent in Africa and around 50 per cent in Latin America (Khromushin *et al*, 1976 and Todaro, 1977, 1981). In

Tanzania it is 85 per cent. In these countries agriculture is the mainstay of the national economy. Todaro (1981:41) observes that agriculture contributes about 32 per cent of the GNP of the Third World countries, whereas it contributes only 8 per cent of GNP of the developed countries. Thus the role of agriculture is crucial in improving levels of living of the nations of the Third World, especially among the predominantly rural populations. However, concern over the predicament of the rural poor and disadvantaged peoples of these countries is a recent phenomenon and "solutions" have been offered and attempted for ameliorating the problem of rural poverty (George, 1976; Lipton, 1977 and Todaro, 1977, 1981). Some of these "solutions" include modernisation of agriculture, rural development and in most recent years integrated rural development planning and implementation of multi-sectoral and poverty-focused development projects/programmes. The latter are popularly called integrated rural development projects or programmes (IRDPs or RIDEPS as in the case of this study). The concept of rural development is an all-embracing approach, which means the sum total of developmental activities - development of agriculture and natural resources and provision of physical and social infrastructure, e.g. road networks, housing, storage facilities and education, health and water supplies - undertaken in a rural setting in order to improve the living conditions of the rural poor. This approach evokes an explicit equity objective, in the view of most commentators (for example see Cohen, 1980:200 and 1987:32; Belshaw, 1977:279-82). Lele (1975:20) defines 'rural development' as a process of "improving living

standards of the mass of the low-income population residing in rural areas and making the process of their development self-sustaining"; the World Bank (1975:1) defines 'rural development' as a "strategy designed to improve the economic and social life of a specific group of people - the rural poor".

Implicit in these definitions is the notion that rural development encompasses multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary public sector interventions as well as those emanating from private and donor initiatives aimed at improving the living conditions of the poor in the rural areas, because it is self-sustaining or self-reliant rather than 'welfarist' in approach. However, it is significant to note that this broad conceptualisation of 'rural development' has grown with time, as part of the disillusionment with the earlier held views of development theory which emphasised "economic growth" as all that was required to overcome rural poverty and human misery facing an overwhelming majority of the rural people of the Third World. 'Rural development' was, accordingly, narrowly defined as implying the realisation of "economic growth" in these countries which would eliminate or reduce rural poverty. Since the economies of these countries are predominantly agrarian, the development theory postulated then was directed towards studying the dynamics of agriculture (or rather *traditional/peasant agriculture*) of the countries of the developing world (see for example, Schultz, 1964).

Furthermore, it was held that the adoption and implementation of a national rural development policy framework was conducive to a process of correcting urban bias through increased investments and

standards of the mass of the low-income population residing in rural areas and making the process of their development self-sustaining"; the World Bank (1975:1) defines 'rural development' as a "strategy designed to improve the economic and social life of a specific group of people - the rural poor".

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Furthermore, it was held that the adoption and implementation of a national rural development policy framework was conducive to a process of correcting urban bias through increased investments and

provision of incentives in the rural sector (Lipton, 1977:330-3; Belshaw, 1977:280-2).

The agriculture of the developing countries is predominantly traditional. A modern agricultural sector also exists, but it is small when juxtaposed with the traditional sector despite the fact that it contributes significantly to the total marketed output of the rural sector, especially in the export trade. Nonetheless, the traditional sector is the most important one as it is the main, if not the only, means of livelihood of the rural people of these countries. The concept of *traditional agriculture* refers to a type of agriculture which is based on age-old techniques utilising the most common factors of production (land and labour) and is characterised by an extremely low level of technology and a meagre marketable surplus. For this reason traditional agriculture is often referred to as *subsistence agriculture*.

However, traditional agriculture may be improved considerably under the effect of "technological change" or through the process of "modernisation". Modernisation of agriculture is a process during which appropriate new methods and techniques of crop production and animal husbandry are consciously applied in order to increase productivity and production. In the literature (Hunter, 1969; George, 1976; Singh, 1976 and Todaro, 1977 and 1981), modernisation of peasant agriculture is construed to mean the use of fertilisers, insecticides, high-yielding seed varieties, irrigation facilities and mechanisation. All these together are sometimes referred to as *technological packages*. Also included in this process are the adoption and

application of improved crop and livestock husbandry practices such as time of planting, weeding and harvesting, spacing (plant population per unit area), soil conservation techniques and the use of draught animals, pasture improvement, livestock health care, multiplication and culling regimes and improved milk production. These processes and interventions are collectively known in the literature as the green revolution, which is, admittedly, associated more with high-yielding varieties (HYVs) or *modern varieties*, biological innovation or plant technology.

Thus, modernising traditional agriculture is believed to be achieved by the use of either technological packages or separate technologies, such as ox-cultivation, which result in higher returns to resources as compared to costs (see, for example, Griffin, 1974; George, 1976; Lipton, 1978; Bowonder, 1981; Blyn, 1983; Prahladachar, 1983; Lipton and Longhurst, 1986 and Ellis, 1988). The evidence of the green revolution in Asia and Latin America bears this out quite convincingly. It has been recognised that there were negative results of the green revolution as well, particularly in the income distributional aspects. It exacerbated inequality by making a smaller section of the population richer while the poor were further impoverished (Griffin, 1974; George, 1976, Lipton, 1978 and Prahladachar, 1983). However, the elimination of the threat of famine in some Asian countries through the existence of abundant domestic stocks of food (with the means and commitment to distribute it to the population in need) is a major achievement. Even Griffin admits the significance of this achievement (Griffin, 1974:1). Naturally, it is

far more acceptable to depend on one's domestic food stocks rather than rely on international handouts of food aid which is often accompanied with political arm-twisting as George (1976:192-212) has convincingly demonstrated.

The green revolution has still to occur throughout Africa. Nonetheless, some African countries, such as Kenya and Zimbabwe have had useful experiences of the impact of the green revolution (Thirtle, 1987; Lawrence, 1988). Not surprisingly, Thirtle's paper is titled "Can the green revolution spread to Africa?". Rasmussen (1986:191-205) documents some experiences of the green revolution in southwestern Tanzania. These writers show that in spite of ecological and institutional constraints positive results of the green revolution have been attained or are tenable. They also point to the consequences aggravating rural differentiation as a result of this kind of intervention, although the evidence is somewhat inconclusive. We return to this issue of rural differentiation in subsection 2.2.4, pp. 50-55.

In a peasant economy like Tanzania the efficacy of new rural technologies in "delivering the goods" (i.e. increased incomes, equity and enhanced quality of rural life - see Chapter 3 for details on these indicators) depends on a whole array of factors or activities. These include the provision and accessibility of supportive services (e.g. agricultural extension, peasants' education and training, rural credit, appropriate pricing policies and marketing) and physical infrastructure (roads and warehouses, agricultural research facilities) and availability of consumer goods in the rural areas. The

provision and maintenance of social services such as education and health facilities and rural water supplies are equally important and imperative in improving the quality of life of rural people (ILO, 1976; Streeten and Burki, 1978; Chambers, 1983). In essence this underpins the importance of treating "development" as a multi-faceted endeavour to improve the living standards of a country's people. Also, improving subsistence agriculture by non-purchased inputs - eco-farming, etc.

Originally, development theory suggested that the benefits of industrialisation could be expected to trickle down to the rural poor. However, the experience of the 1960s and 1970s has shown that, although most LDCs have enjoyed growth and even "development" at an unprecedented rate (surpassing the UN target of 5 per cent of annual 'real' growth rate (see Lipton, 1977:27, 358)), the problem of poverty has not been contained or even reduced (ibid:27-43; World Bank, 1980; 1981). Early rural development attempts in combatting rural poverty revolved around the community development approach (Mellor *et al*, 1968:33-41, 75-81; Hunter, 1970 and Holdcroft, 1978 reprinted in Eicher and Staatz, 1984:46-58). Community development, which was a brainchild of the British Colonial Office (and was enthusiastically supported by the USA), was conceived and implemented as a non-revolutionary development approach that would bring agrarian change and improve the quality of life of the people in the developing countries (ibid.:47-8).

In the event, the community development interventions collapsed around the mid-1960s, partly because of the disenchantment of both the

donors and the recipients with the effectiveness of the interventions and partly, because of changed priorities of the local leadership towards increased food production (Holdcroft in Eicher and Staatz, 1984:51-3). In India, which perhaps had the most intensive community development in the developing world, Singh observes that, although there were positive accomplishments, the community development approach failed because it had little impact on agricultural output and productivity. This was caused by inadequate resources being spread too thinly all over the country (Singh, 1986:176). Singh also notes that the community development programme was plagued with other difficulties as well such as poor popular participation, lack of coordination resulting in confusion of responsibilities and accountability and lack of trained field staff (*ibid*:177). Community development did not involve the big agricultural/rural ministries (responsible for agriculture, water supply, etc) and its coverage and effectiveness were thus circumscribed.

In Africa, as elsewhere in the developing world, rural development interventions of the fifties and sixties included, among others, popular action, communal action, community development, rural animation, mass education, agricultural extension and rural reconstruction (UN, 1971:29). *Rural animation* was a common feature of rural development in French-speaking Africa, whereas community development was more developed in English-speaking Africa. Rural "animators" were the change agents to be emulated by the other villagers and thus achieve diffusion and trickle-down of knowledge and awareness of and adoption of new/modern technological packages for

improving agricultural production. Both rural animation and rural development placed more emphasis on the development of human than physical resources. Some limited success was achieved, but the resulting programmes were considered inadequate for realising the expected rural change. It was considered necessary to transform the rural animation approach into integrated rural development "in which not only the social, educational, health and agricultural programmes are integrated, but also the administrative framework (local or regional government), industrial, technological and all other branches of government, science and technology as well" (ibid.:33-4).

Rural change was not helped either by the economy-wide growth interventions which pivoted around import-substitution industrialisation in most sub-Saharan Africa (see, for example, Rweyemamu, 1973 and 1980; World Bank, 1981; Ravenhill, 1986 and Onimode, 1988). The industrial sectors of these countries are dependent on external resources (machinery, equipment, spares, intermediate raw materials and expertise). Thus, they encounter an immense problem of shortage of foreign exchange. Overall, these growth policies accentuated not only dependence and the foreign exchange bottleneck, but also inequality and poverty (Rweyemamu, 1980 and Onimode, 1988).

Tanzania also had its share in following the growth policies, especially during the period 1961-66, which exacerbated inequality and poverty, particularly in rural areas. The realisation of these problems led to the enunciation of the Arusha Declaration which committed the country to a policy of self-reliance and rural

development. As a result of this new commitment, Tanzania has undeniably done more to improve the quality of life of its rural people, especially in the provision of social services, during the post-Arusha era than in the previous period. Nonetheless, import-substitution has continued to be the centrepiece of the country's industrialisation programme, which has led Rweyemamu (1973) to write about *perverse capitalist industrialisation in Tanzania*. Thus, *inequality and poverty still continue to be immense problems in the country*.

2.2.2 The History of Approaches to Development

Community development gave way to the green revolution effort which gave rise to integrated rural development programmes/projects (IRDPs). As noted already, the green revolution resulted in increased food production, especially in India, the Philippines and Mexico, but the conditions of the poor disadvantaged majority did not improve and in some cases even worsened (Griffin, 1974). IRDPs ushered in rural development interventions which had both **growth** and **equity** objectives. The famous book by Chenery *et al*, 1974, *Redistribution with Growth* was an attempt to influence rethinking of "development" in this new perspective. Development has to mean the achievement *pari passu* of both economic growth and reduction in inequalities and/or absolute poverty alleviation. Provision of basic needs was regarded as crucial in this new approach. The message of this treatise was **growth-cum-distribution**. This is an outcome of disenchantment with past

development efforts as it is summed up in this statement:

It is now clear that more than a decade of rapid growth in underdeveloped countries has been of little or no benefit to perhaps a third of their population. Although the average per capita income of the Third World has increased by 50 percent since 1960, this growth has been very unequally distributed among countries, regions within countries, and socio-economic groups. Paradoxically, while growth policies have succeeded beyond expectations of the first development decade, the very idea of aggregate growth as a social objective has increasingly been called in question (Chenery *et.al*, 1974:xiii).

In other words, the new concept of "development" embraced new criteria and values. Development became in the late 1960s and early 1970s a concept denoting a multidimensional process. Seers (1977:3) argues that development must include, in addition to economic growth, the reduction of inequality, unemployment and poverty. Streeten states: "Development must be redefined as an attack on the chief evils of the world today; malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, slums, unemployment and inequality. Measured in terms of aggregate growth rates, development has been a great success. But measured in terms of jobs, justice and elimination of poverty, it has been a failure or only a partial success" (Streeten quoted by Todaro, rev. edn., 1981:56).¹ Accordingly, rural development was charged with new criteria and values and became a multidimensional process too.

This view was given further impetus by the basic needs approach (BNA). Particularly prominent efforts in this regard were those of ILO (1976), Ghai *et.al.* (1977) and Streeten and Bürki (1978) which attracted a wide audience to the problems of poverty suffered by the majority of the rural people. Provision of and accessibility to

basic needs (these include food, clothing, shelter, education, health and sanitation and potable water) became critical objectives of development and/or rural development. Integrated rural development was born as a specific process during which multidimensional and interdisciplinary interventions would be undertaken to improve the levels of living of the rural people. Most of these interventions took the form of integrated rural development programmes and/or projects (IRDPS).

Kitching (1982) finds this conception of "development" which also embodies distributional aspects as having roots in nineteenth century populism. Its modern-day version he calls "neo-populism" and associates those policies with the poor performance of development strategies in the Third World. He asserts that

"populism in the nineteenth century and neo-populism in the twentieth century were and are counter-doctrines, minority oppositional creeds, to the dominant social and economic belief of those centuries, and indeed of development itself, the belief in the necessity of industrialization in order to produce a continued rise in living standards. ... Both populism and neo-populism are doctrines which oppose industrialization and large-scale production in the name of small-scale enterprise. [However,] neo-populism ... attempts to argue that there is an alternative pattern of trajectory of economic development which can be just as effective or more effective than large-scale industrialization in eliminating mass poverty, and can also be less costly in social or human terms" (1982:3, 21, *passim*).

Kitching singles out Julius Nyerere, Michael Lipton, E. F. Schumacher and the International Labour Office as the typical representatives of neo-populism and uses Tanzania and China to demonstrate the failures of the neo-populist development strategies

(1982:104-41). In particular, basing his arguments on the analysis of von Freyhold (1979:92-9), he points to the failures of the implementation of ujamaa in Tanzania. Nonetheless, Kitching (1982:123-4) concludes that, although Tanzania's ujamaa "must certainly be said to have failed", there are "three positive features of Tanzania's performance to date (1982)". These are "the considerable strides in the provision of basic social services, the completion of the villagization process [and thus] villages exist [offering an opportunity to improve] both the quantity and quality of services, which include provision of inputs needed to increase output and productivity and marketing ... and Tanzania's growth performance has been far from disastrous". These first two conclusions have direct relevance to Tanzania's RIDEF policy and its implementation and this is the main concern of the present study as we have seen in Chapter 1 and as we shall also see in Chapters 5-7.

Following from this line of argument, it can be said both the Arusha Declaration and the Second Five-Year Plan were populist. But it is also true that these policy documents advocated an agricultural-led strategy for industrialisation (or balanced growth) along the stance pursued by Lipton (1977), Johnston and Kilby (1975) and Mellor (1976).

Sender and Smith (1986) also enter with the 'populism' debate by advocating agriculture-led growth as a precursor to industrialism and a proletarian revolution as prerequisites to socialist construction in a developing country. In particular, they insist on expanding the crop export sector in order to ameliorate the critical problem of foreign exchange to finance the 'industrializing project'. They state:

In order to short-cut the process of technological development by importing, it is essential to ensure a *rapid rate of growth of export earnings*. Successful late industrializing economies must import not only technologically superior means of production, but also a wide range of intermediate goods, with the result that total imports will inevitably rise. The overall growth of imports requires a significant increase in export earnings. ... But a rapid and sustained rate of industrial growth is impossible unless a balance is secured between the foreign exchange requirements of such growth and the *rate of growth of export earnings*. (*ibid.*:72-3, *passim*) (Italics added).

Toye (1981) traces the process of state (or *dirigiste*) capital formation as the critical element in accelerating economic growth and structure in India during the period 1960-1970. Influenced by "mimetic nationalism" (defined as a process of defensive copying by a post-colonial society "to provide the nation with all those types of property, and those skills, that will serve to defend it against those developed countries whose domination is feared", *ibid.*, *op. cit.*:21), the state assumes the role of a leading agent of capital accumulation characterised by an overriding concern with industrialisation, especially heavy industrialisation and use of massive import protection. The reason for this form of direction and emphasis is provided by Sender and Smith (1986:68): "The historical evidence suggests that, given an international context in which advanced and backward capitalist economies coexist, rapid and sustained accumulation in backward areas has required a variety of forms of *state intervention*". (Italics added). The state, through state planning, implementation and central coordination, is assumed to be able to play a crucial, perhaps a critical, role in accelerating economic development in an underdeveloped economy.

Conceptually, IRDPs entailed interventions on rural poverty

across a wide front through, first, increased agricultural output and productivity and second, provision of basic social and economic infrastructures such as schooling, rural health facilities and water supplies, rural roads, transport and communication systems, etc. Further, the IRDPs' objectives included increasing personal incomes of the target populations and improving their levels of living through the eradication of illiteracy, elimination of preventable diseases and malnutrition through increased food production and improved quality.

In contrast to the earlier conceptualisation of 'development', the IRDPs had a wide-ranging perception of 'development'. As Robert McNamara, the former President of the World Bank, so eloquently put it, "Development is about people. The only criterion for measuring its ultimate success or failure is what it does to enhance the lives of individual human beings....The truth is that poverty in the developing world is an intolerable assault on human dignity and decency. Malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, unemployment and early death pervade these vast populations [of the countries of the Third World]. If development cannot alter that situation, development will have failed" (McNamara, 1973:8,op.cit). That development had taken on a broader perspective is evident from this quotation.

The 1970s witnessed the emergence of the IRDPs as multi-sectoral and multi-faceted programmes or projects with national or areal (subnational) objectives. Encompassed within IRDPs were increased agricultural productivity and output, increased employment opportunities leading to higher incomes for the rural people, minimum acceptable levels of food and nutrition, housing, schooling and health

care and sanitation.² In addition, the terms of trade within a developing country needed to be improved in favour of the rural sector as a way of providing incentives and halting or reducing the surplus flight to the urban-based development.

Implicit in this new context of rural development theory is the imperative of national commitment, integration and coordination of rural development interventions, adequate regional and/or area planning and effective local-level institutions for organisation and popular participation in the planning and implementation processes. Experience indicates that a strong commitment to rural development at the national level is an indispensable prerequisite in order to achieve the stated objectives and their impacts (United Nations, 1971; World Bank, 1975; Lele, 1975 and Lipton, 1977). Often times, macroeconomic policies and interventions are biased against agriculture and rural development and, hence, inimical to the achievement of the the IRDP objectives. For example, pricing policies, which favour the urban and/or manufacturing sector and keep food prices low in the urban areas, work against agriculture and rural development; in longer, therefore, they also work against industrialisation.

Furthermore, the need for strong coordination and integration of rural development interventions at the local level is recognised as both desirable and necessary so as to give unity of purpose, forward and backward linkages and to minimise duplication and wastage of scarce resources. Implicit in this assertion is the requirement to create and maintain decentralised administrative institutions and

organisations which permit and sustain flexibility, area specificity and popular participation in planning and implementation IRDPs (Rondinelli, 1981; Conyers, 1981, 1982 and 1983; Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983).

For Tanzania, integrated rural development planning and implementation took off after the launching of the decentralisation of the government administrative machinery (see Chapter 4). Therefore, in setting about M&E of IRD plans for the regions of Tanzania, it has been considered necessary to give particular weight to project design, planning methodologies, formulation of project objectives and their internal logic and appropriateness, implementation approaches in order to determine their achievements, shortcomings and impact.

2.2.3 Tanzanian Agricultural Development

It is apposite to make brief remarks about Tanzanian agricultural development and the process of peasantisation and commoditisation of the rural economy. A brief survey of the state of Tanzanian agriculture (covering the period 1976-86) is presented in Chapter 4 (pp. 128-34) for contextual purposes for the chapters that follow. The aim here is to provide an historical perspective in order for the process of peasant differentiation in the country and its relation to regional development efforts. Iliffe (1971 and 1979) has shown how the introduction of cash crop production - especially of coffee - in the mountain areas of Tanzania (Kilimanjaro, Meru in Arusha, Bukoba, Rungwe and Mbinga (see Map 1.1, p. 2, for

location of these areas) has gradually led to the transformation of African 'subsistence producers' into 'peasants' (see Appendix A for definitions of these concepts). Iliffe (1979:273) notes that in sub-Saharan Africa capitalism and peasant societies evolved simultaneously; the emergence of rural capitalism has brought about the differentiation of the Tanganyikan people and has made some of them peasants.² This process took place not only in areas with dominant cash-crop growing, but also in food-crop growing parts of the country so that Iliffe (1979:313) talks about infinite possibilities of positions to be occupied by the "capitalist rice growers of Ujiji, Ngindo river valleys and Nyamwezi groundnut producers and Makonde manioc traders". In addition, cattle sales for cash enabled the owners to accumulate money capital and thus command resources which made them a distinct category.

Peasant differentiation has been documented in various parts of the country by various writers of the Tanzanian scene (Cliffe and Saul, 1972; Cliffe *et al*, 1975; Sender, 1973; Feierman, 1974; Raikes, 1978; Fleuret, 1978; von Freyhold, 1979, Thompson, 1984 and Collier, Radwan and Wangwe, 1986). Some of these analyses have focused on explaining the process of stratification of the rural people and have suggested the emerging of class categories such as 'rich peasants' or 'kulaks', 'middle' and 'poor peasants' and even 'landless peasants' (see, for example, Iliffe, 1979; Raikes, 1978 and also 1986; von Freyhold, 1979). In particular, Raikes (1978) and von Freyhold (1979) have attempted to explicate the inter-relationships between the state and peasant communities with the view of establishing how state

policies have directly or indirectly assisted the rural differentiation and the emergence of the 'rich' peasantry. They both identify antagonism between the state and the peasantry and claim that state-induced agricultural modernisation interventions (such as agricultural extension and research, and provision of inputs and credit) have benefited the rich peasants.

Bernstein (1981) rejects the contemporary view of the existence of a disparate peasant mode of production which may be articulated to the capitalist mode of production. He introduces the notion of 'the simple reproduction squeeze' (a process in which peasants, since they have to produce for their livelihoods and for the reproduction of their means of producing their livelihoods - i.e. the requirements of simple reproduction - and not for obtaining 'profits', may be forced to continue producing in conditions in which capitalist firms will become bankrupt for lack of sufficient returns to investment. With this notion Bernstein postulates that peasants are 'disguised proletarians' - wage equivalents - because capitalists exercise considerable control over what is produced and how it is produced and eventually appropriate so much of the produce of the peasant households, leaving them only a token, an equivalent of a pittance.

Raikes (in Boesen *et al.*, 1986:105) rejects Hyden's (1980) notion of 'uncaptured peasantry', which means the peasants exercise an 'exit option' from the peasant economy to the subsistence economy, on grounds of incorrect premise. He contends that, although peasants have withdrawn from the official markets, they have resorted to unofficial markets and that this is not a voluntary decision. Although during the

period 1970-85 marketing of cash crops was dominated by the parastatals (each cash crop has its own parastatal) marketing of food crops has been problematic, because only one parastatal - the NMC - was responsible. Given the size of the country and the reality that the food-surplus regions are in the border areas, compounded by the fact that the markets are in the urban areas, especially Dar es Salaam, and the presence of transport bottlenecks, not to mention bureaucratic inefficiency and inertia, in some parts of the country the unofficial markets are often the only means by which the peasant producers earn cash.

The study by Collier, Radwan and Wangwe (1986:128), which is the most up to date, has this important summary: "Taken as a whole, Tanzania possesses a very thin, undiversified rural economy. Subsistence production remains a very large share of total activity ... and employment is dominated by peasant crop production". Although Collier *et al* have found that the Tanzanian rural economy is differentiated with considerable amount of inequality among peasant households, they also suggest that "the number of kulaks in Tanzania is negligible" (1986:132, *op. cit.*). Moreover, Collier *et al* state that there is no landlessness in Tanzania (*ibid.*, see Chapter 3). This, perhaps, requires one to use the terms 'rural capitalists', 'kulaks', etc more rigorously in the discussion of rural development in Tanzania. Thus the frequent use of the term 'peasants' in the present study should not be construed to endorse a stance of a homogeneous, undifferentiated Tanzanian peasantry. Nonetheless, one cannot resist noticing some exaggeration of rural stratification in some of these

writings (see, for example, Raikes, 1978 and 1986; Iliffe, 1979).

The study does recognise the existence of classes in both the rural and urban sectors in Tanzania, although the focus is mainly to seek understanding of the planning methodologies and implementation of three RIDEPs as the vogue method of rural intervention in Tanzania during the past sixteen years and its efficacy and usefulness as a *conduit* for rural change in a low-income country. Whether Tanzania's development strategy is a socialist, neo-populist or capitalist one, the role of external assistance in the rural sector is significant and it is imperative to attempt to understand its effectiveness and develop methods for this purpose.

Before closing this subsection mention should be made regarding the notable efforts of Michael Collinson (1972, 1981 and 1982) on farming systems approach. Collinson had attempted to expand his understanding of the dynamics of cotton peasant production in the Lake Victoria regions in Tanzania and came out with the concept of the farming systems research as a new approach in conducting and managing agricultural research and development relevant to small-scale farmers.

In Southern and Eastern Africa the farming systems approach has become the vogue for undertaking agricultural and rural development research and development during the past two decades and is adequately documented (see, for example, Gilbert *et al.*, 1980; Norman *et al.*, 1982; Low, 1986:167-78; Sutherland, 1987:7-16). Low (1986:167) summarises the aims of the farming systems research thus:-

- (i) To understand farmer's circumstances:
- (ii) To generate hypotheses about how farm productivity can best be improved in the near term given these

- circumstances and current knowledge;
- (iii) To design and test technologies based on these hypotheses on farmers' fields, and
 - (iv) To direct station research towards more relevant programmes if technical information is lacking.

In essence, this entails taking the peasant/farmer family or household as the starting point for agricultural and rural development research and for the design and development of appropriate rural technologies. Thus, in recognising the significant role of and adopting the farming systems approach, one accepts "the principle of an essentially qualitative and 'bottom-up' approach to developing research priorities and testing technologies" (Sutherland, 1987:15, op. cit.). Needless to add here that the bottom-up approach is one of the key elements in the realisation of popular participation in decision-making. This subject is pursued in the next subsection.

It is important to note that the farming systems approach presupposes an existence of homogeneous smallholder farming communities. One needs, therefore, to be wary of its applicability in conditions, in which the rural producers are differentiated into social and economic classes. In such a situation, conflicting interests and power relations are bound to constrain the efficacy of this approach.

2.2.4 Regional Planning and Popular Participation

Two further approaches of importance for Tanzania need to be considered: regional planning and popular participation. There is now

an enormous body of literature on regional planning (see, for example, Friedmann and Alonso, 1964 and 1975; Friedmann and Weaver, 1979; McLoughlin, 1969; Hall, 1970; Alden and Morgan, 1974; Stohr and Todtling, 1977; Stohr and Taylor, 1981; Hansen, 1978; van Staveren and van Dusseldorp, 1980; Gore, 1984; Riddell, 1985 and Dewar, Todes and Watson, 1986).

Regional planning emerged in Western Europe and North America in the 1920s and 1930s as a tool of dealing with development problems of special areas or regions such as Ruhrsiedlungsverband of Germany, the Special Areas Policy of Great Britain and The Tennessee Valley Authority of the USA (Stohr and Todtling in Hansen, 1978:85). However, in the 1950s and 1960s regional planning was called upon to address the problem of regional disparities of living levels of the Western European countries and USA (*ibid.*; also see Friedmann and Alonso (eds.), 1964, Glasson, 1974; Moseley, 1974; Richardson, 1978 and Friedmann and Weaver, 1979). In other words, the main purpose of regional development policies for these countries was restructuring of industry and new town development to enable diffusion or trickle-down of growth from highly developed core regions (in this sense, urban/industrial centres) to less developed peripheral areas. The standard theoretical premise was neoclassical economics which had it that peripheral areas through the market mechanism would benefit from core regions' growth through diffusion and spillovers. Stohr and Todtling (1978) hold the view that the market mechanism alone is inadequate in dealing with the problem of regional disparities in these countries and call for state intervention to complement it.

In the Third World regional/area planning emerged from the recognition that national development planning is somewhat constrained in its capacity to deal with the issues of regional/area distribution of economic activity in general and rural/agricultural development in particular. In a way, a similar pattern of core-peripheral relationships as observed in the West prevailed in the Developing World. The regional and/or area development approach is not a substitute for national economic and social development planning. Given the fact that the poor in most LDCs are found in the rural areas, national development planning models invariably bypass them, thus leaving them unaffected by the benefits accruing from national development efforts of the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s. Piore (in Kuklinski (ed.), 1975:322) asserts "the aim of regional planning is to organise geographical space in such a way that people living in it can develop their natural endowment, both biological and cultural, to its full dimensions".

These concerns brought about in the 1970s elevated interest in regional planning and an area development approach, whose main thrust are (1) specificity of economic activity for a particular area or region and (2) inter-regional allocation of development resources (Belshaw and Douglass, 1981; Conyers, 1986). This model takes account of differences in resource endowments, agroecological specificities, popular participation and the need for interdisciplinarity in grappling with development problems facing rural people. Accordingly, this strategy has several variants, some of which include (i) agroecological and resource endowment differences approach, (ii)

popular participation approach, (iii) project approach (especially popular with the World Bank) and (iv) integrated area-focused rural development approach, which, as noted, became a vogue in the 1970s. Clearly, the first variant has agricultural, land-use planning and environmental concerns at heart for both efficiency and resource-conservation reasons, whereas popular participation has both economic (efficiency) and equity (Lipton, 1977) and political significance (it is a birth right that the people should be involved in decision-making on matters pertaining to their wellbeing; see, for example, Chambers, 1974 and 1983; Cohen and Uphoff, 1980; Conyers, 1982; Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983 and also see the following page).

Stohr asserts that regional planning in the Developing World is a top-down affair and insists on the need for bottom-up planning which has in-built mechanisms for popular participation (Stohr in Stohr and Taylor (eds.), 1981:39-72). He observes that "a new development 'from below' ... can transform the past sectoral and spatial patterns of development 'from above' to incorporate elements of development 'from below' and thereby reduce existing social and spatial disparities in level of development. ... Development 'from below' means the instituting of a diversity of structural objectives and transition paths ... *with the broadest possible participation of the respective communities*" (*ibid.*:61) (Italics added).

Although Cohen and Uphoff (1980:214-5) trace the origins of popular participation to Aristotle's Greece, increased interest and commitment to this element in development planning is a significant feature of the 1970s (see ILO, 1976; Ghai *et al.*, 1977 and Lisk,

1985). Popular participation is considered a crucial prerequisite for achieving the goals and objectives of economic and social development. Specifically, popular participation is necessary because (1) it would arouse the people's commitment and personal identification to development programmes/projects, (2) it would enable the obtaining of information on local conditions, needs and attitudes which are conducive to effective implementation and achievement of the stated goals and objectives of the programmes/projects, and (3) it is a basic right of the people to be democratically involved in the decision-making processes. For the proponents of the basic needs approach, popular participation is regarded as intrinsic to national and regional development.

Many writers accept the need and existence of institutional framework for participatory decision-making is critical for the practice and flourishing of popular participation of the broad mass of the population (Chambers, 1974 and 1983; Conyers, 1982; Cohen and Uphoff, 1980 and Lisk, 1985). Conyers (1982:103) identifies five components of the institutional framework for popular participation: (i) local consultation and surveys, (ii) use of extension staff, (iii) decentralised planning, (iv) local government and (v) community development. To this list one may add various people's organisations such as cooperatives, ujamaa villages, kolkhozes and communes.

For the purposes of this study the existence and use of democratically established institutions such as village assembly, village council, the district councils, etc is of critical

significance for the practice and sustenance of popular participation in decision-making. In the Tanzanian context this institutional framework does exist (ILO, 1982; Freedman in Lisk (ed.), 1985:127-47).

2.3 The Theoretical Underpinnings of Evaluation

In this section the discussion will centre on the origins of monitoring and evaluation, their aims, purposes, methods and functions, and application in agricultural and rural development projects and programmes. In particular, the discussion will concentrate on evaluation because this is the core methodology of the present study. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) are concepts which are strongly related to each other. However, these two concepts are also discrete and it is pertinent that this should be demonstrated clearly for purposes of clarity and appreciation of their distinct roles. Further, this distinction is particularly significant for this study as its primary focus is an evaluation of activities in the three integrated rural development projects in Tanzania.

As Belshaw (1982:4) noted "Renewed debate over the distinction between 'monitoring' and 'evaluation' appears likely with the appearance of the FAO volume of monitoring case-studies (Clayton and Petry, 1981)". Thus it is evident that these concepts have different meanings for different people. Hence it is imperative that their conceptualisation is examined here to indicate how they are defined for this study. This will be done in the first subsection, which will also analyse the origins of monitoring and evaluation as a

discipline and evaluation as one of its two components. The second subsection will provide a background review on the methodological foundations of evaluation and their practice, problems and prospects.

This discussion is to lay the groundwork for the chapters that follow, especially Chapter 3 which describes the methodology of the study. Finally, a description of criteria and preconditions of evaluation will be presented in order to establish that there are difficulties facing an evaluator in undertaking evaluative tasks in Third World settings, especially in ex-post evaluations.

2.3.1 The Disparate Origins of Evaluation

Monitoring and Evaluation as a branch of the applied social sciences has a relatively recent origin. Nonetheless, it should be noted that monitoring is as old as management (UN ACC Task Force, 1984:1). The proliferation of social and economic development programmes/projects in the many countries of the developing world during the first two decades after the Second World War was a logical outcome of humankind's concern to overcome the daunting problems of poverty, hunger, malnutrition, ignorance and preventable diseases. The sponsoring agencies/countries were optimistic that implementation of such programmes/projects would bring about the intended benefits.

Some benefits were gained as a result of the implementation of the programmes and projects, but some failures have also been documented, causing disquiet among the international community, especially among the donors. These failures have been blamed, among

other reasons on insufficient knowledge of designing, appraisal, monitoring and evaluation of these programmes and projects (Kulp, 1970; Belshaw and Chambers, 1973; Lele, 1975; Bachrach, 1976; Imboden, 1978; Patton, 1978; Clayton and Petry, 1981; Johnston and Clark, 1982).

Diagnostic analyses of implementation processes of the various agricultural and rural development programmes and projects in the developing countries revealed that poor and inadequate management was, at least in part, to blame for their poor implementation and performance. Improved management was considered the required solution of these implementation problems (see for example Hunter, Bunting and Bottrall in Hunter *et al*, 1976, *passim*; Chambers, 1974). Of further interest is the assertion by Yudelman (*ibid*:26), then Director of the Agriculture and Rural Development Department of the World Bank, that "The most widespread problem (facing the implementation of agricultural and rural development programmes and projects) is ... management" and proceeded to single out Africa as the area with the most serious implementation problems in the developing world.

The search for solutions of these problems resulted in the late 1960s and early 1970s in increased interest in the design, establishment of monitoring and evaluation activities (see 'Glossary of Terms' - Appendix A - for the definitions of these concepts and also below for further elaboration). Monitoring and evaluation activities became part and parcel of agricultural and rural development programmes and projects funded by international donors. The World Bank was (and is) particularly insistent that projects

funded by it should incorporate M&E activities. In this way, it was hoped that the M&E activities would furnish project managements, national governments (recipients) and funding agencies or countries, including the Bank, with the necessary and relevant information on the operation, performance and impact of the the programmes/projects. Such information would enable managers, experts and national governments' officials and donor agency administrators improve the planning, management and implementation of agricultural and rural development projects (World Bank, 1975:4; Imboden, 1978:23-4 and 1980:9; Clayton and Petry, 1981:2; Deboeck and Kinsey, 1980:iv).

Although we have indicated in the glossary of operational definitions (Appendix A), the commonly used definitions, especially in the UN system and in the World Bank, it is pertinent to elaborate on those techniques which have been selected for use in this study. Monitoring is a process during which information is garnered to enable management to improve the implementation process. In other words, monitoring is concerned with technical efficiency of the project or programme. It enables management to ensure that the short-term objectives and targets of the project are being achieved or are likely to be achieved and hence remove bottlenecks in the way of successful implementation. Monitoring is thus an internal activity undertaken to improve management of a project. Key elements embraced under monitoring include operation and performance of the project, that is the relationship between inputs and outputs. In fact, in the literature invariably one finds, for reasons of brevity and accuracy, the definition that "monitoring is an information system for

management decision-making" (Clayton, in Clayton and Petry, 1983:2 (rev.edn.))

This concern for information for monitoring and evaluation has led Deboeck and Kinsey (1980:iv) to report: "Workshop participants suggested a hierarchy of users, with project-level users ranking highest in priority, national- or regional-level users intermediate, and donor agencies lowest."⁴ However, using a different criterion (interest as opposed to need or value), Imboden (1980:32-3) observed that "too often the donor institution is the most interested party in the establishment of an information system."⁴ Prioritisation of information audiences apart, the critical issue must be that information is necessary, if monitoring and evaluation are to be effective. In fact, information collected by monitoring activities is the critical input in evaluative processes.

Evaluation is, as noted above, a periodic assessment of the performance, efficiency and impact of a project in the light of its stated objectives. Evaluation is essentially concerned with pinpointing the relationships between outputs, effects and impact. Imboden (1978:130) identifies seven types of evaluation, namely (i) accounting and auditing, (ii) programme/project reporting system, (iii) monitoring, (iv) process evaluation or ongoing evaluation, (v) implementation or terminal evaluation, (vi) impact evaluation or ex-post evaluation and (vii) evaluation research. Imboden further presents us with the purposes and users of each of these types of evaluation.

With increased interest in the monitoring and evaluation

activities, especially by the multilateral agencies (World Bank and the UN system agencies) in the late 1970s and early 1980s, these concepts have undergone refinement with the view of eliminating the confusion (UN ACC Task Force, 1984; Casley and Kumar, 1987). For example, Imboden's types of evaluation can be recategorised into two groups of monitoring and evaluation. Monitoring is viewed as being basically a management tool for gauging progress and performance of a programme/project and for problem-solving; it is thus preoccupied with efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation process. Whilst evaluation is concerned with the identification of the effects and impacts of the programmes or projects in reference to their objectives. Freeman *et al* (1979:16) note that "evaluation is designed to provide systematic, reliable and valid information on the conduct, impact and effectiveness of projects". This conception, however, refers to impact or ex-post evaluation and therefore, leaves out of account ongoing or continuous evaluation.

Ongoing evaluation (sometimes also known as process, developmental or formative evaluation) can be synonymous with continuous assessment of programme/project activities with a view to improving performance and efficacy of the programme/project, checking out deviations and putting it back on course (negative feedback), in order to achieve the intended objectives. In terms of purpose and/or function, ongoing evaluation is identical to monitoring. It is initiated and carried out by project management and staff and its results are used by them to determine validity and relevance of the project appraisal assumptions and hypotheses. It seeks to answer the

question: Why is it happening or why is it not happening? It is an internal management device for underpinning achievements or failures of a programme/project. Such information may also be used to falsify an assumption or hypothesis or even a project design and thus call for its re-examination, reformulation, modification or even replacement or abandonment (UN ACC Task Force, 1984:7; Casley and Kumar, 1987:100-1). In management terms, the value of ongoing evaluation hardly needs emphasising; its significance lies in its capability in

providing an early warning that an essential precondition for the project is being removed. These preconditions may have been rather easily assumed in the project appraisal report - favourable domestic terms of trade for producers, adequate recurrent expenditure, qualified nationals in post adequate fuel supplies, maintenance of physical infrastructure (power, roads, bridges, processing plant, etc.). Schedules to monitor inadequacies in these areas - and detecting the approach to critical limits - are important, especially as the effect of several major projects sending up warning signals together may be the most effective way of alerting central decision-makers that policy changes or reversals are necessary (Belshaw, 1986:3).

Implementation evaluation is regarded as a discrete evaluative activity from ongoing evaluation. Its concern is to examine the extent of actual implementation in the light of project assumptions as formulated at appraisal. The purpose of the implementation evaluation is to determine the content of the project assumptions, without which it is not possible to attribute accomplishments or non-accomplishments. In the circumstances, the non-accomplishments of the project may be a result of "either it did not activate the 'causal process' that would have culminated in the goals - this is a failure

of the programme - or it may have set the presumed 'causal process' in motion but the process did not 'cause' the desired effects - this is a failure of theory" (Bachrach in Miller, ed., 1980:60, quoting Weiss, 1972:38).

Terminal evaluation is undertaken at the end of project/programme implementation to assess the initial outputs, effects and impacts of a project/programme. Ex-post evaluation, which is sometimes called impact evaluation, is an evaluative activity undertaken after several years have elapsed since project completion when effects and impacts are expected to be fully realised. Casley and Kumar (1987:109) go further in their definition of ex-post evaluation by ascribing a time horizon when such an activity should be undertaken: "*Ex-post* evaluations are designed as in-depth studies of the impact of an intervention, usually after five to ten years after completion of its funded, implementation phase". (Italics in the original; emphasis ours). The significance of this stipulation is to be found in the fact that impacts are usually realisable and visible well after project or programme completion. Specifically, ex-post evaluation aims at:

- identifying whether stated goals have been achieved;
- attributing the identified effects and impacts to the project/programme;
- determining the conditions under which the project/programme is most effective, and
- underpinning any unanticipated consequences or side effects and/or impacts as a result of the implementation of the project/programme.

Impact or ex-post evaluation attempts to answer the question: What happened and why did it happen. Ex-post evaluation is an aide of decision-makers and planners rather than of project management. In any

case, by the time it is mounted and completed, it is more than likely that the project staff have moved to somewhere else as the project would have been wound up. Thus, the main purpose and function of an ex-post evaluation is to glean information and experiences to improve future planning and implementation.

Evaluation research or summative evaluation is a scientifically based evaluative activity and it is undertaken to provide definitive information about the value of a given policy intervention. Evaluative research and impact/ex-post evaluation address the same questions, but they may differ in methodology and hence the degree of confidence one can put into the results of the evaluation activity.

Nott (1983:17) asserts that M&E is in essence a "combination of planning-programming-budgeting system (PPBS) and management by objectives (MbO)" which emerged in the United States as strategies to maintain control of the state apparatus and of civil society in which capitalist accumulation has taken place".⁶ The implication of this assertion is in the need to locate any examination of M&E purposes and functions within the context of a particular political economy and ideological persuasion. Consequently, one can understand and appreciate better their uses and limitations given a particular environment, in which M&E are applied. Undoubtedly, this assertion is correct and Tanzanian evaluation studies must be aware of the development philosophy of the nation (see Chapter 4).

In the literature there is clearly a preponderance of analyses which are simply concerned with monitoring and evaluation as mechanisms for improving planning, management and implementation

processes (see, for example, Belshaw and Chambers, 1973; Chambers, 1974; Clayton and Petry, 1983 (rev.edn.):1-9; Conyers and Hills, 1984:169-75). In fact, early concerns of M&E concentrated on designing methods and techniques for improving planning, management and implementation of agricultural and rural development projects whatever the political and ideological persuasion.

Belshaw and Chambers (1973) drawing from the experiences of Kulp (1970) and Chadwick (1971), developed an approach, the **programming and implementation management system (PIM)**, which emphasises programming, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of rural development programmes and projects. PIM was based on the *systems analysis* approach to rural development and describes procedures for improving the project management and implementation and the planning process itself. Belshaw and Chambers (1973:1-4) describe this as flawed and needing correction and improvement. PIM clearly elevated the role of **management** of rural development projects and programmes.

This concern for improved management led to increased interest in monitoring and evaluation activities which in turn necessitated information gathering. Information is an essential requirement in decision-making processes at whatever level of the bureaucratic hierarchy. In the literature several ways of gathering this information are identified. For example, Chambers (1978:24) suggests nine activities which can be used to collect information for monitoring and evaluation. These are as follows:

- (i) Self evaluation;
- (ii) Key indicator identification;
- (iii) Before-and-after indicator surveys -- won't pick up

- unanticipated effects. Use informal investigation to assess relationships between outputs and impacts;
- (iv) routine reporting -- cannot be expected to include impact;
 - (v) Project/programme review -- the UN system;
 - (vi) Informal investigation -- sensitive and perceptive exploration together with the rural people;
 - (vii) Ad hoc specialist survey;
 - (viii) Evaluation research;
 - (ix) Ex-post evaluation, and
 - (x) Rapid Rural Appraisal and the use of indigenous technical knowledge and indigenous knowledge systems.

Chambers insists on the need to develop and disseminate methods and techniques for informal investigation. The reason for this is that in agricultural and rural development projects/programmes, resources - both human and physical - are scarce, and their judicious use, to achieve maximum benefit is of prime importance to all those concerned.

In concluding this brief review of M&E information needs, it should be emphasised that their design and configuration should take account of management needs (Imboden, 1978: 131).

Patton (1978:16) has noted that two factors necessitate evaluation: "First, there is not enough money to do all the things that need doing; and secondly, the realisation that even if there was enough money, it takes more than money to solve complex human and social problems". The evidence from the LDCs has demonstrated the validity and relevance of this quotation. For example, increased inequality and impoverishment of the poor and the disadvantaged in the face of increased investments and "economic growth" have raised more questions than answers. Evaluation has been called upon not only to grapple with the problem of cost-effectiveness of projects and programmes, but also to determine their relevance, efficacy in realising the planned objectives and their effects and impacts on the

target population (Casley and Lury, 1982:20).

In Tanzania institution-building for M&E activities is in its infancy. John Semwaiko (undated:1), then Commissioner for Planning and Control in the Prime Minister's Office, stated: "The historical background of monitoring and evaluation in Tanzania indicates that *very little* has been done in this field". (Italics ours). One also finds a similar type of information in another document (PMO, 1984:128). However, monitoring activities in the form of accounting, auditing, reporting (monthly, quarterly or annually) and project appraisal are quite common. This does not imply that their quality is impeccable. But they have become institutionalised in the planning and implementation procedures and mechanisms of the Tanzanian bureaucracy. The same cannot, however, be said of evaluation activities, especially ex-post evaluative activities. Belshaw (1982:292) had noted this and proposes a "full *ex-post* evaluation" of each RIDEP to determine the influence of donor-supplied inputs in the regional economies of those regions which have received such assistance. The donor agencies have carried out their own evaluations, usually *mid-term* or even *terminal* evaluations which have been used to influence their decision to continue or discontinue their support of the RIDEPs.⁷

It is, therefore, little wonder that the regional planning officers and planning experts from PMO meeting in Arusha in May 1984 (PMO, 1984:128-9) lamented the lack of official commitment to M&E activities in the country and recommended in their resolutions the institutionalisation of evaluation of projects, including RIDEP, in order to gauge their effects and impacts with reference to the stated

objectives. Presumably, such a measure would have an important impact on the country's planning and implementation mechanisms.

Since RIDEPS are multi-sectoral and multi-dimensional projects with multi-purpose objectives for diverse target groups, the scope of an evaluative activity should take into consideration not only the traditional economic concerns of social rate of return, but also social and political benefits whose cumulative effects are *pari passu* necessary because RIDEPS aim at achieving improved quality of life of the rural people.

The experience gathered over the years has indicated that project/programme effects and impacts take a much longer time to be realised than previously expected (UN ACC Task Force, 1984:33; Casley and Kumar, 1987:109). This realisation makes a strong case for undertaking ex-post evaluation studies in order to capture such project outcomes, whether intended or unintended, which would not normally be obvious during terminal evaluations. Casley and Kumar state, in support of ex-post evaluation activities, that "much of the lasting impact will not be visible at the time the project comes to an end" and "such impact as is detected at the time of the terminal evaluation might prove to be transitory" (*ibid.*, *op. cit.*). The information and experience gleaned during an ex-post evaluations will be useful in learning from our past mistakes and shortcomings with a view for future replanning and redesigning of rural and agricultural development projects and programmes. Planning experience in Tanzania reveals an unfortunate phenomenon of repeating the same mistakes (PMO, 1984).

Under these circumstances, an even stronger case prevails for ongoing or continuous evaluation as a means of eradicating or countering mistakes before the end of the project implementation process. Removing bottlenecks facing a project might thus set it back on course again and facilitate the achievement of the planned objectives. Further, such a measure may prevent wastage of scarce resources, let alone save everyone concerned from unnecessary inconvenience and/or hardship which might result from a failed project or programme. As we shall see in Chapter 5, some of the difficulties that were encountered in the course of the Kigoma RIDEP could have been alleviated or ameliorated had the ongoing evaluation or even the supervisory inspections functioned properly as envisaged in the plan document. This further underscores the significant role of ongoing evaluation as a management tool. Ex-post evaluation is more important as a planning aide because it evokes lesson-learning, particularly from failed projects (falsified hypotheses) (Belshaw, 1986).

2.3.2 Methodological Background of Evaluation

The purpose of this section is to show the existence of several methods of evaluation and why it is necessary to choose the methods which are appropriate in a low-income country such as Tanzania.

In the literature on evaluation it is possible to discern several components of evaluation methods (see, for example, Lichfield, 1970; Lichfield *et al.*, 1975; Alden and Morgan, 1974; Imboden, 1978; Casley

and Lury, 1982; Nott, 1983; Conyers and Hills, 1984). These include:-

- (i) Check-list of criteria;
- (ii) Financial investment analysis;
- (iii) Goals achievement analysis;
- (iv) Cost-minimisation analysis;
- (v) Social cost-benefit analysis;
- (vi) Planning balance sheet analysis;
- (vii) Planning-programming-budgeting system;
- (viii) Optimisation technique;
- (ix) Management by objective technique;
- (x) Before and after comparison method;
- (xi) With and without comparison, either between two groups or with a national alternative group;
- (xii) Case studies/village surveys and
- (xiii) Evaluative research.

Most of these methods are used or have a wider applicability in project appraisal than in evaluation (especially ex-post evaluation) such as (i) - (viii). With the exception of (x) and (xi), and perhaps (xiii) these methods can be considered as sophisticated and usually requiring computerised facilities and expertise. Since the method - social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA) - has significance in both project appraisal (*ex-ante* evaluation) and evaluation (*ex-post*) activities, although with greater preponderance in the former than in the latter, some discussion is pertinent here.

There is an enormous literature on cost-benefit analysis (CBA) or SCBA (see, for example, UNIDO, 1972; Little and Mirrlees, 1974; Squire and van der Tak, 1975; Mishan, 1972; Dasgupta and Pearce, 1972; Irvin, 1978 and Conyers and Hills, 1984). CBA has roots in financial analysis to which a private entrepreneur resorts in making a choice of a most profitable investment from several projects. CBA assesses costs and benefits of alternative investments and thus determines which one is

the most profitable: "If benefits exceed costs ..., the project is acceptable; if not, the project should be rejected" (Squire and van der Tak, 1975:4, op. cit.). The difference between CBA and SCBA is that the latter evaluates costs and benefits (social costs and benefits) of a project as they affect society. CBA is concerned with profitability of an individual project as seen by the private investor.

This method has its origin in the USA, where in the 1930s it was used in the evaluation of water resource development projects. The SCBA method can be used for comparison of alternative projects within single sectors as well as among many sectors. Moreover, it may be used to facilitate choice between alternative ways of carrying out a particular project or among many independent projects competing for a limited amount of resources.

SCBA seeks to measure benefits and costs on the basis of preferences of the individuals of a community or society who are affected by plans or projects to be implemented. Benefits and costs become gains and losses or advantages and disadvantages of every member of the community/society who are going to be affected by such plans/projects. To this end, it is necessary to follow these steps:

- defining the project;
- identifying and measuring costs and benefits;
- placing monetary values on costs and benefits;
- discounting of costs and benefits over the life-span of the project;
- presentation of the results of the analysis.
(Conyers and Hills, 1984:135-6, op. cit.).

The calculation of financial/accounting costs and opportunity

costs (the use of resources in one project means benefits forgone in another; opportunity cost arises because resources are limited in relations to needs) entails resorting to the use of shadow or *accounting* (to use the Little-Mirrlees terminology) prices. "Whether or not the profitability of any investment, whose output has a market, is a reliable measure of its contribution depends on how well prices reflect social costs and benefits. Where they do not do so, ... [that is] they are 'distorted', then social or 'accounting' prices which better reflect social costs and benefits should be estimated - by making adjustments to market prices" (Little and Mirrlees, 1974:66, *op. cit.*). These authors do not consider social income of a project (i.e. the net increase in output of the economy which the project has brought about) as a sufficient measure of the project's value to society: "... we must consider the use to which the social income is put. ... The social income will be corrected to allow for the disadvantages of being committed to consumption by particular income groups" (*ibid.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-4). Little and Mirrlees suggest the use of a *numeraire* - a unit of account - to "measure all commodities in terms of *uncommitted social income, measured in terms of convertible foreign exchange*" (*ibid.*:145). (Italics in the original). Their notion of the unit of foreign exchange does not have to be dollars or any other foreign currency; it can be the domestic currency, but the values recorded are expressed in foreign exchange equivalent, say, Tanzanian shillings.

The same view is outlined by Squire and van der Tak who determine the value of inputs and outputs of a projects not only in terms of

technical and behavioural considerations, but also according to value judgements by the government:

"Shadow prices are here defined as the value of the contribution to the country's basic socio-economic objectives made by any marginal change in the availability of commodities or factors of production. ... Any changes in objectives or constraints will therefore necessitate a change in the estimated shadow prices. ... Thus the process of shadow pricing presupposes a clear understanding of the country's objectives and their interrelations so that the marginal changes can be evaluated; and secondly, a precise understanding of the constraints and policies that determine the country's development both now and in the future, and hence the existing or projected circumstances in which the marginal changes will occur" (*ibid.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 26, 49, *passim*).

In SCBA computations another key element, in addition to accounting prices, is the social rate of discount which is rate used in calculating the net present value (NPV) or present social value (PSV) (again to use the Little-Mirrlees terminology) of a time stream of project benefits and costs. The social rate of discount is sometimes called the "social time preference" denoting a "price" of time which is resorted to because "the main reason for discounting future consumption was the expectation that consumption per head would be higher in the future" (Little and Mirrlees, 1974:52, *op. cit.*). The present net value (NPV) is calculated as

$$NPV = \sum_t \frac{B_t - C_t}{(1+r)^t}$$

where B_t is the expected benefit of the project time t , C_t is the expected cost (both evaluated using shadow prices) and r is the social rate of discount. Social rates of discount are generally different

from market rates of interest (used by private entrepreneurs to determine profitability of investments) because they depend on the subjective evaluation attached to future net benefits: "the higher the future benefits and costs are valued in the government's planning scheme, the lower will be the social rate of discount" (Todaro, 1981:455, op. cit.).

Shadow prices and social rate of discount are the distinguishing features of SCBA from CBA and which give the former added ability to handle multiple objectives (for details of this particular line of analysis, see Scott, MacArthur and Newbery, 1976). Scott *et al's* study, which is significantly titled *Project Appraisal in Practice: The Little-Mirrlees method applied in Kenya*, attempted to estimate shadow prices or accounting prices with the view of determining the feasibility of the Settlements and a beef research station in Kenya. Thus the Scott *et al* study is essentially an appraisal (ex-ante evaluation) and not an ex-post evaluation one.

It is worth noting here too that SCBA faces a number of difficulties which have somewhat constrained its widespread application in low-income countries, especially in Tanzania. The most significant only are mentioned here. They include: (a) the problem of the definition of equilibrium prices, (b) the definition of welfare function, (c) the proposed goal hierarchy which is rooted on two fundamental goals and (d) the determination of the effects of a projects (for details, see Imboden, 1978:35-8). The estimation and calculation of shadow prices are loaded with difficulties as Conyers and Hills (1984:137) aptly state: "Methods of determining ... shadow

prices have become a major, and somewhat controversial, topic in the literature on CBA. Clearly there are major problems in Third World countries - such as calculating the opportunity cost (benefits forgone by using resources elsewhere) of a subsistence farmer's time and, more generally, calculating the opportunity cost of labour in areas of high unemployment or underemployment and where large numbers of people are not directly involved in the wage economy." The same difficulty is confronted when benefits are calculated (*ibid.*).

Similar difficulties facing the practice of SCBA have been observed by other writers as well (see, for example, Imboden, 1978:20-21; Elzinga, 1981 and Leff, 1983). In particular, Leff observes: "At best, SBCA is used to select projects in intra-sectoral competition that ensues after the key investment choices have in effect been made. In fact, in many developing countries, the contrast between prescriptive theory and actual practice is even starker. Little or no use is made of SBCA to select projects; and the designation of individual sectors for high priority is the major conceptual determination of investment choice" (*op. cit.*, pp.337-8). Moreover, Toye (1987:80) concludes: "In order to be determinate and applicable, social cost-benefit analysis has to be comprehensive; which it cannot be".

In the Tanzanian circumstances and, especially in a regional economy such as that of remote Kigoma, shadow pricing is more problematic because of there is a dearth of consumer goods and parallel markets are prevalent - these latter complicate the flow of marketing information. Although the Project Preparation and Monitoring

Bureau (PPMB), which is on technical assistance from FAO, of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development has recently introduced SCBA activities in the country, built mainly around shadow exchange rate (SER) computations, SCBA or CBA is not a standard project appraisal tool, let alone *ex-post* evaluation technique employed by the Tanzanian bureaucracy. Accordingly, the study did not include SCBA in its evaluation techniques because it is not a standard method in the Tanzanian bureaucracy. The critical issue here is one of focus and appropriateness.

The cost-effectiveness analysis owes its appeal as an evaluation (*ex-ante*) method to the fact that it is applied by people who are dissatisfied with the cost-benefit analysis method. The latter method is considered too dependent upon market prices being used as a guide of costs and benefits. The former method seeks to identify more effective ways of using resources to attain the stated objectives. Imboden (1978:38) notes that cost-effectiveness analysis "defines the efficiency of different input combinations to achieve a given goal or set of goals, if the goals are identified in an operational way so that the degree of goal achievement can be measured by a set of indicators". However, only costs are measured in monetary terms, whereas benefits are determined in form of measures of the plan or project effectiveness in attaining its stated objectives or targets. Cost-effectiveness analysis is also limited by the fact that it does not provide information about the desirability of goals (*ibid.*) or a full picture of resource implications of decisions on different investments (Conyers and Hills, 1984:138).

In the literature it is evident that not only evaluation of social programmes, but also agricultural and rural development projects or programmes, have encountered methodological difficulties (Carruthers and Clayton, 1977; Rutman, 1977; Patton, 1978; Casley and Lury, 1982; Nott, 1983; Casley and Kumar, 1987). For example, Carruthers and Clayton (1977:305) acknowledge this problem in these terms: "The methodology of evaluation needs improving but also there remain a number of unresolved problem areas."²⁶ One critical issue has been the choice of criteria for an evaluation to be undertaken, because "criteria set in relation to various goals are not inherently equal" (*ibid.*:309). A project/programme may be evaluated in order to determine its technical efficiency (economic and/or financial soundness), but also determine its impact on the target group. In such a situation of complexity, a simple method may not be able to capture multiple criteria. Agricultural and rural development projects are generally multi-purpose and multi-objective interventions which require evaluation based on multiple-criteria consideration.

2.3.3 The Choice of the Methodology of the Study

Implicit in the discussion in the foregoing paragraph is the need to make a choice of the methodology of this study. The methods chosen are (1) 'before and after' comparison and (2) 'with and without' comparison techniques appropriate for outputs, effects and impacts (see, for example, UN Task Force, 1984:32; Loft *et al.*, 1982; Bhattarai and Campbell in FAO, 1985:45-51); (3) a village sample survey is used

to gather information on popular participation and project impacts from the point of view of the project participants. The chosen research methodology is elaborated in Chapter 3. This choice of these methods is based on their simplicity and therefore, their appropriateness to the Tanzanian situation. Belshaw (1981:6) warns:

Crude tests, using broad-gauge indicators, of a large number of identified assumptions is (sic) likely to be more appropriate than the converse. Certainly an insistence that evaluation requires 'sophisticated methodologies ... and advanced computational facilities' (Slade, in Clayton and Petry, 1981; p. 41) runs the *risk of expensive and tardy feedback*. The use of data-economising techniques ... seems likely to be *attractive* for use in monitoring and evaluation procedures in a wide range of development institutions. (Italics ours).

The key element here is the need for appropriateness and simplicity of evaluation methods, especially in an economy such as that of Tanzania. The before and after comparison method entails, as the name suggests, comparing two sets of data, that is, baseline data and the data collected at the end of the project implementation or at the time of the ex-post evaluation study (e.g. Moseley and Townroe, 1981; Casley and Lury, 1982; Belshaw, 1984). The validity of the before and after comparison hinges on (1) the existence of baseline data as a benchmark of the 'before' situation and (2) no other factors besides those attributable to the project/programme have had an influence of the events. As Casley and Lury (1982:27) emphasise "a pre-implementation survey is ... essential, since this is the only way of ensuring that the 'before' situation measurement is not 'contaminated' by project effect". In the case of the RIDEPS under

study, the appraisal data are used as the benchmark with data gathered through documentary research (see Chapter 3) being used as the second generation data for comparison of the extent of the project's implementation achievements or non-achievements.

An essential problem in meeting the second prerequisite is the 'contamination' emanating from extraneous factors, to which the study RIDEPs have been subjected, such as national pricing policies, climatic conditions, the emergence and prevalence of parallel markets and normal public interventions by the regional authorities over and above the RIDEP activities. In coming to grips with these difficulties, it is essential that other techniques are brought in such as the 'logical framework' and *modus operandi* methods of analysis. The 'logical framework' (USAID, 1973, as quoted by Carruthers and Clayton, 1977:310) entails evaluating a project following a vertical progression thus:

If adequate *inputs* are provided, then planned *outputs* will be produced.
If these *outputs* are produced, then *purposes* (effects - UN) will be achieved.
If *purpose* is achieved, then a planned degree of progress (impact) toward a higher *goal* (objective) will occur. (Italics in the original).

Embedded in these statements above are hypotheses of causation i.e a 'model' of development. The explicit statement of this model and the verification of its construed suitability are usually overlooked (UNDTCD, 1983:44). An ex-post evaluation should endeavour to establish causation as an essential element for project attribution.

The essential condition of each of the italicised terms, as

Carruthers and Clayton have suggested, is an objectively verifiable indicator. For the RIDEPS under study, these indicators are present and include, in case of inputs, fertilisers, seeds and building materials and equipment, and outputs are agricultural produce, physical structures, such as classrooms, teachers houses, dispensaries, length of roads and number of bridges constructed, number of staff trained and recruited.

The *modus operandi* method is essentially based on the similar consideration as the 'logical framework' approach just discussed above. As Casley and Lury (1982:21) have observed: "Projects are planned and financed because there already exists a body of knowledge and experience indicating that certain activities can be expected to produce certain results ... they have a *modus operandi*. Evaluation ... is to establish whether these expectations have been realised in a particular case". Historians employ the *modus operandi* method to establish a sequence and attribute responsibility. The aim is to establish causal chains between output and effect and ultimately impact. Plausible causation becomes the basis for attribution.

There is a problem in establishing causality generally in the social science studies due to the difficulty of adhering to the scientific method as applied in the natural sciences. In any case, it is pertinent to appreciate what Patton tells us:

The purpose of the scientific method is to control for bias. Scientists struggle to be value-free, objective, and neutral. But such virtues are more believable in fairy tales than in real life. The fundamental assumption of ... evaluation is that there are no value-free alternatives. The issue is not one of avoiding bias, but rather one of making biases explicit and then deciding whose values and which biases will

prevail. Bias is inevitable; it is inherent in the very paradigms that undergird our theories and methods. Paradigms are deeply embedded in the socialization of adherents and practitioners: paradigms tell them what is important, legitimate, and reasonable (Patton, 1978:203).

This difficulty of establishing causality, has led to the resort for this study of another method of evaluation: 'with and without' analysis. This method is used, because of the problem of 'after' being not necessarily attributable to the project inputs as postulated in the before and after method. The with and without comparisons method, either between two groups or with a hypothesised with/without situation, attempts to identify causal linkages between project inputs, outputs, effects and impacts. The theoretical premise underlying this method is the comparison of results of "with project" and those of "without project" (e.g. UN ACC Task Force, 1984:32-3; Casley and Kumar, 1987:120-1). The with/without project method requires a "control" area or group comparable to the project area or group in order to make before and after comparisons of the changes taking place in them (UN ACC Task Force, 1984:32). The aim is to provide an explanation for the non-project-induced changes and for the influence of extraneous factors on the project area. In this study non-RIDEP villages were used as "control". Nonetheless, one needs to be aware of the problems encountered in a real world situation, in which for political, ethical and practical reasons it may not be possible to "keep out" some villagers or farmers of project area or benefits.²⁹

Sampling and sample surveys are resorted to when there is a need

to study large populations which are not easily manageable (e.g. problems of data availability, introducing or investigating complex questions), if they are taken as a whole. Data collection can be a really expensive undertaking. Sampling enables us to economise resources when collecting data and statistical information. The purpose of sampling is to make inferences from a sample to a population. Discussions on sampling and sample surveys can be found abundantly in the literature (e.g. Moser and Kalton, 1971; Casley and Lury, 1982; Scott, 1985; Conyers and Hills, 1984; Casley and Kumar, 1987). Casley and Kumar (1987:57-8) state:

Despite stubbornly held myths, sampling does not have to be complicated, time-consuming or expensive. The facts are:

- A sample does not necessarily have to be large to meet specified inferential requirements.
- A sample does not depend on the size of the population and therefore does not need to be any particular percentage of it.
- A sample can be drawn from as narrowly defined a group as is desired... and does not have to be drawn from an entire population.
- The size of the sample depends, first, on the variation within a population being tested (not on the population's size, except in a very limited case) and, second, on the desired level of confidence that the estimate is within a given margin of the value for the population. ... Larger populations thus do not necessarily require larger samples. Failure to understand this is the commonest reason for excessively large samples.

This stand is presumably an outcome of the concern caused by the very high demands made on resources by the conventional surveys. This statement does not imply that surveys are ruled out completely. Rather it emphasises the need for selecting appropriate size of survey

samples which takes account of both information economics and requirements. It is, however, considered that integrated rural development interventions need and make demand on the use of appropriate processes of data gathering, which are cost-effective, relevant, reliable and participatory. As Lipton and Moore (1972) have shown, village surveys are important instruments of data collection at the grassroots level and from project beneficiaries. Thus they emphasise the need for beneficiary participation in evaluative activities (see also Farrington and Martin (1988) for farmer participation in agricultural research activities).

Deboeck and Kinsey (1980:v) reporting on the experiences from Eastern Africa noted:

The most commonly applied sampling technique described in the papers submitted for the Regional Workshop consisted of two-stage stratified random sampling. The primary sampling units are usually geographical areas, limited by specific boundaries or clusters. Second stage sampling then consists of a random selection of project participants, or households within each primary sampling unit. Probably the most difficult -- if not controversial -- issue in M&E is the measurement of yields. ... Only one paper [out of 25] submitted for the Workshop discussed a method for yield measurements.

The usefulness, operation and management of the stratified sampling is also discussed in the several texts (e.g. Casley and Lury, 1982:81-6; Scott, 1985:21-4; Moser and Kalton, 1971:81). Also are discussed research designs which employ direct techniques such as case studies with or without control groups and with one or more measurements (e.g. community or village studies, farm management studies) (Casley and Lury, 1982:52-8, 62-8; Imboden, 1980:52-61). The

purpose of a case study is "to provide one of the ways in which the unfolding of causal mechanisms can be studied ... Plausible causal inferences will be possible only if more general survey data are supplemented by a case study, examining in detail the project impact on a small number of beneficiaries" (*ibid.*:52). Generally, both managers and researchers are wary of the escalating costs, the difficulty in managing and administering sample surveys and case studies. Equally demanding is the data processing and analysis which can lead to delays and thus minimise the utilisation of evaluation results in the decision-making processes of the relevant audiences.

The present study chose this method because of its significance in collecting grassroots-level information on the planning, implementation and impacts of the RIDEPs.

From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that evaluation methods which are appropriate and simple are being preferred in an environment such as the regions of Tanzania. This is an outcome of both resource constraints (funds and high-level manpower) and the need for relevance. Further, beneficiary participation in evaluative activities is crucial in garnering their views on the impact of the project/programme.

2.3.4 Criteria and Preconditions of Evaluation

It is considered very important that evaluability¹⁰ of a project or programme is an input into the analysis of its effectiveness, relevance and efficiency. For a project to be evaluable, it is

essential it meets certain criteria and conditions (Rutman, 1977:59-60). These include:

- (i) A clearly articulated programme;
- (ii) Clearly specified goals or objectives and the expected effects;
- (iii) A plausible rationale linking the project to the goals or effects, and
- (iv) Implementation of the actual projects.

In other words, project/programme evaluability is enhanced by the way objectives are clearly and explicitly stated and that they permeate mutual consistency. The project design and its assumptions exhibit a logical and practical sequence and therefore, display the likelihood of achieving the objectives. Implicit in this project specification is the correspondence of the design assumptions with the development philosophy articulated and adopted by the society in which the project is to be implemented.

Rutman observes that "vaguely stated goals and/or effects are not easily measurable and do not provide adequate criteria for determining whether a programme produced the outcomes ... prior analysis would have revealed that the causal assumptions are not plausible and that there is little likelihood of the programme producing the expected outcomes." (*ibid.*). Although Rutman further suggests that in such a situation evaluators should not agree to perform an evaluation, because such an endeavour would be futile, it is not uncommon that evaluation proceeds and possibly some useful inferences from the experience can be drawn even if requiring qualification and further, more rigorous, verification.

The main threat to the satisfaction of the evaluability preconditions are the conflicting interests among all the parties involved in a project or programme: the decision-makers, planners, managers, staff and beneficiaries, who may be classified into merchants, moneylenders, large farmers, peasants, the landless, etc. This conflict of interests is simply compounded when foreign resources are brought into the rural sector. In this regard, Carruthers and Clayton, 1977:311) are convincing when they state: "Evaluation can be real finger-pointing exercise." The problem is not easier even within the bureaucracy itself. Mosley (1983:598), drawing from works of Downs (1967) and Blau (1963), concludes: "Management needs an evaluation system in all its functions; professional staff will be, in general, very glad to assist it; operating staff will be opposed to it, particularly in its performance-assessment function and may carry their opposition to the point of obstruction". As a broad generalisation this may be debatable, but the main issue is that conflict of interests is also prevalent in the bureaucracies, in which projects are born, nurtured or killed (Nott, 1983:51-8; Samoff, 1979:31-62). However, evaluation has broader purposes as has been apparent in the discussion in this chapter.

The important implication for the present study is the need to identify objectives as clearly as their text allows in the RIDEP plan documents so that the evaluation exercise is undertaken better according to their self-declared aims and against the wider societal objectives, if these differ.

Of related significance to this discussion is the issue of **hierarchy**

or stage (i.e. step-by-step approach) in undertaking an evaluation activity. The conception of a hierarchy in regional economics denotes a spatial dimension (see Richardson, 1978:27- 28). A region embodies spatial units, as we have seen, of districts, divisions, wards and villages. The implication of this concept is that a regional integrated rural development project can be evaluated hierarchically or on a step-by-step approach basis. In this case, the first hierarchical layer or stage would be the region, the second would be the district, whilst the village would form the third and final stage for the focus of an evaluative activity, especially in determining causal linkages of the project-induced effects and impacts.

Belshaw (1984:12) has suggested three approaches in evaluating a planning methodology:

1. Evaluation of impacts/outcomes of the plan objectives;
2. Evaluation of the plan document itself prior to implementation in order to determine the appropriateness and the feasibility of the plan proposals, and
3. Undertaking comparison of the planning methodology used with other alternative methodologies which could be adopted and could generate different proposals.

It is evident that the first approach implies that an ex-post evaluation is being carried out in order to determine the outputs, effects and impacts which are project-induced as the result of the implementation of plan proposals. All the activities undertaken during the process of implementation are viewed as the major product of the used methodology.

In the second approach of evaluating the plan document one is essentially asking questions about appropriateness of the adopted planning methodology and the ensuing plan proposals given a particular contextual framework of a national development philosophy and ideology, and the likelihood of the proposals to generate the envisaged effects and impacts. It is worth stating that a plan methodology (the planning of planning) can be appraised *ex ante* and evaluated *ex post* (in terms of output), while the plan itself can be appraised *ex ante* and evaluated *ex post* in terms of its internal logic, effects, impacts on the target group, economy, etc.

The third route of evaluation compares the adopted planning methodology with other alternatives since a choice of one alternative automatically "shuts the door" on other plans with different proposals. In the event, "the emphasis is less on narrow input-output relationships, but on identifying the 'what-might-have-beens'" (*ibid.*). The RIDEP interventions can be evaluated to note how they have prevented further declines in the regional economies and how they have triggered regional development activities.

2.4 Conclusion

Rural and agricultural development theory and practice have undergone a remarkable metamorphosis during the four decades or so since World War II. International concern to overcome poverty and other scourges in the Third World intensified with the aim of containing the development problems facing the developing countries.

As a result of these efforts development policies and strategies were formulated and implemented to bring about the desired changes in the economies of these countries.

Early development theory concentrated on formulating economic development models prescribing solutions which gyrated around "growth" policies and strategies. True, some "growth" did take place, but the majority of the poor and disadvantaged were bypassed by this development endeavour and in some cases their plight was exacerbated. These concerns precipitated a rethinking of the development theory of the time and this resulted in the 1970s in new policies and strategies which espoused both growth and equity objectives. This new outlook and direction of development theory led to the adoption and formulation of integrated rural development programmes/projects (IRDPs) as multi-sectoral and multi-dimensional interventions in the rural sector of a developing country. IRDPs were considered appropriate tools for dealing with the multi-faceted development problems facing the rural people of the developing world.

Although success of the IRDPs has been documented (see for example, Lele (1975) for Africa; Whang, 1981, in Clayton and Petry, 1981, for Taiwan; Singh, 1986, for India and Johnston and Clarke, 1982 and Ruttan, 1984 for a general overview), failures and shortcomings have also been identified. Some of these failures and shortcomings have been attributed to inadequacies in designing, monitoring and evaluation activities of the IRDPs. Thus, the 1970s and early 1980s saw increased interest in these activities in order to improve the chances of the IRDPs to achieve their stated objectives.

Tanzania, as many other LDCs, had embarked upon formulating and implementing, with donor assistance, IRDPs (or rather RIDEPS) in several regions. In fact, integrated rural development and planning and implementation have been institutionalised in Tanzania's regional planning (see, for example, Belshaw, 1977, 1979 and 1982). Monitoring and evaluation activities are at their infancy in Tanzania (thus the need for them to be institutionalised in the Tanzanian bureaucracy is evident as it will be demonstrated in Chapters 5-7 of this study), but even in their present form and content they, especially evaluation, can be used to reach conclusions about the weaknesses and shortcomings in the design of the RIDEPS and its consequences on the effects and impacts of the projects/programmes on the target populations. Of further interest is the need for frequent resort to evaluative activities for early problem-solving of ongoing projects and also for drawing experiences and lesson-learning for future planning and implementation.

Past experiences in Tanzania on these issues indicates that there have been inadequacies or even lack of attempts to undertake evaluative studies along these lines that would enhance our understanding of the planning and implementation processes of RIDEPS and other related interventions with the view to improving their effectiveness and efficiency. It is evident from the preceding discussion that improved planning, management and implementation can be achieved through monitoring and evaluation exercises. Evaluation is an important tool in assembling the necessary information for decision-making of the various audiences: managers, aid agency

administrators, government officials and politicians. This study is attempting to contribute towards the fulfilment of this objective. In this way, the study hopes that it can arouse enthusiasm and awareness of both policy makers and planning and implementing experts in the country to the need and imperative of the evaluation activities.

FOOTNOTES

1. For Tanzania the TANU Guidelines of 1971 provided a further elaboration of the concept of development which included political liberation and one's control of one's destiny. In a typical reiteration of the Guidelines: "Development means *liberation*, ... to us development means the elimination of oppression, exploitation, enslavement and humiliation, and the promotion of our independence and human dignity" (TANU, 1971:9) (Emphasis in the original). In September 1971 TANU had decided that the Government should embark upon provision of education, health and potable water as basic needs of the people (see TANU, 1971, *Maazimio ya Mukutano Mkuu wa 15* [Resolutions of the 15th Biennial Conference of the Tanganyika National African Union (TANU)]).
2. As IRDPs were gaining currency as the preferred rural development interventions in the Developing Countries, attempts were being made to develop a quality of life index (QLI) or physical quality of life (PQLI) which would measure levels of well-being. QLI was expected to lend itself to both national and international comparisons (Morris, 1979; McCall, 1976). Concern for quality of life studies had come about partly, because of dissatisfaction of some people with GNP as a statistic for progress as it leaves out of account consumption or subjective elements (e.g. happiness, justice, popular participation in decision-making, freedom, leisure, etc.), not to mention some productive activities which are also excluded (e.g. housewives work and do-it-yourself activities) (ILO, 1976; Ghai *et al*, 1977; Morris, 1979). The QLI was, therefore, an attempt to found an index that measures well-being, which is interpreted as satisfaction or dissatisfaction with one's life (Morris, 1979). Morris' PQLI was a composite index, encompassing three social indicators: infant mortality, life expectancy and basic literacy. QLI or PQLI was envisaged to compare levels of achievement within and between countries and by extension could be used to compare development models and evaluate impact of a project or programme. It should be noted, however, that some authors object to its use for reasons of inadequate theoretical foundation and arbitrary weighting (Hicks and Streeten, 1979; Brodsky and Rodrick, 1981).

3. Iliffe uses definitions of Saul and Woods, "African Peasantries" and Redfield and Singer, "The Cultural Role of Cities" in Shanin (ed.), 1971, *Peasants and Peasant Societies*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, pp. 103-14; 337-65. Saul and Woods uphold the Chayanovian concept of the peasant, which emphasises the duality of the peasant *household* as both a productive and consumptive group, but also provide an extension to include *homestead* economy. Thus they define peasants as "those whose ultimate security and subsistence lies in their having certain rights in land and in the labour of family members on the land, but who are involved, through rights and obligations, in a wider economic system which includes the participation of non-peasants", page 105. Saul and Woods includes pastoralists in their "non-peasants". For a detailed discussion on the Chayanovian conceptualisation of the peasant economy see Hunt (1979) for the Kenyan peasantry and Harriss (ed.) (1982) for peasantries and agrarian change in the Third World in general.
4. The Deboeck and Kinsey study is a summary of the discussions and principal conclusions of a Workshop on Monitoring and Evaluation of Rural Development Projects in Eastern Africa held in Nairobi in April 1979. The workshop was sponsored by the World Bank.
5. Imboden (1980) was also reporting on the discussions and conclusions of a Workshop on Information Systems for Rural Development Projects held in Paris in March 1978 under the auspices of the OECD Development Centre.
6. The Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) was introduced in the United States bureaucracy in 1965 during President Johnson's "Great Society" era when there was increased public expenditure on social services programmes. However, PPBS collapsed in 1971 due to its unworkability precipitated by conflicting interests and irreconcilable objectives (Nott, 1983:17-20, drawing from works of Botner, 1970 and Schick, 1973). The PPBS was replaced by the 'Management by Objective' (MbO) technique which also encountered similar problems. According to Nott (1983:17) the World Bank, being dominated by the US capital, had adopted these US bureaucratic procedures of control and supervision, and has spread them to the Third World where it funds agricultural and rural development projects.
7. For the World Bank-supported projects, it is a common practice to undertake mid-term or supervisory reviews. Mid-term and terminal reviews were carried out for the Kigoma RIDEP (see Chapter 5), and by the GTZ (FRG), and the EEC for the Tanga and Iringa RIDEPs respectively. For details see the relevant chapters of the present study.
8. Paul Mosley (1983:595) has shown that of the 218 evaluation reports produced by the World Bank between January 1979 and December 1981, only 8 per cent were ex-post evaluation reports assessing project impacts on the target groups, whilst 90 per cent were mid-term/supervisory reports. Of further interest are

the criteria for assessing impact. Mosley's comments are illuminating: 68 per cent of the reports are based on "internal rate of return" (*ibid.*), that is, on the narrow input-output relationships, as opposed to 8 per cent of them on target group impact. One interpretation of these data is that impact evaluation on target groups is not a focus despite the Bank's professed claim that its agricultural and rural development projects are poverty-oriented; and still another is that economic/technical criteria are preponderant over the distributional, regional/areal development impacts (see Richardson, 1978; Belshaw, 1984).

9. For example, in the case of the Kigoma RIDEF, the Project Management Executive - the RIDEF's management/executing organ - vigorously instituted, at the insistence of the World Bank supervisory missions, the with/without approach. The approach was based on the presumptions: (i) random selection of the project villages and (ii) the RIDEF was an exclusive as well as an inclusive system, that is, development efforts were being directed to the RIDEF villages and that non-RIDEF villages were not receiving any funds for development. These assumptions could not be sustained for long as non-RIDEF villages over time became RIDEF supported villages as well. In any case, non-RIDEF villages were receiving funds for their development from the regional government through the normal budgetary process of the national government. Moreover, some village got a water supply scheme, another a dispensary, etc. In practice, none received everything originally envisaged in the appraisal design.

10. Wholey *et. al.* (1975) of the Urban Institute in Washington D.C. have suggested the following sequence of steps for an evaluability assessment:-

1. Identify users of the planned evaluation and from their point of view determine what activities and objectives constitute the programme.
2. Collect information on the activities, goals, objectives and assumed causal relationships.
3. Synthesise into a "rhetorical programme model" - a flow model of resource inputs, programme activities, impacts and causal links.
4. Determine whether the programme is evaluable in terms of the model, with agreement of the potential users of the evaluation information.
5. Feedback the results of the analysis to the programme managers and intended users.

Always bear in mind that the people are not fighting for ideas, for things in anyone's head. They are fighting to win material benefits, to live better and in peace, to see their lives go forward, to guarantee the future of their children.

Amilcar Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea*, 1969.

If you want to acquire knowledge you must take part in the practice of changing reality. If we have a correct theory, but merely talk about it, lay it aside, and fail to put it into practice, then that theory, however good, has no importance. Knowledge begins with practice, reaches the theoretical level through practice, and then returns to practice.

Mao Tse-Tung, *On Practice*, 1937.

CHAPTER THREE

THE METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

3.1 Introduction

It is now apparent from the discussion in the preceding chapter that the methods - 'before and after' comparisons, 'with and without' comparisons and sample survey - form the basis of evaluation for the present study. The choice of these methods, as noted, was dictated by their simplicity and appropriateness in a low-income country. More sophisticated and complex methods were considered inappropriate and infeasible. The nature of the evaluation which was undertaken in this study is described more fully in this chapter.

In the present study ex-post evaluation was planned to be carried out at two levels. Firstly, the RIDEP plan documents were appraised, *ex post*, to determine their *technical soundness* and *appropriateness* of the objectives, strategies and plans for implementation. The purpose was to note whether the RIDEP plan proposals were capable, as claimed explicitly or implicitly, of delivering the outputs, effects and impacts intended. This entailed an examination of the plan documents, a total of 2,200-page output (120 pages of the Kigoma RIDEP plan, 1,180 pages of Tanga RIDEP plan and 1,000 pages of the Iringa RIDEP plan). This examination was also intended to reveal whether the plan proposals were congruent (or otherwise) with the declared objectives of the Tanzanian Government as espoused in its adopted national development trajectory postulated in the Arusha Declaration.

This is an interesting aspect, since Tanzania's commitment to a

particular form of socialist construction is well known and is described in Chapter 4, but it was capital and technical assistance from the capitalist countries and agencies that dominated the RIDEP interventions. [*Socialist construction* is construed as all purposeful and conscious efforts to create a socialist economy or society by adhering to the basic principles of socialism, one of which is the collective and/or public/state ownership and management of the major means of production and distribution. Cooperative ownership and management of some means of production and distribution is one measure of early socialist transformation]. We shall return to this crucial issue in detail in Chapter 8. Suffice to note here that integrated rural development itself is not 'socialist' in the normal sense. To be 'socialist', IRD must embody the basic socialist features of production, distribution and organisation as mentioned above.

Secondly, the study investigated the extent of the implementation of the three RIDEPs of Tanga, Kigoma and Iringa regions. This entailed the evaluation of the implementation of the plan proposals as stipulated in the RIDEP plan documents. The study sought to identify the achievements and non-achievements of the plan proposals. The purpose of such an examination was to identify and establish causal linkages between the RIDEPs' inputs, outputs, effects and impacts in the light of their objectives. Table 3.1 provides guidance on the activities undertaken in the evaluation of the RIDEPs.

In the sections which follow a description of the data collection process is made. There were two categories of data sources. Firstly, there was information gathered through documentary research and

Table 3.1: Guideline of evaluation tasks of the study

Action	Purpose	Focus
A. Examine plans	1) Congruence with Tanzanian development philosophy (Appropriateness) 2) Technical soundness	Objectives Strategies and Projects (needs and targets method of provision)
B. Extent of implementation	1) Achievements identified 2) Failures identified) % of use of inputs,) outputs and) activities;) % of targets achieved

secondly, interviews with RIDEP and Regional Administration officials, and thirdly, there were village surveys, which were the primary information. These are discussed below.

3.2 The Indicators Used in the Study

The nature of this study requires use of particular indicators for measuring the extent of the RIDEP project implementation and their impacts. Implementation is measured by inputs, outputs and activities. The selection of the indicators for the present study is crucial in illuminating the issues which are the outcomes of the RIDEP interventions. The RIDEPs concentrated, at least according to their stated objectives, on raising agricultural production and efficiency, and, to varying degrees, on improving levels of living of the target populations. This meant investing in peasant agriculture (crop and livestock development, forestry and fisheries) and social and economic infrastructure (education, health, water supply, rural roads, grinding

mills, warehousing facilities and popular participation). Accordingly, the selection of indicators must take the RIDEPs' objectives and their appropriateness as the reference point. They should be able to measure what the RIDEP set out to achieve.

The study uses both direct and indirect (proxy) indicators (McGranahan *et al.*, 1972 and Scott *et al.*, 1978).¹ Proxy indicators (such as indicators used to measure health, education, water and popular participation) are useful in measuring change when it is not possible to use direct indicators. In most cases, in social infrastructural interventions change can only be measured by proxy indicators, because it cannot be measured by direct indicators. For example, increased adoption and application of improved farming practices may be an indicator of receptivity of technological information by farmers which may be due to expanded provision of educational facilities and improved extension services. Other examples include anthropometry as a proxy indicator of nutrition status, some household assets such as bicycles, radios, etc., as proxy indicators of incomes.

It is considered necessary that to be effective indicators should meet certain criteria. These criteria include reliability, validity, consistency, specificity and sensitivity.² Indicators should, therefore, be able to determine the nature and extent of change that has occurred as a result of a project intervention. Not every intervention can result in change. However, the RIDEP interventions were expected to produce changes and achievements that could be attributed to them. In addition, indicators should facilitate

comparisons between planned targets and actual achievements between the achievements of similar projects in different areas.

To assess the extent of the implementation of the RIDEPs and thus identify their effects and impacts on the target populations, the present study used the following indicators:-

1. Agricultural production/productivity:
 - consumption of inputs/rate of adoption of improved/modern farming practices
 - outputs of agricultural produce
2. Education:
 - provision of schooling facilities: classrooms, teachers houses and furniture as a percentage of requirement
3. Health:
 - accessibility/proximity of services
 - availability of essential drugs and equipment
4. Water:
 - accessibility (percentage of population with access to potable/clean water)
 - quality of provision of services
5. Popular participation:
 - presence/absence of decision-making institutions or organisations at the village level (village assembly, village council and its five committees, etc).
 - frequency of meetings
 - attendance at meetings
6. Food/nutrition:
 - frequency of intake/consumption of types of food

These indicators are related to the study's objectives and those of the RIDEPs. All the three RIDEPs had increasing agricultural production of smallholder farmers as one of their key objectives. Agricultural production was to be increased through increased use of inputs (mainly fertilisers and improved seeds) and adoption of

improved cultivation methods. Yield per unit area was not chosen as an indicator for this study because of poor reliability of yields estimates. Crop cutting as a method of estimating yields is hardly practised in Tanzania. In the livestock sector increased use of improved breeds and provision of animal health facilities were envisaged. In short, the aim was to improve peasant production so as to increase incomes and improve nutritional status of the rural people (i.e. the target populations). The Kigoma RIDEF, for instance, aimed at doubling incomes of the target population by the end of the implementation period.

Measurement of agricultural productivity and production, and income levels of peasant producers is recognised as a daunting task. There are a number of difficulties such as non-existent household records, existence of both official and non-official channels of produce disposal, unwillingness to reveal ones' income for fear of taxation, etc. Nonetheless, official procurement data of the commodities benefiting from RIDEF funding were the basis for the assessment of project outputs. Input distribution data of the RIDEFs were also used to determine the extent of project implementation. These data were augmented by information provided by the village surveys.

For the education component the number of classrooms, teachers houses and school furniture provided by the RIDEFs were balanced against demand and targets, and were counted as the outputs. Accessibility of health facilities and availability of essential drugs were the key indicators for the health sector. This meant determining

the number of rural health centres, dispensaries and first aid boxes provided through the RIDEF funding. Other possible indicators include level of knowledge acquired, number of children educated, healthiness, etc, which are difficult to measure and therefore, were not used in the study.

In the Tanzanian case, construction of the building is not a sufficient reason to assume that a service is being delivered. Acute shortages of essential drugs and equipment may render the structure a white elephant. This may also apply to the water supply schemes as is evident in Chapters 6 and 7. Thus the determining of provision of water supply facilities was considered necessary to be accompanied with an assessment of quality of services, that is, how frequently was clean/potable water available.

Popular participation - involvement of the people in decision-making on matters affecting their welfare - was considered crucial by the national leadership as exemplified by this statement: "If development is to benefit the people, the people must participate in considering, planning and implementing their development" (TANU Guidelines, 1971). The Tanzanian decentralisation programme (see Chapter 4) was implemented with a view to meeting this objective. Through the decentralised administrative system and regional planning, it was hoped that the people would increasingly be involved in the decision-making processes on matters affecting them (Nyerere, 1972 and 1977). Popular participation is considered an essential precondition in Tanzania's national development strategy in order to obtain (i) the people's commitment to and personal identification with development

programmes and projects, (ii) information on local conditions, needs and attitudes which are conducive to effective implementation and achievements of the stated objectives, and (iii) enable the people to be democratically involved in decision-making.

In a representative democracy, it is the representative organ which will be the people's instrument for participatory decision-making as it is not always possible to involve every member of a community in the process. However, in the Tanzanian situation, the village assembly, as established by the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975 (and recently incorporated in the Local Government (District Authorities) Act of 1982), has all the villagers over 18 as its rightful members. For the purpose of the present study, the existence of this organ, the village council and its five committees was the first issue which needed to be established as the premise, through which participation of the people can take place. The second issue was whether they convened their meetings as required by law and finally, who attended and what was discussed, agreed upon and, if possible, what was implemented.

Regarding food and nutrition, one indicator was used: frequency of intake or consumption of types of food. This exercise was used in village surveys (see Appendix C for results). The aim was to note whether there has been an improvement in food and nutrition status of the villagers. Intake or consumption of type of foods were considered an appropriate proxy indicator of nutrition in a village situation, where weight measurements of food were difficult to obtain (as were the other indicators e.g. age/weight/height data for children),

because villagers do not measure their food rations before they prepare them.

3.3 Documentary Sources of Information

The purpose of this part of the research activity was to gather information which would enable the testing of the study hypotheses (see Chapter 1, section 1.4). In particular, it was designed to glean information on the extent of implementation, that is, outputs, achievements and/or shortcomings of the RIDEPS.

Research on the RIDEPS began in the summer of 1983 when a field research trip was made to Kigoma to collect documentary information on the activities of the project. A similar trip was made to Tanga in the summer of 1984 just before I left the country to join the University of East Anglia. Between November 1985 and August 1986 I returned to Kigoma and Tanga to collect more documentary data during the field research period in Tanzania. At various times during this period the researcher collected data from the Prime Minister's Office both in Dar es Salaam and Dodoma and also in Iringa region. Supplementary data/information was also gathered from the offices of the Bureau of Statistics, Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre, Marketing Development Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and the University of Dar es Salaam Library and Economic Research Bureau. The Treasury and DEVPLAN also provided useful sources of data as well.

On arrival in a region the procedure followed was that the researcher would first see the Regional Planning Officer or his

assistant, who was invariably the RIDEP coordinator. This officer in effect became the local contact, through whom appointments of meetings and discussions with other officials of the Regional and District Administrations and the RIDEPs were made. Once one secures the cooperation and tacit approval of the Regional Planning Officer, one is in most cases able to get access to most of the information sources, with the exception of classified material. However, this was usually applicable to data under the domain of the regional authorities and not those under the RIDEP management. Generally, many officials are somewhat suspicious of "outsiders" who undertake evaluations and the relevant literature is full of this difficulty (Rutman, 1977; Patton, 1978; Clayton and Petry, 1981, 1983; Elzinga, 1981; Nott, 1983).

One reason for this suspicion is that the concerned officials think that there is little to be gained from such exercises carried out by "outsiders", especially from academics who are accused of being theoretical and impractical. In the case of the present study, information sought was collected and the researcher, save for a few cases, had access to most relevant data available in the regions.

This documentary information was augmented by information gleaned through observations and discussions with the relevant officials which provided more detailed data on the planning and implementation of the RIDEP and non-RIDEP projects. In Tanga all districts were visited by the researcher, partly to gather data from documentary sources and partly, as it will be seen later, to administer the village sample surveys. This endeavour proved somewhat difficult

because of the transport and acute fuel shortage problems which were at the time very serious indeed. In most parts of the field research I had to rely on public transport which was at the time quite unreliable. Fortunately, for the village surveys departmental transport was available from the University and this enabled their speedy implementation.

In the study regions, sources of secondary data included Planning Offices in the Offices of the Regional Commissioners, RIDEP Management or Coordination Offices and the offices of the development departments (Agriculture, Livestock, Education, Water Development, Natural Resources, Community Development and Cooperatives). In the districts the Offices of the Executive Directors were the main sources of data/information sought by the researcher. District functional department offices were also useful in filling the gaps or augmenting the data collected from the former.

Secondary data was generated during these visits through interviews and discussions with the relevant officials and RIDEP experts. Furthermore, secondary data was garnered through reading relevant documents, publications and reports. In certain instances, some of these documents and publications were kindly made available to the researcher for future reference.

The researcher collected data on the RIDEP activities by reading the various documents and reports on the RIDEP projects both at the Office of the Regional Commissioner and RIDEP Management Office. At various times discussions were held with the Regional Planning Officer and his assistant, the Counterpart Project Coordinator and his

assistant, the Project Coordinator and RIDEF experts responsible for various activities such as horticulture, irrigation, village development programme, small-scale industries, ox-training and soil erosion control and agroforestry projects. Moreover, interviews and discussions were held with the regional functional managers responsible for agriculture, livestock, natural resources, education, water, health and works and transport. Differing perspectives were given on the advantages and disadvantages of the RIDEF activities.

This process was repeated in the districts, depending on the nature of emphasis of the RIDEF activities there. For example, in Handeni District the RIDEF activities concerned provision of piped water from the Pangani River through the establishment of the Handeni Trunk Main, construction or rehabilitation of dips and veterinary centres, the rehabilitation/construction of rural roads and the construction and equipment of the honey processing factory. In Korogwe the RIDEF management had established a small-scale industrial unit and ox-training unit. In Lushoto the RIDEF was involved in soil erosion control and tree planting. In the event, the researcher concentrated his attention on the discussions with officials of these departments. Discussions with the district executive directors and district planning officers were very constructive in highlighting the implementation accomplishments and shortcomings/failures of the RIDEF projects.

In Iringa discussions were also held with the Planning Officer in charge of the UNICEF nutrition and health programme in the region. This officer provided insight in the problems of food and nutrition in

the region. The researcher made visits to ten villages in Iringa Rural, Mufindi and Njombe districts for the on-site inspection and assessment of the IRADEP projects. These included the Pawaga and Mtandika irrigation schemes, three ox-training centres, six village godowns, two tree nurseries, three mechanical and maintenance workshops, and some rural roads and bridges. While in some of the villages the opportunity was taken to discuss the project activities with some villagers, village leaders and officials.

While in Kigoma region the researcher also travelled to Kasulu district, where he visited five villages, including the MATI (Ministry of Agriculture Training Institute) at Mubondo village. The MATI was originally the Agricultural Trials and Training Centre (ATTC) established with funds of the Kigoma RIDEP to undertake research and extension staff training specific for the region.

3.4 Primary Sources of Data Collection: The Village Surveys

As it has been shown in Chapter 2, village surveys were a third method used by the study to collect primary information from the villagers, who are the target populations of the RIDEPs. It is a method which, in spite of the resource and logistical difficulties, should be used to expand the evaluator's direct understanding of the effectiveness of rural development interventions in improving the wellbeing of rural people. Administrative and project staff, however objective, introduce their own perception of problems and performance. The village surveys were designed to collect information on the RIDEP

effects and impacts on the quality of life of the target population. The key element here was to involve the villagers in providing information on the RIDEP activities i.e. to secure beneficiary participation in the evaluation exercise. The aim of the village surveys was twofold: to obtain additional information from that collected from interviews of government and RIDEP officials and to involve some of the beneficiaries in the evaluation activity in order to understand their perception of the RIDEP activities.

This method was confined to the Tanga RIDEP. It was realised right from the beginning that resources could not permit the undertaking of village surveys in all the three RIDEPs under study. Thus, the Tanga RIDEP was selected to test this technique. In Tanzania both PMO and TIRDEP officials talk of the Tanga RIDEP as the most successful of all the RIDEPs in the country (PMO, 1984). Naturally, the researcher having a keen interest in RIDEP planning and implementation in the country, failed to resist the temptation not to subject the accolade to grassroots evaluation so as to gain an indepth insight in the TIRDEP activities.

Primary data for the study had been collected through the questionnaires designed by the researcher (Appendices B & C) and administered in sample villages. These were selected by means of a stratified sampling procedure. The stratified sampling procedure entails obtaining a sample from groups (or strata) of elements which are deliberately chosen in order to meet certain predetermined objectives. In the present study the objective was to obtain a purposive sample of 10 villages; six villages from Stage I, three

villages from Stage II and one from Stage III villages. These stages are discussed below.

The village surveys were undertaken in Tanga Region in order to test some of the hypotheses of the present study. In the Tanzanian context the village is a significant grassroots-level political, social and economic institution and any effective rural and agricultural development intervention is bound to be felt there, if it is poverty-focused and people-oriented.

Tanga region in January 1986 had 538 villages of which 535 were registered under the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975. The Act gave the villages corporate status and recognised them as multipurpose primary cooperative societies. For the purpose of this study all villages were included in the random selection of the sample villages. The random selection gave the researcher 3 sample villages in Muheza district, 2 each in Handeni and Tanga districts and 1 each in Pangani, Lushoto and Korogwe districts. The sample was a stratified one according to the dominant form of production in the villages.

The stratification used categories derived from the village development policy of Tanzania described below. Officially, there are four stages of development in which each of the 8,300-odd villages in Tanzania can fall into: Stages I, II, III, and IV (CCM, 1984).² So far, most of the villages fall into stages I and II, whereas only a few are categorised as stage III villages and still fewer are recognised as **ujamaa** villages. Ujamaa villages fall in stage IV, which as noted is the highest form of rural socialisation in Tanzania. The

categorisation of villages according to the level of "ujamaa" development is based upon three principles; these are:

- (1) level of socialist construction attained by a village, which must be manifested by:
 - (i) commitment of both party and government leadership to socialist construction and
 - (ii) growth and expansion of socialisation of village activities i.e. collective ownership and management;
- (2) socialisation and management of village economic activities such as agriculture, livestock, forestry, fisheries, small-scale industries and trade and
- (3) provision and running of social/community services such as primary education, literacy campaigns, maternal and child health care, health and sanitation services and water supply.

Thus, based on these principles a village's development can be identified belonging to a particular stage. The classification is usually done annually by the Party central committee through its sub-committee responsible for economic affairs as part of the "Siasa ni Kilimo" [Agriculture is Politics] competitions. A national committee of party and government officials visits each region to see for themselves the two best villages in each district from which the best village of the region is found. In theory, such a village should be in stage IV, but in practice it is usually a stage III village. District and regional committees of party and government functionaries tour the villages of their relevant areas and select the final categorisation according to the guidelines or principles as mentioned above. The national committee makes its final decision based on this final categorisation, which is in essence a shortlisting of the likely villages to win prizes in the competitions at the regional and

national levels. It is significant to bear in mind that such a procedure must be fraught with subjective undertones. The existence of nation-wide and well-defined guidelines and a national committee does presumably minimise the extent of subjectivity.

For Tanga region the villages were categorised in 1985 in the following manner:-

Stage	Number of Villages	Selected Sampling Frame		Actual Sampling Frame	
		Number	%	Number	%
I	501	6	1.2	5	1.0
II	34	3	9.0	2	6.0
III	3	1	33.3	1	33.3
IV	0	-	-	-	-
Total	538	10	1.9	8	1.5

These villages were listed and numbered sequentially and within each stratum a pre-selected number were chosen with the aid of a table of random numbers. A total of ten sample villages were selected; this number was considered feasible given the resources available to the researcher. The aim was to have villages from all three stages with villages I-III. The stages were strata and within strata a random selection was made. This selection of the sample villages according to stage of socialist development is warranted by the need to collect information for the testing of Hypothesis 1 (see Chapter 1, section 1.4).

This stratified random selection produced the following villages with their stages which fitted in very well with the forms of village production. The villages were:-

Stage I:	1. Mkingaleo	--	Muheza District
	2. Kigongomawe	--	Muheza District
	3. Kwamkono	--	Handeni District
	4. Sangeni	--	Handeni District
	5. Pongwe Kaskazini	--	Tanga District
	6. Viti	--	Lushoto District
Stage II:	7. Mwanyumba	--	Muheza District
	8. Mleni	--	Tanga District
	9. Kimang'a	--	Pangani District
Stage III:	10. Magamba/Kwalukonge	--	Korogwe District

In terms of division according to agro-ecological zones Map 1.5, p. 16, the study villages fall in the following manner:-

- (i) Coconut/cashewnut zone - Mkingaleo and Kimang'a
- (ii) Coconut zone - Pongwe Kaskazini and Kigongomawe
- (iii) Maize plateau zone - Kwamkono and Sangeni
- (iv) Cattle/sisal zone - Magamba/Kwalukonge
- (v) Sisal/maize zone - Mwanyumba and Mleni
- (vi) Vegetable/temperate fruit/tea-coffee zone - Viti.

Thus, the sample villages are found in six of the eleven agro-ecological zones of the region. It must be pointed out here that,

although these agro-ecological zones are significant in determining the main thrust of village economic activities and therefore, the nature of RIDEP and non-RIDEP interventions, they were not used as a basis of choice for undertaking the village surveys. This was simply an outcome of randomisation. The purposive stratification was that of selection of villages according to development stages.

Kigongomawe and Mleni were not reached due to impassable roads as a result of heavy rains at the time of the field research. This made the sample much smaller, thus exacerbated the problem of generalisability of the research results. Accordingly, the sample comprised of eight villages chosen from all districts of the region.

In the sample villages the questionnaires were administered to a pre-selected number of randomly selected village peasants (see Questionnaire I in Appendix B) and village leaders and officials (see Questionnaire II in Appendix C). This was done with the assistance of four enumerators, one of whom was a woman. One of the key elements of the study, for which information was sought, is popular participation in decision-making. It was considered pertinent that women's views be sought on this issue. Thus, it was felt desirable to include a female enumerator in the team of the research assistants. The enumerators were closely supervised by the researcher who also frequently participated in recording the answers of a proportion of the respondents.

As noted, there were two types of questionnaires: questionnaire I was meant for the villagers/peasants, whereas questionnaire II was designed to collect information from the village leaders and

officials. These included the village chairman and/or secretary and other elected leaders such as members of the village council or the Party's branch executive committee, and government officials such as the agricultural/livestock extension worker, community development assistant, head teacher, rural medical aide, etc., that is, whoever was resident and available for the interview. This apparent arbitrariness is due to the fact that not every government department has its resident representative in each village. Furthermore, the nature of information sought from these officials was usually facts and/or statistics about their work or village activities. For example, the rural medical aide was asked about the availability of essential drugs and equipment and in most cases either the enumerators or the author verified them. Therefore, the element of bias in this aspect was minimal if any and with no or little consequence for the results.

In each sample village 10 villagers were picked according to randomisation procedures. It is a common practice in Tanzania to keep a list of names of villagers at the Village Office. In all the sample villages such a list did exist and was produced when requested. It formed the basis for the selection of the names of the peasants with the assistance of random numbers. The names of the peasants coinciding with the random numbers were selected for interview and each was separately interviewed. For the officials, they were either asked to complete the questionnaire themselves after explanation on how to do it or they were assisted either by the researcher or enumerators.

Questionnaire I (see Appendix B) was used to elicit information on RIDEP planning and implementation including the status and content

of other issues such as primary and adult education, health and essential drugs availability, provision of water and its frequency, farming and animal husbandry practices, popular participation, etc. In all 70 villagers were interviewed using the questionnaire, of whom 20 were women. In some villages some of the villagers did not come for the interview due to various reasons, such as illness or family problems which needed a villager's immediate attention. In all, ten villagers did not come to be interviewed as planned.

Questionnaire II (see Appendix C) was designed to obtain information on the RIDEP and non-RIDEP activities from the village leaders and officials from each sample village. This questionnaire was divided into two parts: the first part sought to obtain general information about the village, such as its history, whether it was established before or during villagisation, existing services, resident government personnel, etc.; the second part was more specific, asking questions about RIDEP and non-RIDEP projects undertaken in the village, their advantages and disadvantages, etc. In all, 45 village leaders and officials completed the second questionnaire. Of these 12 were women. [For details of the questions asked see the questionnaires: Appendices B & C].

At this point a brief comment is in order about the design and structure of the questionnaires. One criticism of the questionnaires is that they include some open-ended questions which are, perhaps, too general and make too much demand on the memory of the peasant respondents. In addition, one may feel that the survey might have been biased against women as there were only 20 of them out the 70 village

interviewees. These are valid criticisms. The purpose of the questionnaires was to cover as many aspects of village life as was possible as they were influenced or were hoped to be influenced by the RIDEPS as multidimensional interventions. In this way, perhaps, the study became overambitious. Indeed, one important aspect of the present study is to identify key areas for further research. Similar studies are beginning to appear. Some of the questions of this study are similar to the ones in the Thompson survey (1984), although the former was designed in 1984/85 without the benefit of knowledge of the latter. Unfortunately, the published study by Collier and associates (1986) did not include the three questionnaires used in their village surveys of 20 villages of Tanzania (which ironically left out Kigoma, Singida, Rukwa, Ruvuma, Lindi and Mtwara, the most lagging regions in the country). There is, nonetheless, some similarity of issues pursued with the present study. Unfortunately, again, comparison was not possible, because the present study was already being drafted before the Collier study was published.

The recall issue could be a serious problem. Since this is an ex-post evaluation attempting to measure the effectiveness of past activities, some time-series data were found necessary in order to establish trends in the improvement of rural life as a result of the implementation of the RIDEPS. It is pertinent to recall a rejoinder by Feierman (1974:8): "In our society, important records of social relations are in writing - from constitutions to contracts to birth certificates. But in Shambaai, as in most of Africa, land deeds, religious doctrines, constitutional arrangements and *technical data*

are committed to memory". Oral tradition is an important historical method (*ibid.*:3, quoting Vansina (1961)). Perhaps, one does not need to take the part of peasants (Williams in Harriss (ed.), 1982:381-98) to appreciate that peasants are also reliable. Nonetheless, caution must be exercised when interpreting data gathered in this way.

Regarding sampling error and bias one can only say that the low proportion of women was an outcome of randomisation as was the case in the Thompson (1984) study whose sample of 86 farmers were all men. In the present study it is the random selection and not a biased household list that has resulted in under-representation of women. Thompson's study, like the present study, also used village lists of households obtained from the village offices (in all 3 villages, about five miles apart in Mlalo division of Lushoto district) and so did the Fleuret (1978) study. Moreover, Collier *et al* (1986:23) used existing village lists generally and only compiled their own where they did not already exist. Given the aims and nature of the present study, however, the damage to the overall conclusions inflicted by this bias is likely to be small.

3.5 Techniques of Data/Information Interpretation and Presentation

The study employed two techniques of interpretation and presentation of information: (i) quantitative analysis and (ii) descriptive and narrative analysis. Quantitative analysis is important in this study because, firstly, of the need to measure relative allocation as an indication of priorities, and secondly, to assess

changes as a result of the implementation of the various RIDEP components as stipulated in the plan documents. Moreover, these changes must be attributed to the project activities. Thus the data assembled during the field research, have to be used to determine changes in the quality of life of the target groups and whether these changes have causal relationships with the RIDEPs.

Descriptive and narrative analysis is the key technique of interpretation and presentation of the information. In essence this is a qualitative analysis and its main purpose is to explain as fully as possible the trend of events, their causation and attribution. These two techniques are not mutually exclusive, rather they are used in this study in a complementary manner.

Although it would have been useful to test the correlation between the value of inputs of RIDEPs and increases in village outputs, to be able to use such a methodology would have necessitated a much larger sample and longer period of study than used in the present research. [To test correlation means using statistical measures of relation as a method of determining the relationship between variables (in this case, between the RIDEP inputs and outputs) in terms of causation and attribution.] Moreover, as far as the author is aware nobody else in the country is collecting these data. Resource constraints for the study meant such a methodology was not feasible at the present time. Also monitoring and ongoing evaluation were not fully in place. However, this methodology would be a valuable topic for future research endeavour.

The study mostly relied on the 'before and after' information

collected through documentary research, interviews and the questionnaires as discussed in the preceding sections. The 'before' information was based on the appraisal data contained in the RIDEP plan documents. These data were the benchmark data. The 'after' information comprised data on the RIDEP activities at the end of the implementation period. The data were gathered from implementation progress reports and/or terminal evaluation reports. In addition, data were collected through interviews and the questionnaires (see Appendices B and C).

The 'before and after' information is presented in a tabular format (see Chapters 5-7). The information aimed at making comparison of the 'after' situation with the 'before' one. Therefore, it was possible to determine the trend and change in the RIDEP outputs as a consequence of the use of inputs during the process of implementation. In other words, the 'before and after' data enabled comparing achievements and/or non-achievements with the appraisal targets.

The village survey questionnaires had also embodied a 'with and without' component. The non-RIDEP situation represented the 'without' component of the method. The purpose of this component was to collect information from the respondents on the non-RIDEP activities for comparison with the information on the RIDEP interventions. The crucial question was grassroots participation in the identification and formulation of projects. Further, the respondents (see Questionnaire II, Appendix C) were asked to give their perception on the effectiveness of the two kinds of public-sector interventions (RIDEP and non-RIDEP). In this respect, information was elicited from

the respondents on the influence of both the RIDEP and non-RIDEP projects on agricultural production and delivery of economic and social infrastructural services.

The Tanzanian economy has, as will be seen in Chapter 4, gone through a period of severe economic difficulties. This period has coincided with the implementation of the first-generation RIDEPs. This state poses a difficulty in establishing causal linkages of effects and impacts to the RIDEP activities, because of the fact that the declines of some of the indicators of the regional economies are simply a reflection of what has occurred in the national economy. In other words, one needs to address these macro/micro-economic interactions in order to note the extent of their influence on the final outcomes of the RIDEP interventions.

Belshaw (1984:12) has observed:

Usually, the set of regional policies and investments are only partially derived from the regional plan itself; both local and national political influences will have modified the recommendations emerging from the technical planning exercise. Further, the observed pattern of regional development will be the consequence of a wider set of variables including the effect of national-level policies and investment decisions, the pattern of development in other regions, other unplanned changes in the region's external context and the internal dynamics of the region's own political economy.

Belshaw concludes, nonetheless, that evaluation is a worthwhile endeavour (see below; also Belshaw, 1982 in the case of foreign-assisted RIDEPs in Tanzania).

As a result of the complex way in which the macro- and micro-

economic interactions influence progress of a regional economy, Belshaw has suggested two approaches of dealing with this difficulty: firstly, resort to "more subjective analyses about the impacts of plans upon the pattern of regional development" and secondly, the use of "a check-list of evaluation criteria or questions generated from the development objectives" (1984:13).

In the case of this study, it is significant to determine the influence of the national (and perhaps international) factors on the pattern of the regions' development in view of the RIDEP interventions. In this context, another key question would be: What would be the situation if there was no RIDEP? The implication for this question (i.e. with and without analysis) is the possibility that the declines in some of the indicators would be more pronounced, if the regions had no RIDEP interventions. Thus the value of the RIDEPs could lie primarily in cushioning some of the severity of the general economic decline.

3.6 The Limitations of the Study

The most critical limiting factor of this study was funding of the field research effort, as my employer and sponsor, the Sokoine University of Agriculture, was operating under a very tight budget at the time. In fact, this was a general trend with almost all national institutions in Tanzania during the period, a reflection of the severity of the economic difficulties confronting the country. Communications and transport were another set of limitations, being

further compounded by the dire fuel shortages then common in the country. The study being part of a higher degree research programme, time became another constraint.

Given these constraints, the findings of the study must be considered as part of a continuing research programme. Once resources become available, this activity should be continued so as to expand our understanding of the dynamics of integrated rural development planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation in Tanzania.

FOOTNOTES

1. Pioneering work on social and economic indicators, especially proxy indicators, has been carried out at the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), Geneva (see for example, D.V. McGranahan *et al*, 1972, *Contents and Measurement of Socioeconomic Development*, New York: Praeger and W. Scott *et al*, 1978, *Measurement and Analysis of Progress at the Local Level*, 2 Vols., Geneva: UNRISD).
2. Rutman (1977:31-35, *passim*) defines:
 - Reliability as the concern of how much of variation in the measured phenomenon is due to inconsistencies in measurement, rather than in the phenomenon being measured.
 - Validity as the degree to which the measurement succeeds in measuring what it purports to measure.
 - Internal validity as the confidence in the causal inference that the programme produced the measured effects is enhanced when plausible alternative explanations have been ruled out.
 - External validity as the generalisability of the findings across times, settings and persons.Imboden (1978:148) distinguishes five types of validity thus:
 - Internal validity as the ability of research design to yield unbiased estimates of effects of the treatment administered. The evaluation design should allow the ruling out of competing explanations for the effects of the project.
 - External validity -- monitoring and evaluation systems collect information on a few representative individuals to make inferences about the effects of a programme on all individuals to whom the policy is applied. It must be possible to *generalise* on measurements made on a few individuals to the population as a whole. Modern sampling techniques are used to counter threats to external validity.

Construct validity addresses the question of whether the indicator used *really indicates* what it is supposed to.
Measurement reliability addresses the question of careful data collection in the field and rigorous data processing.
Policy validity depends on the sensitivity of decision-makers to variations in measurements.

Moser and Kalton (1971:64) define:

Accuracy as closeness of a sample estimate to the correct population value.

Casley and Kumar (1987:59-60) give the following definitions:

Consistency: The values of indicators should stay constant as long as they are collected in identical conditions, no matter who does the collecting.

Specificity: Indicators should measure specific conditions that the project aims to change.

Sensitivity: Indicators should be highly sensitive to changes in a project situation.

3. These categories are contained in CCM, 1984, **Guidelines in Conducting of "Siasa ni Kilimo" [Agriculture is Politics] Competitions in Tanzania**, Dodoma: CCM Mass Mobilisation Department. These Guidelines have further defined the meaning of not only the **Ujamaa Village**, but also the socialisation process as it concerns the rural sector. The "Siasa ni Kilimo" competitions are an annual event which involves villages, districts, regions and parastatals. The purpose is to raise agricultural production and the socialisation of the productive activities in rural sector, especially in the villages.
4. It should be noted that the context of Belshaw's study was one of evaluation *ex-ante*, that is, the evaluation was carried out before implementation of the project/plan had commenced. This is not the same thing as appraisal *ex ante*, because of the plan's proposals.

To plan is to choose. Choose to go forward.

Julius K. Nyerere, **Speech to the TANU National
Conference, May 28, 1969.**

*A plan is not simply an informed guess about the future;
it is not just a prophesy about what will happen anyway.
Planning involves an act of will. An official plan is,
in some measure at least, an affirmation of resolve on
the part of the government that sponsors it. The govern-
ment is attempting not merely to predict the future but
to shape it.*

T. Wilson, **Planning and Growth, 1965.**

CHAPTER FOUR

CONTEXT FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT

PLANNING IN TANZANIA

4.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the context within which regional integrated development planning takes place in Tanzania and therefore the development philosophy with which the RIDEPs should be consistent and by which, in part, they must be judged. The chapter starts by providing basic information on Tanzania, including the most recent trends of its economy. There is a relationship between national and regional economic interventions and the achievements and shortcomings of the RIDEPs were affected by macro-economic events during the period under review. The chapter also includes a discussion of the Tanzanian decentralisation and villagisation programmes, with the aim of demonstrating their significance for and place in regional planning in Tanzania and their relevance to the RIDEP strategies for development.

Tanzania has an area of 945,100 sq km with a population estimated to be 22.5 million in mid 1987 (on the basis of the 1978 National Census). It has an average population density of 21 persons per sq km, with district means varying between 2 and 400 persons per sq km. In recent years the Tanzanian population has been growing at 3.3 per cent per annum, one of the higher population growth rates in Sub-Saharan Africa. The most densely populated areas are found in the mountain areas, which are generally border regions and are well endowed with

natural resources. The dry central wedge-like plateau (which is widest in the north - from the Smith Sound on Lake Victoria to the foot of the Usambara and Pare Mountains - tapering into a point in Chunya District of Mbeya Region in the south) is sparsely populated. However, it has the highest livestock concentration in the country and as a result soil erosion and desertification are already serious problems in some parts of this area. Over 85 per cent of the national population lives in the rural areas in some 8,300 designated villages, the majority of which is an outcome of the *villagisation* programme of the 1970s.

The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) was the political party founded in Tanganyika in 1954 to organise the people for the struggle for independence, whilst in the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), formed in 1957, performed similar functions. Tanzania became independent from the United Kingdom in December 9, 1961. It was a republic with an executive president within the Commonwealth a year later. On 26 April 1964 Tanganyika and Zanzibar formed a union, the United Republic of Tanzania. In February 1967 TANU and the Government adopted the Arusha Declaration which charted a new development strategy for the country. The key elements of this strategy were a commitment to the policy of socialism and self-reliance or reiteration of the leading role of agriculture and the adoption of a basic needs approach in rural development interventions. On 5 February 1977 TANU and ASP amalgamated to found a new political party - *Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)* - with jurisdiction over both parts of the Union (on the Mainland and in the Islands). In

this study, however, all reference to Tanzania is construed to mean or concern Tanzania Mainland (i.e. Tanganyika), unless it is specifically indicated otherwise.

Tanzania is divided into 20 administrative regions, one of which is an urban region (see Map 1.1, p. 2). A region is usually divided into 3-5 districts. In July 1986 there were 88 districts, of which 80 were rural districts and 8 were urban districts. In addition, there are 13 urban sub-districts. A district is further divided into divisions and wards. The ward is the smallest geographical and administrative unit which is normally comprised of 3-5 villages. Dodoma is the capital, but Dar es Salaam continues to be the hub of administrative, commercial and industrial activities of the country.

Tanzania is predominantly an agrarian country with an overwhelming majority of the population depending on agriculture for their livelihood. Thus, agriculture is the mainstay of the national economy, contributing between 1980 and 1985 an average of 40 per cent of GDP in 1976 prices (see Table 4.1) and over 80 per cent of foreign exchange earnings.

Tanzania has three major climatic zones with climatic, soil and vegetation conditions being influenced by altitude. The coastal strip, which varies from 16 to 70 km in width, is tropical with temperatures averaging 26.7-29.4°C, annual rainfall up to 1,900 mm and high humidity. The central plateau has an altitude of between 900 and 1,200 m above sea level and covers much of the country; it is hot and dry with annual rainfall ranging from 500 to 760 mm. The highlands are cool and fertile with an annual precipitation of up to 2,000 mm.

Table 4.1: Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost by Industrial Origin at 1976 Prices (Percentages)

Sector	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry & Fishing	41,8	41,9	40,6	39,5	39,4	40,2	40,0	40,9	39,5	39,9	39,4
Mining and Quarrying	1,0	1,0	0,9	0,9	0,8	0,8	0,8	0,7	0,7	0,7	0,6
Manufacturing	13,0	12,1	12,3	12,3	11,2	10,0	9,6	9,0	9,0	8,4	7,6
Electricity and Water	1,0	1,1	1,3	1,4	1,7	1,8	1,7	1,8	1,8	1,9	2,1
Construction	4,1	4,2	3,5	3,8	3,9	3,8	3,9	2,3	2,6	2,3	2,2
Wholesale and Retail Trade, Restaurants and Hotels	13,1	12,7	12,6	12,4	11,9	11,5	11,1	11,1	11,0	10,8	10,5
Transport, Storage and Communications	7,8	7,6	7,7	7,1	7,6	7,0	7,0	6,3	7,1	7,5	7,4
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and business services	9,4	9,6	10,0	10,2	10,4	10,7	11,2	12,0	12,2	12,2	12,1
Public Administration and other services	10,8	11,9	13,3	14,6	15,3	16,5	17,5	19,0	19,0	19,4	21,2
Less Imputed Bank Service Charges	2,0	2,1	2,2	2,2	2,2	2,3	2,8	3,1	2,9	3,1	3,1
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Source: Hali ya Uchumi kwa Mwaka 1985 na 1986 [Annual Economic Surveys for 1985 and 1986], Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning, Dar es Salaam.

Generally, the country is well endowed with agricultural and natural resources. Tanzania has over 40 million hectares of potentially cultivable agricultural land, of which 6.2 million ha (or 15.5 per cent) is currently used for crop production. In addition, it has over one million hectares of potentially irrigable land (FAO, 1961, 1969 and 1972; World Bank, 1961), but only 145,000 ha are known to be under irrigation (Tanzania, Government of, 1983:50; Ngasongwa, 1984:64-5).

Tanzania has, in contrast with many developing countries, several cash (export) crops. They include coffee, sisal, cotton, cashewnuts, tobacco, tea, sugar cane and pyrethrum. Food crops include maize, rice, sorghum, millets, cassava, bananas, sweet potatoes, Irish potatoes, pulses, oilseeds, fruits and vegetables.

In 1981 Tanzania had 12.9 million head of cattle, 5.9 million

goats, and 3.7 million sheep. Inefficient marketing organisations and transport bottlenecks are some of the difficulties inhibiting more productive utilisation of these resources.

Mineral resources, comprising diamonds, gold and other metals, salt, gypsum, kaolin, etc. are important commodities earning foreign exchange for the country. Other minerals, known to be in exploitable deposits, include coal, iron ore, phosphates, uranium, natural gas, etc. In recent years, mining activities have been expanding with new mines being commissioned for gold, coal, natural gas and phosphates.

4.2 The National Economy: Recent Trends

The Tanzanian economy had faced immense problems during the past decade, 1976-86. In essence, this is the period of the Third Five Year Plan, 1976-81 and First Union Five Year Plan, 1981-86. The end of the Third Five Year Plan also marked the end of the first perspective plan 1964-80, whilst the First Union Five Year Plan was the first of the series of medium-term plans of the second perspective plan, 1981-2000.

Signs of malaise in the Tanzanian economy began to manifest themselves since 1979, when falling agricultural and industrial production became noticeable to a wide section of the population. In particular, shortages of consumer goods, especially of petroleum products, became a common problem. The largest trade deficit since independence was encountered in 1978, amounting to over Tshs 4.1 billion. Table 4.2 presents details of the value of trade between Tanzania and foreign countries. [This table should be read in

Table 4.2: Value of Trade between Tanzania and Foreign Countries 1976-86
(Current Tshs Million)

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Exports	4,109	4,536	4,671	4,216	4,165	4,806	4,256	4,319	5,866	5,937	10,963
Imports	5,421	6,199	8,798	8,885	10,047	9,739	10,499	9,018	12,961	17,962	30,270

Trade											
Balance	-1,312	-1,663	-4,127	-4,669	-5,885	-4,933	-6,243	-4,669	-7,095	-12,025	-19,307

Source: Hali ya Uchumi kwa Mwaka 1985 na 1986 [Economic Survey for 1985 & 1986],
Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning, Dar es Salaam.

conjunction with the data on the devaluation of the Tanzanian shilling in Table 1.2, p. 12.1 The impact of the 1978 deficit began to be felt in 1979, during which year the trade deficit rose to around Tshs 4.7 billion, a rise of 13 per cent over the previous year. The trade deficit rose to Tshs 5.9 billion in 1980, thus triggering immense anxiety in the government which reacted by launching the National Economic Survival Plan (NESP) in 1981 (Tanzania, Government of, 1981). The plan, which covered a three-year period, 1981-83, aimed at arresting the economic deterioration by instituting measures that utilised more the domestic potential and at the same time removed the shortcomings and impediments in the national economy. The key element in the plan was a massive export drive to earn more foreign exchange to counter the ever-expanding trade deficit, which, although it declined to Tshs 4.9 billion in 1981, picked up again to Tshs 6.2 billion in 1982. In that year the government launched the Structural Adjustment Plan (SAP) 1982-85, which was prepared with the assistance of a team of expatriate experts (Tanzania, Government of, 1982).

Nonetheless, the deficit has been growing at a faster rate since

1984 from Tshs 7 billion to Tshs 19.3 billion in 1986 (Table 4.2). And this has been in spite of all these attempts because they did not address the problems at all or sufficiently to make the requisite impact on the national economy (see below, pp. 134-5). Perhaps, the agreement with the IMF in early 1986 and the subsequent launching of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), 1986-89 may help to ameliorate some of these difficulties. The ERP aimed at "increasing production levels in important sectors and provision of services; increasing foreign exchange earnings with the objective of improving the balance of payments, the Government Budget, together with the reduction of growth in money supply and inflation in the country." (Msuya, 1986:8, op. cit.). In a nutshell, the ERP aimed at increasing GDP at an average rate of 4.5 per cent per year between 1986 and 1991. Export drive continues to be the focus of this programme too. The data in Table 4.2 illustrate also the fact that the value of exports has grown 2.7 times during the decade, whilst that of imports has grown by 5.6 times. The main source of the export earnings have been agricultural commodities, whose production as we shall see below has been declining throughout the period under review.

Tanzania's economic difficulties started much earlier, during the early seventies. There were two sets of causes which have precipitated these economic problems. The first set comprised extraneous factors: (i) the oil price shocks (1973/74 and 1979/80), which had direct and indirect impacts on the national economy, especially on the agricultural sector, because of rising prices of oil-based chemical inputs, soaring costs of rural transport, and

domestic industrial products; the cumulative effect of all this is the large deficits in foreign trade (Table 4.2), (ii) the "export inflation" from the industrial (capitalist) countries which easily transferred some of their costs as a result of the new prices of oil products to non-oil developing countries, including Tanzania, (iii) the international recession (especially between 1979 and 1983), which depressed further prices of primary commodities in real terms, (iv) the ever-growing burden of debt-servicing, (v) persistent droughts (1972-74, 1980-82) and floods (1979/80, 1983/84) (MDB, 1981 and 1985; Ngasongwa, 1984 and 1986), (vi) the war with Idi Amin of Uganda (1978/79) and (vii) the collapse of the East African Community, which meant that Tanzania had to establish its own national services at great costs, both in domestic and foreign exchange resources.

The second set of causes were of domestic origin. Expansionary fiscal and monetary policies fuelled inflationary pressures on the national economy and thus led to over-valuation of the exchange rate with consequences inimical to the export sector and to a more equitable income distribution. This was because the cheaper, imported industrial and consumer goods benefited more the urban sections of the population (see Belshaw in Hawksworth, 1984:5-11.), while export incentives were reduced. Also, insufficient resources were allocated to agriculture (Nyerere, 1982; Ngasongwa, 1984 and 1986) compared to industry, whose benefits accrue more in the long-term than in the short-term. To inadequate producer incentives were added poor organisation and mismanagement of the crop marketing system. There was a rapid growth of the size of the public sector

(both government and the parastatals) with consequent management and recurrent expenditure problems. Extensive price controls precipitated the emergence and sustenance of parallel markets and the "leak" through over-the-border trade of primary export and food commodities and game trophies. Finally, there were generally inadequate and ineffective agricultural support services (extension and research) so that there were very few technological packages to extend to farmers.

GDP grew at 5.5 per cent (in real terms) during the period 1973-78. As the Tanzanian population was growing at 3.3 per cent per annum, average per capita GDP grew at an annual rate of 2.2 per cent. In the years 1979-81 aggregate growth declined to 3.3 per cent; the bottom of the decline being reached in 1982/83 at 3.2 per cent per annum. The period 1980-83 has shown a decline of per capita income by 6 per cent, indicating that by and large the living standard of Tanzanians has been deteriorating as a result of the economic difficulties facing the country. Caution must be exercised when interpreting this conclusion which is based on officially recorded transactions. However, in 1984 the GDP registered an increase of 3.0 per cent, thus heralding some signs of economic recovery (Msuya, 1985). These signs of economic recovery continued in 1985, though at a lower rate of 2.6 per cent. A better performance of the economy was registered in 1986, when the official GDP growth attained 3.8 per cent, surpassing population growth for the first time for several years (Tanzania, Government of, 1987a:1).

4.2.1 Trends in agricultural production

Tanzania's agriculture is predominantly smallholder and subsistence-oriented, with mean per capita land holdings of 2 ha. Per capita cultivated land varies greatly amongst the rural population. For example, in Kilimanjaro it is 0.3 ha and in Rukwa it is 0.64 (Tanzania, Government of, 1982:61). The traditional sector is larger than the modern sector, which is nevertheless significant. The modern sector is comprised of state farms and private commercial farms or plantations. The modern sector accounts for almost all sisal production and the majority share of tea and wheat production. The rest comes from the traditional sector. In this respect, increasing agricultural production and productivity, as envisaged in the RIDEP plans, essentially meant investing in the smallholder and subsistence-oriented sector.

Table 4.1 presents data on GDP by industrial origin between 1976 and 1986 (in real terms) which clearly illustrate the significant role of the agricultural sector in the Tanzanian economy. In addition, agriculture contributed, as noted above, over 80 per cent of foreign exchange earnings. Moreover, agriculture provides the nation with food; even in the recent drought years about 90 per cent of the food was produced within the country. Agriculture provides raw materials for the domestic industrial sector, whose GDP contribution has averaged 10.9 per cent during the period 1976-86.

Agriculture's contribution rose from 41.8 per cent in 1976 to 58.9 per cent in 1986 (in current prices), thus equalling the 1960s

levels (*ibid.*, 1987b:11), that is, structural transformation in reverse, due to declines in the non-agricultural sectors. The first perspective plan had envisaged, among others, the reduction of the contribution of agriculture to the GDP from 50 per cent in 1964/65 to 39 per cent by 1980, whilst that of industry was to be raised from 6 per cent to 13 per cent over the same period. Although it did reach 13.3 per cent in 1978, by 1986 it had declined to 7.6 (in 1976 prices). Moreover, although agriculture's proportional contribution to the GDP had increased, actual production has declined during the 1980s, especially of export crops with possible exceptions of coffee and tea (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4; one must, however, attach the necessary caveats when interpreting these data as they are based on official statistics which underrecord actual production).

Production declines for sisal, cashew and pyrethrum have been very marked; the 1985/86 production was for sisal 31 per cent, for cashew 26 per cent, for pyrethrum 29 per cent and for tobacco 70 per cent of the 1976/77 production. In monetary terms, the scenario is equally unsatisfactory (Table 4.5), although the last three years have seen much higher export crop earnings in Tsh terms following devaluation and commodity price hikes (particularly for 1986 for almost all the Tanzanian export crops). The 1986 commodity price of coffee was 2.3 times the 1985 price or about 5 times the 1976 price. Although there were average increases of between 2.5 and 5 times of the 1976 coffee prices by the end of the decade, price fluctuations were considerable. Since Tanzania's exports have been declining throughout the period, there was a net loss in export earnings to the

Table 4.3: Production of Cash Crops 1976-86 (tons)

Crop	Peak Production		1976/77	1977/78	1978/79	1979/80	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84	1984/85	1985/86
	Year	Quantity										
Coffee	1980/81	67,000	49,000	53,000	50,000	48,000	67,000	56,000	53,000	50,000	49,000	53,400
Cotton	1971/72	64,500	40,400	47,000	60,500	58,400	53,800	44,200	42,900	51,766	36,200	56,000
Sisal	1963/64	230,400	105,000	92,000	81,000	86,000	74,000	61,000	46,000	38,000	32,000	32,270
Cashew	1973/74	145,100	96,807	68,483	57,068	41,416	56,558	44,331	32,966	48,306	32,532	25,000
Tobacco	1977/78	18,273	17,900	18,273	17,087	17,334	16,675	16,234	13,635	11,012	13,315	12,552
Tea	1978/79	18,300	15,000	15,200	18,300	17,500	17,300	16,300	15,500	17,500	16,798	17,550
Pyrethrum	1967/68	6,700	3,900	1,300	2,900	1,600	1,600	2,000	1,440	1,700	1,600	1,150

Source: (i) Budget Speeches for Fiscal Year 1985/86 and 1986/87, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development, Dar es Salaam.
(ii) Hali ya Uchumi 1985 na 1986 [Economic Surveys for 1985 and 1986], Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning, Dar es Salaam.

Table 4.4: Purchases of Major Food Crops by the National Milling Corporation (NMC) (tons)(a)

Crop	Peak Purchase		1976/77	1977/78	1978/79	1979/80	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84	1984/85	1985/86
	Year	Quantity										
Maize	1978/79	218,000	130,000	216,000	218,000	161,489	105,113	89,440	85,961	70,961	89,996	178,498
Paddy(b)	1977/78	53,957	26,257	53,957	52,164	46,530	20,317	23,000	32,143	33,911	18,716	15,933
Wheat	1985/86	50,289	27,242	35,011	28,740	26,530	27,912	23,080	31,175	28,256	33,185	50,289
Sorghum	1979/80	57,631	2,900	11,378	33,610	57,631	19,362	10,456	4,556	5,520	2,364	
Millet	1979/80	16,834	1,103	6,422	14,488	16,834	1,299	339	62	66	56	14,744
Cassava(c)	1978/79	63,719	19,746	36,937	63,719	44,214	7,516	9,233	18,764	30,687	19,875	12,935
Beans	1979/80	34,323	10,208	31,668	27,946	34,323	16,314	14,059	11,288	8,273	3,587	5,659

Source: (i) National Milling Corporation.
(ii) Hali ya Uchumi ya Mwaka 1986 [Economic Survey 1986], Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning, Dar es Salaam.

Notes: (a) NMC is the parastatal charged with the responsibility to purchase and distribute food crops in the country. It also imports all food grains when necessary.
(b) Includes rice based on the principle that 65 kg of rice are equivalent to 100 kg of paddy.
(c) Includes both dried cassava and cassava flour.

nation. If Tanzania had kept the 1980/81 coffee production level of 67,000 tons or thereabouts to 1985/86, it is clear that the country would have earned more foreign exchange than hitherto. For example, Kahama *et al.* estimate that Tanzania could have earned Tshs 657 million between 1971 and 1979 at 80 per cent of the 1971 cashew production of 149,000 tons had it been maintained for the whole of

Table 4.5: Value of Export Commodities sold to Foreign Countries (Current Tshs Million)

Commodity	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Coffee	1,288	1,857	1,303	1,213	1,181	1,186	1,211	1,427	2,293	2,031	5,416
Cotton	614	541	420	391	399	642	523	689	754	514	1,016
Sisal	241	229	211	472	240	270	224	145	157	100	172
Cashew	131	188	289	230	186	511	243	189	335	193	354
Tobacco	188	211	222	149	103	151	178	127	138	232	450
Tea	135	178	168	164	183	168	172	243	359	279	445
Total	2,597	3,204	2,613	2,619	2,292	2,928	2,551	2,820	4,036	3,349	7,853

Source: (i) Hali ya Uchumi 1986 [Economic Survey 1986], Table 16.
(ii) Kilimo [Ministry of Agriculture], Budget Speech for 1985/86, Table 3.
(iii) Bank of Tanzania (undated), Tanzania: Twenty Years of Independence (1961-1981); A Review of Political and Economic Performance, Dar es Salaam: BOT, Table 14.

that period (Kahama, Maliyamkono and Wells, 1986:65-6). In any case, production of cashew has continued to decline since then, although it had improved somewhat during the years 1980/81, 1981/82 and 1983/84. As noted, the production of export crops has declined throughout the decade and this has meant substantial losses of revenue to the government in form of both foreign exchange and taxes of various kinds.

For food production the situation is slightly different (see Table 4.4, which shows marketed production through official channels). The period 1976-79 saw substantial increases of food crops sales, especially of sorghum, millets and cassava (commonly known as the "less-favoured staples" as opposed to the "favoured or preferred staples": maize, rice and wheat). Three factors brought about these increases. Firstly, the weather was quite favourable during the whole period. Secondly, the massive *Kilimo cha Kufa na Kupona* [Agriculture as a Matter of Life and Death] campaigns of 1975/76 crop season

positively influenced the increases of food production. This situation had been precipitated by the 1972-74 drought which necessitated considerable imports of staple grains in 1973/74 and 1974/75 amounting to 423,700 tons and 410,700 tons, costing US \$ 106 million and US \$ 104 million respectively. Thirdly, the "less favoured staples" seem to have benefited more than the "favoured staples" from the government's pricing policies of the time (Ellis, 1982:263-75), leading to embarrassingly large stocks and NMC overdrafts with the National Bank of Commerce. Floods in 1979 and droughts in 1980-84 are some of the major factors that constrained increased food production in Tanzania's agriculture during the first half of the 1980s (MDB, 1983 and 1986).

Nonetheless, both internal and extraneous causes have been mentioned to be at the root of the poor performance of the Tanzanian agriculture during the past decade or so. The internal causes include unsatisfactory agricultural policies on producer prices, inadequacies and poor management of agricultural marketing, weak or poor distribution of agricultural inputs, inadequate and ineffective extension services, irrelevant and/or inappropriate research priorities and activities, inadequate training and lack or shortage of resources (Hansel, De Vries and Ndedya, 1975; De Vries, 1977; Ngasongwa, 1980; Ellis, 1980 and 1982; Lupanga, Ngasongwa and Shayo, 1982; Nyerere, 1982; World Bank, 1983).

In setting producer prices for export crops, the government has been guided by the need to maintain producer incentives and to take account of the rising costs of marketing and low international

commodity prices. In the event, it was the producers who suffered as the marketing parastatals retained a greater share of the export price than that actually going to the producers (Ellis, 1980 and 1982). The government's concern to restrain food costs for the minimum wage earners (in urban centres) has kept the lid on producer prices of food crops which in effect removed the key incentive to the rural producers and also compounding the problem of urban bias (Amey, 1978).

The real producer price of maize (the major staple grain) fell from 1977/78 to 1982/83 but recovered in 1984/85. This coincided with the favourable weather conditions and resulted in an increase in food production in 1984/85 and 1985/86, leading to an overall drop of 30 per cent in food prices to the consumer (Tanzania, Government of, 1987b:6). Consequently, the NMC's procurements of maize, which had fallen from 218,000 tons in 1978/79 to 70,961 tons in 1983/84, recovered to 178,498 tons by the 1985/86 crop season (Bomani, 1986:49).

Between 1975/76 and 1981/82 the real producer price index of all export crops has consistently fallen. Although real producer prices were increased by 5 per cent per year between 1982/83 and 1984/85, they were in real terms lower than in the early seventies (Tanzania, Government of, 1987b:6-7). As a result of this trend, as part of the SAP, a national agricultural policy was published in 1983, which, among other policy reforms, introduced the privatisation of land as one of the incentives to increase agricultural production (*ibid.*, 1983:107-111). Perhaps, it is too early to evaluate the impact of this decision, but it seems evident that the response has been

somewhat hesitant and of muted enthusiasm.

Distribution of agricultural inputs, especially of fertilisers, was problematic; late arrival and inadequacy of the inputs were common occurrences. Most of these difficulties can be blamed on the poor performance of the crop authorities, inadequate transport facilities and shortage of fuel and spares. Nonetheless, fertilisers increased from 70,360 tons in 1976 to 107,100 tons in 1980, dropped to 81,910 tons in 1982. Since then fertiliser distribution has been expanding, reaching 178,285 tons in 1985/86.

4.2.2 Trends in Industrial Production

Industrial production is crucial for the successful implementation of RIDEP projects, especially those involving construction such as classrooms, teachers houses, health facilities and agricultural inputs. Also, consumer or incentive goods availability and prices are crucial in maintaining agriculture's terms of trade. As will be observed in Chapters 5-7, lack or inadequacy of building and construction materials was a critical bottleneck. The review of industrial production which follows aims at giving the reader a brief contextual framework of these problems.

The year 1986 is the eighth consecutive year during which the industrial sector continued to register declining output. The share of industry in the GDP has decreased continuously from its peak of 13.3 per cent in 1978 to 7.6 in 1986 (Tables 4.1, p. 130). Value-added in industry has declined in real terms by 15 per cent a year between 1978

and 1982, and by 11 per cent during 1983-84 (Tanzania, Government of, 1987a:1). In 1986 the decrease was 6.7 per cent compared to the decrease of 4.0 per cent in 1984 (*ibid*). Capacity utilisation in most of the industrial enterprises in the country is between 30 and 40 per cent. Since Tanzania's industries are import-dependent, they have been hard hit by the chronic shortages of foreign exchange, thus denying them essential spares and raw materials. Nonetheless, the period 1978-82 saw some increase in investment in manufacturing, following the Basic Industrial Strategy of the Third Five-Year Plan which instituted an industrial restructuring (more investment in relatively capital intensive industrial enterprises as opportunities in the basic import-substitution had reached their limit) and partly, external finance was already committed and available for certain large scale projects, which had long lead times of preparation and subsequent construction and/or installation.

With the introduction of the SAP, however, emphasis had shifted from new investment to rehabilitation and maintenance, increased utilisation of existing capacity and completion of on-going projects. Moreover, a package of production incentives for the industrial enterprises were introduced as part of the massive export promotion package mentioned above. These included export retention schemes, export credit guarantees, concessional interest rates, trade liberalisation of imports through the own-funds import scheme and the Presidential awards for industrial achievements and inventions and/or innovations. However, given the acute shortage of foreign exchange, there is greater need for government control of this scarce resource.

Export retention schemes are conducive to abuse by individuals and hence wasteful and counterproductive.

Other incentives were the currency devaluations of 1982, 1983, 1984 and 1986 (so that in a period of the four years the shilling had been devalued by over 80 per cent) (see Table 1.2, p. 12), price decontrol, deconfinement of some consumer goods (of both local and external origin) and simplification of the licensing procedures for industry and trade.

This period saw also chronic shortages of consumer goods in the country and the escalation of consumer prices. The index of retail prices of goods consumed by minimum wage earners in Dar es Salaam (1977 = 100) rose from 98.9 in 1976 to 262.9 in 1982 and again to 787.9 in 1986, that is, almost eight times in a period of ten years. The rate of inflation spiralled from 12 per cent in 1978/79 to 33 per cent by 1984/85. In this regard, the situation was worse in the rural areas than in urban centres, both in the availability of consumer goods and in their consumer prices.

4.2.3 Production Infrastructure

In this section the discussion will focus on road and railway transport, communications, warehousing, and construction in order to demonstrate the significance of these infrastructural developments in the national economy as well as for regional development planning and implementation. In particular, an attempt is made to demonstrate their links with the RIDEP interventions, especially in the movement of

materials and inputs from their places of manufacture or entry to the sites. Table 4.1 (p. 130) summarises the trends of these sectors during the period under review. The data show declines in the GDP contribution of these sectors with the exception of electricity and water supply.

All in all these declines are less severe than experienced by export crops or industry.

(a) The Transport and Communication System

A basic transport and communication system is in place in the country to meet the normal requirements for the ferrying of agricultural produce, farm inputs and consumer goods. The main problems facing Tanzania's transport and communication system are the general run-down due to inadequate and poor maintenance caused by lack or inadequate equipment, spares, tyres, tubes and fuel as well as poor planning and implementation. Feeder road networks, which link up the rural areas and villages with the urban centres, are worst off in this respect. In particular, fuel shortages in the rural areas have been more acute than in the urban centres with the consequence of pile-ups of agricultural produce and hold-ups and delays in the distribution of inputs. The implication of this for the RIDEPS was serious bottlenecks for the implementation of the various project components (see Chapters 5-7).

For example, these difficulties have been encountered by all the six regional transport companies (RETCOs) (of Mwanza, Tabora, Dodoma,

Mtwara, Ruvuma and Kagera). Although these RETCOs registered profits (with the exception of the Kagera RETCO) in 1985/86, a decision was made not to establish any more RETCOs, because of the generally poor state of the economy and that it was imperative to strengthen first the existing companies. The RETCOs had 308 lorries (with trailers) and 49 buses by December 1986 and were able to ferry 153,457 tons of agricultural produce, inputs and consumer goods (70 per cent of which were agriculture-related) and 64.7 million passenger kilometres during that year. These figures represent a decline when compared to those of 1985. At the time there were 330 lorries, which had ferried 260,488 tons (Nyang'anyi, 1986:52-3). Nonetheless, one third of this fleet was over 4 years old and given the "very bad state" of most the roads, vehicle life deterioration is fast. This problem is compounded by the chronic shortages of fuel, tyres, tubes and spares, and their very high prices. The 1986 devaluation of the shilling has led to price increases of up to 300 per cent in vehicle spares, tyres and tubes, whereas the cost of purchasing a motor vehicle had gone up 1.5 times (Tanzania, Government of, 1987b:119). Thus, the RIDEPs' contributions of transport equipment, fuel, spares and construction and/or rehabilitation of some feeder road network was undoubtedly important in palliating some of these constraints.

Railways, harbours, posts and telecommunications and air transport services were run by the East African Community until its collapse in February 1977. As a result the government had to bear the burden of establishing, administering and managing these services in the country. For example, Tanzania had to build a whole structure of

Civil Aviation including the creation of a new national airline, to build repair and maintenance workshops for railway locomotives and to set up and run at great cost an earth satellite station as well as establish central services for postal and telecommunication services. To give an indication of the costs involved Tanzania had to pay Tshs 212 million (of which Tshs 170 million were in foreign exchange) for the construction and equipment of the diesel locomotive workshops in Morogoro, Tabora and Moshi (Nyerere, 1982:6).

Financial and manpower resources were the main constraints at the time of take-over and establishment of these services and over the years acute shortages of fuel, spares and rolling stock added up to the difficulties facing these services. This sector is forex-intensive in most of its requirements of equipment (motor vehicles, aircraft, locomotives and other rolling stock, ships, etc) spares and fuel. Nyang'anyi (1986:4) states that over 80 per cent of the requirements of the sector of transport, communications and works must be imported from overseas.

Turning to the rolling stock of the Tanzania Railways Corporation (TRC) we note that in 1977 it had 140 locomotives, of which 46 were diesel-powered ones. By 1986 there were 134 locomotives, of which 112 were diesel powered. However, this is only 66.3 per cent of the size of the locomotive fleet of 1983 when there were 202 of them, among which 116 were diesel locomotives. The process of dieselisation had been initiated before the first oil price shock (1973/74) and even continued after the second oil price shock (1979/80); this was exactly the wrong time for such a process to be pursued. Given the fact that

abundant coal deposits are known to exist in the country close to line of rail, the dieselisation of the railway system was definitely inappropriate. Further, the TAZARA (Tanzania-Zambia railway) could have easily used steam engines using coal as their source of power, since the Chinese have this technology and widely use it in their country.

The central railway line is of crucial significance to the Kigoma region as it is the only life line linking it to Dar es Salaam on the coast. As will be seen in Chapter 5, shortages of rolling stock and fuel seriously affected the implementation of the various RIDEP components.

The situation is even worse for passenger carriages which dropped to 172 in 1986 from 274 in 1977 and it is not surprising that there is considerable over-crowding in the passenger trains especially in the central line, Dar es Salaam-Kigoma and Mwanza. In fact, there was a fall in number of passengers ferried by the TRC from 3.5 million in 1977 to 2.3 million in 1986, i.e. 34.3 per cent. There was also a drop in the tonnage of goods carried from 1.2 million tons in 1977 to 877,000 tons in 1986, a drop of 26.9 per cent, despite the fact that the number of goods wagons rose from 5,551 to 7,123, an increase of 28.3 per cent. The TRC has 2,600 km of rail-line most which was laid during the first two decades of this century and therefore it is old and require constant repairs and maintenance. Derailments and washaways are frequent, amounting to 173 in 1983/84 and 150 in 1984/85 (Nyang'anyi, 1986:56).

Regarding postal and telecommunication services the picture is

much better than in the services discussed in the preceding paragraphs. For instance, there were 133 post offices and 410 sub-post offices in the country in 1977. By 1986 there were 162 and 576, representing increases of 21.8 and 40.5 per cent respectively. There were 138 telephone exchanges with a capacity of 46,720 lines in 1977 and by 1986 these had risen to 173 with a capacity of 73,942 lines, increases of 25.4 and 58.1 per cent respectively.

(b) Construction

The contribution of this sector to the GDP, as illustrated in Table 4.1 (p. 130) declined from 4.1 per cent to 2.2 per cent during the period under review. The main constraints facing this sector are scarcity of building materials and their high prices and lack or inadequacy of equipment, fuel, funds and appropriate manpower. Table 4.6 presents information on the domestic production of four major building items between 1976 and 1986. The data show expansive and slackening trends for all these items during the period under consideration. For cement production the peak was reached in 1981 when 390,000 tons were produced as opposed to 244,000 tons in 1976, an increase of 62.6 per cent. Production, however, declined to 247,000 tons in 1983 thus levelling with the 1977 production, a decrease of 36.7 per cent from peak.

Cement production picked up again in 1984 at 369,000 tons, an increase of 49.4 per cent over the 1983 production. A new peak of production was reached in 1986 at 435,000 tons. Nonetheless, demand

Table 4.6: Trends in Domestic Production of Selected Building Materials
1976-86 (tons)

Year	Cement	Rolled Steel	Iron Sheets	Timber (Plywood) (in cu.m.)
1976	244,000	10,500	25,943	806,000
1977	247,000	11,912	27,506	1,217,000
1978	250,000	16,423	30,183	1,003,000
1979	299,000	17,950	29,985	804,000
1980	306,000	18,414	17,322	874,000
1981	390,000	16,473	10,105	712,000
1982	334,000	12,104	16,044	770,000
1983	247,000	12,104	16,044	1,728,000
1984	369,000	9,445	22,661	1,892,000
1985	376,000	11,297	21,672	1,589,000
1986	435,000	11,289	8,857	1,632,000

Source: Annual Economic Surveys for 1981, 1985 and 1986, Ministry of Finance,
Economic Affairs and Planning, Dar es Salaam.

and consumption was already 451,590 tons in 1972 and therefore, the consumption of 470,368 tons in 1986 - local production was 435,000 tons, an extra amount of 42,000 tons of cement had been imported from Mozambique - is definitely below demand. [The figures do not tally because in 1986 Tanzania had exported 6,632 tons to its western neighbours (Tanzania, Government of, 1987b:104)]. Shortages of cement and corrugated iron sheets, not to mention rolled steel bars, were frequent headaches of officials involved in the implementation of the RIDEPS.

The production of rolled steel, iron corrugated sheets and timber (plywood) has also exhibited a fluctuating trend during the period, 1976-86. Steel production rose from 10,500 tons in 1976 to 18,414 tons in 1980 and thereafter declined to an all time low of 9,445 tons in 1984, almost equalling the 1974 production of 9,300 tons. Production picked up again to 11,297 tons in 1985. Iron sheet production peaked

in 1978 at 30,183 tons, but thereafter declined quickly to 10,105 tons in 1981, picking up to 16,044 tons in the following year, reaching 22,661 tons in three years later. Thence production declined to only 8,857 tons in 1986. Production of timber rose from 806,000 cu.m. in 1976 to 1,217,000 cu.m. in the following year, but declined continuously thereafter for four years, reaching bottom at 712,000 cu.m. in 1981, picked up to 770,000 in 1982, reaching the peak in 1984 at 1,892,000 cu.m. In the last two years production fluctuated as is evident in Table 4.6.

Under these circumstances and given the foreign exchange constraint, it is not surprising that chronic shortages and price escalation of building materials were some of the major difficulties confronting this sector during the period under review. The implication of these production trends is critical to the RIDEP construction activities in terms of increasing costs, delays in implementation and consequent non-achievement of the stated targets.

4.2.4 Social Infrastructure

This section is devoted to a discussion on the progress of provision of education, health and water supply facilities during the period 1976-86. Tanzania's commitment in the provision of these services dates from 1971 when TANU directed the government to give top priority to these three services (TANU, 1971) in the allocation of resources in order to accelerate their provision to the people. The content of regional plans has been influenced by national objectives

and priorities of these three services in the allocation of resources in order to accelerate their provision to the people. However, progress has been achieved in these sectors without regard to the ability of the economy to pay for the arbitrarily accelerated rates of provision.

(a) Education

In 1974 the TANU National Executive Committee brought forward the date for the achievement of universal primary education (UPE) from 1989 to 1977. At the time primary education enrolment was 50 per cent of all school-age children. In essence, this meant redoubling the efforts in providing education facilities, materials and manpower. The previous five year plans (the First Five Year Plan (FFYP), 1964-69 and Second Five Year Plan (SFYP), 1969-74) placed emphasis on the expansion of secondary education which was necessitated by the objective to achieve self-sufficiency in middle- and high-level manpower by 1980 (as one of the objectives of perspective plan 1964-80). The 1974 TANU directive was another attempt to strengthen the principles embodied in the policy document of *Education for Self-Reliance* (Nyerere, 1967b) which is *inter alia* an elaboration of the Arusha Declaration (*ibid*, 1967a). These include the merging of theory with practice, equality, anti-elitism and the relating of the school activities to the community affairs (TANU, 1974).

The earliest quantifiable achievements of the UPE efforts are impressive. Pupil enrolment in the primary schools rose from 1,874,000

million in 1976 to 3,160,000 in 1985, a rise of 68.6 per cent. There were 506,000 pupils enrolled in Standard I in 1976 and the figure reached 525,000 pupils in 1985 (this represents a fall of 3.1 per cent of the 1983 pupil enrolment). Table 4.7 presents data on primary school enrolment in Tanzania between 1976 and 1985. The largest pupil population was enrolled in November 1977 (in Table 4.7 the figure appears under 1978) when 898,000 pupils were registered, they completed their seven-year primary education in 1984. However, by that year only 650,000 pupils reached and completed Standard VII; 248,000 pupils or 27.6 per cent dropped out in the course of the seven years of primary education. Drop-out rates and truancy in the primary schools are some of the several teething problems confronting delivery of primary education in the country (see below).

The data in Table 4.7 also show the expansion of teaching manpower in the primary schools during the decade under review. The size of teaching staff has grown from 39,000 in 1976 to 93,000 teachers in 1985, that is 2.4 times. In general terms, the teacher-pupil ratio has improved from 1:48 in 1976 to 1:34 in 1985. Nonetheless, one needs to interpret these data with caution, because of the fact that the overwhelming majority of these teachers are untrained or very superficially trained. The decision to use some Standard VII pupils to teach their fellow pupils in the lower standards is a clear testimony of the desperate shortage of teaching staff in the primary schools. As is demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, there is an acute shortage of grade A teachers (ex-Form IV leavers with two years teacher training). In 1982 the shortage of teaching

Table 4.7: Primary school enrolment 1976-1985

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Number of schools	7,522	8,367	9,546	9,794	9,897	9,947	10,002	10,015	10,079	10,147
Number of teachers (000)	39	45	64	77	81	82	88	90	91	93
Pupils-Std I enrolled (000)	506	543	898(a)	541	487	498	497	542	533	525
Pupils-Std VII enrolled (000)	156	173	179	192	211	356	420	464	650	423
Pupils-Std I-VII enrolled (000)	1,874	2,194	2,933	3,197	3,361	3,531	3,504	3,554	3,506	3,160

Source: Annual Economic Surveys for 1981, 1985 and 1986, Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning, Dar es Salaam.

Note: (a) This exceptionally large number is due to the fact that this was the first year of the UPE campaigns.

staff in the primary schools was 34.9 per cent (cf shortages in secondary schools and teacher training colleges of 29.8 and 29.6 per cent respectively; Tanzania, Government of, 1984:32). In particular, there were shortages of science, mathematics and English language teachers (Tanzania, Government of, 1987b:46). Needless to add that the implication of this problem for the quality of education is the lowering of education standards, and in each region with a UPE target achievements were constrained by nationally experienced shortages. The poor standard of English has spread to the universities as well with consequences to the teaching and learning processes there.

The most critical problem, perhaps, facing primary education is the shortage of schooling facilities and materials. For example, in 1984 there were only 26,357 permanent classrooms, which was 33.3 per cent of the total need. The shortfall of teachers houses was 73,684 units or 75.3 per cent of total requirement (Makwetta, 1985:3).

Chronic shortages of textbooks, exercise books, desks, etc. are common phenomena. It would be pertinent to note here the concern of the Tanzanian Minister of Education when he told the National Assembly in these terms: "This state (of shortages/shortfalls) negatively affects our objective to provide good and terminal education as this can only be provided in a proper teaching and learning environment." (*ibid. op. cit.*).

In a nutshell, there are both impressive achievements and shortcomings as a result of the implementation of the UPE effort. By 1985 the enrolment rate of school-age children reached 87 per cent (World Bank, 1986:236) as opposed to 50 per cent in 1974. Other objectives, at least partially, achieved include "making primary education terminal, inculcating the spirit of self-reliant work and dignity of manual labour, participation and full involvement of the community in the school's affairs and performance, and *egalitarian* selection and assessment procedures." (ILO/JASPA, 1982:111, *op. cit.*) (Emphasis in the original). Shortcomings of the programme include the deterioration of the quality of education caused by shortages of teachers (both in quantity and quality), classrooms, teachers houses, furniture, textbooks and other schooling materials. The achievements of and failures in each region need be seen in this context and progress evaluated in terms *relative* to progress nationally.

Turning to post-primary education and higher education in Tanzania during the period 1976-85 one notes a modest expansion in secondary education and vocational training, whilst there is a somewhat accelerated expansion in higher education. The Tanzanian education

pyramid is very wide at the bottom and very narrow at the top. In 1984 primary education pupils formed 97.4 per cent of the total Tanzanian student population, whereas secondary education comprised 2.1 per cent, teacher education 0.4 per cent, technical education 0.04 per cent and university education 0.09 per cent. [These percentages add up to more than 100 per cent due to rounding]. The selection of Form I pupils from primary school leavers has declined from 5.5 per cent in 1976 to 1.6 per cent in 1984. The number of primary school leavers has tremendously increased in the period from 156,114 to 649,560, that is, an increase of 416.1 per cent, as a result of the UPE endeavour. Form I entrants have increased from 8,659 in 1976 to 10,077 in 1984, which is an increase of 16.4 per cent. This small intake of Form I entrants is explicable when one observes an equally small expansion of secondary schools, which only increased from 81 in 1976 to 84 units in 1984. However, by 1986 there were 96 secondary schools in the country, ten of which were established in 1986 itself, signifying a change of policy in the development of secondary education in Tanzania.

Secondary and higher education has been accessible to much fewer people than the education sector policy (i.e. Education for Self-Reliance) had espoused, because of slow rate of expansion of secondary education relative to primary education. It is, therefore, little wonder that Samoff had to remark thus: "In Tanzania, differential access to education has facilitated the perception of a particular pattern of social stratification which in turn has fostered class differentiation" (Samoff, 1979a, op. cit.:44-89). Block is even more blunt in his criticism when he states:

The Party has successfully held down overexpansion at the post-elementary level, but in so doing has produced an "educated elite". For a Party moving to establish and maintain a democratic socialist society based on egalitarian ideals, provisions for secondary and university education should be made for all who could benefit. Therein lies a dilemma in seeking to meet short-term manpower goals" (Block, 1986:13).

Problems similar to those stated above under primary education face also the provision of secondary education in the country. These are inadequacy of teachers, especially science, mathematics and English language teachers, teaching and learning facilities and materials (Makwetta, 1986:10-12).

Especially through adult education campaigns by 1985 Tanzania had reached 85 per cent functional literacy and both the Party and Government had resolved to eradicate completely the problem of illiteracy by the end of 1987 (Mwinyi, 1985). Tanzania's efforts in this aspect is exemplary, but the problem of lack of follow-up material especially in the villages for the newly attained literates is still to be solved, if illiteracy is to be prevented from rolling back again, assuming that it has not yet started to do so already. Most important of all is to ensure that such material helps to disseminate information on appropriate farming techniques, livestock development, tree planting and natural resources harvesting and processing, handicrafts, marketing and sanitation and hygiene. In this regard, both the Tanga and Iringa RIDEPS recognised the significance of providing the newly acquired literates with such materials, but as

will be seen in the relevant chapters no implementation was undertaken.

(b) Health

Tables 4.8 and 4.9 present information on the progress of the provision of health facilities and the development of health manpower during the period 1976-86. [Caution must be exercised when interpreting these data.] The objectives of the SFYP for the health sector were, among others, to provide one dispensary for every 10,000 people, one hospital bed for 1,000 people and one rural health centre (RHC) for 50,000 people. Some of these objectives were fulfilled or even slightly surpassed. For example, the 1980 number of dispensaries (2,600) is more by 270 dispensaries than envisaged in the TFYP for that year. Similarly, the number of hospital beds for 1980 exceeds the target for that year by 901 hospital beds. However, the 239 RHCs in 1980 is below the target by 63 (Tanzania, Government of, 1987b:47).

The aim during the TFYP and FUFYP had been to continue with the targets set out during the SFYP in expanding health facilities, especially in the rural areas and in putting more emphasis on preventive services than in the past without at the same time neglecting curative efforts. The massive campaigns of *Mtu ni Afya* [Man is Health] and *Chakula ni Uhai* [Food is Life] were the outcome of this policy emphasis aimed at raising the people's awareness on sanitation hygiene and nutrition. The 1977 cholera epidemics took the authorities so unawares that they reacted (or rather over-reacted) by calling in

Table 4.8: Provision of Health Facilities in Tanzania 1976-86

Year	Hospitals			RHCs		Dispensaries(c)	
	Number(a)	Beds(b)	Pop./Bed	Number	Pop./RHC	Number	Pop./Disp.
1976	147	19,680	794	162	99,000	1,847	7,500
1977	148	19,823	758	181	81,000	1,997	7,000
1978	148	20,847	823	202	86,000	2,205	7,000
1979	149	21,291	822	235	74,500	2,568	6,820
1980	149	21,291	849	239	75,680	2,600	6,950
1981	149	21,352	873	239	78,000	2,644	7,050
1982	149	22,350	860	239	80,500	2,644	7,270
1983	149	22,350	888	239	83,000	2,644	7,500
1984	152	22,800	897	239	85,600	2,644	7,740
1985	152	22,800	928	254	83,300	2,831	7,475
1986	152	22,800	958	260	84,100	2,831	7,720

Source: Hali ya Uchumi [Economic Survey] 1985 & 1986, Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning, Dar es Salaam.

Notes: (a) Includes special hospitals.

(b) Excludes beds of special hospitals.

(c) Excludes dispensaries owned and managed by private and parastatal organisations.

the military to ensure that everybody abided by the quarantine regulations.

The Extended Programme of Immunisation (EPI) (started in 1983) and MCH (Maternal and Child Health) (began in 1974) services were part of the public sector interventions in preventive health. Further, the programme "Health through Sanitation and Water" (HESAWA) initiated during the First Union Five Year Plan (FUFYP) was another attempt to educate the public to raise their knowledge of combatting preventable diseases through eating good food, drinking clean water and living in a hygienic dwelling and environment.

The curative services placed emphasis on the strengthening and rehabilitating the existing health facilities instead of construction of new ones, except in particular cases only. The gradual expansion of

the facilities is even evident in Table 4.8. For example, there were only four new hospitals during the whole period, 1976-86, an average of one hospital in every 2½ years. The TFYP envisaged the construction of 20 RHCs every year so that by the end of the plan period 100 RHCs would have been completed. In the event 77 RHCs were built by the end of the plan and only 21 RHCs were built during the period 1981-86, signifying the reality of the macro-economic difficulties which had become acute during the course of this plan. Nonetheless, the rural dispensaries continued to increase so that by 1986 there were 2,831 of them, representing a rise of 53.3 per cent from 1,847 dispensaries of 1976. Thomas (1982:18) found in 1978 that there were 2,143 dispensaries or 27 per cent of the then total 7,934 villages in Tanzania had a health facility. With 8,390 designated villages existing in the country in 1983 (PMO, 1985), it means that only 33.7 per cent of them had a dispensary. It must be noted that this figure excludes privately owned dispensaries including church-owned ones which are very significant in some areas.

The data in Table 4.8 show a deterioration of per capita targets of provision of health facilities. For instance, the ratio of population/hospital bed has worsened as it has risen from 794 people per hospital bed in 1976 to 958 people/bed in 1986. The statistics for the RHCs are somewhat dissimilar to those of population/hospital bed. The number of people/RHC decreased from 99,000 in 1976 to 74,500 in 1979, but steadily increased to 84,000 by 1986. A similar pattern is depicted by the population/dispensary ratio; the 1976 ratio was 7,500 people/dispensary and went down to 6,820 in 1979. By 1986 the figure

Table 4.9: The Development of Health Manpower 1976-86 (a)

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Doctors	683	727	769	830	889	950	1,015	1,065	1,115	1,160	1,255
of whom Tanzanian doctors	356	400	442	503	566	599	732	782	820	865	960
Assist. Medical Officers	193	223	223	258	258	291	391	436	436	517	517
Medical Assistants	770	930	1,100	1,235	1,400	1,589	1,808	2,131	2,383	2,633	2,914
Rural Medical Aides	1,049	1,393	1,690	2,100	2,310	2,691	3,691	4,191	4,601	5,021	5,391
Health Officers	156	170	176	186	222	270	309	353	394	535	590
Health Assistants	455	500	545	585	681	789	918	1,108	1,247	1,740	1,897
Nurses/Midwives Gr. A	1,100	1,255	1,340	1,465	1,591	1,717	1,852	2,197	2,356	2,721	2,825
Nurses/Midwives Gr. B	3,720	4,423	4,750	5,250	5,684	6,070	6,439	6,857	7,242	7,430	8,066
Village Midwives	960	1,400	1,190	1,650	2,070	2,070	2,887	3,328	3,432	3,572	4,110

Source: Hali ya Uchumi [Economic Survey] 1985 & 1986, Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning, Dar es Salaam.

Note: (a) These data are on the public health sector only.

had reached 7,720 people per dispensary. Thus, these data show the widening gap between the targets and actual achievement. The problem is partly explained by the rapid growth of the Tanzanian population, of which there is an extra 650,000 people per year, and partly, by the economic difficulties the country has been facing during the period under review.

There is, however, an acute shortage of drugs in all these facilities (see Chapters 5 and 6). Dispensaries face more serious drug shortage than the other facilities and for this reason the Government, with assistance from external donors, had initiated the Essential Drugs Programme (EDP), through which essential drugs and equipment are distributed more frequently to the village dispensaries. This programme has somewhat improved the availability of essential drugs in the villages (*ibid*, 1987b:142).

Turning to the development of health manpower (see Table 4.9) it is evident that impressive results have been achieved in the training

and recruitment of key health staff. The number of Tanzanian doctors has increased from 356 in 1976 to 960 in 1986, which is 2.7 times the former. Similar fast growth rates can be observed for the other categories of health manpower. For example, the number of medical assistants in 1986 is 3.8 times that of 1976; for rural medical aides is 5 times, whereas that of village midwives is 4.3 times. Although these impressive efforts have improved the situation enormously, there is still a long way to go.

There is indeed an improvement in the delivery of the health services in the country which has resulted in improving the quality of life of the majority of the people. For example, life expectancy has improved from 41 years in 1965 to 50 years in 1984, and the comparable data for infant mortality rates are 138 and 111 per 1,000 (World Bank, 1986:232).

(c) Water Supplies

The national target for provision of water set in 1971 was that by 1991 every Tanzanian household should have potable and dependable water within a distance of 400 m. Energetic endeavours have been undertaken over the years to realise this objective. By 1985 it was estimated that 11,418,000 people, of whom 8,243,000 were rural inhabitants, had access to clean water supplies. At the time the Tanzanian population was estimated to be 21,162,000 and therefore, 54 per cent of the total population had access to domestic potable water supplies (*ibid.*, 1986b:128). However, in practice a much smaller

number of the population purported to be served by these water schemes actually benefited from them due to the operational bottlenecks, especially in the villages (see for example the discussion in sections 5.4.2 (c) (pp. 268-71) and 6.4.2 (c) (pp. 330-1). Most of the schemes were inoperational, sometimes for as long as six months due to lack or inadequacy of fuel, lack of spares or equipment and appropriate manpower. In some instances design flaws, as is demonstrated below in the case of the Kigoma RIDEP (see Chapter 5), hampered the smooth operation of the water schemes.

Technical manpower proved to be a very serious design and implementation bottleneck. Generally, there was an underestimation of water development manpower needs and lack of appreciation of the fact that provision of water is an extremely technical undertaking, particularly in the survey and design stages, resulting in putting faith in inappropriate sources and raising the people's expectations unnecessarily. Fortunately, in the recent years there has dawned upon the authorities what it means to provide potable water to the people. The current target is to provide *clean* water (notice the de-emphasis on *potable* water) to all Tanzanians within 400 m by the year 2000 and with an emphasis on shallow wells and gravity schemes (Tanzania, Government of, 1987b:45).

4.3 The Rural Development Strategy, 1972-86

Several of the major components of the Tanzanian development strategy are well known and the literature on them is enormous (for

reviews, see Kocher, 1976; Mascarenhas and Mbilinyi, 1983). Major contributions on these components are made by Cliffe and Saul (1972 and 1973), Pratt (1976), Shivji (1976), Mwansasu and Pratt (1979), Coulson (1982), Hyden (1980) and Kahama *et al* (1986). The aim of this brief review of the Tanzanian development strategy is to create the necessary link between it and the main theme of the study and hence facilitate understanding of the issues under discussion in the later chapters.

The intellectual foundation of the Tanzanian development strategy is the Arusha Declaration (Nyerere, 1968:231-50). Apart from its emphasis on socialist construction, the Declaration espoused a basic needs and rural-oriented development strategy¹. The strategy embraced both growth and equity objectives in bringing about sustained development of the people. Subsequent policy dealt with specific aspects². For example, the Presidential paper *Socialism and Rural Development*, issued in September 1967, provided an elaboration on rural socialism and rural development (*ibid*, 1968:337-366). It was in this policy document that the notion of an **Ujamaa Village** [socialist villages] was announced and elaborated.

In the words of its architect, the concept of the **Ujamaa Village** evolved in this manner:

We must ... aim at creating a nation in which Ujamaa farms and communities dominate the rural economy and set the social pattern for the country as a whole. In a socialist Tanzania then our agricultural organization would be predominantly that of cooperative living and working for the good of all. This means that most of the farming would be done by groups of people who live as a community and work as a community. *They would live together; they would farm together; market together and undertake the provision of local*

services and small local requirements as a community.
(Nyerere, 1968:350-1) (Emphasis added).

It is evident from the above quotation that the key elements of the ujamaa village are the ujamaa farm and the communal working on it with the proceeds benefiting all as community. Thus the ujamaa village was envisaged as the basic social and economic unit from which socialism would grow and spread in rural Tanzania. Farming was clearly recognised as the most important economic activity, but infrastructural and social services were also considered crucial in creating an environment for a better life of the villagers. Also, the rural development strategy embodied key elements of (1) popular participation - TANU cells, development committees, etc., (2) villagisation as both a scale-economies measure and a facilitator of rural socialism, (3) priority for development investment and (4) improvement of rural/urban terms of trade, i.e. to endeavour to reduce the disparities between the urban and rural areas.

In the sections which follow the discussion will attempt to explain the Tanzanian endeavours to implement its rural development strategy during the period 1972-86. Although rural development has been official policy since independence and particularly since the Arusha Declaration, integrated rural development planning became an earnest official policy only after the introduction of the decentralised administrative structure in 1972. The decentralised system of government administration created an appropriate premise for integrated rural development planning and implementation in the regions and districts of the country. For this reason this study must

document, even if very briefly, the most important events that took place during the period under review.

The discussion covers the topical issues of decentralisation, villagisation, the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975, rural cooperatives and attempts at socialist rural development, the abolition of the secondary cooperatives and its impact on agricultural marketing, distribution of consumer goods in the rural areas and popular participation, and the reintroduction of the local government institutions and secondary cooperatives. Significantly, this period also saw the rise and dissipation of donor enthusiasm in providing financial and technical assistance to the regional integrated rural development programmes/projects (RIDEPs) (see Chapters 5-7).

The early 1980s saw the decision, take-off and implementation of the reestablishment of the local government and cooperative institutions which was taken as a step to consolidate the decentralised administrative system and popular participation. The experiences and lessons of the previous period were undoubtedly the main impetus for this decision (see below).

4.3.1 The Decentralisation of Government Administration in Tanzania

The implementation of the decentralisation programme in Tanzania had by mid 1986 been 14 years in place. Thus there is no shortage of analyses on the subject in the literature on the subject (Rweyemamu and Mwansasu, 1974; Hyden, 1976; Nyerere, 1977; Belshaw, 1977; Samoff, 1979b; Picard, 1980; Conyers, 1981 and 1982; Rondinelli, 1983;

Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, 1983 and Smith, 1985). Perhaps, one must add, somewhat ritually, that both liberal and Marxist analyses are to be found in the literature on the Tanzanian decentralisation. Samoff (1979b:31, 45) presents us with an interesting and appropriate conclusion on this subject as viewed by most of the Marxist commentators:

The almost euphoric optimism that characterized much of the writing about the 'Tanzanian experiment' a decade ago has given way to detailed criticism and unrelieved pessimism. What were once regarded as the socialist policies that differentiated Tanzania from much of the rest of Africa are now described as the ideological facades behind which hide the neocolonialism and self-serving ruling class found in most other African states ... Nowhere in the world should one expect new institutions to become rooted and to achieve their stated objectives within a few years, yet many researchers on Tanzania do just that, concluding that if goals have not been achieved immediately, they have been definitively displaced or rejected.

In the following section we intend to discuss the implementation of the Tanzanian decentralisation policy during its first decade of existence, showing its successes and shortcomings, its significance for regional/areal planning, especially integrated rural development planning and implementation. The aim is to demonstrate, in spite of its manifold shortcomings and inadequacies, that decentralisation created a basis for the emergence, nurturing and sustenance of integrated rural development in Tanzania. Perhaps, the implication of this last statement may be construed as a *de fide* case in the "defence" of any particular view of the Tanzanian decentralisation. Rather its objective is to create a premise for the study of the externally funded integrated rural development projects in the

country. The author is fully aware, as observed above, of the need to undertake detailed research on the subject to widen our understanding of its prospects and constraints. The literature on decentralisation amply demonstrates how problematic it is to try to define this concept, because of the various meanings attached to it by different people (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983:18; Conyers, 1984:187 and Smith, 1985:1-2). Nonetheless, it is possible to come up with an appropriate working definition of decentralisation, which embraces both territorial and functional division and/or dispersion of planning, decision-making and administrative authority. In essence, decentralisation entails the transfer of this authority from the central/national government to lower level hierarchies, such as provinces, regions, parastatal organisations, etc. Several forms of decentralisation are discernible: *deconcentration*, *delegation* and *devolution*. Deconcentration is the lowest form of decentralisation and devolution is the highest form, whilst in between them is to be found delegation. In the literature three subforms of deconcentration are usually discernible. These are *shifting of workload*, *field administration* and *local administration* (University of Wisconsin, 1981:15-16; Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983:18-20). Delegation of functional decentralisation (Conyers, 1984:187) entails transfer of administrative and management authority to specific institutions, such as parastatals and other semi-autonomous organisations. Devolution embodies much more local autonomy and discretion and that central government exercises no or very little direct control over the local government bodies. This form of decentralisation distinguishes two

subdivisions: *regional or state governments and local government.*

Decentralisation is also categorised, according to the manner in which authority is distributed between the centre and the subnational levels, as *political or bureaucratic* (Smith, 1985:8-9). It should be stated here, however, that Smith regards decentralisation as an outcome of political choice (Smith, 1985:ix). Political decentralisation is a product of legislative enactment to distribute power/authority between the central and area governments, whereas bureaucratic decentralisation entails delegation of responsibilities by the national headquarters of an organisation to the field administrators/managers (*ibid*:9). In the former case political institutions based on democratic principles are established at the subnational levels and thus some autonomy is created. In the latter instance no such institutions are created. Field administrative staff have no or very limited discretionary decision-making authority and they have to refer constantly to the centre for even the smallest aspect of policy, particularly if it concerns public expenditure.

The intellectual foundation of the Tanzanian decentralisation is the Arusha Declaration and *Mwongozo* [TANU Guidelines of 1971]. Both these policy documents have explicit statements on democracy and popular participation. Nyerere reiterates thus: "The purpose of both the Arusha Declaration and *Mwongozo* was to give the people power over their own development" (Nyerere, 1972:1). The pre-Arusha Declaration experience had shown serious constraints on democracy and popular participation. Nyerere himself made the admission quite explicitly when he states: "We have made great progress in seizing power from the

hands of capitalists and traditionalists, but must face the fact that, to the mass of the people, *power is still something wielded by others - even if on their behalf*" (ibid). (Italics ours).

The implementation of the decentralisation programme in the country was based on an Act of the National Assembly, the Decentralisation of Government Administration (Interim Provisions) Act, 1972. The key elements of the decentralised system were the transfer of planning and financial functions from the centre to the regions and districts, the establishment of development committees at the regional, district and ward/village levels. Further, the Act introduced a new procedure in the planning system at the subnational levels by making a requirement that plans must receive approval from the Party organ at the appropriate level before their onward transmission to a higher planning stage or level.

Implementation of the decentralised system entailed reorganisation of then existing government administrative structure in order to accommodate the envisaged objectives and expectations (for details, see McKinsey 1971 and 1972). For reasons of brevity a schematic presentation is given in Charts 1 and 2. Chart 1 shows what the government administrative structure looked like before the decentralisation changes initiated in July 1972, whilst Chart 2 is about the new structure at the regional and district levels. As some commentators of Tanzanian development have noted, at the time of its launching the primary focus of the decentralisation programme was directed towards the regional institutions (Samoff, 1979b:36, quoting Baguma, 1973; Finucane, 1974 and Collins, 1974). In some of these

Chart 1: Government Administrative Structure before Decentralization of July 1972





Chart 2: Government Administrative Structure after Decentralization of July 1972 (Regional and District Structures)



analyses one cannot fail to notice the imputation of conspiracy by the national leadership concerning this focus. It is evident that the main reason for according more emphasis to the regions than the districts at the time was lack of appropriate manpower to fill all the posts established under the decentralised programme. Also, it is likely that the national leadership had wanted more time to learn from the experiences of the regional centralised structure before proceeding with the same institutions at the district level.

Chart 2 shows regional and district development teams, popularly known as development directorates, which were established and were headed by a Development Director. The development director was the chief executive and the principal advisor/assistant to the Regional or Area (District) Commissioner as appropriate. The Regional Development Director (RDD) had equal status as a principal [permanent] secretary of a ministry, whereas the District Development Director (DDD) had the same status as the head of division or department in a ministry headquarters. The Regional Commissioner (RC), a political appointee and representative of the President, was elevated to the rank of a cabinet minister. All Government officials of the development ministries in a region or district were now responsible to the development director. The Prime Minister's Office (PMO), which was established as part of the implementation programme, became the link between the centre and the regions, custodian of rural development matters.


The decentralised system also created posts of staff officers who were immediately under the development director. The first staff

officer was in charge of the Planning Office, the second looked after the finances and the budget, and the third was responsible for personnel and manpower management. These officers together with the technical/functional managers formed the Development Directorate's management team under the leadership of the RDD or DDD as appropriate.

Together with this technical/management structure as illustrated in Chart 2, there were established development committees from the village to the regional level in which sat both directly and indirectly elected representatives of the people to deliberate on all matters pertaining to local level development (see Chart 3). As noted above, the regional development committee (RDC) had no direct representation, save for the elected Members of Parliament representing constituencies within the region, who become members by virtue of their elected office. Nonetheless, several local leaders, such as the Party chairpersons (of the region and districts) and the Member of the Party NEC elected from the region, whom we categorise as directly elected, sit also in the meetings of the RDC as full members. Membership of the other development committees was comprised predominantly of elected representatives of the people. Other intended effects included (i) party officials in principle were in charge over civil servants, (ii) upgrading seniority of regional commissioners, regional and district development directors, (iii) raising planning capability (in theory) and (iv) regions to be allocated 40 per cent of the national development budget.

At the time it appeared as if every attempt was being taken to foster and sustain popular participation in these subnational

Chart 3: The Planning Institutional Structure and Process



institutions. However, the decentralisation act abolished district and urban councils which had been the primary instruments of popular participation at that level.

Chart 3 is also intended to illustrate the planning process in the country after the introduction of the decentralised system and especially after 1975. At this time, the Villages and Ujamaa Villages (Registration, Designation and Administration) Act of the 1975 was passed by the National Assembly. We shall return to this subject later, but suffice to say here that the Act aimed at giving further impetus to grassroots participation, apart from the fact that it gave the villages legal recognition as corporate entities. The planning process of the Tanzanian decentralised system involved two organisational structures, those of the Party and Government as schematically presented in Chart 3. In both structures, there are forward and backward linkages and flow of information, guidelines, directives and ideas. Plans are in the first instance discussed in the development committees and then must be forwarded to the relevant Party executive committee for scrutiny and approval.

It is difficult to appreciate this requirement without understanding fully the Tanzanian development philosophy. Nyerere (1972:2) provides part of the explanation: "To ensure that national objectives and priorities are adhered to, and that the policy of gradual equalisation of wellbeing between different regions can be implemented, broad general policy guidelines will be issued within the framework of which the local bodies must make their decisions". Smith (1985:139-40), who discusses several key elements of decentralisation

under socialism, provides the other part of the explication. One of these elements is democratic centralism which "assures uniform state guidance in fundamental matters of general national significance and to provide broad opportunities for the development of local initiative and activity" (ibid:140).

It is important to underline the fact that planning and financial functions were given more attention in the implementation of the decentralisation programme than the democratic and grassroots participation processes. Planning offices were established both in the regions and districts to undertake and oversee planning activities. Nonetheless, even in these areas manpower constraints have been the limiting factors in achieving the full potential of the decentralised system. In particular, planning capacity has been recognised as one of the constraints facing regional planning in Tanzania (Hyden, 1976; Belshaw, 1977). The appointment of village managers in 1978, some of whom were university graduates, and their subsequent posting in the villages, was another attempt to strengthen the planning capacity in the villages and improve the flow of the planning information between them and district planning offices.

The Tanzanian decentralisation has been described variously as a form of deconcentration and delegation (University of Wisconsin, 1981:42-3) and more than deconcentration (ILO/JASPA, 1982:154). In our view, these descriptions of the Tanzanian decentralisation, especially during the first decade of its implementation, are correct. However, with the reintroduction of the local government institutions, as a result of the enactment of the local government laws [Local Government

(District Authorities) Act, 1982 and the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act, 1982], with powers and authority to collect revenue for their recurrent and development budgets and engage and dismiss most of their staff, the restrictions of deconcentration are being removed. In view of this, one can, therefore, categorise the Tanzanian decentralisation as some form of devolution as well.

Hyden (1976:8-9) identifies 9 objectives of decentralisation based on the Presidential statements and the McKinsey report (1972) on managing rural development. For the purpose of the present study we cite five of them *in extensu*:

- (i) to manage development in the regions on the basis of coordination of all functional activities within these units rather than on the basis of individual functional ministries run from the capital;
- (ii) to make regions autonomous accounting units allowed to administer their own development funds instead of handling only recurrent funds;
- (iii) to achieve a reallocation of resources, including staff, from the advanced regions to the less privileged ones;
- (iv) to ensure that the delegation of authority does not stop at the regional level but is gradually pushed to the lower levels of administration, and
- (v) to make the senior officers in the regions more involved in policy-making (managers) and not only administrators of policies made by the central government authorities.

To this list we would add one more objective of decentralisation, namely (vi) to increase the people's participation in the decision-making and to increase the power and responsibilities of the local representatives (Nyerere, 1972:3).

The first two objectives can be said *mutatis mutandis* to have been met. Coordination and integration of rural development planning

and implementation have been some of the key features of decentralisation. Regional and integrated rural development planning and implementation in the country have indeed benefited greatly from the decentralisation measures. To be sure, there are continuous forces pulling against regional and district coordination and integration. These emanate from the centre. One outcome of these centralist forces is the recent recentralisation of the Kilimo's extension services.²¹ As a result the extension services have been the 'odd man out' in the regions and districts which makes the performance of their duties much more difficult and inefficient. Bureaucratic support of the decentralisation programme has been markedly inadequate. For example, Rondinelli comments: "Nyerere had the general support of important political leaders in Tanzania but received little cooperation from the bureaucracy" (Rondinelli, 1983 in Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983:95).

Turning to the objective (iii) the evidence shows mixed results, some success here and there, but also shortcomings. Some regions, especially in the south (Mtwara, Lindi and Ruvuma), Kigoma and Rukwa, are not favoured places of work for most civil servants. Originally, it was envisaged that regions would be allocated up to 40 per cent of the national development budget in order to finance regional and district development projects (McKinsey, 1972; Coulson, 1975 and Hyden, 1976). In this way, bottom-up planning approach would improve grassroots popular participation and thus, arouse commitment and enthusiasm for self-help from the people. Tables 4.10 and 4.11 present data on actual development and recurrent expenditures of the central government institutions (ministries and their parastatals) and the

Table 4.10: Actual Development Expenditure by Ministries, Parastatals and Regions 1972/73-85/86 (Current Tshs Million).

Year	Ministries and Parastatals	Regions	Total	% (Regions)
1972/73	754.4	92.0	846.4	9.2
1973/74	1,202.0	240.0	1,442.0	16.6
1974/75	1,904.0	341.0	2,225.0	14.4
1975/76	1,866.0	387.0	2,253.0	17.2
1976/77	2,926.6	317.7	3,244.3	9.8
1977/78	2,944.1	318.7	3,267.8	9.8
1978/79	4,164.1	576.8	4,740.9	12.2
1979/80	4,564.0	620.0	5,184.0	12.0
1980/81	4,265.0	630.0	4,895.0	12.9
1981/82	4,537.0	648.0	5,185.0	12.5
1982/83	4,583.2	562.3	5,145.5	10.9
1983/84	5,047.0	689.0	5,736.0	10.9
1984/85	4,467.1	924.0	5,391.1	17.1
1985/86	4,964.6	852.6	5,817.2	14.7

Total	48,188.9	7,199.1	55,373.2	(Ave)12.9

Source: (i) Statistical Abstracts, Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning, Dar es Salaam.
(ii) Annual Economic Surveys (for relevant years), Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning, Dar es Salaam.
(iii) Percentages are author's computations.

regions for the period, 1972/73-85/86. Since the accuracy of these data is open to question, one must attach the necessary caveats when interpreting them. The data in Table 4.10 show that the highest development expenditure ever achieved by the regions was 17.2 per cent of the total national development expenditure. And this was during the third year (1975/76) of the implementation of the decentralisation programme. In absolute terms the change in nominal expenditure by the regions during the 14 years of the programme's existence has been **nine times** (in 1985/86) the 1972/73 amount. Some observers of the Tanzanian development blame this non-achievement of the fund

Table 4.11: Actual Recurrent Expenditure by Ministries and Regions
1973/74-85/86 (Current Tshs Million)

Year	Ministries	Regions	Consolidated Funds	Total	% (Regions)
1973/74	1,191.1	845.1	299.6	2,335.8	36.2
1974/75	2,420.1	1,162.5	378.5	3,961.1	29.4
1975/76	2,058.2	1,112.1	595.3	3,755.6	29.5
1976/77	2,893.1	1,131.7	677.7	4,702.5	24.1
1977/78	3,313.1	1,525.4	724.8	5,563.3	27.4
1978/79	5,102.0	1,865.9	1,327.0	8,294.9	22.5
1979/80	4,223.7	2,059.3	1,135.9	7,418.9	27.8
1980/81	5,666.7	2,545.0	1,319.0	9,530.7	26.7
1981/82	8,544.6	3,102.0	1,567.5	13,214.1	23.5
1982/83	9,121.3	3,425.0	2,825.2	15,371.5	22.3
1983/84	11,393.4	3,068.9	3,719.7	18,182.0	16.9
1984/85	11,907.7	5,336.6	4,192.2	21,436.5	24.9
1985/86	17,875.4	4,837.0	6,510.0	29,222.4	16.6
Total	85,710.4	32,016.5	25,272.4	142,999.3	25.2 (a)

Source: (i) Statistical Abstracts, Bureau of Statistics, Dar es Salaam.

(ii) Annual Economic Surveys (for the relevant years), Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning, Dar es Salaam.

(iii) Percentages are author's computations.

Note: (a) Average.

allocation target on the lack of commitment of the national leadership to the original recommendation of the McKinsey consultants (McKinsey, 1971 and 1972)⁴ or even to rural development (Coulson, 1975; Kleemeier, 1984:171-201). It is surely possible, however, that the original target was too high and overambitious. It was somewhat arbitrarily arrived at to indicate a direction of change rather than an accurate prediction of an optimal pattern of allocation.

Moreover, the consultants had no way of forecasting future developments of the national economy, such as the rapid expansion of the parastatal sector (especially after the establishment of the crop authorities, most of which were upgraded from marketing boards in the

period 1972-76)⁵, the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia railway and the Kidatu/Mtera hydroelectric power complex, and the establishment of the transport and communication parastatals after the collapse of the East African Community in February 1977. All this entailed heavy centrally administered public sector outlays and therefore, even if the Tanzanian authorities had wanted to do exactly as recommended by the McKinsey consultants, financial and manpower constraints would definitely have prevented them or circumscribed their action to implement fully this recommendation.

Table 4.11 further shows that since 1978/79 the centre's recurrent expenditure had expanded faster than that of the regions as part of these new commitments to the national economy. For example, if we exclude the consolidated funds (these are special funds; usually their use has to have prior presidential approval), one notes that the regions' recurrent expenditure was 70 per cent of that of the ministries in 1973/74, but was only 36.6 per cent in 1978/79. Although it rose again to 45.2 per cent in 1984/85, it declined to a mere 27.1 per cent in 1985/86. However, the data in both Tables 4.10 and 4.11 do give one an impression of lack of purpose and direction in the allocation of resources to the regions. One cannot help noticing the *ad hoc* nature of this exercise as symbolised by the annual fluctuations in the total regionally allocated funds.

But also regions have been facing (a) the problem of regional planning and implementation capacity and (b) a weak base of planning data quality/capacity which have slowed down the utilisation of funds allocated to them. In addition, donor commitment made regions to be

allocated smaller development budgets from the centre than normally would be the case.

At this point, perhaps, it is pertinent to discuss briefly inter-regional allocation of resources and the state of the regional economies as these questions have particular significance and relevance to the design of the RIDEPS. In terms of the value of agricultural production, it is evident that some regions fared better than others (see Table 4.12 - care must be exercised when interpreting this information). For example, taking the three regions (Kigoma, Tanga and Iringa), it is evident that Tanga fared best. Tanga Region was in second place after Dar es Salaam in 1963 with Tshs 603 per capita gross regional product; it was in the third position in 1966 after Dar es Salaam and Arusha. Kigoma region held the 15th position both in 1963 and 1966, whilst Iringa was in the 11th and 13th place in 1963 and 1966 respectively. In 1969 Tanga, with per capita gross regional product of Tshs 727 (ignoring the Tabora figure - for an explanation see footnote (a) in the table), was in the third place and maintained this in 1973. Kigoma held 11th and 12th positions respectively, whereas Iringa was 14th and 10th respectively. The 1980 data are interesting as they show that for the first time Dar es Salaam's leadership has been lost to Kilimanjaro which had per capita agricultural gross product of Tshs 2,070. It was followed by Morogoro region with Tshs 1,590, whilst the third position was shared by Dar es Salaam and Kagera. Significantly, Kigoma was in the fifth place with Tshs 1,447, suggesting a significant impact by the RIDEP activities (see Chapter 5).

Table 4.12: Gross regional product per capita in the Tanzanian regions (Tshs)

Region	1963	1966	1967	1969	1973	1980 (b)
Arusha	546	777	534	735	762	1,310
Coast	263	454	427	596	617	
Dar es Salaam	3,417	3,367	4,152	3,824	3,838	1,470
Dodoma	238	352	278	408	415	619
Iringa	292	368	347	392	519	919
Kagera	341	482	334	425	504	1,470
Kigoma	254	350	267	425	500	1,447
Kilimanjaro	553	667	660	633	679	2,070
Mara	344	502	343	503	400	1,092
Mbeya	184	384	279	460	544	1,284
Morogoro	498	580	452	579	566	1,590
Mtwara	262	295	299	356	460	928
Lindi	-	-	-	-	-	814
Mwanza	368	491	406	522	627	1,104
Rukwa	-	-	-	-	-	620
Ruvuma	189	300	262	368	410	1,315
Shinyanga	348	670	422	670	604	668
Singida	-	348	227	380	439	813
Tabora(a)	433	697	384	776	443	768
Tanga	908	715	657	727	730	1,458
<hr/>						
Tanzania	435	568	478	604	650	1,167

Source: (i) TIRDEP, 1975, **Tanga Regional Development Plan**, Vol. 2, p. 17 for the data of 1963-73.

(ii) Ministry of Agriculture, 1982, **Tanzania National Food Strategy**, Table 3.5 for the 1980 data.

Notes: (a) The 1966 and 1969 figures are clearly too high and may be incorrect.

(b) These data are solely agricultural gross value product per capita of the rural population and they include crops, livestock, poultry and fishing. These figures are in current prices, whereas those of 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1973 are in 1963 prices.

Of a total marketed production value of Tshs 1,130 million in 1967, Tanga accounted for Tshs 161 million or 14.3 per cent, only behind Kilimanjaro region which had 16 per cent of the total value. These two regions were ahead of all the others in the country with Singida being in the tail with only 0.5 per cent. Kigoma, with about

1.0 per cent was second from the bottom. Iringa Region was in the tenth place.

According to Thomas and Mascarenhas (1973:ix) in Tanzania 24.5 per cent of the population did not live within 10 km of any health facility. The situation was best in Kilimanjaro region with 2.6 per cent and most unsatisfactory in Mara region with 40 per cent. Tanga region with 6.7 per cent was the second best in the country. Kigoma with 10.3 per cent was in the third position and Iringa was in the 14th place with 22.0 per cent.

In 1967 the illiteracy rate among adults above 14 years of age was about 73 per cent for the whole country, with a range between 41 per cent in Dar es Salaam, 50 per cent in Kilimanjaro and around 85 per cent in Kigoma, Lindi, Mtwara, Rukwa, Shinyanga and Tabora regions. Tanga region with 63 per cent was in the third place. In enrolment of school-age children, which averaged 50 per cent for the whole country in 1972/73, Tanga was placed in the fourth position among all regions with 56 per cent. Kigoma, with 37 per cent, was one with the lowest rate in the country. Iringa had 46.1 per cent and thus, was below the national average as well.

In mid-1973 about 1,806,000 people in Tanzania had access to potable water supply facilities, ranging from 225,000 people in Kilimanjaro and 50,000 people in Mara. Tanga region, with 113,000 people with such access, had 6.3 per cent of the total population with such facilities in the country, which corresponds exactly to the region's share of population.

Turning to the distribution of resources among the regions for

Table 4.13; Regional Distribution of Resources in 1974/75 and 1983/84

Region	Staff				Development Budget (Tshs '000)			
	1974/75		1983/84		1974/75(a)		1983/84	
	Number	%	Number	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
Arusha	6,009	5.7	9,171	5.1	-	-	32,685	4.1
Coast	4,160	3.9	6,518	3.6	-	-	35,648	4.5
Dar es Salaam	6,685	6.3	1,127	0.6	-	-	18,036	2.3
Dodoma	6,372	6.0	11,011	6.1	-	-	44,544	5.6
Iringa	5,334	5.0	11,825	6.6	-	-	60,601	7.6
Kagera	6,395	6.0	9,901	5.5	-	-	30,056	3.8
Kigoma	3,890	3.7	7,607	4.2	-	-	30,029	3.8
Kilimanjaro	6,213	5.9	11,867	6.6	-	-	51,177	6.4
Lindi	3,883	3.7	6,531	3.6	-	-	34,417	4.3
Mara	4,849	4.6	9,786	5.4	-	-	42,232	5.3
Mbeya	6,200	5.9	12,085	6.7	-	-	38,973	4.9
Morogoro	5,525	5.2	11,757	6.5	-	-	49,924	6.3
Mtwara	4,613	4.4	7,349	4.1	-	-	35,624	4.5
Mwanza	6,327	6.0	11,167	6.2	-	-	46,001	5.8
Rukwa	2,285	2.2	6,055	3.4	-	-	42,082	5.3
Ruvuma	4,163	3.9	7,368	4.1	-	-	36,110	4.5
Shinyanga	5,061	4.8	11,304	6.3	-	-	47,732	6.0
Singida	4,427	4.2	7,797	4.3	-	-	27,561	3.5
Tabora	5,355	5.1	8,332	4.6	-	-	28,305	3.6
Tanga	7,120	6.7	11,726	6.5	-	-	56,324	7.1
Total	105,863	100.0(b)	180,305(c)	100.0	-	-	794,061	100.0

Source: (i) G. Hyden, 1976, Decentralization and the Government Staff, Working Paper 76.1 University of Dar es Salaam, Table 5.

(ii) E.M. Sokoine, 1983, Budget Speech for the Fiscal Year 1983/84, Dar es Salaam; Government Printer, Table 3.

(iii) Percentages for 1974/75 are author's computations.

Notes: (a) Data not available.

(b) Figure does not add to 100 due to rounding.

(c) As at 1st March 1983.

the period 1974-84 (see Table 4.13), one again is confronted with a 'mixed bag'. Although the accuracy of these data is doubtful, they do show some regions as having gained, while others have lost out some of their resources, especially manpower resources, between 1974/75 and 1983/84. In absolute terms, there is an increase of regional staff from a total of 105,863 in 1974/75 to 180,305 in 1983/84. The

generally accepted least developed and most disadvantaged regions in the country are Kigoma, Lindi, Mtwara, Dodoma, Singida, Rukwa and Ruvuma, probably in that order too. As noted above, all these regions too have experienced increases of personnel during the period under review, but their share of staff either declined or increased only marginally. The only possible exceptions are Kigoma and Rukwa regions with 13.5 and 54.5 per cent share increases respectively. Kigoma's increase may be explained by the influence exerted by the RIDEP (see Chapter 5). Rukwa had become a new region in that financial year and there is some logic that it had to be given special attention to expand its technocracy commensurate with the minimum requirements of a regional administration. Otherwise, the famous dictum 'the rich get richer and the poor get poorer' seems to apply here too. This problem is explicable by two reasons: (i) donor dropouts; although all the regions had a RIDEP plan ready 'on the shelf' by 1981/82, only ten had follow-up funding. Over the years some of the donors dropped out from even these ten RIDEPs so that by December 1986 only Tanga, Iringa and Kilimanjaro were still on-going (see Chapter 1, Table 1.1, p. 6), and (ii) the practice of planning RIDEPs as single-region development projects rather than an inter-regional planning process. In such a situation, inter-regional relationships and linkages are relegated to the wayside.

Unfortunately, data on the regional development budgets for the fiscal year 1974/75 are unavailable, but the 1983/84 figures do give an indication of the overall scenario. A few regions had over Tshs 50 million for their development budgets in 1983/84. These were Iringa,

Tanga and Kilimanjaro and followed closely by Morogoro with Tshs 49.9 million. Undoubtedly, the impact of the RIDEP funding in these regions is one major reason for these allocations. Morogoro has been receiving funds from the Netherlands for the construction of shallow wells and boreholes in various parts of the region; it also has been receiving funds from Switzerland and Ireland for infrastructural development in Ulanga and Kilombero, and Kilosa districts respectively. These are the better-off regions in the country and this treatment does not speak well for the leadership's commitment to the equity objective.

Regarding objective (iv) - delegation of authority - this did not take place for the whole first decade of the implementation of the decentralised system, with the possible exception of the provisions of the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act, 1975 and *Madaraka Mijini* [Urban Wards Act] of 1976. Both these acts strengthened grassroots democratic participatory decision-making institutions and gave them legal existence and power. However, without the directly elected district councils, these lower level institutions stood little chance in realising popular participation. And this really brings us to objective (vi), which for all intents and purposes remained a far cry as already mentioned above. True, popular participation with the local councils equals representative participation, whereas at the village level, especially in the village assemblies, popular participation is direct and, therefore, their strengthening is equally crucial. However, district-level participatory organs are of prime importance, if popular participation is to grow and be sustained.

For this reason (and perhaps others as well, such as the need for

increasing responsiveness of the technocrats to the citizenry, debureaucratisation of the regional public sector institutions. etc.) the national leadership decided to reestablish the district and urban councils. Chart 4 illustrates the administrative structure of both the central and local governments as at July 1986 which has also incorporated the most recent administrative changes. The Mwinyi Government, which assumed power after the 1985 general elections and subsequent retirement of President Nyerere (popularly known as the "Second Phase Government") created a new ministry of local government and cooperative development (Chart 5). This new ministry, in essence, took over PMO's responsibility for rural development from the districts downwards to and upwards from the villages. Both charts are self-explanatory. It is only the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development which has its representatives reporting to it right from the village level upwards to the national headquarters. PMO has, however, kept its manager and ward secretaries as its grassroots officials and the district councils are busy recruiting ward executive officers, who are to be their chief representatives and executives in the wards and shall be responsible for all their staff and functions. One wonders what will be their relationship to each other. One cannot help feel there will be some overlapping and duplication of roles and underemployment of these officials with adverse consequences on the delivery of services to the people.

Although the local government laws were passed by the National Assembly in 1982, implementation began only in January 1984. Thus, it is too early to subject them to evaluation to see whether they are

Chart 4: Government Administrative Structure as at July 1980





Chart 5: Local Government Administrative Structure as at July 1986



RURAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANS

URBAN DEVELOPMENT ORGANS

achieving their stated objectives or not. The signs are that some progress is being achieved, but the struggle against centralist tendencies and practices requires more time and effort, if it is to alter the situation significantly at the grassroots.

However, it should be stated that the problem of regional disparities seems bound to be exacerbated rather than reduced as a district's tax base is the one which influences provision of public services, etc. The centre must, as a matter of policy, provide more resources to those lagging regions. The past record shows dismal efforts on the part of the central government.

These difficulties notwithstanding, decentralisation had created preconditions for more effective regional planning and meaningful integrated rural development planning and implementation in the country. In the Tanzanian context, regional planning is construed as the undertaking of planning activities which are decided upon, in part, by and for the people of a particular geographical area known as a region.

It is evident that regional planning is a responsibility of the regional and district authorities, who make decisions (with or without consultation of the people) to be implemented in the regions and districts. Technically, project identification and appraisal, and plan formulation is the work of the regional and district planners and functional officials, but all plans must be discussed in various committees in both the Government and Party structures (see Chart 3, p. 175). In this way, in spite of its limitations as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the plans are an outcome of participatory

decision-making inputs. Once Parliament approves the regional plans and allocates funds for them, implementation becomes a regional responsibility with the centre exercising accounting and auditing roles only. The PMO and the donor agencies, however, played key roles in the formulation of the RIDEP plans. In fact, as noted above, the RIDEP plans were chiefly outcomes of the technical assistance teams so that the role of the donors was crucial in making the plans and providing follow-up funding.

The Third Five Year Plan (TFYP) 1976-81 was the first national plan in which there was popular participation in its preparation. The representatives of the people and officials from the village to the national level participated in fact and principle. To be sure, there were differences within and among the regions in the extent and substance in popular participation. The TFYP was originally scheduled for implementation in July 1974 i.e. immediately after the end of the SFYP (1969-74). Due to the 1973/74 financial crisis and the fact that regions had just started implementing the decentralisation programme and therefore, needed more time in assembling the information required for the regional planning activities, it was delayed firstly to July 1975 and finally to July 1976, when it actually took off. In addition, the products of the technical assistance teams, with the possible exception of the Kigoma RIDEP, were expected to be important inputs in the regional plans which were to be components of the TFYP.

The Fourth (or rather the First Union) Five Year Plan (FFYP or FUFYP) 1981-86 benefited greatly from the participatory planning activities of its predecessor. Regional planning had gained valuable

experience and with in some regions completed or on-going RIDEPs a reality, the regional and district planning officers were mustering the planning skills and know-how for future planning. Nonetheless, an opportunity for on-the-job training for planning officers was lost when the Institute of Regional Planning (IRP), which was originally situated in the premises of the Sokoine University of Agriculture, Morogoro and was later arbitrarily moved to Dodoma, adopted formal training as its only responsibility. The original IRP programme would have provided opportunity for continuity of planning, inter-regional seminars, evaluation and standardisation of planning procedures.

However, difficulties still exist in respect to the *modus operandi*, role and emphasis of regional planning within the context of national or central planning, the size of allocated funds for the regions vis-a-vis those set aside for the national projects, regional equalisation, popular participation, manpower needs and regional planning methodologies and techniques. Decentralisation has definitely brought senior officers nearer to the people and scene of felt needs and problems. This has offered an opportunity to both the officials and the people to increase communication between them and understanding and appreciation of each others problems and needs.

Further, decentralisation has speeded up the process of decision-making (Nyerere, 1977) and reduced the redtape which characterises most conspicuously the ministerial headquarters' bureaucracies. Villagers' representatives are much more likely to travel to their district or regional headquarter offices than to Dar es Salaam or Dodoma to seek official assistance to solve their problems or meet

their needs. In addition, decentralisation provided centralisation of rural development management and coordination in the regions and districts through the newly elevated and expanded Offices of the Regional and Area (since 1984 renamed District) Commissioners as the *primum mobile* for integrated rural development planning and implementation. This is the premise and context within which RIDEPs were developed and within which their implementation must be evaluated (see Chapters 5-7).

4.3.2 Villagisation and Socialist Rural Development

Elaboration of rural socialism in Tanzania was systematised in the policy document "Socialism and Rural Development" which was published in 1967 (Nyerere, 1968:337-66). This document, among others, defined the meaning of an "Ujamaa Village" as a village in which villagers lived, farmed and marketed together for the benefit of the whole community (*ibid*:351). Further, it emphasised the primacy of living and working according to the principles of **UJAMAA** as the key characteristic in an "Ujamaa Village". Nonetheless, the notion of living together in nucleated villages for economies of scale reasons was first mentioned and elucidated in 1962 by President Nyerere (Nyerere, 1965). Nucleated villages would enable the public sector interventions to be cost-effective and to reach more of the rural population than otherwise would have been possible, if the rural people continued to live in the scattered homesteads or hamlets. For example, the village settlement schemes of the 1960s were an outcome

of economies and modernisation reasons. It was only after the Arusha Declaration of 1967 and the publication of the policy document "Socialism and Rural Development" that ujamaisation became official policy. [See pp. 164-5 and Appendix A for definition of an ujamaa village.] True, the ujamaisation programme stood to benefit a great deal by any villagisation of the rural people. However, both policies have their own *raison d'être* and *rationality* in the overall Tanzanian development philosophy, but they tended to be mutually reinforcing.

The focus of the village for public sector interventions has remained primarily the same since the early days of the village settlements which were launched in 1963. These were abandoned in the spring of 1966 for over-capitalisation reasons (Kawawa, 1966:9) and were replaced by the early "Ujamaa villages" which for all intents and purposes differed very little from their predecessors, the village settlements schemes. Usually, they comprised unplanned groups for joint farming with subsidised inputs. Obviously, there were exceptions among the village settlement schemes, where there were communal living and communal farming. The ujamaisation policy, however, was strongly influenced by the national leadership's commitment to egalitarianism since the days of the struggle for the political independence (Pratt, 1976:63-72, *passim*). The early attempts of ujamaisation in the period 1968-70 were superseded by the villagisation of the rural people through timetabled *operations*.⁶ These gained further impetus in 1973 when the TANU NEC directed that all rural people should be living in the villages by the end of the 1976. Given the scarcity of resources and poor planning and implementation by over-zealous

politicians and bureaucrats, some blunders were committed in regard to choice of suitable sites for the resettlement, size of village population time of shifting and manner of resettling the people. Thus, some hardships to which the people were subjected could certainly have been avoided. Other problems of villagisation include environmental degradation with consequent effects on farming efficiency and underdelivery of social services.

All this notwithstanding, success of the villagisation programme in the light of its major objective of resettling the rural people in the nucleated villages on the assumption of improved access to be provided economic and social services is undeniable. Although care must be exercised when interpreting the data in Table 4.14, they help to illustrate the progress of the implementation of the villagisation programme between 1970 and 1976 when it was officially declared to be complete. By the end of 1976 there were 7,684 villages (or rather development villages, a term which gained considerable currency at the time as an attempt to distinguish them from the earlier phase "ujamaa villages"; however, this attempt proved fruitless as in reality the difference did not exist for most of them), where 13, 087,220 people lived. This was 82 per cent of the Tanzanian population (PMO, 1976:6). By June 1979 the number rose to 8,299 villages with a population of 14,874,522 living in them, representing about 87 per cent of the Tanzanian population (Sokoine, 1980:12).

Thus, the resettlement of the rural people in the nucleated villages created both an increased demand for and scale economies in the provision of social services. Government endeavours to meet the

Table 4.14: Progress of the Villagisation Programme in Tanzania
1970-76

Year	Number of Villages	Total Population in the Villages
1970	1,956	531,200
1971	4,484	1,545,240
1972	5,556	1,980,862
1973	5,628	2,028,164
1974	5,008(a)	2,560,472
1975	6,944	9,140,229
1976	7,684	13,087,220

Source: PMO, Dodoma, 1980.

Note: (a) In 1974 some villages were amalgamated in order to have the required minimum number of the families per village which was 250 families.

challenge are discussed in section 4.2.4, pp. 152-63.

The accomplishment of the villagisation programme created a condition for the establishment and organisation of grassroots democratic and participatory decision-making institutions. Hence the passage by Parliament of the Villages and Ujamaa Villages (Designation, Registration and Administration) Act in 1975. The Act not only clarified the status of the villages, but also built on the Decentralisation Act of 1972 and thus, gave the people more power in managing their own affairs. In terms of popular participation and democratisation processes, the 1972 decentralisation was an improvement of what existed before, but the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act, with its 1979 amendments (which gave the villages power to levy and collect revenue), was an improvement of these processes as conceptualised and developed by the earlier Act. The Local Government Acts of 1982 were still better in this regard.

The Act gave the registered village a corporate body status and

the right and power to organise itself as a multi-purpose primary cooperative society. In essence, the registered village was an agricultural producer cooperative, a measure which made the former primary marketing cooperative societies redundant and hence their dissolution in May 1976. At the time, secondary cooperatives (the cooperative unions) were also abolished on grounds of poor performance, inefficiency, embezzlement, theft and wastage. Their functions were handed over to the crop authorities and other marketing parastatals.

Further, the Act gave the villages power to form village governments by electing a village council and its five committees (namely, (i) defence and security, (ii) planning and finance, (iii) production and marketing, (iv) construction and transport and (v) education, culture and social welfare). By March 1983 there were 8,213 registered villages in the country, of which 8,148 or 99.2 percent had village councils i.e. they had village governments.

By the end of the 1970s, it was evident that the abolition of the secondary cooperatives was a gross mistake, not only because their substitutes - the crop authorities - did an even worse job, including non-payment or delayed payment of farmers when they delivered their produce, but also a vital participatory institution was simply obliterated from the political scene overnight in favour of a bureaucratic one. The parastatals, as centralised bureaucratic organisations, were extremely unwieldy and insensitive to the farmers' problems and needs. For these reasons and coupled with the public demand for their cooperatives, the national leadership reintroduced

them by the passage by Parliament of the Cooperative Societies Act No. 14 of 1982.

Implementation of the provisions of the Act started, as in the case of the Local Government Acts, in January 1984. By the end of March 1986 there were 4,420 registered cooperatives under the Cooperatives Act of 1982 in Tanzania Mainland. Of these 1,946 were village-based primary cooperative societies, 1,545 urban-based cooperative shops, 906 other types of primary cooperatives and 23 cooperative unions (some regions have more than one cooperative union e.g. Iringa, Mbeya and Kilimanjaro) (Ngombale-Mwiru, 1986:16). During their first year of operation (1984/85) the cooperative unions collected 32,177 tons of both food and cash crops. However, by 30 March 1986 they, excepting the Dar es Salaam Cooperative Union, had collected 489,524 tons of agricultural produce (*ibid*:16-7).

In addition, they were involved in the distribution of agricultural inputs and implements to the peasant farmers. Moreover, some even began the distribution of consumer goods to their members, thus finally breaking the monopoly of the distribution trade by the regional trading companies, another group of state-owned corporations.

The cooperatives, like the villages, come under the jurisdiction of the new Ministry of Local Government, Cooperative Development and Marketing, which in addition to local government matters, is responsible for all agricultural marketing, that is, it has taken over from Kilimo's responsibility for all the marketing boards. The PMO is no longer in charge of the cooperatives as was the case during the period 1972-85. The Registrar of Cooperatives is now in the former

ministry and the Regional Cooperative Officers are the Assistant Registrars of Cooperatives for their respective regions and not the RDDs as was the case in the past. The Tanzanian cooperative movement is a three-tiered system with primary cooperative societies forming the bottom-of-the-pyramid institutions, the unions are the secondary cooperatives (these are regional - sometimes district - cooperatives which are amalgams of primary societies) and the Cooperative Union of Tanzania in the apex organisation, which replaced the semi-deficient Union of Cooperative Societies which existed during the period 1976-82.

The multipurpose single-village cooperative society is a producer cooperative, which engages in both production and marketing activities. In addition to assisting the production activities of its members, the village cooperative can engage directly in communal activities such as farming, dairy cattle and poultry keeping, small-scale industries and handicrafts. The primary cooperative society is simply a marketing organisation and its members are scattered in two to five villages.

Although everyone talks of the reintroduction of the cooperatives in Tanzania, in reality there is a marked continuation of the key micro elements of rural cooperation embodied in the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975. The villages were envisaged as multi-purpose in role and emphasised producer cooperatives as the focus of rural cooperation and the key to rural development in the countryside. Nonetheless, this assertion has not been without contention. However, there has been a debate between the politicians and the technocrats,

especially in the Cooperative Development Department then in the PMO; the former preferred the multi-purpose role and single-village cooperatives, whilst the latter had wanted to return to the pre-1976 cooperatives, the primary marketing cooperative societies.

In the event, the NEC of the CCM resolved in 1985 in favour of the multi-purpose and single-village rural development cooperatives as the basic unit of rural cooperation in Tanzania. But not without some exhortation of any would be protagonist of the pre-1976 cooperatives:

For the establishment of the rural producer cooperatives in the villages to succeed, it must receive the contribution of the experts of all fields concerned with rural development. The concept of rural producer cooperatives in the villages is new to our experts, including the cooperative officers themselves. What they know well is the crop marketing cooperatives. It is the duty of the Party to educate our experts of the various fields about the substance and content, and importance of the producer cooperatives for the real development of our rural citizenry and our country (CCM, 1985:10-1). (Our translation from the Swahili).

The success and/or failure of this type of rural cooperation will be evident with time. Nonetheless, the reestablishment of the cooperatives has encountered a number of operational difficulties. Some of these include the distribution of assets which were owned by the parastatals, whose major functions have been taken over by the cooperatives, autonomy of the cooperatives and marketing costs and crop purchase funds (usually, available from the National Bank of Commerce as overdraft and subject to immense bureaucratic redtape and controls). It is ironic that some parastatals are reluctant to hand over the assets to the cooperatives, even if these originally belonged to the latter before their dissolution in May 1976! At the time of the

debate on the Cooperatives bill a majority of the MPs had resisted the Government's intentions to give itself the power to employ and remove senior officers of the cooperative unions, but the Government finally bowed to this pressure so that this power has been placed on the committees of the cooperative unions themselves. If public enthusiasm and confidence in them are not to be undermined, the cooperatives must be controlled, it is argued, by the owners. Recent complaints by the Secretary General of the Cooperative Union of Tanzania that Government is exercising too much control of the cooperatives (Tanzania, *Daily News*, November 18, 1987) gives an indication of the problems facing the autonomy of the cooperative movement in the country.

The Party, through its position of supremacy, has some control on the cooperatives as well through its executive committees at each appropriate level. Incidentally, the chairperson of the committee of a cooperative society is also a member of the relevant Party executive committee so that he/she is bound to be aware of any matter discussed in it about the welfare of his/her organisation; this group control is likely to be better than the control exercised by one single bureaucrat or technocrat.

4.4 Conclusion

The purpose of the discussion in this chapter was to provide the reader with the context within which RIDEPS have been planned and implemented, and within which this study sets out to evaluate their planning methodologies and implementation. To achieve this aim, it has

been necessary to discuss the recent trends of the national economy, since macroeconomic decisions and activities have influence and significance on the regional economies.

The period 1976-86 has witnessed immense difficulties in the Tanzanian economy. The causes of these difficulties have been identified as both of local and external origin.

The administrative decentralised measures initiated in 1972, though still characterised by shortcomings, have created conditions for the development and sustenance of regional planning in general and regional integrated development planning in particular. Further, villagisation created premises for cost-effective public sector interventions, especially in the provision of production and social infrastructure and the institutionalisation and practice of popular participation. Moreover, the villagisation programme offered opportunities for the organisation of communal production activities.

FOOTNOTES

1. It is significant to note that until 1976 there was no international recognition of the basic needs approach of national development i.e. about 9 years after the promulgation of the Arusha Declaration. See ILO, 1976, **Employment, Growth and Basic Needs Approach to Development: Some Issues Regarding Concepts and Methodology**, Geneva: ILO.
2. Over the years the Party had issued policy documents which clarify and/or emphasise aspects of the Arusha Declaration, namely Education for Self-Reliance (March 1967), TANU Guidelines (1971), *Siasa ni Kilimo* [Politics is Agriculture] (1972), *Siasa ya Chama kuhusu Viwanda Vidogovidogo* [Party Policy on Small Industries] (1973), *Wito wa Chama juu ya Umwagiliaji Mashamba* [The Party Call on Irrigation Agriculture] (1974), The Musoma Resolution on clarification of Education for Self-Reliance (1974), etc.
3. The decision to recentralise the Extension Services was made in 1983 (and became effective in July 1983) on the recommendation of

the Task Force on National Agricultural Policy which blamed the poor performance and ineffectiveness of the extension services, among others, on their fragmentation between the ministry, regions and crop authorities and their consequent "loss of cohesiveness and coordination with the technical and professional counterpart in the Ministry of Agriculture" (see Task Force on the National Agricultural Policy, 1983, Dar es Salaam: Printpak, p. 125.) However, it is doubtful that this is the solution of the specific problem. Other observers have identified many other problems facing the extension services, such as poor supervision and guidance, lack or inadequacy of work tools, equipment and funds and most markedly the archaic method of "lecturing" peasants (see Hansel, De Vries and Ndedya (eds), 1975, *Agricultural Extension in Ujamaa Development*, Morogoro: Faculty of Agriculture and Forestry; De Vries, 1977, 'Ujamaa Villages and Problems of Institutional Change with Emphasis on Agricultural Extension and Development' in *Rural Economy Paper*, No. 3, Morogoro: Faculty of Agriculture and Forestry and Ngasongwa, 1980, *A Study of Agricultural development in Morogoro Region: A Historical Perspective*, M.A. Dissertation of the University of Dar es Salaam.

4. There was an earlier report on government decentralisation which was prepared in 1969 by a commission headed by Professor C. Pratt. This report, however, was never made public.
5. Some commentators of the Tanzanian development have called this phenomenon as a "pathology of institution-building", because there was unjustified proliferation of the parastatals, especially in the first half of the 1970s. For details of this view see Mudoola, 1985, 'The Pathology of Institution Building - The Tanzanian Case' in Kiros (ed.), 1985, *Challenging Rural Poverty: Experiences in Institution-Building and Popular Participation for Rural Development in Eastern Africa*, Trenton (N.J.): Africa World Press, pp. 117-25.
6. "Operations" in the Tanzanian context are movements of large numbers of people into planned villages, normally involving a whole district or region such as "Operation Chunya" or "Operation Kigoma". The term may also be used for an activity undertaken for the whole district, region or country such as "Operation Maduka", under which communal shops were started in the villages with the ultimate aim to eliminate private shops there.

PART TWO

DISCUSSION OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS: EVALUATION OF
EXTERNALLY FUNDED RIDEPS IN TANZANIA

In country planning the interests of the countryman must be the first concern, and any attempt to reconstruct the countryside will fail, if it does not take account all the circumstances of his life. ... The problem ... is how to put within reach of the country dweller all the amenities and the opportunities of life, which are regarded nowadays as the normal inheritance of every townsmen.

E.A. Johnston (quoting E. Yalan, 1961), *The Organisation of Space in Developing Countries*, 1970.

CHAPTER FIVE

EVALUATION OF THE KIGOMA RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (THE KIGOMA RIDEP)

5.1 Introduction

The Kigoma RIDEP was the first integrated package plan to be implemented in the country and also one of the World Bank's early endeavours in supporting integrated rural development projects. The RIDEP was to run for 15 years divided into three five-year phases. The first phase was scheduled to commence in July 1974 and to end in June 1979. The other phases were scheduled to commence in July 1979 and to run through to June 1989. In the event, only the first phase was funded and implemented. Due to a slow start-up and other difficulties, as we shall see later, the first phase was finally closed down in December 1983, but actual funding was last provided for the 1981/82 fiscal year.

The Kigoma RIDEP envisaged increased incomes and living standards of the rural people as its main objectives. The plan aimed at doubling the per capita income of Tshs 160 (US\$ 20) to Tshs 320 (US\$ 40) during the first five year period. This target was to be achieved through increased production of four major crops (cotton, maize, beans and groundnuts) using better and improved husbandry methods and practices, and agricultural inputs. Moreover, there would be provision of social and economic infrastructure, such as educational and health facilities, village water supplies, warehouses and feeder roads. It was hoped that the Kigoma RIDEP would provide a blueprint for

replication in the other regions in Tanzania.

Kigoma Region is, mainly for historical reasons, one of the less developed areas in the country. During both the colonial period and first decade of independence, Kigoma region acted as one of the labour reserve areas, providing migrant labour for the sisal estates along the coast. This phenomenon depleted the region of its active labour force.

The situation was further accentuated by lack of a reliable cash crop and communications and transport constraints. Thus, it is little wonder that, although the region is well endowed with agricultural potential, it has been unable to attract sufficient investment resources both from public and private sources. For these reasons and in line with its declared policy emphasis on rural development and reduction of regional disparities, the Tanzanian Government set out to take measures to overcome the region's development problems. It actively sought assistance from the World Bank, which responded through its affiliate, the International Development Association (IDA), by providing a soft loan of 10 million US dollars (or Tshs 71 million or 74.7 per cent of the total funds earmarked for the RIDEP) to be disbursed over a five year period. The United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) was to contribute Tshs 11 million or 11.6 per cent and the Tanzanian Government was to provide Tshs 13 million or 13.7 per cent to meet local costs. However, by June 1983 IDA had disbursed Tshs 79 million or 63.2 per cent, UNCDF had disbursed Tshs 11.9 million or 9.5 per cent and Tanzania had contributed Tshs 34.1 million or 27.3 per cent. All in all, the Kigoma RIDEP spent Tshs 125

million as opposed to the original estimates of Tshs 95 million at appraisal in 1973.

Project implementation got off to a slow start due, in part, to the dissolution of the Kigoma Region Cooperative Union in July 1974, which was a key institution in the implementation of the various projects of the Kigoma RIDEF, and also to the delay in securing the services of a land use planner. The land use planner was crucial in identifying suitable villages to be included in the RIDEF, which was envisaged to cover 150 villages during the first phase, 1974-79. This would involve 34,500 families. Subsequent phases of the RIDEF were to cover 325 villages. Villages to be covered by the RIDEF were to be selected according to economic potential and to be registered as agricultural producer cooperative societies. By 1978 there were 218 villages in Kigoma region, of which 217 were registered as multi-purpose primary cooperative societies. The villages had to be situated in the three zones: highland, intermediate and miombo zones, which together embraced about 460,000 people or 87 per cent of the Region's rural population (see Maps 5.1 and 5.2). Moreover, the project villages would be selected in all the three districts of Kigoma, Kasulu and Kibondo (Table 5.1). The number of project villages was revised in 1980 to 135 villages. At the end of the RIDEF implementation, there were 130 project villages, in which about 250,000 people lived.

The choice of the Kigoma region was made because of several favourable considerations: (1) Tanzania's stated commitment to rural development and especially, its poverty-oriented and basic needs

Map 5.1: Kigoma Region: Population Density in 1974




Table 5.1: Project coverage of villages 1975-81

Project Year	Kigoma	District Kasulu	Kibondo	Total Region
PY2 (1975/76)	9	7	7	23
PY3 (1976/77)	6	9	7	22
PY4 (1977/78)	5	3	4	12
PY5 (1978/79)	3	1	1	5
PY6 (1979/80)	15	9	11	35
PY7 (1980/81)	9	15	9	33
Total	47	44	39	130(a)

Source: Project Management Executive Report: Mambo Tuliyojifunza Kutokana na Utekelezaji wa Mradi wa Uwiano wa Mkoa wa Kigoma [Key elements we have learned in the implementation of the Kigoma RIDEPI u.d. (mimeo.), p. 4.

Note: (a) In 1981 Kigoma region had a total of 220 villages, of which 218 were registered.

objectives, which coincided closely with the Bank's new thrust in lending; (2) the 1972 decentralisation of Government administration offered enhanced opportunities for the planning and implementation of an integrated rural development project, as such a project would portray area and/or ecological specific advantages, and (3) the choice of Tanzania, as one of the World's poorest and dominantly agrarian countries, and Kigoma, as one of the most remote and lagging regions in the United Republic, was in tune with the Bank's elevated interest and intentions of focusing on the "poorest of the poor" (World Bank, 1975:3). Indeed, for these reasons, Tanzania has been able to attract more aid from various donors, the majority of whom are in the West, during the post-Arusha Declaration period than in the previous one.'

5.2 Project Design, Objectives and Targets

This section discusses the RIDEPI's design, objectives and targets in order to assess their appropriateness and likelihood of realising

them. The first sub-section reviews the appraisal, the objectives and the strategy and the means to achieve them.

5.2.1 Appraisal, Objectives and the Strategy

A team of experts from the World Bank Resident Mission in East Africa based in Nairobi visited Kigoma Region for a short time between May 1972 and February 1973. The team subsequently prepared a project document, in the form of a blueprint plan - Appraisal Report No 453 CTA issued in May 1974. Following the acceptance of the Appraisal Report's recommendations by both the Bank and Tanzanian Government, the former agreed to extend to the latter a credit of US\$ 10 million to finance the various components of the RIDEP as specified in the Appraisal Report. The UNCDF made available a grant of US\$ 1.5 million, while the Tanzanian Government's contribution was to be US\$ 1.8 million, thus bringing the total estimated project costs to US\$ 13.3 million. However, about US\$ 0.9 million was set aside for the activities of a monitoring and evaluation unit, which was later set up by PMO in Mwanza. This unit, the Planning and Evaluation Unit, which is a national undertaking, had little relevance to the Kigoma RIDEP. Thus, the total amount to be spent in Kigoma region was to be US\$ 12.4 million to be disbursed over a five year period.

The main objective of the RIDEP was the doubling of the annual per capita income from approximately US\$ 20 to US\$ 40 for about 250,000 people or 50 per cent of the total population of the region. These people would be living in the 150 project-covered villages. The selection criteria for a village to receive RIDEP-funded projects

included availability of land and water, and accessibility by road and/or rail. These criteria were dictated by the design's concern for raising agricultural production. The increased income would be achieved through increased agricultural productivity made possible by widespread adoption of project financed technological packages (improved extension services, inputs, adoption of fine-tuned and ecologically-specific research recommendations, adoption and application of improved cultivation methods and practices) for cotton and groundnuts (as cash crops) and maize and beans (as food crops).

Villagers would be given access to agricultural inputs through provision of rural credit. The selection of villagers to receive credit depended upon their being creditworthy and recommendations from the village leadership and their *Bwana Shamba* (agricultural extension worker). Although the RIDEP's thrust was the raising of rural incomes through greatly increased agricultural productivity, social and economic infrastructure received far greater resources than those components directly influencing agricultural production. This can be seen in the breakdown of the RIDEP's estimated costs of expenditure as shown in Table 5.2. Seasonal inputs (B1) were to account for only 9 per cent of the total RIDEP costs of expenditure and yet this is the only component providing for direct investment in agriculture, the principal source of the project's increased incomes. Village infrastructure (A and B2) was allocated 41 per cent, whereas regional support (C, D and E) was estimated to cost 19 percent of the total project budget.

Table 5.2: Estimated costs of expenditure of the Kigoma RIDEP
(US\$ '000)

	Costs	% of Total
<u>A. Village Infrastructure</u>		
1. Water supply	1,774	14
2. Health	218	2
3. Education	2,161	17
4. Feeder roads	134	1
5. Tsetse clearing	118	1
Sub-total	<u>4,405</u>	<u>35</u>
<u>B. Loans to Villagers</u>		
1. Seasonal inputs	1,079	9
2. Production infrastructure	767	6
Sub-total	<u>1,846</u>	<u>15</u>
<u>C. Loan & equity contribution to KCU</u>		
	<u>798</u>	<u>6</u>
<u>D. Regional Infrastructure</u>		
1. Regional training centres	248	2
2. Radio-telephone set	49	-
3. ATTC & pilot livestock project	123	1
4. Vehicles	78	1
5. Field demonstrations	30	-
6. Aerial photography	252	2
Sub-total	<u>780</u>	<u>6</u>
E. Technical Assistance	<u>825</u>	<u>7</u>
F. Contingency Allowances	<u>3,767</u>	<u>30</u>
<u>Total cost</u>	<u>12,421</u>	<u>100</u>

Source: Appraisal Report, 1974, p. 17.

In the case of the Kigoma RIDEP all but four of the project components began to be implemented as stipulated in the design. Note (a) in Table 5.3 indicates those projects which were never implemented throughout the RIDEP's life span. This contrasts with the other two RIDEPs of Tanga and Iringa where only a few projects or sectors were selected for implementation. The data in Table 5.3 is authenticated by the information contained in Table 5.8 (p. 248) which shows project accomplishments against targets. Agricultural production

Table 5.3: Kigoma RIDEF proposed and actually implemented project components

Project Component	Proposed Targets (1974) (number)
A. Village Infrastructure	
1. Water Supply	
(i) Shallow wells/boreholes	55
(ii) Piped water system	55
2. Health	
(i) Dispensaries (new)	10
(ii) Rural health centres (new)	3 (a)
3. Education	
(i) Classrooms	378
(ii) Teachers houses	335
(iii) Offices	76
(iv) Workshops	93
(v) Toilets	120
(vi) Desks	7,920
(vii) Workshop tool sets	93 (a)
(viii) Textbooks sets	91
(ix) Library book sets	135
4. Feeder roads (km)	389
5. Bush clearing (ha)	21,775
B. Loans to Villages	
1. Seasonal inputs for villages	95
2. Production infrastructure	
(i) Village godowns	95
(ii) Maize mills	95
(iii) Maize shellers	95 (a)
(iv) Village subloans	175
C. Agriculture	
Annual marketed outputs (tons)	
(i) Maize	8,400
(ii) Beans	4,900
(iii) Cotton	10,700
(iv) Groundnut	700 (a)
D. Regional Infrastructure	
(i) Rural Training Centre (new)	1
(ii) Rural Training Centre (upgrading)	2
(iii) ATTC	1
(iv) Vehicles	10
(v) Land use planning for villages	150
(vi) Training (a) Extension workers	100
(b) Bookkeepers	100
(c) Village medical helpers	50

Source: Project Management Executive Annual Report for 1975/76, *passim*.

Note: (a) Implementation never took place for the whole RIDEF life.

Table 5.4: Targets of distribution of fertilisers (metric tons)

Year	Targets
PY2 (1975/76)	67
PY3 (1976/77)	261
PY4 (1977/78)	408
PY5 (1978/79)	627

Source: Appraisal Report.

and productivity was expected to improve largely as a result of the introduction of technological innovations based on chemical inputs (fertilisers and insecticides), improved seeds, agricultural credit and improved delivery of extension services.

Table 5.4 details the envisaged targets of fertilisers, whereas Table 5.5 presents targets of expected crop improvement by the end of project in 1978/79. These technological inputs would be directed towards maize, cotton, beans and groundnuts. The project would provide fertilisers, insecticides and improved seeds to project villages on credit. Credit-worthy villages would apply and receive credit for inputs from the Kigoma Cooperative Union (KCU), which would in turn borrow from the Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB), the agency responsible for input procurement. The village governments would collect loan repayment from the individual village farmers when selling their produce.

Appraisal recommendations for fertiliser application in Kigoma region were to be directed towards cotton, which was to receive the bulk of the chemical inputs, whilst the remainder was earmarked for use in maize production. Beans were assumed to benefit from residual effects, as it was usually intercropped with maize or grown after

maize was harvested. The emphasis on increasing yields per unit area (Table 5.5) through intensification was based on the experiences of the traditional cotton-growing areas of Western Tanzania (Mwanza, Shinyanga and Mara regions), where increased yields per unit area were being achieved through increased use of fertilisers and insecticides. This assumption was further supported by the fact that ecologically Kigoma region's intermediate and miombo woodland zones exhibited similar soil and vegetation characteristics as those found in the Lake Victoria regions which are the major cotton growing areas in Tanzania.

Originally, the Regional Administration planned to effect villagisation at a gradual pace, achieving complete resettlement by 1980 (Appraisal Report, 1974:37). The majority of the rural population lived in the highlands where land shortage was acute, but they were unwilling to move out and resettle in the intermediate and miombo zones which, although land was both plentiful and fertile, were infested with tsetse flies. Hence, the Appraisal team felt, perhaps, that it would be infeasible to attain widespread resettlement in the intermediate and miombo zones, especially the latter, so that it emphasised intensification rather than extensive land use and expansion into new formerly uncultivated areas as in much of the Lake Victoria regions. Thus increased application of fertilisers coupled with improved crop husbandry practices formed the preferred basis for raising yields of the two major crops (*ibid*:30-2). Thus, intensification was seen by the RIDEP planners as the only alternative under the circumstances.

Intensification was also considered appropriate, given provision

Table 5.5: Expected crop improvement targets by the end of the project (1978/79)

Crop	Traditional Husbandry kg/ha	Advanced Husbandry kg/ha	Increase (%)
Maize	600	1,900	217
Beans	280	670	139
Cotton	390	1,120	187
Groundnuts	390	790	103

Source: Appraisal Report, Annex 3, pp. 13-6.

Table 5.6: Kigoma RIDEP's targets for the education sector

Project Year	Classrooms		Workshops		Teachers houses		Offices		
	Yearly	Cum.	Yearly	Cum.	Yearly	Cum.	Yearly	Cum.	
1974/75	65	65	25	25	68	68	8	8	
1975/76	73	138	21	46	75	143	8	16	
1976/77	84	222	14	60	68	211	7	23	
1977/78	80	302	17	77	62	273	-	23	
1978/79	76	378	16	93	62	335	-	23	
Other targets (cum.):		120 toilets							
		95 workshop tool sets							
		7,920 desks							
		91 textbook sets							
		135 library book sets							

Source: Appraisal Report.

Note: Cum. = cumulative total.

of improved extension services which would be equipped with region-specific technological packages emanating from the Agricultural Trials and Training Centre (ATTC) (see pp. 253-7).

Cotton growing was also given top priority by the regional authorities for other reasons as well. For years Kigoma region has acted as a labour reserve for other regions and the Swahili word "MANAMBA" [migrant labourer] has both derisive and derogatory connotations and, therefore, the regional authorities were anxiously looking for a cash crop which would occupy the would-be migrant labour

force. This would eventually curtail the movement of able-bodied people seeking employment elsewhere in the country. Some of the regional leaders felt that the region's backwardness was partly caused by lack of a cash crop and, therefore, cotton seemed to be the answer to this problem. This was in line with national policy (and also the World Bank's) to encourage expansion and improvement of cash crops in order to earn foreign exchange.

The village infrastructural development accounted for 35 per cent of the proposed expenditure and a multitude of improvements was envisaged (Table 5.2, p. 214). The Appraisal Team thought that the provision of social services was both a good thing and necessary for improving labour inputs and agricultural production through increased receptivity of modern scientific knowledge. In the educational sector the RIDEP planned to improve schooling facilities so as to raise the educational level of Kigoma's rural population in primary and technical fields by helping the region achieve the national goals of: (i) universal primary education (UPE) by 1989 (as against a 1972/73 enrolment of 37 per cent)², (ii) eradication of adult illiteracy and (iii) emphasis on technical education in the primary schools. To this end the RIDEP design envisaged provision of funds for the construction of 378 classrooms, 93 workshops, 335 teachers houses, etc (Table 5.6).

The RIDEP objective for the health sector was to improve the quality of the health services available to the rural population and thus, reduce debility caused by diseases. The RIDEP would contribute to improvement of the health delivery system by providing funds for the construction of 3 new RHCs and 10 new dispensaries to bring in

line with national levels. However, these targets were revised in 1976 (PY2) due to the dire state of the region's health services by comparison with needs. The revised targets for the health sector included:

- improvement of 4 existing rural health centres
- improvement/upgrading of 17 dispensaries
- construction of 10 new dispensaries in newly settled villages
- provision of dispensaries and RHCs medical equipment and supplies
- training of 50 village health workers, who would work in the villages on a voluntary basis
- provision of transport (2 motorcycles per RHC and 1 bicycle per dispensary) for outreach services
- construction of staff houses (unspecified).

At appraisal Kigoma region had 24 rural water supply schemes. The RIDEP was designed to improve this situation by providing the rural people with easily accessible potable water and thus, reduce the time spent fetching water enabling further productive work. Readily available safe water would also improve the villagers' health as it would greatly reduce incidence of preventable diseases.

To meet this objective the RIDEP design provided for the construction of water supply schemes in 75 newly settled villages and 35 old villages. Table 5.7 presents the data on appraisal targets of the water component. The dugwell systems would each consist of 10-15 shallow wells (maximum depth was to be 10 m) fitted with heavy-duty hand pumps. The piped water schemes would be operated either by gravity or diesel-powered pumps. The water supplies were designed to have distribution points located within 200-300 m of households.

Table 5.7: Appraisal targets for the Water Component

Project Year	Dugwell Systems		Piped Water Schemes	
	Annual	Cumulative	Annual	Cumulative
1974/75	11	11	11	11
1975/76	11	22	11	22
1976/77	11	33	11	33
1977/78	11	44	11	44
1978/79	11	55	11	55

Source: Appraisal Report.

Appraisal targets of other village infrastructural development included:

- 95 village godowns
- 95 maize grinding mills
- 60 maize shellers
- 389 km of road network to be constructed/upgraded to link project villages, especially those 95 villages receiving credit from the TRDB.

The design also envisaged provision of funds for the construction of a regional agricultural trials and training centre (ATTC), which was to undertake agronomic research and training of field staff for specific climatic and ecological conditions prevailing in the region. The *raison d'être* for the establishment of the ATTC was the felt need of the region to have its own agricultural research and training institution which catered for its specific requirements. In the past, trials have been carried out by the Ukiriguru Research Station in Mwanza 800 km away on the shore of Lake Victoria. The last agronomic experiments in crop improvement to be carried out in Kigoma had been in 1966 (Appraisal Report (Annex 5), 1974:1-2). The local centre would undertake region-specific adaptations of technical recommendations emanating from the Ukiriguru Research Station and also train field extension workers, who would have an inside knowledge of Kigoma's

peasant agriculture and thus, would be better equipped in the solution of its problems. Specifically, the centre's research programme would include: (i) on-site and village crop trials to test suitability of seeds and agronomic practices recommended by the Ukiriguru Research Station; (ii) undertaking experiments with livestock management systems and pasture development, and (iii) undertaking seed multiplication of maize, beans and groundnut varieties suitable for increased production in the region.

Moreover, RIDEF funds would be available for the construction of a rural training centre in Kigoma District and the rehabilitation of existing rural training centres of Kasulu and Kibondo Districts. The expanded capacity in the rural training centres was to be utilised for training village functionaries such as village leaders (chairmen and secretaries), village bookkeepers, cooperative assistants, village shop managers, community development assistants, etc.

The RIDEF design also required 'participation' of the target population in the implementation of the various components of the project. Villagers were expected to provide self-help in the construction of classrooms, teachers houses and village warehouses; in bush clearing to rid their areas of the tsetse flies; in digging trenches for the water supplies and construction and rehabilitation of feeder roads. The reason for emphasising self-help was to induce enthusiasm and, thus, to ensure commitment of the villagers to the project activities which will benefit them. Further, self-help was considered an important cost-saver for the RIDEF infrastructure expenditures. In this regard the RIDEF design fell in line with the

national rural development philosophy, whose *primum mobile* is grassroots-level self-help activities. However, the design fell far short of popular participation in the crucial phase of decision-making, especially in the identification and formulation of the projects, which were purported to benefit them.

5.2.2 Manpower inputs and equipment

The RIDEP design provided for support of the Regional Administration in terms of technical assistance, provision of vehicles (10 units), office and warehousing space, radio-telephone link system, construction of staff houses, staff development scheme and installation of a monitoring and evaluation system.


In addition to the technical assistance provided for specific technical activities, such as the land use planner, credit and training supervisor and the research and training officers for the ATTC, the RIDEP design provided for technical support to strengthen the regional administration's capacity. The initial plan was to strengthen the ailing KCU, which, as noted, was to be the pivot of the RIDEP's organisational and management interventions. The RIDEP would fund two posts: an operations manager and a financial controller. The management and administration of the project was to be effected under the existing institutional structures of the region. Overall responsibility for planning, supervision and implementation was vested in the Office of the Regional Development Director (RDD), but responsibility for implementing individual components was assigned to

the regional sectoral departments and the Kigoma Cooperative Union. The assignment of responsibilities was as follows: the regional agricultural development officer for the ATTC, trial demonstrations and bush clearing; the regional livestock development officer for the pilot livestock component and dips; the regional water engineer for the water component; the regional education officer for the development of the education facilities; the regional engineer for the roads and construction works and the regional medical officer for the health component.

5.2.3 Management structure for the RIDEP administration

The project design also provided for the establishment of a management advisory unit in the RDD's Office (Chart 6). This unit was to comprise four specialists: (1) Programming and Evaluation Officer, responsible for day-to-day project planning, coordination and control of performance, (2) Credit and Procurement Officer to be responsible for establishing and managing the credit system for the region, ordering and supplying farm inputs, (3) Land use planner, responsible for preparation of land use maps, demarcating block cultivation areas and their parcelling into village farming units, and advising on soil conservation measures and (4) Master fisherman, whose responsibilities included training lakeshore extension staff in the use of modern fishing gear and equipment, and training of village crews to manage and operate purse-seine fishing units and collecting and recording information for preparing detailed investment proposals for the Lake

Chart 6: Kigoma Integrated Rural Development Programme – Project Organisation



Source: Appraisal Report, Chart 1.


Tanganyika fisheries development.

The KCU was assigned a central role in the implementation of the Kigoma RIDEF. Its responsibilities ranged from procurement and distribution of agricultural inputs, administering of the credit service, purchase and collection of produce, construction and management of storage facilities through the training of village bookkeepers. However, the KCU was dissolved about the same time as the RIDEF was taking off and its functions were designated to the regional offices of the Tanzania Cotton Authority (TCA), National Milling Corporation (NMC) and Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB) and later the Project Management Executive (PME). The TRDB became responsible for the administering of the credit service component of the RIDEF, whereas procurement and distribution of agricultural inputs and collection of produce were entrusted to the TCA and NMC.

The Project Management Executive (PME) was created at the RDD's Office to fulfill the envisaged role of the KCU and the two posts were filled, namely a project manager responsible for overall supervision and coordination, and a financial controller in charge of all financial operations of the RIDEF. A Tanzanian was appointed the project manager, while the post of the project financial controller was filled by an expatriate. The post of the project manager was later recategorised as the project coordinator, perhaps, signifying the erosion of his executive powers.

Chart 7 illustrates the new project management structure which was actually implemented and in operation by the end of Project Year One, as opposed to the one proposed by the design (Chart 6). In the

Chart 7: The Kigoma RIDEP Organisational Structure (Actual Implementation).



LEGEND

— RIDEP command/communication links

- - - Regional Administration command/communication links

administering the RIDEP the Project Coordinator was assisted by four senior staff members as shown in the chart (7): the Financial Controller, the Project Engineer, the Evaluation Officer and the Land Use Planner. There have been two expatriate financial controllers during the eight years of the RIDEP's life. The two posts of project engineer and evaluation officer were initially filled by expatriates and later were filled by Tanzanian officers. The Financial Controller was in charge of all the financial and accounting and auditing matters of the RIDEP, including follow-up of disbursements from the IDA, UNCDF and Tanzania Government and ordering and procurement of materials and equipment.

The Project Engineer looked after the technical designs and construction activities, whereas the Evaluation Officer was in charge of M&E activities of the RIDEP. The Land Use Planner was responsible for the production of the village land use plans/maps with details of village boundaries, demarcated blocks of residential areas, cultivated and fallow land, village forests and/or woodlots and pastures. In addition, there have been three expatriate water engineers who were attached to the RWE's Office to assist the RWE and his staff with the survey, design and implementation of the water component projects.

5.2.4 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)

At this point a brief discussion of the proposed M&E activities is necessary. The appraisal report attached considerable importance to the need to incorporate M&E functions in the RIDEP activities. The

objective of the M&E was to provide information to the project management about progress of the implementation of the various projects of the RIDEP and to make the experience of the Kigoma RIDEP available for the benefit of the other RIDEPs in the country. The design did not formulate any specific strategy or pattern for the institutionalisation of the M&E activities in the RIDEP plan. It was left to the discretion of the Project Planning Team (PPT) (later designated as the Planning and Evaluation Unit (PEU) and stationed in Mwanza) of the PMO to design and implement the Kigoma RIDEP's M&E activities.

This was an anomaly, because, in practice, the PPT and later the PEU had very little influence on the M&E activities of the Kigoma RIDEP. This crucial task was left to the regional administration and the PME Project Coordinator to sort out. Not surprisingly, not much work was done in this regard until the World Bank exerted pressure on the project coordinator, who established a quarterly reporting system. This system entailed the compilation of progress reports of project activities by implementing agencies (the functional managers and the district development directors). Although some improvements were discernible, the system was fraught with difficulties, rendering the reports sometimes unusable due to inaccuracies or discrepancies. Part of the difficulties lies, no doubt, in the lack of tradition of M&E in the Tanzanian bureaucracy. Periodic or sporadic reporting is a known phenomenon in the bureaucracy, but the type of reporting or data gleaning and retrieval demanded for M&E activities were markedly absent and untested in the

Tanzanian bureaucracy. Coupled with shortfalls of a highly personalised administrative/management system and poor communications between field staff and head office personnel, these difficulties hampered the data gathering activities for monitoring of the Kigoma RIDEP.


The M&E activities also faced the problem of rapid staff turnover. The two Tanzanian evaluation officers, who took over from the expatriate evaluation officer, each served the RIDEP for about one year before it reached its end in the fiscal year 1981/82. Evaluation of the RIDEP, although it received a somewhat belated but elevated attention in comparison to monitoring, was effectively undertaken. A baseline survey was mounted in mid-1976 by the Economic Research Bureau of the University of Dar es Salaam and thus it was able to establish benchmarks for the RIDEP. The baseline study was a single-visit survey and measured production and social parameters at the household level, covering 30 households in each of 10 villages, of which 8 were project villages (Mabele and Schultheis, 1977). These data were also used to make comparisons overtime with data gathered two years later in a farm management survey (Loft and Oldewelt, 1981).

5.2.5 Schematic representation of the RIDEP linkages and interrelationships

The RIDEP design is silent on the masterplan or schema of the interrelationships and linkages of the many components of the project. The provision of such schema is necessary as it helps us to understand the logic of the design of the different components and their linkages

and interactions. Loft *et al* (1982:17) have constructed such a schema through deduction from the Appraisal report and its adaptation is shown here as Chart 8. The numbers in circles indicate the offices and agencies responsible for the component implementation, whereas the capital letters in blocks or squares represent the interventions to be undertaken in order to attain the RIDEP's stated objectives. Schematically, the RIDEP's support package was to streamline the advancement of the villages through three stages: (i) identification of suitable village sites, (ii) provision of social and economic infrastructure and (iii) provision of technological packages. At the centre of Chart 8 is the main objective of the RIDEP: **increase agricultural production, which will bring about increased rural incomes and marketed surplus.** This would be realised through a chain of effect linkages and interventions from the periphery, which is comprised of the specific sectoral components. The arrows signify the direction of the movement of effects of the different components, which merge into a series of interactions. The ultimate and cumulative result of all these interactions will be the accomplishment of the principal objective at the centre of the chart. The interlocking of the different components was assumed to facilitate the intensification of land use, which would raise greatly agricultural productivity and output. As is evident from the chart, the KCU's role was crucial in ensuring effective implementation of the several project components. Thus understandably its demise just at the time when implementation of the RIDEP was starting to take off created organisational problems and, most importantly, displeasure of the lender, the World Bank, all

Chart 8: Effect Linkages of the Kigoma RIDEP Components (Original Design Targets)



Source: M.V. Loft et al, 1982. An Evaluation of the Kigoma Rural Development Project, E.R.B. 82.1, Figure 1.

of which continued to plague the Kigoma RIDEF throughout its life span.

In order to underline the rationale and assumptions of the RIDEF design, the linkages and interrelationships as shown in Chart 8 will be further examined. At the time of the design, Kigoma was undergoing villagisation through "Operation Kigoma". Rural people were being moved from the densely populated highlands into the intermediate and miombo zones, which were until then thinly populated due to the menace of the tsetse infestation with its high incidence of sleeping sickness and trypanosomiasis. Thus, the need for identification and selection of suitable village sites in terms of adequate agricultural land and water was considered appropriate and necessary. To this end, village planning was built in the RIDEF design to ensure that villagers went to sites with abundant natural resources to support sustainable development in the future (Block A in Chart 8). The experts from the sectoral departments would cooperate closely in the preparation of village site feasibility reports, which would form the basis for selection for settlement. In this first stage of village site identification, the services of the land use planner were considered indispensable. For this reason, the design provided for the recruitment of an experienced land use planner and the procurement of materials and equipment for aerial photography. Bush clearing was to be undertaken early in the implementation process in order to rid the new villages of tsetse flies.

The second stage would comprise input investments in social and economic infrastructure so as to make the villages habitable and

attractive to the settlers. This would also lay the foundation stone of induced technological advancement in the villages. The cumulative effect of all these interventions would be lifting of development constraints such as time-consuming and strength-sapping working conditions of the peasants. These drawbacks, undoubtedly, militate against raising labour productivity in the villages. Increased agricultural production at the centre of Chart 8 (Blocks R & S) would raise the need for expanded crop procurement capacity (Block J) which would call for revamping of the region's ailing marketing structure and organisation (as exemplified by the KCU). Villages as the new cooperative societies and hence the new crop buying agents (Block H) would need to have storage capacity (Block F) and accounting system (Block G). The project design provided for a credit fund to enable villagers to secure loans for the construction of village stores and train village bookkeepers. The KCU would be provided with funds to strengthen its transport fleet and upgrade the feeder roads system (Block I).

During the third stage the ATTC would run crop improvement trials (Block K) which would create specific knowledge for the region (Block L). The cumulative effect of the interventions (Block L - extension package, Block N - technological package and Blocks M & T - increased awareness and receptivity) would bring about increased rate of adoption of improved crop husbandry practices and techniques (Block O) which would ultimately lead to agricultural intensification (Block P). The combined effect of the intensification process and the neutralisation of the production constraints (Block Q) would result in

greatly increased agricultural production, the principal objective of the Kigoma RIDEP.

5.3 The evaluation of the planning methodology and its appropriateness

The purpose of the discussion in this section is to determine the internal logic of the RIDEP design assumptions and the extent to which they were congruent with the Tanzanian development philosophy. As noted in Chapters 2 and 3, the aim here is to appraise the RIDEP plan *ex post* to underline its technical soundness and appropriateness. The analysis aims at establishing the likelihood of the design assumptions to achieve the targets.

The Kigoma RIDEP was a single-shot planning output in a form of a blueprint plan followed up by capital investment, a revolving fund and a technical assistance team. The plan was comprehensive and integrated, embracing all the key sectors of the regional economy, with small-scale agriculture assigned the role of the leading sector. In other words, the RIDEP plan was both multisectoral and area-specific in the sense that it dealt with a range of sectors and disciplines, encompassing a regional economy. In addition, it addressed itself to tackling problems of development in a holistic manner in a particular geographical entity. In its spatial coverage, it was envisaged to include 150 villages out of the planned 193 villages to be resettled under the villagisation programme, which was then already being implemented. These project villages were to be

selected and included in the RIDEP activities from all the three districts of the region.

The plan's identification of agriculture as the leading sector was quite appropriate, since (1) its principal objective was the doubling of rural per capita incomes within a five-year timeframe and (2) the ecological and economic suitability of the food crops and the new technical packages, at least, appeared to be sound on the basis of experience locally and in similar areas of Tanzania. The design, as demonstrated by the data presented in Table 5.2 (p. 214) did not allocate adequate funds to support directly productive activities in agriculture. As noted, seasonal inputs were allocated only 9 per cent of the total budget. Even if we included items A5, B2, D3 and D5 as activities indirectly supportive to the agricultural production (some people may regard this as 'begging the question'), they added up to an extra US\$ 1,038,000 or 8 per cent, in all totalling US\$ 2,117,000 or 17 per cent of the total RIDEP budget. Moreover, the notion of agriculture being the leading sector was replaced after implementation took off in favour of the infrastructural development, especially education and rural water supply facilities. It is not intended here to state what size of fund would be needed for directly productive agricultural activities as this would be speculative. The point being emphasised here is that funding for directly productive agricultural activities was inadequate in absolute terms given their envisaged role in the RIDEP plan. The critical issue here is one of creating the appropriate balance in the allocation of resources commensurate with each sector's planned role

in the project. In this aspect, the design was subject to considerable slippage. We return to this issue in section 5.4.1 (pp. 249-57).

Infrastructural development to improve marketing of agricultural produce was correctly identified as conducive to aiding agricultural development. Other infrastructural developments, such as education, health and provision of rural water supplies were considered concomitant to the general improvement of quality of life of the rural people. This was also a correct assessment of the needs of the target population and one which was in accordance with the Tanzania's declared objectives. In short, the plan had both efficiency and equity/distributional objectives which were consistent with both national and regional objectives. The RIDEF plan was also in congruence with the then prevailing rural development philosophy of the World Bank, the donor funding the RIDEF (see Chapter 2 for the Bank's increased interest in IRDPs). The Tanzanian leadership had committed itself to the basic needs development strategy since the 1967 Arusha Declaration and the RIDEF plan addressed basic needs. The design was supportive of collective agriculture, but this was never translated into action.

The RIDEF plan proposals correctly identified the key constraints facing the region, though some of its suggested palliatives were ineffective or simply incorrect. It correctly identified its target population as the rural inhabitants of the region, but its procedure for selecting and including villages into its funded activities tended to be discriminatory against the very people it planned to assist as it was based on land availability and accessibility. This meant that

villages which faced land shortages and were remote or poorly accessible were excluded from the RIDEF activities. Since the RIDEF design's concern was to reach the "poorest of the poor" (i.e. poverty-oriented objective), the logic would demand helping more the disadvantaged (the peasants in the land-scarce and remote villages). Fortunately, these selection criteria were later abandoned, thanks to the success of villagisation, which made the original proposals technically impossible to implement, because (1) all peasants received adequate land in the villages, making non-viable the land availability criterion, (2) there were far too many villages for the land use planner to prepare the "plans" which were used to select villages to receive RIDEF support.

The plan emphasised strongly the "correctness" of its design assumptions, which was rather paradoxical, given the fact that the RIDEF was an experiment in a new area, both in terms of the planning and implementation methodologies, and the physical environment, on which very scarce data existed. Kigoma region was being singled out to experiment with planning and implementation methodologies, which spatially covered a large and diverse geographical area and the plan was the first of its kind in the country. In fact, both the donor agency and recipient had wanted to use the experience and lessons generated by the Kigoma RIDEF to assist them in the planning and implementation of other RIDEFs elsewhere in the country.

The plan lacked the flexibility which was necessary, particularly in the circumstances obtaining in Kigoma at the time. The success of the implementation depended, in a large measure, on the validity of

the design assumptions and their in-built flexibility to make adjustments whenever appropriate. As a result of this inflexibility, changes to some of the flawed assumptions (see p. 243 for details) had to be instituted in March 1980, that is, in the sixth year of implementation after the mid-term review exercise of November 1978 (Loft *et al*, 1982:75). Undoubtedly, this problem is an expected outcome of any blueprint, single-shot and non-iterative plan. In any case, this was the standard planning methodology at the time in the country. Regional planning was just being evolved in the country and indeed, elsewhere in the Third World, and therefore, its "prevailing body of theory and techniques ... is poorly adapted both to the objective conditions in rural regions and to the subjective needs of their populations" (Belshaw and Douglass, 1981:1).

This problem of lack of flexibility was also compounded by the long and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures of both the recipient and the donor. The plan also made provision for training of personnel once implementation was in place and left this discretion, correctly, in the hands of the RDD as the chief executive of the region. However, in practice, there must have been some re-direction of awards by the PMO as a substantial number of officers who received training using the RIDEP funds came from outside the region. The RIDEP's concern for agricultural knowledge fine-tuned to Kigoma's agroecological conditions was both sensible and appropriate and so was its proposal to have an agricultural trials and training centre established in the region expressly for that purpose.

The identification of four crops for intensification: maize and

beans as food crops, and cotton and groundnuts as cash crops, was consistent with the regional and national development priorities at the time. Nonetheless, had comparative advantage been given sufficient thought, probably these cash crops would not have been included in the project for reasons of marginality and lack of competitiveness in the crop mix. Both cotton and groundnuts are marginal crops in the region and are also of only recent introduction. Given their problematic production economics when compared with maize and beans and the longer gestation period (for example, a peasant has to wait for 6-8 months to earn money from his cotton as opposed to 3-4 months for maize and beans), their future as accepted commercial crops among the Kigoma peasantry was, to say the least, high risk. (See Acland, 1971:20-5, 94-109, 124-32, *passim*, for details on the production economics of these crops in East Africa). This was overlooked because of, partly, over-enthusiasm by both the World Bank and regional authorities for these cash crops and partly, lack of reference to local expertise/knowledge. It is worth noting here that pan-territorial pricing assisted the economics of marketed crops in the peripheral regions.

At the time of the RIDEP design, concern for both increased food and cash crop production was paramount for separate but related reasons. Tanzania had had its severest drought since independence in 1961 during the years 1972-74 when food imports had been the largest ever (MDB, 1982 and see Chapter 4). Cotton remains one of Tanzania's major foreign exchange earning crops, second only to coffee. The regional administration's eagerness for supporting these national

objectives also stemmed from their commitment to find a reliable cash crop for its rural people to stamp out the practice of labour migration. In the eyes of the regional authorities, labour migration was their number one enemy, if they were to succeed in their fight against the region's backwardness and poverty. Given the World Bank's known enthusiasm for cash crop development, everything seemed to fall in place quite conveniently.

The design correctly assessed the willingness of the villagers to volunteer self-help in any infrastructural development project of their village. The Kigoma villagers' enthusiasm to participate in the construction of school buildings, health facilities, feeder roads and bridges and to dig trenches for laying pipes for the village water supplies was forthcoming in exemplary fashion. Their contribution was in the provision of unskilled labour which was vital in enabling the skilled craftsmen (fundis) to perform their work well and efficiently. This included making bricks, collecting stones and sand and transporting and/or carrying them to the building sites. The mid-term evaluation report summarises neatly its feelings on the villagers' enthusiasm in contributing self-help labour in these terms: "Frequently, the volume of village contribution has been such as to *overwhelm* the capacity of the regional authorities to respond, either with inputs or adequate supervision." (World Bank, 1978:iv) (Italics ours).

However, this was the only form of participation by the target group. It was to improve cost-effectiveness, but it did not extend to decision-making as stipulated in the Tanzanian development philosophy.

This would have entailed involving the people in project identification and formulation. The design did not provide for any popular participation in this sense. Even the local officials were left out of the process. All design and decision-making was vested in the technical assistance team.

This blemish can be explained partly by the nature of the planning methodology used in the preparation of the Kigoma RIDEF, and partly by the haste in which it was prepared, and the manner and procedure under which expatriate technical assistance teams set about performing their task. A planning methodology which aims at producing a blueprint plan document as its outcome, is usually handicapped in making a provision for popular participation lest expectations are raised unduly. Popular consultation necessarily means allowing for representations on the needs and aspirations from the grassroots level upwards, a process which is time-consuming and costly. The way the RIDEF was conceived and finally prepared, it is not surprising that popular participation was relegated to the wayside. Moreover, the language problem added up to the weight against the involvement of the target population in the identification and formulation of the RIDEF plan. Nevertheless, one is baffled by the extent of this non-involvement, which included even the regional and district experts.

We now turn to the design flaws, which would have made it difficult or unlikely for the RIDEF implementation to realise the planned objectives, especially the one of doubling rural per capita incomes. As it turned out, these design flaws had an extenuating influence on the RIDEF's impact on the region's rural economy. The

first of these flaws concerns its assumption that increased agricultural production was realisable only through intensification of land use. This foreclosed the option of extensification of land cultivation as the prime means of expanding agricultural production. The architects of the RIDEP design, however, correctly identified the two constraints facing the majority of the Kigoma peasants at the time: land and labour. Thus, they believed that injection of capital into the peasant economy would automatically overcome these constraints and bring about the realisation of greatly increased cash incomes. This capital injection would be in the form of chemical inputs, the pillar of the RIDEP's intensification. Moreover, as a complement to this objective, other labour saving schemes were to be implemented simultaneously. These included provision of potable water to reduce time fetching it, and maize mills and shellers to reduce time and drudgery of food preparation and improve its nutritional value. These were of considerable importance to the women of the villages.

In reality, the problem of land scarcity was only confined to the highland zone. Labour shortage was only a temporary drawback during the initial stages of resettlement, apart from its usual demand peak during weeding. Villagisation, which resettled the majority of the peasants in the intermediate and miombo zones, where land was more plentiful than in the highland zone, created a double impact: (i) it enabled the people left behind in the highlands to own and work on more land than before and (ii) it allowed the new settlers to exploit large areas of virgin soils in the new villages in the intermediate

and miombo zones. In both instances, agricultural production by extensification became a more rational mode of production than intensification. Evidence suggests that peasant rationality will in most cases opt for extensive rather than intensive cultivation of land, if it is not a limiting factor. Intensification also means more parting with meagre resources for investment than extensification.

In the Kigoma circumstances, only cotton, among the four RIDEF supported crops, could viably lend itself to intensification under peasant production conditions. The maize/beans farming system was well established and was extremely efficient from the point of view of the Kigoma peasants. Thus, without an adequate supply of improved seeds and resources for sustainable extension campaigns, there was little hope to change it as rapidly as the design envisaged. To be fair, the design did think of this and proposed the ATTC. The problem was one of sequencing. The RIDEF design had expected from the region manpower, transport and materials for the project implementation. The acute shortages of these very resources in the region must have been quite evident to the RIDEF designers and yet they went ahead in formulating the various components of the project as if these resources would be made available wherever and whenever they were required. In this respect, it is, perhaps, pertinent to invoke here a comment of Loft *et al*:

Kigoma had been correctly identified as a poor, deprived and needy area, but it had been incorrectly thought of as already being in a position to overcome this deprivation. *The appraisal report is a testimony to the belief that dollars are readily transferable into manpower and materials.* The region's struggle to absorb those dollars, and the very modest outcome therefrom, are testimony that

Kigoma's *underdevelopment* was no historical accident which twelve and a half million dollars could compensate for in one full sweep of five years. It was precisely the region's *remoteness, weak infrastructure* and *poverty* which would detract from the power of funds to remedy them.

(Loft *et al*, 1982:139) (Italics added).

To be fair to the RIDEP designers, one must point out the in-built provision for technical assistance to fill in gaps of senior personnel. However, working and living conditions obtaining in Kigoma hardly attracted the personnel as envisaged. For example, both the regional land use planner and the project engineer served the RIDEP for only about one quarter of the total RIDEP life time. The ATTC (see pp. 253-7) suffered the same problem throughout the RIDEP period. True, the design anticipated that the Tanzanian government would give Kigoma special treatment in the allocation of these resources. Given the fact that these constraints pervaded also the centre and that at the time RIDEPs were also springing up over much of the country (also at the encouragement of the World Bank) and hence making similar demands to the centre, it is quite understandable that not enough senior manpower could be available to meet all these requests.

The RIDEP design's most weak assumption in this regard was its slip-up in not taking into account the need for the middle-level and technical personnel who perform the day-to-day implementation tasks. Field staff, craftsmen and unskilled workers need to be directed by this cadre and therefore, its extreme shortage must be a severe constraint on the implementation process.

The RIDEP phasing was another area in which design flaws were quite evident. The sequencing and time frames for various components

was in many respects inappropriate or simply mistimed. Chart 8 (p. 232) suggests that sequencing was carefully considered and taken into account when the design was being formulated. For example, the RIDEF would start supporting a new village with infrastructural developments after the village site had been identified, selected and people had moved in to settle. It was further designed that an extension worker and a bookkeeper would be resident in such village after the completion of some infrastructural developments and that this would be, possibly, in the third or fourth year of the new village's life. At this time, the village would have qualified for loans of chemical inputs from the RIDEF funds. However, this neat sequence of events seldom worked out as planned. Reliance for success on this degree of dovetailing proved to be a weakness.

Again, agronomic research was to commence after the completion and appropriate staffing of the ATTC, which was planned to be completed 18 months from the middle of the first year of the RIDEF implementation. This did not occur. Yet, one of the key functions of the ATTC was fine-tuning of agronomic recommendations and extension packages to suit the agroecological conditions of Kigoma region. The way the design envisioned things, the ATTC would have been completed by the middle of the RIDEF's third year. By this time chemical inputs would have been distributed and used by the peasants. This time the sequencing was not just unrealistic but also wrong.

On the time horizon, it is evident that IDA'S concern in approving a 5 year RIDEF duration was dictated by its requirements of bankability. The architects of the RIDEF design went to great lengths

to meet this requirement, producing at the end of the day, a comprehensive, integrative and, perhaps most importantly, bankable project. Rural development projects are of necessity long-term projects and most of their initial assumptions are a "hit or miss" affair. With the advantage of hindsight, the Kigoma experience demonstrates that tackling underdevelopment and rural poverty cannot be accomplished in a relatively short span of five or eight years of development endeavour. And meeting the needs of the donor as the prime requirement is hardly the best way to proceed.

5.4 Extent of Implementation of the RIDEP Objectives and Targets

This section discusses the implementation of the Kigoma RIDEP sector-by-sector in order to analyse performance in terms of the study's indicators. Ultimately this analysis will be related to the hypotheses of the study (Chapter 8). The purpose is to gauge the attainment of the project outputs and assess the immediate effects of each sectoral project on the quality of life of the target population. Drawing on the experience of the RIDEP implementation, inferences are made to explain impacts, both intended and unintended, of the different components of the project. In this way, the discussion aims to assess the extent of implementation of the RIDEP's various projects in the light of their stated objectives. This is important in judging the successes and failures, identifying constraints encountered and measures which needed to be or were taken to counteract them, and assessing the merits and demerits of the RIDEP. This discussion on the

Table 5.8: Accomplishments of the Kigoma RIDEF as at November 1981

Activity	Appraisal targets (1974)	Revised targets (1980)(a)	Accomplishments (November 1981)	
			Number	% (1981/1974)
Number of Project Villages	150	135	130	86.7
Village infrastructure				
Education facilities				
- classrooms	378	230	221	58.5
- teachers houses	335	147	106	31.6
- offices	76	49	57	75.0
- workshops	93	24	23	24.7
- toilets	120	30	1	0.8
- desks	7,920	-	4,517	57.0
- workshop tool sets	93	-	-	0
- textbooks sets	91	-	26	28.6
- library book sets	135	-	20	14.8
Health facilities				
- dispensaries upgraded	-	17	18	105.9
- dispensaries constructed (new)	10	10	5	50.0
- rural health centres upgraded	-	4	3	75.0
- rural health centres constructed (new)	3	-	-	0
Water supplies				
- shallow wells/boreholes	55	2	2	3.6
- piped systems	55	24	24(b)	43.6
Bush clearing (hectares)	21,775	-	18,476(c)	84.8
Village godowns	95	22	24(d)	25.3
Maize mills	95	-	21	22.1
Maize shellers	60	-	-	0
Feeder roads upgraded (km)(e)	389	600	720	185.1
Village sub-loans (f)	175	-	11	6.3
Agriculture				
Villages eligible for seasonal inputs	95	75	55	57.9
Annual marketed outputs (tons)				
- maize	8,400(g)	-	190(h)	2.1
- beans	4,900	-	1,542	31.5
- cotton	10,700	-	2,366	22.1
- groundnuts	700	-	-	0
Regional Infrastructure				
Extension of Office Block	-	1	1	100.0
Regional warehouses	-	3	3	100.0
Rural Training Centre (new)	1	-	1	100.0
Rural Training Centre (upgraded)	2	1	1	50.0
ATTC(i)	1	-	1	100.0
Vehicles	10	-	95	950.0
Land use planning (Villages)	150	135	134	89.3
Training - extension agents trained	100	77	77	77.0
- bookkeepers trained	100	180	263	263.0
- village medical helpers trained	50	200	86	172.0

Source: (i) World Bank, 1983, Project Performance Report No. 4858 (Table 2a), Washington D.C.: IBRD.
(ii) Regional Commissioner's Office, 1984, Annual Plan 1985/86, Kigoma.
(iii) Percentages are author's computations.

- Notes; (a) Based on achievements to date and additional objectives anticipated to completion of project,
- (b) At least half not functioning due to technical design shortcomings and fuel/spares shortages.
 - (c) Total area cleared during this period was 31, 510 ha; the extra area was financed by the Regional Development Fund.
 - (d) In all there were 82 village godowns constructed during the period. Other sources of funds included the Regional Development Fund and TCA.
 - (e) Based on reports of the Regional Engineer, Upgrading merely refers to some work being done on these roads.
 - (f) For fishing gear, maize mills etc, but excluding godowns (Source: TRDB Progress Report to March 1981).
 - (g) Appraisal estimate for PY5 (1978/79).
 - (h) Actual output for PY7 (1980/81). However, total value of agricultural produce procured by the NMC in Kigoma region increased from Tshs 300,000 in 1974/75 to Tshs 22.5 million in 1979/80. In 1980/81 the value amounted to Tshs 8.9 million, this drop is attributable to increased sales through unofficial channels and domestic consumption.
 - (i) The ATTC was officially converted into a MATI in July 1981. The new two-year training course (certificate agriculture course) had started with 50 students in August 1981.

extent of the implementation of the various RIDEF project components will be centred around Table 5.8. However, some components will be presented in separate tables for clarity and ease of reference.

5.4.1 Agricultural Production and Productivity

As noted, the principal objective of the RIDEF was the doubling of the rural incomes through greatly increased agricultural production. This was to be achieved through introduction of technological innovations based on improved seeds and chemical inputs (fertilisers and insecticides).

(a) Improved seeds

Improved seeds (maize hybrids and composites, improved varieties of beans and groundnuts) were to come from the ATTC, whose implementation was never completed even by the end of the RIDEP implementation period in December 1982. In other words, this item was never implemented as stipulated in the plan document. Nevertheless, a makeshift arrangement was made by the RADO, who procured and distributed improved maize seed: 4 tons of "Katumani", 69 tons of Hybrid 632 (both Kenyan varieties) and 109 tons of Ukiriguru composite A between 1975/76 and 1977/78.

(b) Chemical inputs

Chemical inputs were distributed by TRDB through the regional branches of the NMC and TCA as the delivery agents. Table 5.9 presents data on the distribution of the fertilisers between 1975/76 and 1978/79. The data show that the supply of fertilisers had a flying start, surpassing the target for 1975/76 by 1,218 per cent (see Table 5.4, p. 216), only to ground to a complete halt three years later. TRDB had stopped further distribution of fertilisers, because of non-repayment of the loans by the villagers. The majority of the peasants were not prepared to buy fertilisers for application on cotton or even on maize. Crop collection is done by village governments as buying agents of the crop authorities.

Although the bulk of these fertilisers went to support production

Table 5.9: Distribution of project-financed fertilisers (metric tons)

Year	Target	Actual	%(Increase)(b)
1975/76	67	883	1,218
1976/77	261	1,765	576
1977/78	408	551	35
1978/79	627	- (a)	-

Source: Appraisal Report and TRDB Annual Reports for relevant years.

Notes: (a) No new supply, but residual distribution of existing stocks.

(b) Author's computations.

of cotton, which got 80 per cent (and the remainder was used in the production of maize), cotton was not popular with the majority of the Kigoma peasants. There are a number of reasons, some of which include lower producer prices of cotton relative to the other crops and higher labour inputs. True that during the first two years of the RIDEP cotton prices were a little more attractive than the prices of maize and beans. But, subsequent price hikes of food crops, especially after the *kufa na kupona* [life and death] campaigns of the mid-seventies, made these crops more attractive than cotton. By 1977/78 cotton prices were lower than the prices of both beans and groundnuts, thus further making cotton an unattractive crop. Given the weakening economics of cotton production due to central pricing policy, which not only meant a high demand of labour, but also an increased cash expenditure to procure chemical inputs, it is little wonder that villagers responded by cutting down their demand for fertilisers.

Although the Kigoma peasants favoured maize and bean production, the existing farming system was less able to support a

significant demand for fertilisers. Villagisation has resettled villagers in areas where land was both abundant and fertile (see Maps 1.3, p. 9 and 5.2, p. 210), and therefore, they thought that spending their little cash on fertilisers was simply throwing away good money. Once resettlement activities had been taken care of more labour was released to work on the land. Food production (maize and beans) took precedence over cotton in order to meet the villagers own consumption needs and the surplus was sold to earn cash incomes to meet their other needs.

The Kigoma RIDEF also supplied insecticides and spraying equipment as shown in Table 5.10. The evidence from Kigoma shows that the demand for insecticides was substantially higher than for fertilisers in both absolute terms and in relation to target (Loft *et al*, 1982:61). However, the supply of insecticides was limited because of nation-wide scarcity and poor/weak transport facilities. Moreover, supply had to be discontinued because villages became uncreditworthy as they were unable to meet their obligations of loan repayment for fertilisers. Undoubtedly, some of the peasants could have paid for the insecticides from their proceeds realised from the sale of food crops, but these were tied to the fertiliser loans. Without their settlement, the whole credit system collapsed.

Before closing the discussion in this section a brief mention on yields is pertinent. Table 5.11 presents data on yields/crop-acre. [A crop-acre is an acre of land on which a particular crop is planted regardless of whether other crops are grown on that same land - a reality of the intercropping farming system.] The table shows that the

Table 5.10: Insecticides supplied by the Kigoma RIDEP

Project	DDT 5% dust (tons)		Liquid insecticides (000 litres)		Spray sets (units)	
	target	actual	target	actual	target	actual
PY2 (1975/76)	21	4 (a)	11	-	350	473
PY3 (1976/77)	56	84	47	32	1,225	923
PY4 (1977/78)	91	-	100	51	2,100	1,373 (b)
PY5 (1978/79)	126	-	152	-	2,975	-

Source: (i) Appraisal report.

(ii) TRDB Regional Branch Office, Kigoma: Annual reports.

Notes: (a) Plus 6,000 'acre-packs' of DDT dust.

(b) Plus 595 bottles and 100,000 batteries.

survey data in 1978 (Project Year 4) were only a half of the appraisal projections for the fourth project year. The table contains also data on average acreage per household. [A household is defined here a comprising a nuclear family i.e. a husband, his wife or wives and their children plus relatives living with the nuclear family. A household may be headed by a man or a woman.] The household average acreage presumably indicates that the Kigoma farming system adopted an extensification rather than an intensification pattern contrary to the design's assumptions. Although twice as much land was cultivated, yields were less than a half of those which the design had projected and the RIDEP had attempted to implement and develop.

(c) The Agricultural Trials and Training Centre (ATTC)

The ATTC was planned to be established within the first 18 months after the commencement of the RIDEP implementation. The ATTC would also be staffed and ready to commence its activities within that time-

Table 5.11: Comparison of projected with actual production coefficients at the (RIDEP) Project Year 4

	Appraisal projection for PY 4 (1977/78)	Survey data from maize-bean villages in PY 4 (1977/78)
Average acreage per household (acres)	3.5	6.99
Yield per crop-acre for:		
Maize (kg)	360	146
Beans (kg)	168	80
Cotton (kg)	390	120

Source: Loft *et al*, 1982, An Evaluation of the Kigoma Rural Development Project, E.R.B. Paper No.82.1, University of Dar es Salaam, Table 6.1.

Table 5.12: Construction status of the ATTC as of November 1981 (PY8)

Unit	Completed	Uncompleted	Approved(d)
Dormitories	2(a)	1	3
Offices	1	1	2
Teaching block(c)	1	0	1
Laboratory	0	1	1
Kitchen/dining hall	1	0	1
Staff quarters			
Grade A	2(a)	0	2
Grade B	4	3	7
Grade C	6	0	6
Supporting staff quarters	0	5(b)	5

Source: M. Loft *et al*, 1982, An evaluation of the Kigoma Kigoma Rural Development Project, Economic Research Bureau Restricted Paper No. 82.1, University of Dar es Salaam, Table 4.9.

Notes: (a) Louvres not supplied.
 (b) Each unit containing two houses.
 (c) Includes office, classroom and library.
 (d) Other buildings approved and budgeted for but later deleted by the region were one assembly hall and one dispensary.

frame. Table 5.12 presents the data on the status of the implementation of the ATTC construction programme in the eighth year since the RIDEP inception. Construction started in January 1976, only a few months before its expected completion date as stipulated in the appraisal report. This delay was blamed on tardy architectural designs and lack of cost estimates. The slow progress was attributed to shortages of building materials such as cement, nails, corrugated iron sheets, tools and fittings, and lack of transport to bring to the site stones, sand and burnt bricks needed for the construction of buildings. This tardiness in the construction of the centre can be seen in Table 5.12; some buildings have yet to be completed. The centre also faced other constraints such as non-release of funds, especially at the very start and near the expiry of the RIDEP timeframe and low priority assigned to it by the regional authorities (ibid:52).

In 1978 the regional authorities initiated negotiations with the officials of the Kilimo (Ministry of Agriculture) over the possibility of the latter taking over the ATTC. An agreement was finally reached in 1980 for the taking-over of the ATTC by Kilimo which transformed it into a MATI (Ministry of Agriculture Training Institute). The ATTC had 13 persons as members of its staff by November 1981, that is, actual staff in post. This number corresponded with the one proposed by the appraisal report, that is, the staff establishment of the centre in line with its proposed role and functions. The establishment provided for three tutors, seven trials officers (including the principal and farm manager) and three livestock development officers (all university

graduates). However, the livestock officers were never recruited as the pilot livestock component never took off. The level of staffing (i.e. actual establishment) was attained at the ATTC when it became a MATI, since previously it was very difficult to recruit senior staff, because of uncertainty of future prospects. Moreover, many junior staff were lost in 1978 when they were appointed village managers. The centre's staff at November 1981 included ten tutors (one graduate, eight diplomates and one certificate holder) and three trials officers (one diplomate, one certificate holder and one agricultural field auxiliary - these last two posts are of inadequate level for trials and on-farm research). But these staff levels never approached the number and qualifications stipulated in the appraisal document.

Given these staffing, organisational and managerial problems, very little research work was undertaken before 1981. In fact, no serious research activity was being carried out in 1985/86⁴ and there is little likelihood of it being undertaken in the next couple of years or so. The main obstacle is finding appropriate personnel to man agronomic research and funding. In addition, Kilimo was somewhat reluctant in recognising the significance of the appraisal recommendations for a region-specific research and training institution. This can be deduced from their lack of enthusiasm for the ATTC right from its inception (ibid:53-7).

However, the experience gained so far from the sporadic research activities carried out by the ATTC has "highlighted the complexities and variations in the region's ecology and the officers concerned have come to know that one doesn't yet know much" (ibid. op. cit:55). This

underlines the correctness of the appraisal report in proposing the establishment of the ATTC. There is agreement by the regional administration with the proposal, but resource constraints prevented them from owning and managing the ATTC. Moreover, this is a responsibility of a technical ministry, an argument borne out by the return of the extension services to Kilimo in July 1983.

The training aspect of the centre fared slightly better than its research component. Seventy-seven village youths with primary educational background had been trained as agricultural extension workers by June 1981. The centre offered a nine-month course which was saddled with a number of problems: language, lack of appropriate textbooks, lack of proper preparation, inadequacy/lack of equipment and facilities, etc. As a result the graduates initially were subjected to the humiliation of non-recognition by the Ministry of Agriculture. Nonetheless, later they were all absorbed in the Kilimo's extension services, after they had attended a two-month upgrading course at the ATTC. In addition, 24 extension workers had gone through retraining at the centre, thus bringing the total number of ATTC graduates to 101.

5.4.2 Quality of Life Indicators

In this section the implementation of the projects for provision of education, health and rural water supply facilities is examined. The budget set aside for these projects amounted to US\$ 4,153,000 or 33 per cent of the total RIDEP funds. That the appraisal report

accorded top priority to these components can be discerned from its assertion: "The Ujamaa concept offers considerable advantages in providing social services such as schools, dispensaries and rural water supplies. ... but many areas have families living in scattered holdings making provision of these services both difficult and costly" (Appraisal report:4). Thus, Government's attempts to resettle the rural communities at the time was in tune with the World Bank Mission's thinking on the provision of the social infrastructural facilities.

The region was at the time relocating its rural population into villages, many of which were new and needed social and economic infrastructure to attract people and to make each village viable for normal life. Moreover, Government's intention to improve rural social and economic services to a level comparable to those of urban centres, it was hoped, would close the rural/urban gap and reduce the number of the people who vote with their feet by moving to the urban centres.

The discussion intends also to underline the accomplishments and/or shortfalls of the implementation of these projects in the light of their stated and implied objectives. In addition, it includes a statement on popular participation as was envisaged at appraisal. Although popular participation formed one of the objectives of the decentralisation (see Chapter 4, pp. 166-95), the RIDEP plan was not explicit about what and how popular participation would be undertaken as part and parcel of the decision-making process in the region. The PMO did issue guidelines in March 1974 regarding preparation of "Integrated Rural Development Programmes"⁵ in Mainland Tanzania.

However, these came too late for consideration when preparing the Kigoma RIDEF and so too did the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975, both of which provided details on the execution of popular participation. But at appraisal the policy documents charting grassroots participation, apart from the Arusha Declaration and TANU Guidelines², was Nyerere's Decentralization paper. As already stated, the Kigoma RIDEF plan provided only for the involvement of the target population in the form of offering self-help. Self-help was particularly asked for in all social and economic infrastructural projects, which involved construction and/or building works and bush clearing to reduce the tsetse menace.

This conception leaves out the target population in the early and crucial stages of the decision-making process, contrary to what was envisaged in the decentralisation programme (see Nyerere, 1972:1-5). One crucially problematic outcome of this conception was the issue of non-payment of loans for the agricultural inputs. In this respect, the appraisal did provide for early consultation of the villagers about their needs for fertilisers, but the regional authorities in their bid to increase cotton production at all costs ordered and distributed fertilisers in total disregard of the villagers views and concerns. As a result the level of indebtedness of the majority of the villagers to TRDB and TCA became intolerable and the wastage of resources unacceptable to these institutions.

(a) Education

At the time of appraisal, Kigoma region had a total of 173 primary schools in which were enrolled about 41,000 pupils, some 37 per cent of the school-age children in the region (7-13 years old). Compared with the national average of 50 per cent of all school-age children attending primary education in Tanzania, Kigoma's average was low. Government policy was then to achieve universal primary education (UPE) by year 1989. To achieve this objective, Kigoma region would have needed about 3,000 classrooms, that is, by the year 1989. However, at appraisal there were 612 classrooms when actual demand then was 770 classrooms, which is a shortfall of 158. National policy was putting emphasis on expanding facilities for primary education, since it was intended that with villagisation, village primary schools would assume a much broader responsibility catering for the overall educational needs of the whole community as opposed to concentrating solely on child education⁷. Schools thus developed would be renamed community education centres and would offer as well adult education, basic training in agricultural techniques and handicrafts, health and sanitation education and political education.

As noted, the appraisal's objective was to raise the educational level of Kigoma's rural population in primary and technical fields by helping the region to achieve the national goals of universal primary education by 1989, eradication of adult illiteracy and elevated priority for technical education in the primary schools. Table 5.6, p. 218, presents the education targets under the RIDEP plan. Table 5.13

Table 5.13: Comparison of RIDEP and TFYP targets for the education component in Kigoma region

Year	Classrooms		Teachers houses		Workshops	
	RIDEP	TFYP	RIDEP	TFYP	RIDEP	TFYP
1974/75	65	-	68	-	8	-
1975/76	73	-	75	-	8	-
1976/77	84	316	68	96	7	10
1977/78	80	635	62	21	-	14
1978/79	76	694	62	14	-	17
1979/80	-	524	-	17	-	16
1980/81	-	413	-	16	-	-
Total	378	2,582	335	164	23	57

Source: (i) Appraisal Report.
(ii) Regional Education Office, Kigoma.

shows an interesting comparison of the RIDEP and TFYP (Third Five Year Plan, 1976-81) targets. The data for the TFYP take into consideration the revised UPE target then set for 1977 as opposed to the original one of 1989.²

The appraisal target of 378 classrooms is only 23 per cent of the TFYP one of 1,645 classrooms for the years 1976-79. However, the appraisal target for teachers houses (335 units) exceeds the TFYP target of 131 units for the same period by about 2.6 times. The higher appraisal target for the teachers houses was a recognition of the dire situation of accommodation facing teachers at that time (and still prevailing today).

In practice, parents/villagers rate the construction of teachers houses as a low priority when compared with the construction of classrooms. In a village situation, where there are only a handful of "good" houses, it is not surprising that only a few people would bother to construct good houses for the primary school teachers.²

Moreover, given the multitude of activities in a village community, it is understandable that the villagers' prioritisation is likely to be quite different from that of the bureaucrats/technocrats. It is, perhaps, in recognition of this fact that the TFYP target for the teachers houses is lower than that of the RIDEP.

Accomplishments of the RIDEP targets for the education component are shown in Table 5.8, p. 248. Originally, the RIDEP was to end in mid-1979, but due to a slow start and implementation difficulties, such as shortage of fuel, building/construction materials, lack of transport and poor communications, most of the allocated funds were unspent by the 4th year of the RIDEP implementation as can be observed in Table 5.14). As a result, it was decided to extend the timeframe for two years to the end of 1981.

This decision was an outcome of the discussions between the Tanzanian and World Bank officials which took place as follow-up to the 1978 mid-term evaluation exercise. At these discussions it was agreed to revise many of the original targets as shown in Table 5.8. It is evident that appraisal targets were not achieved. In fact, the results are very modest indeed. Of all education targets, classrooms and offices received relatively more attention than the other items. Achievements for classrooms and offices represented 59 per cent and 75 per cent of appraisal targets or 96 per cent and 116 per cent of revised targets respectively. These were immediately followed by the provision of desks with accomplishments of 57 per cent of appraisal targets. Significantly, accomplishments of teachers houses were only 32 per cent of the appraisal targets, while workshops, the structures

Table 5.14: The RIDEP expenditures: appraisal estimates and estimated actuals (Tshs'000)

Year	Anticipated Costs		Actual Expenditures	
	Annual	Cumulative	Annual	Cumulative
PY1 1974/75	14,546	14,546	636	636
PY2 1975/76	23,346	37,891	4,630	5,267
PY3 1976/77	20,247	58,138	16,970	22,237
PY4 1977/78	18,024	76,162	13,999	36,236
PY5 1978/79	18,447	94,609	12,602	48,838
PY6 1979/80			25,986	74,824
PY7 1980/81			22,001	96,825
PY8 1981/82			9,175	106,000

Source: (i) Appraisal Report, Annex 11, Table 1.

(ii) M. Loft *et al*, 1982, An Evaluation of the Kigoma Rural Development Project, E.R.B. Paper No. 82.1, Appendix F.

crucial in meeting technical education, attained only 25 per cent of appraisal targets.

Although UPE inflated the requirements for classrooms and teachers houses, the latter received less priority in terms of materials and labour. This situation, probably, reflects the villagers' own priorities: generally self-help was readily forthcoming for classroom construction, but was less so for the construction of teachers houses and workshops, while toilet construction was ignored completely. This may not be an outcome of lapse of sanitary hygiene on the part of the villagers, but rather an issue of trade-offs between several competing demands on resources, and the fact that villagers have been accustomed to temporary latrines. The new design of permanent toilets, with cement slab-covered pit latrines, were considered a luxury they could ill-afford, given the chronic shortage of cement and roofing iron sheets in the region. In fact, non-fulfilment of targets is in part attributable to lack or

inadequacy of these building materials. Insufficient transport facilities to facilitate movement of materials and personnel to sites scattered all over the region slowed down the implementation process. Poor communication between the PME and the craftsmen on site added to the constraints hampering smooth implementation. One significant effect from the schooling facilities construction activities was the adoption and spread of brick-making in the region.

Provision of school furniture and equipment also encountered difficulties. Desks had to be obtained from outside the region, because local carpentry capacity could not cope with the greatly expanded demand. Desks had been obtained from neighbouring Tabora, but also from distant Dar es Salaam. The latter became the only source of school equipment, cement and roofing materials so that the shortage of rolling stock facing East African Railways (after February 1977, Tanzania Railways) caused considerable hold-ups in transportation of these items to Kigoma Town for onward transmission to the sites. Generally, most primary schools faced a furniture shortage, to such an extent that pupils had to share five to one desk (as opposed to two pupils per desk) or had to sit on bricks or on the floor and to write using their knees as support. It is not surprising that, under these circumstances, Tanzania's primary education is of concern of many a parent.

Workshop tools were never supplied, thus reflecting the low priority given to technical education. It is little wonder that by December 1983, the region had only nine primary schools with operating workshops, which had been supplied by the Swedish International

Development Authority (SIDA).¹⁰ The region had in 1983 224 primary schools so that only 4 per cent had an effective component of technical education.

On average the education component attained only 32.3 per cent of its stated targets (altogether there were 9 items - see Table 5.8, p. 248). It was only in 3 items (classrooms, school offices and desks) that implementation was above 50 per cent of the original targets. These results are definitely unsatisfactory, but as it will be argued later, given the circumstances prevailing in Kigoma then, they represent some progress in this sector. Comparable achievements data for classrooms, teachers houses and desks between the RIDEP and TFYP targets give a somewhat similar picture: 58.5, 31.6 and 57.0 per cent and 20, 84 and 74 per cent for the RIDEP and TFYP respectively.

(b) Health

At appraisal Kigoma region had five hospitals with a total of 446 beds, three rural health centres (RHC) with 118 beds and 61 rural dispensaries.¹¹ One RHC and 12 dispensaries were under construction. Of the five hospitals two were Mission hospitals, both situated in Kasulu district, which had the largest population in the region. The national target is one hospital bed for 1,000 people, whereas the targets for an RHC and dispensary were 50,000 and 10,000 people respectively. Table 5.15 presents the data on health facilities as existed in the region at appraisal. At the time national averages were as follows: one hospital bed per 794 people; one RHC per 112,000

Table 5.15; Kigoma region health facilities as in March 1974

District	Hospitals		RHCs		Total beds	Population per Bed	Population per RHC	Dispensaries	
	No.	No. of beds	No.	No. of beds				No.	Population per dispensary
Kibondo	1	79	2	80	159	960	66,000	19	8,240
Kasulu	3	245	-(a)	-	245	990	200,000	26	9,350
Kigoma	1	142	1	38	180	850	127,000	16	9,550
Total	5	466	3	118	584	945	131,000	61(b)	9,055

Source: Appraisal Report, Table 10.

Notes: (a) One RHC was under construction.

(b) Twelve dispensaries were under construction; Kibondo - 2; Kasulu - 4 and Kigoma - 6.

people and one dispensary per 8,100 people. Thus, the Kigoma data indicate that the region has slightly exceeded the national targets of number of people per hospital bed and dispensary. However, population distribution creates extreme variations of accessibility of health services. This was to be exacerbated by the villagisation programme which relocated a sizable rural population in new villages. Thus, the RIDEP design hoped to improve accessibility of the rural population to health facilities by expanding their number, especially into newly resettled villages.

The record of implementation is shown in Table 5.8, p. 248. The revised target of upgrading/improving existing dispensaries was surpassed by about 6 per cent, while the target for the construction of new dispensaries can claim achievement of only 50 per cent. The construction of the new RHCs was abandoned in March 1980 in favour of upgrading the existing four RHCs. Of these, three were upgraded as planned.

Provision of medical equipment and supplies, though it was considered a major activity under the RIDEP revised targets, was

undertaken for some dispensaries only and that was at one time only for the whole project life. Nonetheless, some of the health facilities were provided with essential drugs and equipment by UNICEF. By then the shortage of foreign exchange gripping the country began to take its toll on most social and economic services (Tanzania, Government of, 1981:5).

During the third year of the RIDEP implementation 4 motorcycles and 20 bicycles were ordered from overseas. By November 1981 only one motorcycle had arrived in the region and had been handed over to the Bitale RHC, some 20 km away from the Kigoma/Ujiji town.

Training of village medical helpers (VMHs) achieved 43 per cent of the revised target, but attained 172 per cent of the 1974 target. However, only a few of the VMHs stayed to work in the villages. Given the scarcity of medical personnel in the region and in the country, it is not surprising that a majority of these cadres found more remunerative jobs elsewhere. The original notion that they would work for voluntary services in the villages thus proved unrealistic.

No medical staff houses were constructed during the RIDEP's lifetime.

It is pertinent to mention here the progress achieved in bush clearing. Although this item could be dealt under agricultural production, as more land, undoubtedly, was brought under cultivation once it was cleared of tsetse infestation, the initial objective of bush clearing was to reduce the health hazard brought about by the high incidence of sleeping sickness and trypanosomiasis in the region. The accomplishment attained was 85 per cent of the appraisal target of

21,775 ha (Table 5.8). In all, however, 31,510 ha were cleared, the extra hectareage received funding from the Regional Development Fund.

Overall, the implementation and achievement of the health targets is somewhat better than those of the education sector, that is, in relative terms. The same problems discussed under education also faced the implementation of the projects of the health component. This is, presumably, in line with the villagers' prioritisation (Mabele and Schultheis, 1977). The decision to resort to upgrading and improvement of existing health facilities and provide equipment was an appropriate one. It is, undoubtedly, pointless to install new facilities when existing ones are not effectively utilised. Nonetheless, it is obvious that this decision was made too late in the implementation cycle of the project to have the desired impact.

(c) Rural Water Supplies

Accomplishments of the water component are shown in Table 5.8, p. 248. By November 1981, 24 RIDEP-financed schemes had been completed. Five of the piped water schemes were expansions or revisions of earlier water supply systems. However, during the same period the RWE's Office had been able to complete the construction of 72 water schemes in the region, of which 42 were new schemes, while 30 were expansions or revisions.¹² At the same time, an additional 11 schemes and 1 expansion were being constructed. NORAD, which has been undertaking studies for the Kigoma region Water Master Plan since 1980, took over some of the RIDEP's uncompleted schemes, while others

received funding from the central government.

Implementation of the water schemes encountered a number of constraints which greatly influenced the extent of the accomplishments of the RIDEP's initial targets. These included (i) manpower, (ii) materials, (iii) transport and (iv) hydrogeological constraints. An additional comment on the first and last constraints is, perhaps, desirable here as they are somewhat special to this component and, in any case, others are common problems which faced all the RIDEP components and have been described sufficiently in earlier sections.

Manpower constraints - The appraisal assumption that there would be greatly increased manpower capacity of the RWE's Office to design and implement schemes proved unattainable for the whole lifetime of the RIDEP. The anticipation that the annual RWE's implementation capacity would almost double from 12 to 22 schemes proved somewhat overambitious. It was also assumed that the RWE's Office would devote itself full time on the RIDEP-funded projects. Both these assumptions were to be proved erroneous as time passed by. The technical ministry was unable to supply the region the technical manpower as anticipated at appraisal. In fact, there was an outflow of technical staff from the region during the project period (Loft *et al*, 1982:30). This was exacerbated by the fact that hardly any of the senior staff, including the expatriate personnel, had any experience in design and provision of water supply facilities in a rural setting. As a result ill-suited and poor quality designs with avoidable technical flaws became the order of the day (*ibid.*; also see R.C.'s Office, 1986:82-8). In this connection Loft *et al* eloquently sum up this unsatisfactory state of

affairs of the RIDEP's water schemes thus:

This resulted in substantial water schemes, where pipes were not dimensioned properly, water points were placed at excessively high levels, intakes were not well situated in relation to flow or width of the stream, etc., often resulting in schemes which only worked seasonally or which never worked at all. (ibid:30)

Hydrogeological problems - As noted the RIDEP design attached particular significance to shallow wells, but it was to be discovered several years later that the region's hydrogeological configuration was problematic as far as the shallow well technology was concerned. The only exception was a small area near the border with Tabora region, along the central railway line (Dar es Salaam-Kigoma). This situation created havoc with the initial RIDEP's targets as construction of alternative schemes proved more costly and problematic in implementation. The design of shallow wells subcomponent was particularly undertaken to avoid this very problem.

In a way, it is difficult to blame all this on the RIDEP design, since its authors, who never anyway included a water engineer in their midst, could not have anticipated the region's hydrogeological problems. This, perhaps, lends further support to the idea of iterative planning and learning by doing, improving the planning process accordingly.

The fuel and spare shortages, which were precipitated by the foreign exchange constraint and other difficulties in the macro economy, could not be blamed entirely on the RIDEP design. The designers could not possibly have foreseen the national and

international economic difficulties that became commonplace in the late 1970s and early 1980s (see Chapter 4), except again to build in flexibility, allowing the introduction of 'worst scenario' contingency plans.

The implementation of the water component faced more difficulties than the other two components, most of which are attributable to flawed design and erroneous assumptions. As a result the achievements of this component were very disappointing as the data in Table 5.8 (p. 248) demonstrate. The dugwell system programme achieved a mere 3.6 percent, whilst the piped-water programme accomplished 43.6 percent of the initial targets. But this latter figure is in reality much smaller, when it is considered that only half of the schemes were operational at the end of the RIDEP implementation.

(d) Feeder Roads

The objective of the road network component was to provide access routes between project villages and the existing roads. This would enable villagers to market their agricultural produce, bring in consumer goods and travel to and from their villages. The RIDEP funds would be used to undertake elementary construction and/or upgrading of feeder roads employing village unskilled labour paid on a partial self-help basis (Tshs 5 per day as opposed to Tshs 10 per day, the official wage rate for rural areas at the time), and supervised by staff of the District Engineer's Office. The roads to be affected would correspond with the 95 villages scheduled to receive the TRDB

loans for agricultural inputs, altogether covering 389 km.

The programme's target was revised in 1980 to cover 600 km of road network. By November 1981 some 720 km were constructed or upgraded, achieving an overfulfilment of 20 per cent of the revised target. It is worth noting that the quality of the work left much to be desired: little or no drainage work or gravelling was undertaken, thus rendering them liable to easy damage by rain water. Probably, the most significant accomplishment of the road component (at least in the eyes of the officials of the Regional Engineer's Office) was the acquisition of equipment for the Road Construction Unit through the RIDEP funds. These included a power grader, a wheeled loader, a bulldozer, a mobile lubrication unit, a low loader, 4 water bowsers, 7 tipper lorries, 3 water pumps and 3 tower graders. Kigoma Region's stock of vital equipment had always been wanting.¹⁴

The RIDEP components discussed above are only a selection of those shown in Table 5.8 (p. 248), but they demonstrate the main range of problems encountered. The focus had been on agriculture, education, health, rural water supplies and rural roads. Immense implementation bottlenecks facing the RIDEP during the first four years of its existence necessitated an emergency session to review its progress and to find solutions. This culminated in the **mid-term evaluation** of the RIDEP, which was held in November 1978 and attended by officials from all implementing agencies, the World Bank and the Treasury. This activity was the watershed of the RIDEP in terms of generation of data, experiences and knowledge which led to significant changes in the implementation strategy and procedures. For example,

appraisal targets for some components were revised upwards or downwards (see Table 5.8), criteria for villages to receive project funds were relaxed and stopped the village input-loan programme due to non-repayment of previous loans. Moreover, a decision was reached to undertake a terminal evaluation, which was later carried out by experts from the ERB of the University of Dar es Salaam. Their report was published in 1982, which has been an important source of material for this chapter (Loft, Hanak and Ndyeshobola, 1982).

The implementation of the agricultural input started well, but stopped three years later because TRDB would not provide more loans to the villages. The evidence on performance of the infrastructural development projects presented in Table 5.8 gives a mixed picture of success. The implementation of the education and health components was somewhat better than that of the water component. Within components, differences in status of implementation are substantial. For example, more classrooms and teachers offices were built in relation to target than teachers houses or school toilets. The shallow wells/boreholes subcomponent fared poorly when compared to the piped water schemes. On the one hand, there is generally poor performance of all village infrastructural development activities and on the other, there is all success in the regional infrastructural development projects. The reason for this asymmetry is, perhaps, the fact that the former activities depended on loan money for their success and once that was stopped, no progress could take place, whereas the latter did not have to depend on loans at all. This was further aided by the fact that these latter activities benefited directly the regional/district

bureaucracy and therefore, they were implemented energetically and enthusiastically. In any case, these activities were undertaken mainly in Kigoma Town or in district headquarters towns, where there was easy accessibility to construction materials, transport facilities and supervision.

(e) Popular Participation

Although the design was undertaken during the peak of the enthusiasm for popular participation in Tanzania, it was, to say the least, deficient in providing explicit and concrete endorsement or details of the form it should evolve in the RIDEP activities. The design's perception of grassroots-level popular participation was the requirement that villagers offer self-help in all construction and/or building works and bush clearing. That this perception stemmed from the designers' concern for cost-effectiveness rather than popular involvement (as was then - and still is - fashionable in Tanzania and elsewhere) is undeniable (see Appraisal Report:35-6). This blemish was singled out for criticism by Mabele and Schultheis (1977:57-8) in these terms:

A development programme that is village-centred and oriented to self-reliance can succeed only in so far as the people are *actively involved* in defining their problems and resolving them. The ideal role of external assistance, therefore, will be a marginal one, helping to determine viable alternatives and to discover solutions, *always ancillary to local initiatives and efforts*. (Italics ours).

However, the RIDEF design did stipulate that provision of agricultural inputs (on credit) should only be undertaken after consultations with the villagers, probably, to determine precise demand and underpin their commitment to their use and prompt repayment. Unfortunately, this stipulation was ignored by the regional authorities with undesirable consequences on agricultural production and rural incomes. It is notable that this commandism was a common feature throughout the RIDEF's life time. Its most conspicuous feature was the bye-laws and regulations requiring peasants to adhere to minimum acreages of cotton. Failure to comply was punishable by fine, imprisonment or both. Not surprisingly, this commandism was met with the peasants' non-compliance, despite the compulsive and coercive agricultural bye-laws and regulations (Loft and Oldewelt, 1981:140-50; Loft *et al*, 1982:110-1).

One final point is necessary. At appraisal grassroots-level participatory organisations/institutions were the village development committees and ward development committees (Chart 1, p. 171). Elected representatives of villagers sat in these committees, usually with technical functional staff, to deliberate on matters pertaining to village/ward development and law and order. The leadership of the committees was in the hands of the Party functionaries: the branch chairperson and secretary. This feature was introduced for the first time by the Decentralization Act of 1972 which also elaborated the planning process (Chart 3, p. 175). The Decentralization Act breathed new life in these grassroots-level participatory institutions by giving them power to control developments affecting their life.

Villagers would indicate their priorities for onward transmission to the district and regional authorities for technical scrutiny and funding. In this way, not only their commitment to the projects would be secured, but also their democratic right to actively participate and control their destiny would be ensured.

These grassroots-level people's institutions were given further impetus with the passage of the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975 which established village assemblies and village councils, in which villagers directly participated in decision-making (see Chapter 4 for details). Grassroots institutions for participatory decision-making were already in place right from the time of the appraisal of the Kigoma RIDEF, and improvements continued to be made as the project was progressively being implemented. Neither the regional authorities nor the World Bank showed much concern for this important set of developments.

5.6 Conclusion

The Kigoma RIDEF was the first attempt of the Tanzanian government to plan and implement a regional integrated rural development project in the country. The RIDEF was also one of the early generation IRDPs to be supported by the World Bank. Both had hoped to use the planning and implementation experience from the Kigoma RIDEF for similar projects elsewhere in the country. The implementation of the RIDEF had faced immense implementation difficulties.

The present study recognises that there had been immense implementation bottlenecks which confronted the Kigoma RIDEF. These bottlenecks had, undoubtedly, extenuating influence on the overall impact of the RIDEF. Given the circumstances obtaining in the region and indeed in the country, these difficulties were to be expected. From whatever angle the RIDEF plan was examined, it should have been seen as experimental from the viewpoints of both donor and recipient. It was the first of its kind for both the Tanzanian authorities and the World Bank, and it was being tried in unknown and most underdeveloped area in the country. Planning data were not only scanty, but also unreliable and therefore, the design assumptions must, by implication, be based on weak foundations, and simply of a "hit and miss" affair. Thus, a more appropriate planning methodology would have been one based on continuous and iterative planning.

Accordingly, the study finds the planning methodology of the RIDEF plan wanting. Some of its assumptions were seriously flawed and, therefore, were unlikely to have brought about the realisation of the stated objectives. Although both the donor and recipient regarded the RIDEF as a 'social experiment' (as Rondinelli would have called it) in an unknown environment, both acted as if they had all the required experience and knowledge in the planning and implementation of such projects. This was, to some extent, caused by the lack of time allowed for the project to learn from experience. This could have alerted all those concerned that the project was facing trouble and that remedial action would have been taken quickly before much harm had been done. The rapid turnover of some key personnel of the PME was also

detrimental to the smooth implementation of the RIDEP, especially the M&E activities.

The present study, having reviewed all the evidence at its disposal and especially with the advantage of hindsight (as it was undertaken five years after the ending of the RIDEP funding) concludes that the Kigoma RIDEP had an important impact on the region's rural development. It has assisted the regional and national development endeavours in bringing about the improvement of the quality of life of the rural people of Kigoma region. The RIDEP has influenced the region's marketing which in turn spurred agricultural production for the market and increased household incomes. It has facilitated the expansion of physical infrastructure and the spread of an appropriate technology (brick-making) in the region. That the Kigoma RIDEP was one of the public sector interventions which laid one of the foundation stones, on which further regional development could then be built, is undeniable.

The conclusions of this study have been derived from the application of a selected evaluation methodology. The usefulness of the *ex-post* evaluation methodology lies in the fact that an evaluation activity can be undertaken to appraise a planning methodology *ex post* in order to determine its appropriateness and to examine the extent of implementation to identify accomplishments and non-accomplishments. Moreover, stage-by-stage (hierarchical) evaluation is useful in identifying design and implementation strengths and weaknesses at every concerned stage or hierarchy and thus attributing causality appropriately. In addition, such an evaluation exercise is also

participatory as it involves many more people, especially project beneficiaries, in presenting their views on the project design, performance and/or failure.

The study methodology was based on both quantitative and qualitative analyses used in a mutually complementary manner. The use of qualitative techniques is dictated by the need to capture benefits which an economic analysis is unlikely to do. For example, some of the benefits of the Kigoma RIDEP cannot be expressed in economic terms such as the strengthening of nation-building and administrative structures from the village to the regional level, including acquisition of assets (buildings, vehicles, etc.) and the triggering of rural development in a most lagging and remote area in the country.

Nonetheless, the usefulness of the methodology of the present study is linked to the availability of baseline and end-of-the-project data to enable comparison to take place. Such data may not always be available or be easily accessible especially to an outsider. Moreover, some people are sceptical about relying too much on qualitative methods because of their dependence on value judgements and guesstimates.

FOOTNOTES

1. Kleemeier argues that increased response in foreign assistance to Tanzania was a product of the donors' perception that Tanzania's policies were tackling the problem of rural poverty, but the reality in Tanzania was a bureaucratic "conspiracy" to enable the bureaucratic class to extract more surplus from the peasantry. See Kleemeier, 1982, 'Domestic Policies versus Poverty-oriented Foreign Assistance in Tanzania', *Journal of Development Studies*, pp. 171-201. For a different view on this same subject see Mushi and Kjekshus, 1982, *Aid and Development: Some Tanzanian Experiences*, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, pp. 18-27.

2. Mainly prompted by the villagisation programme the TANU NEC in November 1973 brought forward the target of universal primary education from 1989 to 1977. All fees for primary education were abolished in 1973 as an incentive to parents to send their children to school instead, for example, herding livestock. (See TANU, 1974, **Musoma Resolution on Education is Work**, Dar es Salaam: TANU Publicity Section). However, in 1986 fees were reintroduced as part of the conditions of the IMF agreement.
3. Soon after the launching of the Kigoma RIDEP, the World Bank, through its soft window, the IDA, provided loan funds to the Tanzanian government for the implementation of three more RIDEPs of Mwanza, Shinyanga and Tabora regions and the Geita Cotton Project. For details see PMO, 1984, 'Proceedings of a Workshop on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation of Rural Development Projects', Mwanza: Planning and Evaluation Unit, especially chaps. 10, 12, 14 and 15.
4. Personal communication with the Planning Officer in charge of RIDEP matters in the Regional Commissioner's Office, Kigoma, July 1986.
5. In March 1974 PMO issued the following terms of reference regarding the preparation of RIDEP plans:

"The assignment of the joint Tanzania/External Technical Assistance Teams will be to prepare IRDPs (RIDEPs) for the respective regions. Broadly speaking, their terms of reference will include the study of the existing rural sub-sectors (including rural institutions - cooperatives, DDCs, rural training institutes, etc); identify the present regional resources and constraints to rural development, appraise the development potential of the region (medium-term) and recommend appropriate rural development priorities, goals, strategies and investment programmes for realising the region's development potential. Specifically, the joint Tanzania/Technical Assistance Team will undertake the following tasks:-

 - (a) Review the present development status of the various rural sub-sectors e.g. agriculture (crop, livestock, fisheries, forestry), marketing, agro-industries, small-scale industries, social infrastructure sectors and non-agricultural commercial ventures.
 - (b) Identify development and investment opportunities and recommend development priorities and strategy for the rural area as a whole and for each of the various rural sub-sectors.
 - (c) Analyse existing facilities and the degree of use of modern agricultural inputs such as improved seed varieties, fertilisers (natural and artificial) and so on.
 - (d) Identify opportunities for profitable use of modern inputs and techniques suitable for accelerating rural development (social and economic).
 - (e) Prepare recommendations for investment programmes

for the following:-

- (i) rural health facilities;
- (ii) rural physical infrastructures, e.g. rural transportation system and facilities;
- (iii) rural water supply schemes, including small-holder irrigation schemes;
- (iv) improvement of production for priority crops, both cash and food crops;
- (v) development of cattle range production and marketing based on the suitability of the particular region". (Excerpts from the PMO Principal Secretary's letter PMC/D.20/3 of March 11, 1974 to all Regional Development Directors, Tanzania Mainland).

6. This conceptualisation has its roots in the Arusha Declaration and further clarified by the TANU Guidelines of 1971, especially paras 14 and 15, which insisted on the need to involve people in decision-making and that it was the duty of the leadership [of the Party] to ensure that popular participation was a reality for both the workers and peasants.
7. Tanzania's education policy in the period 1964/65-1979/80 (i.e. during the first perspective plan) was geared towards achieving manpower self-sufficiency in middle and high level brackets by 1980. This meant expansion of secondary and tertiary educational establishments (see Economic Survey for 1974/75, p. 99). However, in the early 1970s there was a change of emphasis. Primary education was given top priority with the aim of attaining universal primary education (UPE) by 1977. See footnote 2.
8. This, perhaps, raises a general issue of responsiveness of the RIDEP approach in planning and implementing rural development projects/programmes. As has been pointed out in section 5.3 flexibility was one of the problems of the RIDEP. Given its nature as a blueprint plan and coupled with inadequate M&E activities and delaying bureaucratic procedures of both the recipient and the donor, this problem was further compounded with negative consequences on the overall effectiveness of the project.
9. The data from the village surveys in Tanga region corroborate this problem too. For details see Chapter 6 and Appendix D.
10. Personal communication with the Regional Supplies and Logistics, Kigoma, July 1986.
11. Tanzania has a four-tier health delivery system. At the apex of health system's pyramid are the consultant (referral) hospitals (Muhimbili, K.C.M.C, Moshi, Bugando, Mwanza and Mbeya) and are followed by hospitals (regional and district) and rural health centres. At the bottom of the pyramid are the rural dispensaries sited in the villages. In villages, where a dispensary is not yet established, a first aid box and health medical helper provide

basic medical attention to the villagers. However, given the chronic shortages of essential drugs (see Appendix D), this programme is severely constrained as the shortages are more acute there.

12. Source: Office of the Regional Water Engineer; data gleaned by the author from office files during the field research in Kigoma in July 1986.
13. This is the view held by the NORAD experts who undertook the investigation for the region's Water Master Plan which was published in 1982. The NORAD experts had to mount redesign and reconstruction of the uncompleted and ill-fated RIDEP-funded water schemes in order to make them more efficient and reliable sources of potable water.
14. Personal communication with the Regional Engineer, Kigoma, July 1986.

To organize, develop and utilize the available resources of land, water and manpower in such manner that the entire rural population dependent on these resources has an equal (or at least an equitable) opportunity to meet, as a minimum, their basic needs of food, clothing and shelter with reasonable facilities for education and health and can live together in a positive and healthy social environment.

Sartaj Aziz, *Rural Development: Learning from China*, 1978.

CHAPTER SIX

EVALUATION OF THE TANGA RIDEP

6.1 Introduction

The discussion in this chapter centres on two aspects of the study. Firstly, as has been the case in the preceding chapter, the discussion will review the activities of the TIRDEP between 1975 and 1980 which was the first phase of the implementation of the plan. This review will include an examination of the design, objectives and targets of the RIDEP plan (section 6.2), evaluation of the planning methodology and its appropriateness (section 6.3) and the extent of the implementation of the various projects (section 6.4) with a view to determining the accomplishments and/or non-accomplishments.

As noted from Chapter 3, village surveys were undertaken in this region. Thus, from their analysis the study examines those RIDEP effects on the target population intended in the design and others and explains their causality. The discussion on the findings of the village surveys is presented in Appendix D. These findings aim to show the effects of the various projects of the Tanga RIDEP from the point of view of the target population. The village surveys were a method for seeking out and presenting the views of the beneficiaries on the RIDEP activities, on their accomplishments and/or shortcomings. The village surveys form the third and lowest hierarchy or layer in the evaluation process adopted and followed in this study.

The difficulties of undertaking a rigorous examination of effects

and impacts and their causality and attribution have been discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Nonetheless, some evidence from the village surveys and documentary research is available to enable the drawing of some conclusions on the RIDEP effects with the aim of expanding our understanding of the extent of influence of this intervention on the quality of life of the target population as stipulated in its design.

Section 6.5 contains concluding remarks of the analysis as presented in this chapter.

The Tanga RIDEP (popularly known as TIRDEP) was launched in July 1975. The RIDEP is supported by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) (TIRDEP, 1980:1) through its aid institution - the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ).¹ The Tanga RIDEP plan (1975-1980) was an outcome of a German technical assistance team, which had been in the region since December 1972. The team had been in the region carrying out the planning exercise for two and a half years and, therefore, they had a close look at the region's development potentials and constraints. In this way, the GTZ experts, in contrast to the World Bank experts who designed the Kigoma RIDEP plan or even the UNDP/FAO team who formulated the Iringa RIDEP proposals, had a very adequate time period for studying, designing and eventually writing up the plan.

The Tanga RIDEP was a comprehensive and detailed plan, covering agriculture, livestock, natural resources, food and nutrition, small-scale industries, roads, education, health and rural water supplies. The plan proposals comprised 45 projects (see Table 6.1). In terms of quantity, the productive sectors had 16 out of the 45 proposed

projects, 35.5 per cent of the total number of the RIDEP projects. However, in respect of funding, the productive sectors had only 10.6 per cent of the total funding proposals. It was assumed that implementation would follow these project proposals. However, the donor actually took up for funding and implementation only 17 of the 45 proposed projects of the RIDEP plan.

Between 1975 and 1980 the FRG government had provided the region with loans and grants totalling DM 65 million (an equivalent of Tshs 200 million). During the same period the regional government had spent Tshs 749.6 million and Tshs 137.1 million as recurrent and development budgets respectively (i.e. a total of TShs 886.7 million). Thus, the share of the RIDEP funds in the regional budget was 22.5 per cent. However, generally something between 35 and 45 per cent of the RIDEP funds were spent locally in Tanga, whereas the rest was utilised to pay for equipment and materials and other obligations overseas. For example, total expenditure for the Tanga RIDEP in 1979 amounted to about Tshs 26 million, of which about 40 per cent or Tshs 11.2 million were spent in the region, whereas the rest was used for overseas purchases of project equipment and machinery, direct payments made abroad on behalf of the RIDEP's contractors and for costs of expatriate staff. In other words, the region's capacity to import inputs for its development activities was raised.

6.2 Project design, objectives and targets.

The Tanga RIDEP plan was an output of a team of 16 German

experts, who between them produced 25 sectoral background papers. These papers finally formed the basis of the TIRDEP plan proposals. The experts, who worked under the auspices of the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), came from various disciplines such as economics, agricultural economics, agricultural engineering, agronomy, animal husbandry, fisheries, industrial economics, geography, medicine, education, civil engineering and sociology. The bringing together of all these experts enabled the plan to have both a multisectoral and multidisciplinary outlook and scope, far wider than the Kigoma RIDEF plan. The Tanga RIDEF plan was also an integrated plan, both sectorally and spatially (see below).

Most of the work was undertaken between December 1972 and October 1974, by which time the GTZ experts had not only finished identification and formulation of the project proposals, but also had completed the write-up of the first draft of the RIDEF plan. During January and February 1975, the experts engaged in soliciting views of officials of the Regional Administration for incorporation in the final version of the plan, which was published in May 1975. However, by that time some of the RIDEF projects were already underway in implementation.

The Tanga RIDEF plan proposals hinged around a development strategy which was based "on the one hand, the achievement of greater equality (between different groups of people, between different areas and between towns and the rural country-side) and on the other hand, the most efficient exploitation of economic potential and the acceleration of economic growth of the region." (TIRDEP, 1975:404).

Table 6.1: Tanga RIDEP plan proposed projects with estimated costs (Tshs) (1975-1980)

Sector/project	Estimated Costs		Total	%(sector)
	Local(a)	Foreign(b)		
Agriculture				
1.Agricultural extension&input supply	150,000	500,000	650,000	
2.Agric. mechanisation service centres	-	5,000,000	5,000,000	
3.Deve.of underutilised for agric.prod.	-	3,000,000	3,000,000	
4.Promotion scale irrigation	360,000	500,000	860,000	
5.Regional seed multiplication farm	-	3,000,000	3,000,000	
6.Cassava production and processing	-	-	-	
7.Promotion tropical fruit production	130,000	190,000	320,000	
8.Promotion of tree crops	200,000	300,000	500,000	
9.Promotion of veg.& temperate fruits in West, Usambaras	130,000	190,000	320,000	
10.Coffee extension and input supply project	-	5,000,000	5,000,000	
Subtotal	970,000	17,680,000	18,650,000	8.9
Livestock				
11.Livestock main veterinary centres	150,000	320,000	470,000	
12.Livestock exte.service&train.programme	150,000	150,000	300,000	
13.Improvement of cattle marketing routes	-	500,000	500,000	
14.Water supply for nomadic cattle in West Handeni	-	-	-	
Subtotal	300,000	970,000	1,270,000	0.6
Fishing				
15.Increase of fish prod.thro' bigger boats	-	1,500,000	1,500,000	
Subtotal	-	1,500,000	1,500,000	0.7
Forestry				
16.Protection of the Usambaras'natural environment	300,000	600,000	900,000	
Subtotal	300,000	600,000	900,000	0.4
Village infrastructure				
17.Education facilities	-	6,000,000	6,000,000	
18.Rural health facilities	-	9,000,000	9,000,000	
19.Village market buildings	-	1,000,000	1,000,000	
20.Village stores(c)	-	-	-	
21.Rural water supplies	-	10,000,000	10,000,000	
22.Rural electrification	-	1,500,000	1,500,000	
Subtotal	-	27,500,000	27,500,000	13.1
Other infrastructure				
23.Feeder road rehabilitation & construction	-	10,000,000	10,000,000	
24.Maintenance prog.for local roads	-	3,000,000	3,000,000	
25.Constr.of Mombo-Lushoto-Magamba road	-	20,000,000	20,000,000	
26.Constr./upgrading of Tanga-Kenya border road	-	25,000,000	25,000,000	
27.Constr./upgrading of Tanga-Pangani road	-	15,000,000	15,000,000	
28.Water supply Korogwe town	-	6,000,000	6,000,000	
29.Electric power line Mombo-Lushoto	-	6,000,000	6,000,000	
30.Sewerage & water drainage in main towns	-	6,000,000	6,000,000	
31.Provision of serviced housing plots(site and service programme)	-	15,000,000	15,000,000	

32. Training college for teachers of elementary technical subjects	-	8,000,000	8,000,000	
33. Rural Training Centres	-	6,000,000	6,000,000	
34. Mass media for adult education including a rural newspaper	-	-	-	
35. Library and mobile film services	-	1,100,000	1,100,000	
36. Reconstruction of urban hospitals	-	20,000,000	20,000,000	
37. Handicrafts & small industries ext. service	-	3,000,000	3,000,000	
38. Assistance for dev. of Pangani boat yard	-	200,000	200,000	
39. Mobile Constr. & Training Units	-	1,000,000	1,000,000	
40. Industrial Estate, Tanga	-	6,000,000	6,000,000	
41. Regional Transport Company	1,000,000	3,000,000	4,000,000	
42. Regional Management Centre	300,000	300,000	600,000	
43. Regional Construction Company	-	2,000,000	2,000,000	
44. Transport Clearing Centres	-	100,000	100,000	
45. Workshops for maintenance of public sector vehicles	-	3,000,000	3,000,000	
Subtotal	1,300,000	159,700,000	161,000,000	75.3
Total (d)	2,870,000	207,950,000	210,820,000	100.0

Source: TIRDEP, 1975, Tanga Regional Development Plan, Vol. 1, pp. 37-95.

Notes: (a) Local costs include recurrent expenditures on existing personal emoluments, running costs and self-help contribution which are sometimes quantified, but generally have not been quantified.

(b) Foreign costs are for capital goods and materials only, and do not include expenses of technical assistance.

(c) Estimates given per unit and no number of units was proposed. Costs per unit of local contribution (self-help) was set as at Tshs 40,000-60,000 and materials as at Tshs 60,000-90,000, Foreign contribution was estimated at Tshs 20,000-30,000 per unit.

(d) Given the situation as indicated in (a)-(c) above, the overall total is somewhat incomplete. However, one can still get an indication on the prioritisation and resource allocation of the various sectors.


Thus, the RIDEP strategy espoused both efficiency and equity objectives (see Chapter 1, section 1.2.2, p. 14-9). It is worth noting that these objectives were not given in the order of ranking or prioritisation (*ibid.*:405), although the plan did "advocate a stronger concentration on directly productive activities" (*ibid.*:413). As noted, the plan's basic assumptions were anchored on integrated rural development strategy, with linkages developed both horizontally and vertically. Horizontal integration aimed at creating linkages between all the key sectors of the regional economy. As Table 6.1 shows all

the sectors of the regional economy had a project or projects. Vertical or spatial integration was espoused as the key element in spreading the benefits of development throughout the region, removing the existing imbalances between areas. The design, in particular, singled out Handeni district as the most lagging area in the region and aimed at increased development efforts to reduce the existing disparities.

The RIDEP design was at appraisal silent on the administrative and management structure of the RIDEP activities. However, the projects were implemented under the supervision of the TIRDEP manager until mid-1977 when a new structure was introduced (see Chart 9; this chart should be read in connection with Chart 2, p. 172). The structure introduced the Coordination Unit as the executing agency of the RIDEP projects. Its functions included planning, coordination and supervision of individual project implementation. The coordination unit also acted as the liaison organisation between the German and Tanzanian authorities, especially between the GTZ, which is TIRDEP's funding agency in West Germany, and the Regional Commissioner's Office, Tanga. The establishment of the coordination unit effectively created a parallel institutional structure alongside the regional administrative system.

The rationale for this measure was the concern of the donor with speedy project implementation (indeed a noble concern) and the need to adhere to German procedures and regulations of building structures and expenditure control. We shall return to this issue later; suffice it to say here that it created a number of problems. Firstly, there is

Chart 9: The Tanga RIDEP Organizational Structure



the problem of isolation and/or distancing of the RIDEP activities from the regular government business, thus further weakening the integration and complementarity which are the key elements of an integrated rural development project/programme. In addition, such distancing is inimical to participatory decision-making, from the point of view of both the local experts and the target population.

Secondly, there is heightened risk that an inappropriate foreign technology may be imposed on the local community, with consequences detrimental to sustainability of the projects and their replication. The third problem is of duplication and wastage of meagre resources.

With the establishment of the coordination unit, TIRDEP introduced two systems of project implementation: (i) projects executed under the responsibility of a GTZ-appointed (expatriate) manager and (ii) projects executed by the Office of the Regional Commissioner - the 'financial agreement' projects, that is, their implementation was directly the responsibility of the Regional Commissioner's Office. However, the financial administration and accounting for this latter group of projects is the responsibility of a service unit of the coordination unit. The service unit is physically situated in the Regional Commissioner's Office.² As Chart 9 illustrates the TIRDEP coordination unit is comprised of four sub-units: the first is responsible for project identification and planning; the second is in charge of project monitoring and evaluation; the third supervises and administers the feasibility and backstopping fund and the fourth is responsible for administration of the scholarship programme.

Under its "support programme", TIRDEP has its experts attached to each functional department, who are responsible for day-to-day execution of the TIRDEP project in those sectors. For example, by the end of 1980 there were 22 completed or on-going TIRDEP-funded projects, of which only 5 or 22.7 per cent were financial agreements. The criterion for deciding about a project becoming a TIRDEP's or RC's Office's responsibility is the capacity existing to execute such a project as determined by an appraisal study, usually performed by the German experts. This stipulation was, presumably, valid at appraisal or even during the early stages of the RIDEP implementation. That this has become a standard practice, even now eleven years after it was initially introduced, has dubious validity. Over the years the region's administrative and technical capacity has, indeed, grown and improved so that it is quite adequate to undertake planning and implementation of almost all the projects once financial resources and equipment are made available.

The Coordination Unit is headed by a German manager. His Tanzanian counterpart is known as a project coordinator who is attached to, and physically sits in, the office of the Regional Planning Officer in the RC's Office. The name of this Tanzanian counterpart - project coordinator - and physical absence from the RIDEP's Office are, perhaps, symptomatic of his powerlessness as far as the day-to-day decision-making is concerned. Presumably, his more fitting role is that of a public relations officer for the GTZ experts.

6.2.1 The RIDEP objectives and targets for the development of the productive sectors in Tanga region

The RIDEP design attached substantial importance, at least on paper, to the development of the productive sectors (agriculture, livestock, fisheries, forestry, small-scale industries and handicrafts). The RIDEP plan identified correctly the major constraints facing the productive sectors of the regional economy. For example, it singled out poor or inadequate agricultural extension services (insufficient qualified personnel, lack of transport, lack and/or inadequacy of funds, lack of extension packages, lack and/or insufficiency of linkages between extension and research, lack of or inadequate cooperation and coordination among departments and/or institutions), labour scarcity, seasonality of labour requirements, land shortage, especially in the Usambaras, and poor infrastructure as the major constraints hindering expansion and acceleration of production in the region. Moreover, the plan pointed out the fact that between 1964 and 1974 development endeavours have put insufficient emphasis on the productive sectors, whereas the social services and administration sectors have had the lion's share of investment funds (see TIRDEP, 1975:392-403).³

The RIDEP objectives for the agricultural sector were as follows:-

- (i) to increase food production as fast as possible, but in any case at a higher rate than the population growth rate, which at appraisal was 2.9 per cent per annum, so that essential foodstuffs can be provided in adequate quantities and proper nutritional levels;

- (ii) to expand cash crops in order to achieve increased personal incomes of the rural people;
- (iii) to plan and execute only such measures which assist a further transformation of socialist agriculture in the region, and
- (iv) to increase the degree of commercialisation and integration of the rural farmers or cattle keepers in a modern economy.

The design, after noting the past agricultural performance in the region (see Table 6.2), translated the above objectives into targets as presented in Table 6.3. The project design envisaged an average annual growth rate of 6.3 per cent for both food and cash crops. Food crop production was targeted to grow at 7.2 per cent per year during the plan, whereas the figure for cash crop production was set at 5.6 per cent per year. The region's objective was to achieve self-sufficiency in food by 1990. The RIDEP targets were considered as prerequisites to the achievement of this objective. The plan envisaged increased emphasis on the production of the main staples: maize and cassava. Furthermore, the production of sorghum, bananas, rice and pulses was also to be raised during the RIDEP plan period. The plan had no subsistence sector food projects.

Maize, Irish potatoes and sorghum were singled out for higher increases than the other food crops, at annual growth rates of 10.1, 13.3 and 14.9 per cent respectively. For cash crops, coffee, coconuts, cardamom and cashewnuts - at annual growth rates of 13.3, 10.8, 9.9 and 9.4 per cent respectively - were given more prominence than the others.

The design envisaged increased production of these crops through an improved delivery of the agricultural extension services

Table 6.2: Production of main crops in Tanga region, 1961-64 to 1973 (tons)

Crop	Average 1961-64	1965	1970	1973
Cash crops				
Sisal	118,950	121,866	137,316	102,700
Tea	2,300	2,900	-	3,614
Coconuts (copra)	3,797	2,903	2,381	2,100
Cashewnuts	89	204	1,805	2,240
Cotton	229	662	142	346
Coffee	536	796	532	1,070
Cardamom	-	306	340	536 (a)
Cocoa	43	50	296	150
Sesame	8	20	37	16
Food crops				
Maize	-	43,000	65,000	68,000
Cassava	-	31,000 (b)	160,000	154,400
Bananas	5,000 (b)	25,000 (b)	81,000	102,200
Paddy	6,000	3,000	6,500	6,400
Pulses	5,000	-	6,000	11,500
I. potatoes	-	1,000	-	8,000
Citrus	1,000	4,000	7,000	10,000
Vegetables	2,000	4,000	15,000	6,000

Source: TIRDEP, 1975, Tanga Regional Development Plan, Vol. 2, Table 14, p. 72.

Notes: (a) This figure is for the year 1973/74 (July-June).

(b) These figures appear to be too low, and may be incorrect.

and a small component of input supply. The only exception was in the case of coffee, which was planned to benefit from an intensification programme through adequate supplies of chemical inputs and spraying equipment. The programme included also a concerted fight against the coffee berry disease, which at the time was a serious menace to growers.

The agricultural extension project was built around the traditional lecture-approach in which the Bwana Shamba lectures peasants in a village office, classroom or under a tree on modern farming practices,

Table 6.3: Targets for crop production in Tanga region, 1979/80

Crop	Production 1973/74 tons	Target 1979/80		Increase 1973/74 to 1979/80(a)			
		quantity tons	value(b) shs'000	quantity tons	value shs'000	relative (total) %	average per year %
Food crops							
Maize	68,100	110,000	55,000	41,900	20,950	61.5	10.1
Cassava	154,400	200,000	24,000	45,600	5,473	29.5	5.3
Bananas	103,200	125,000	26,250	21,800	4,578	21.1	3.9
Pulses	11,500	15,000	15,000	3,500	4,500	30.4	5.4
Rice	6,400	8,000	5,200	1,600	1,040	25.0	4.6
I. potatoes	8,000	15,000	6,000	7,000	2,800	87.5	13.4
Citrus	10,000	15,000	4,500	5,000	1,500	33.3	5.9
Vegetables	6,000	7,500	15,000	1,500	3,000	25.0	4.6
Sorghum	(5,000) (c)	(10,000)	(5,500)	5,000	2,750	(100.0)	(14.9)
Total Food crops			151,850		45,591	41.9	7.2
Cash (export) crops							
Sisal	102,700	130,000	148,570	27,300	31,199	26.6	4.8
Cardamom	536	700	15,540(b)	164	5,856	60.5	9.9
Copra	2,100	3,500	7,000	1,400	2,800	66.7	10.8
Tea	3,614	4,500	16,875	886	3,322	24.5	4.5
Cashewnuts	2,240	3,500	3,343	1,260	1,204	56.3	9.4
Cotton	326	-	-	-	-	-	-
Coffee	1,070	2,000	5,500	930	2,557	86.9	13.3
Total cash crops			196,828		46,938	31.3	5.6
Without sisal			48,258		15,739	48.4	8.2
Total food & cash crops			348,678		91,689	35.7	6.3
Without sisal			200,108		60,490	43.3	7.5

Source: TIRDEP, 1975, Tanga Regional Development Plan, Vol. 2, Table 77, p. 441.

- Notes: (a) The apparent accuracy of the figure is a consequence of calculations of growth rates between actual data and indicative targets.
 (b) Valued at 1974 prices.
 (c) Actual figure for 1973/74 very rough estimate.
 (d) The production assumed to be 40 per cent of grade II and 60 per cent of grade III as compared to grade III in 1973/74.

etc. The project had these key tasks:-

- (i) Provision of advisors, funds (for field staff allowances and fuel) and transport equipment to assist the RADO and his staff to improve the delivery of the region's extension services (a constraint-lifting function);
- (ii) Implementation of a field trials and demonstration programme;
- (iii) Preparation of extension aids for the field extension staff to enable them carry out their duties more effectively than hitherto;
- (iv) Improvement of reporting and communication system;
- (v) Support to horticultural nurseries to increase multiplication and distribution of planting materials;
- (vi) Training of field extension workers and village leaders and
- (vii) Collection of village and farm-level data for planning and implementation of the region's agricultural extension services.

All in all the design did not include intensification and/or extensification of land use as the basis of increased agricultural production through its somewhat high growth rates as discussed above. That these planned targets were achievable through only improved extension services overestimated their effectiveness in inducing innovation and changed working methods. Moreover, given the fact that planning aggregate targets for the subsistence sector is quite problematic, one is compelled to conclude the TIRDEP team should have focused their targets on quantity and quality of services delivered to farmers.

Livestock development activities were concentrated on intensification of productivity as an increase in the number of livestock, especially cattle, was considered unwise. The designers were wary of the problem of environmental degradation such increased numbers of animals could precipitate (although this is not automatic e.g. stall

feeding, increased food, etc.). The main objective of the livestock component was to provide the people with meat, milk, eggs and farmyard manure. The targets of outputs of the livestock component are presented in Table 6.4. These targets are rather on the low side due to the fact that Tanga is not a livestock-rearing region. Nevertheless, one is inclined to think that they were still, perhaps, high given the traditional fear of cattle by most inhabitants, land shortage and high density of population.

On fishing, the design planned increased fishing through bigger boats and use of better fishing gear and improved marketing. On forestry development the design provided for multiplication of tree seedlings for distribution to villagers and institutions. The concern here was to contain the problem of soil erosion and vegetational degradation. Planting of Guatemala grass, which was tied to the improved cattle breeds programme, was in itself a measure to check soil erosion in the Western Usambaras.

On small industries and handicrafts, the RIDEP design aimed at the creation of jobs and provision of sources of income for the rural people outside the agricultural sector. The design planned an annual increase of 7 per cent in the number of craftsmen and a reduction of disparities in the relative density of craftsmen (i.e. per number of total population) that existed between districts of the region. Table 6.5 presents the data on the planned targets of jobs to be created in the small industries and handicrafts and number of craftsmen to be produced during the plan period. However, the vigorous pursuit of training of large numbers of craftsmen is misplaced, because there are

Table 6.4: Targets for animal production under the Tanga RIDEF plan (1975-80) (tons)

Product	Production in 1973/74	Target 1979/80	Increase 1973/74 to 1979/80		
			Quantity	Relative % (total)	Average % (annual)
Beef	7,500	9,000	1,500	20.0	3.7
Goat meat	1,620	1,800	260	16.0	3.0
Mutton	625	725	100	16.0	3.0
Poultry meat	130	180	50	38.0	6.7
Skins&hides	240	270	30	12.5	2.4
Milk (a)	2,730	3,800	1,070	39.2	6.8
Eggs (b)	2,034	2,800	766	37.7	6.6
Average				20.1	3.7

Source: TIRDEP, 1975, Tanga Regional Development Plan, Vol. 2, Table 78, p. 442.

Notes: (a) Excludes big milk schemes of sisal estates.
(b) 1,000 dozens.

Table 6.5: Estimates of required number of jobs to be created in handicrafts and small-scale industries during the RIDEF plan period (a)

District	Estimated Number of Craftsmen in 1975			Target Number of Craftsmen per 1000 inhabitants	Number of Craftsmen required in 1980		Necessary Increase of Number of Craftsmen 1975-80	
	absolute	%	per 1000 inhabitants		absolute	%	absolute	%
Handeni	3,600	7.8	20.2	40	8,560	13.3	4,960	27.6
Korogwe	4,300	8.3	25.7	45	8,370	13.0	4,070	22.7
Lushoto	15,400	33.1	56.8	65	20,605	32.0	5,205	29.0
Muheza	18,800	40.5	81.4	80	20,480	31.8	1,680	9.4
Pangani	1,600	3.5	44.4	45	1,845	2.9	245	1.4
Tanga	2,700	5.8	30.3	40	4,480	7.0	1,780	9.9
Region	46,400	100.0	47.7	57.5	64,340	100.0	17,940	100.0

Source: TIRDEP, 1975, Tanga Regional Development Plan, Vol. 2, Table 81, p.524.

Note: (a) Computations based on overall annual growth rate of jobs of 70 per cent and narrowing the gap in density of craftsmen between districts to half the 1975 size.

already many craftsmen in the rural areas; their main handicap is the dearth of tools and equipment of their various trades.

The planners of the RIDEF felt it necessary to find alternative

employment opportunities for some of the rural people, who were being displaced from the sisal estates. Due to a number of reasons, estates were cutting down their production targets and therefore, making many of their workers redundant. The RIDEP designers made provision for creating job opportunities for these people as well. They also considered agriculture to be incapable of employing all the rural people. The designers emphasised the need for expanding skills in the various crafts and trades in the rural areas, but located most of the projects of this sector in the 50-odd designated central places.

The design also placed emphasis on the processing of local raw materials to produce cheap and easily accessible consumer goods, especially in the rural areas.

One final point to be discussed in this section concerns the support of productive activities in the ujamaa villages in the region. The project design identified correctly the bottlenecks facing communal production in the ujamaa villages. These included inadequate motivation of the ordinary members and leaders, lack or insufficient management and organisational capacity and inadequate or poor guidance from the government's advisory staff. The design emphasised the need to eliminate or reduce these bottlenecks as a condition for creating viability of the ujamaa development programme in the region. The design envisaged consolidation of the existing ujamaa villages and making them viable economic units. Such a process was considered pivotal in motivating members to work for their ujamaa villages.

The design opposed the habit of providing material assistance to

Table 6.6: Status of primary schools, classrooms and teachers houses in Tanga region as at July 1974.

District	Number of			Pupils per	Total Pupil
	Schools	Classrooms	Teachers	Houses Classroom	Enrolment
Handeni	77	273	70	54	14,855
Korogwe	73	288	64	54	15,429
Lushoto	103	432	83	54	23,443
Muheza	85	234	84	76	17,773
Pangani	14	44	17	49	2,173
Tanga	29	236	-	36	8,602
Region	381	1,507	318	55	82,275

Source: TIRDEP, 1975, Tanga Regional Development Plan, Vol. 2, Table 35, p. 226 and Table 37, p. 229.

the ujamaa villages free of charge, since the beneficiaries hardly appreciated it and were not aware of the sacrifices (costs) by which such assistance was made possible. The design suggested that ujamaa villages should get productive inputs (seeds, fertilisers, grade cows, etc) on credit. Communal production should be limited to 'block farming', i.e. individually worked plots in contiguous land blocks cleared usually by mechanisation, as transition to communal forms of production at later stage. Needless to add here that this was inconsistent with the national ujamaa philosophy.

6.2.2 The RIDEP objectives and targets for the development of the social services.

At the time of appraisal Tanga's status in the provision of education is shown in Table 6.6. The region had 381 primary schools with 1,507 classrooms and total pupil enrolment of 82,275, which was

about 56 per cent of all school-age children. The average number of 55 pupils per classroom was at the time relatively high as the normal standard is 45 pupils per classroom. To reach that standard, another 345 classrooms would be required over and above the 1,507 classrooms, of which 322 or 21 per cent were temporary and required replacement with permanent buildings.

The RIDEP design aimed at assisting the region meet the national and regional educational targets of UPE by 1977 and eradication of illiteracy by 1980. The design also hoped to provide post-primary technical education and the launching of a rural newspaper "for the people who have just learnt reading in an adult education class" (TIRDEP, 1975:496, op. cit.). TIRDEP planned to provide the region with a grant of Tshs 4.5 million between 1975 and 1977 which would enable the building of 300 classrooms. However, in order to meet the expanded enrolment as a result of the UPE, the region's actual demand was 1,550 classrooms for the period 1975-80. The TIRDEP's contribution in meeting this anticipated demand was only 19.4 per cent of the total demand of classrooms. Regarding provision of teachers houses, TIRDEP proposed to provide the region with a grant of Tshs 2.8 million to construct 150 houses. The region's demand was 1,550 teachers houses and, therefore, TIRDEP's contribution was only 9.7 per cent of the total requirement. It is interesting to note that even the RIDEP designers themselves make this admission: "... but this can only be a minor contribution in the context of the total requirements. At least another 500 units need to be built over the plan period to provide a

minimum of one-third of the total number of required houses" (ibid.:492).

The RIDEP plan had no formulation for assisting the region to eradicate or reduce adult illiteracy, except its proposal on the establishment of a rural newspaper. According to the 1967 population census Tanga region had adult illiteracy rate of 60 per cent. Adult education, especially functional adult education is crucial in raising the level of receptivity of knowledge and awareness of the rural people about development (see, for example, Nyerere, 1967 and 1977; Chambers, 1974:17 and 1983:150). The plan correctly identified the problem of scarcity of teaching staff in the primary schools and particularly pointed out that it will be compounded by the implementation of the UPE target. Nonetheless, it did not include any funding of a general teacher training programme to assist the regional authorities alleviate this problem. It did, however, propose a project for the establishment of a teacher training college to train teachers of elementary technical education in primary schools (see Table 6.1, p. 287).

In 1974 Tanga region had 10 hospitals, 12 RHCs and 177 dispensaries. Of these 4 hospitals and 72 dispensaries were non-government owned and managed (i.e. belonged to missions, private institutions and parastatals). The remainder, 6 hospitals, 12 RHCs and 105 dispensaries were owned by the government. Table 6.7 presents information on the status of health facilities in the region at the time of the RIDEP appraisal in 1974. At the time the region had 6.7 per cent of total population not living within 10 km of any health

Table 6.7: Health facilities in Tanga region as at July 1974.

District	Hospitals			People per bed (d)	RHCs		Dispensaries	
	Govt.	Mission or private	Total no. of beds		No.	People per RHC	No.	People/disp.
Handeni (a)	105	-	105	1,695	3	59,300	27	6,360
Korogwe	116 (b)	54	170	980	2	83,500	45	3,800
Lushoto	89 (c)	200	289	940	2	135,500	34	7,990
Muheza	106	235	341	675	2	115,500	52	4,440
Pangani	80	-	80	450	1	36,000	12	3,000
Tanga	467	75	542	165	2 (e)	44,500	7	12,700
Region	963	564	1,527	637	12	81,000	177	5,490

Source: TIRDEP, 1975, Tanga Regional Development Plan, Vol. 2, Tables 48, 49 and 50, pp. 249-52.

Notes: (a) Excludes 2 bedded dispensaries (with a total of 65 beds) run by Missions.

(b) Addition of a paediatric and maternity ward planned.

(c) Includes a new paediatric ward which is completed but not yet opened.

(d) The 1975 population is estimated based on the 1967 Population Census.

(e) These are not RHCs, but outpatient departments serving the urban population of the Tanga municipality.

facility. The national average was 21.8 per cent and this clearly indicates that Tanga was relatively well endowed as stated already in Chapter 4, pp. 183-8. [In this context, a health facility includes a hospital, rural health centre or dispensary].

However, inequality among the districts in the distribution of health facilities is substantial. For instance, Handeni had 27 per cent of its population not living within 10 km of any health facility (see, for example, Thomas and Mascarenhas, 1973 and Thomas, 1983). Handeni was the most disadvantaged district in the region and therefore the plan hoped to rectify this imbalance by according top priority to this district. Lushoto came second in this prioritisation,

Table 6.8: Cost estimates for the health development projects of the Tanga RIDEP plan 1975-80.

Projects	Unit	Tshs/unit	Total Estimates (TShs)
1. First Aid boxes	-	-	10,000
2. New dispensaries	6	50,000	300,000
3. Dispensary improvement programme	-	-	1,210,000
4. New RHCs(a)	12	635,000	7,620,000
5. RHC improvement program	-	-	250,000
6. Hospital wards, Korogwe	2	225,000	450,000
7. Generators	4	50,000	200,000
8. Nutrition education centres (Pangani, Bombo and Korogwe)	3	200,000	600,000
9. Staff quarters	100	30,000	3,000,000
10. Bombo Hospital wards	-	-	5,000,000
Psychiatric unit	1	300,000	300,000
OPD	1	-	1,000,000
Ancillary building	1	600,000	600,000
Total			20,540,000 (b)

Source: TIRDEP, 1975, Tanga Regional Development Plan, Vol.2, Table 79, p.510.

Notes: (a) For upgrading of Kwamkono and Kwediboma bedded dispensaries to full RHC status and Kisosora and Ngamiani OPD to Urban health centre status a total of TShs 600,000 was allocated.

(b) Includes equipment and vehicles.

because of its population density and was followed by Muheza and Korogwe districts, because of uneven distribution and high concentration of population. Table 6.8 presents the data on the investment proposals in the health sector under the RIDEP plan. Of the 12 new RHCs, three were to be sited and built in Handeni. These would be in addition to the two bedded mission dispensaries of Kwamkono and Kwediboma, which were planned to be upgraded to fully fledged RHCs. Of the six new dispensaries, five were planned to be built in Handeni.

At the time of appraisal the national target was to enable every

citizen an easy access of clean water (potable water) by 1991. To achieve this target a 20 year water development programme was launched in 1970. This programme envisaged, among others, the preparation of a detailed water master plan for each region in the country. The water master plan was expected to provide all the necessary data and information essential for the preparation of detailed water supply schemes/projects to be implemented when resources were available.

Under these circumstances, the architects of the Tanga RIDEP did not commit themselves to putting forward firm proposals on the development of this sector as work on the region's water master plan had then begun and was also being supported by the GTZ. It was expected to be completed by mid or late 1976. Nevertheless, the technical assistance team did come up with a "tentative target" for the plan period, which would serve 200,000 people. These would be in addition to the 300,000 people already being served by some kind of water scheme. In addition, another 100,000 people would be served by the Handeni Trunk Main water project which was then under construction.

At appraisal in 1974 Tanga's population was estimated to be 972,000 people based on the 1967 census. The RIDEP design estimated that this population would increase to 1,126,000 people by the end of the plan period. In 1974 about 30 per cent of the region's population was being served by water supply schemes. As usual Handeni, with only 14 per cent of its population having access to clean water, was at the bottom of the ladder. Given its dry climatic conditions, water availability for human and livestock consumption was a matter of

serious concern of the regional administration. The team correctly identified this problem and came up with the Handeni Trunk Main water project proposal. The project was intended to benefit some 60 villages in Eastern Handeni, the driest area in the region.

For implementation of this programme Tshs 10 million would be needed. The design estimated that, if this programme was carried through, about 55 per cent of the region's population would be served by water schemes. Moreover, the design emphasised, in contrast with the Kigoma RIDEF, the need to avoid or minimise high running costs of rural water supplies by resorting more than ever to use of gravity or hand-operated pumps. Electric power would be used only as a last option, whereas diesel-powered water pump schemes should be discouraged whenever practicable.

6.3 Evaluation of the planning methodology, design and the appropriateness of the Tanga RIDEF plan.

The Tanga RIDEF plan, like the Kigoma RIDEF, was a single-shot blueprint plan and an outcome of a technical assistance team. In contrast to the Kigoma RIDEF, however, the German TIRDEP team, had been in the region for the purpose for over two years. Thus, the TIRDEP experts had more time to study the various sectors of the regional economy and come up with detailed and deeply analysed plan proposals. Despite (or perhaps because of) this prolonged stay, the TIRDEP plan had no participation from either the local experts or the target population.

The planning method employed was geared to producing a one-shot plan. Thus blueprint-type documents, comprising three volumes with over 1,100 pages in all, were produced before the beginning of implementation. With the advantage of hindsight, one could suggest that reduced or iterative planning methods would have been more efficient and appropriate. In particular, these would be more appropriate, given the fact that at the time accurate planning data were scarce and that the new decentralised system was just being established. At the time, however, blueprint planning was a common practice in the country, save for the reduced planning methods which were being applied to regional planning in Arusha region in the late 1970s and early 1980s and the ODG/FAO Iringa RIDEP plan with its farming systems approach (see Chapter 7 for a discussion on the Iringa plan).⁴

Turning to its content, the TIRDEP plan was quite comprehensive with very valuable data and information. The technical assistance team, as noted above, was clearly multi-disciplinary. As shown in Table 6.1 (p. 287) the plan detailed development project proposals. In this way, the Tanga RIDEP plan was a useful document for future planning and implementation.

The TIRDEP design correctly identified the imperative of looking at the total needs of the rural population and emphasising the linkages between the various components of the regional economy. It advocated a stronger concentration of resources on directly productive sectors than in the past. It envisaged improvement of the social and economic infrastructural facilities to be directed towards the most

needy areas of the region i.e. underlining the need for poverty-oriented interventions. The design correctly identified Handeni district as the least developed in the region and wanted particular attention to be directed in promoting directly productive sectors. It also recognised the necessity to improve the district's road network in order to eliminate or reduce its perennial problem of poor communication links. Such a measure was expected to bring the district into the mainstream of the regional economy.

The design also recognised the environmental problem facing the Western Usambaras. This problem of soil erosion and vegetational degradation was caused by cultivation on steep slopes, overstocking and indiscriminate felling of trees, mainly for fuelwood and building poles. To contain this problem, the design formulated the soil erosion control and agroforestry project, which had three components: (i) zero-grazing, pivoted around Guatemala grass and, to a lesser extent, lucerne, (ii) contour planting of Guatemala grass as a measure to control soil erosion and (iii) tree planting for village woodlots and household tree plantings. The assumption that Guatemala grass could be a widespread measure for checking soil erosion was somewhat dubious, both in its efficacy to provide adequate cover or check against run-off and its widespread adoption among the smallholder producers living in the Usambara slopes. In the latter case, the problem was exacerbated by the fact that it was a condition for securing a loan for the acquisition of improved cattle breeds. In the event, only a fraction of the villagers became creditworthy and therefore, decided to plant the Guatemala grass as an extra condition

to get access to the loan programme.

The TIRDEP design had a number other flaws. The design was rather vague in the definition of target groups and distribution of resources in order to benefit those most deprived or disadvantaged. The design was just content with the general definition of the target population being the rural people. Such categorisation ignores the reality that the rural people of the region are differentiated and occupy different positions in the rural economy (for details see, for example, Cliffe, Luttrell and Moore, 1969 and Sender, 1974). True that in some of the formulations of the RIDEP plan, the notion of poverty-focused development is discernible, but the devised solutions tend to leave the poorest and most deprived out of the intended benefits. For example, both the agricultural extension and horticultural extension projects benefited more the "better-off peasants" located in the more developed districts too, namely Muheza and Tanga. The evidence from the village surveys does indicate that in Lushoto the better-off peasants are the ones benefiting more from the grade cattle introduction component of the soil erosion control and agroforestry project.

Although the TIRDEP plan is quite comprehensive and integrated both sectorally and spatially, a close look reveals significant gaps. The main problem here was the vague or unspecified formulation of a coherent development strategy to be followed by the plan in view of the past policy and implementation inadequacies. Undoubtedly, the multi-disciplinarity of the technical assistance team that formulated the TIRDEP design was an important potential asset in formulating an

integrated plan, but the evidence points to the opposite. In the event, the design had a bit of everything as the objectives of the RIDEP (p. 18) and Table 6.1 (p. 287) demonstrate.

Even the horizontal integration is weak, because linkages and complementarities were not sufficiently worked out. This was exacerbated by the fact that eventually implementation got off with only 17 projects of the original plan proposals (see section 6.4). The RIDEP plan, as it stood then, was really unintegrated both sectorally and spatially. The plan's integration, having been erected on a weak foundation, was further eroded by its piecemeal implementation. Moreover, the establishment of a parallel administrative and management structure (TIRDEP's Coordination Unit) with expatriate sectoral managements (popularly called "support" to a functional manager) (see Chart 9, p. 290) was hardly conducive to the integration of the plan and its subsequent implementation activities.

Turning to the RIDEP's institutional structure for administering and managing project activities, a weakness is also evident. The plan design, as noted, did not clearly and specifically set out the organisational and administrative framework for the administration and management of the RIDEP activities. The design did, however, have stipulations here and there that the Regional Commissioner's Office and its various functional departments would be responsible for this or that activity or function. In this respect, the design was definitely vague and there is little wonder that initial implementation encountered difficulties.

Some of these difficulties led to the establishment of the

coordination unit and its expatriate sectoral managements. Presumably, the real reason for this action is to be found in the donor's concern for propriety of expenditure of its allocated funds and concern for quick results from the RIDEP interventions. These are acceptable concerns and their accommodation is necessary or even imperative. Nonetheless, the creation of parallel administrative institutions effectively set up and nurtured new spheres of planning, implementation and administration away from those of the established departments of the regional administration.

The outcome of these measures is the isolation and distancing of the RIDEP activities from locally managed activities. Consequently, problems cropped up, such as (i) lack or minimal integration and duplication of activities (this being wasteful), (ii) passivity of local experts and people to the RIDEP projects, (iii) less popular participation, (iv) local contributions were on some occasions not readily available (probably, being deliberately withheld as sign of displeasure and/or retaliation), thus slowing down implementation and demoralising the expatriate staff manning the affected projects, (v) confusion on budget and audit procedures,⁵ (vi) fostering of conflicts and petty jealousies among the local experts over their expatriate counterparts over earned incomes and fringe benefits for performing the same or almost the same duties with comparable experience and qualifications and (vii) poor or weak sustainability of the projects and their experiences once they are handed over to the regional authorities.

The design was also weak in the prioritisation and allocation of

resources between productive and non-productive sectors. It did not specify what proportions of resources should support the productive versus non-productive (infrastructural) sectors or import-substitution versus export-promotion activities. As a result agriculture, the key productive and leading sector, was allocated only 9.5 per cent of the total RIDEP estimated funds, while village and other infrastructure were allocated 13.1 and 76.3 per cent respectively (Table 6.1, p. 287). The RIDEP design having identified the problem of neglect in the past of investment funds for productive sectors (see TIRDEP, 1975:394-6), should have made concrete proposals to remedy this blemish. In fact, the design should have ventured to put a minimum limit of funding of the productive sectors so that they were given the impetus needed to bring about the desired and anticipated changes in the regional economy. That the RIDEP design left this to chance, seriously undermined its purported intention to raise production and productivity in the productive sectors.

As noted already, popular participation did not feature in the RIDEP plan design, except as a cost-minimisation measure. In respect of the Tanga RIDEP, there seems to be a weaker case for not providing an opportunity for the involvement of the local people, that is, both the experts and target population, since the GTZ experts had been in the region for plenty of time to allow this to happen. Given the fact that the local community were not involved in the planning and formulation of the RIDEP projects, their lukewarm response to volunteer self-help is quite understandable and should have been anticipated. Moreover, the period 1975-77 saw the majority of the

villagers preoccupied with villagisation activities, which, in their point of view would have had top priority over any other activity, including construction of schooling facilities, etc.

The TIRDEP management regarded this condition as unwillingness to participate in the implementation of the RIDEP projects and went ahead to establish a construction unit to undertake all construction activities or to use contractors. This action, coupled with the appearance of expatriates and labour-saving equipment and tools in the villages gave the villagers the impression that the work was being cared for and consequently it compounded their passivity.

Continuous and expensive use of modern equipment and tools and insistence on German standards and regulations of construction and building structure precipitated a situation in which a foreign and inappropriate technology was proffered. Consequently, an opportunity was lost for the introduction and popularisation of a cheaper and appropriate technology as in the case of the Kigoma RIDEP with its brick-making technology which emerged from the construction of education facilities. Use of modern equipment foreclosed the adoption and application of labour-intensive technologies. Pilgram and Zils (1980:77) point out that in the Handeni road rehabilitation project all labour inputs amounted to only 10-15 per cent of all investment expenditures and accordingly, it became a project with a very low employment opportunities. Ironically, the quality of the roads was far from satisfactory, despite the use of the modern equipment, tools and expatriate expertise in their construction.

By and large, the RIDEP plan proposals were in congruence with

the Tanzanian philosophy of rural development. The RIDEP plan espoused a basic needs strategy, which, as noted, was *en vogue* with the Tanzanian leadership since the promulgation of the Arusha Declaration. Equally significant was the declared intention of the plan to place increased emphasis on the productive sectors. However, as has been pointed out already, this emphasis turned out to be largely rhetoric. It is hard to contemplate how the RIDEP plan could have achieved its stated targets of the productive sectors as exemplified by Tables 6.3 (p. 296) and 6.4 (p. 299). It is doubtful, that these targets for the agricultural sector could be achieved, given the plan's investment proposals.

A close look at the agricultural sector projects uncovers the fact that the majority of them are not directly productive. They are supportive projects and therefore, they could not be expected to influence growth rates as stipulated in Tables 6.3 and 6.4. Clearly, these growth rates are quite high. Undoubtedly, rapid expansion of agricultural production can be achieved only if there is commensurate investment in the directly productive activities, as in the provision of production inputs (e.g. fertilisers, insecticides, irrigation facilities, improved seeds, credit, etc. coupled with high incentives and good farmer motivation). The experience of the Iringa RIDEP (Chapter 7) demonstrates, though in a small way, the significance of inputs in increasing agricultural production. To be sure, extension and research endeavours are important components in supporting agricultural production. But, to place so much emphasis on agricultural extension to bring about such increases in food and cash

crop production is, at the least, to misplace one's faith. Thus, the design was not only weak in estimating feasible growth rates, but also in formulating appropriate strategies for achieving such targets.

Although macroeconomic policy emphasised medium- and large-scale industrialisation, small-scale industrial development also received the attention of the national leadership as exemplified by the establishment of the Small Industries Development Organisation (SIDO) in 1973. Thus, the RIDEP's proposal to promote the development of small-scale industries in the region with its emphasis on the processing of local materials, especially in the rural areas, was received widely welcomed. The Tanzanian authorities considered this proposal as a step in the right direction. In a nutshell, the main thrust of the Tanga RIDEP plan proposals fell in favour with both national and regional authorities in Tanzania.

Nonetheless, there were significant differences between the Tanzanians and Germans, especially in the areas of prioritisation, size and distribution/allocation of resources. For example, although the RIDEP plan had elevated the productive sectors, the proposed funding was somewhat smaller than desirable to improve production and productivity. The plan was also lacking or had inadequate proposals for direct investment in the agricultural sector, especially in major crop development. At the time, crop development, especially of food crops was top priority as signified by the *Kilimo cha Kufa na Kupona* campaigns. Another area of difference manifested itself in the education sector, in which attainment of UPE in 1977 was considered a top priority by the Tanzanian authorities. The plan proposals for the

provision of schooling facilities fell far short of their expectations. The RIDEP plan made a commitment of only 19 per cent and 10 per cent of total requirements of classrooms and teachers houses respectively.

The Tanga RIDEP was the second such plan in Tanzania after the Kigoma RIDEP. In a way, it had similarities; e.g. it exhibited similar "heroic assumptions" and inflexibility. As has been pointed out in the case of the Kigoma RIDEP (Chapter 5), the nature of rural development requires one be experimenting and flexible as new evidence becomes available. In addition, monitoring and evaluation seemed to have been left to the wayside in the TIRDEP plan design. However, the component was later introduced, but its impact has still to be seen and it seemed to concentrate more on auditing/accounting activities than on the traditional M&E functions.

6.4 Extent of implementation of the Tanga RIDEP objectives and targets.

As noted above the Tanga RIDEP plan contained 45 projects. TIRDEP selected some projects from this list for funding and implementation at the beginning of the plan period, 1975-80. Table 6.9 presents a list of selected projects as at July 1975. Unfortunately, the data for costings and/or allocations as they were at that point in time are unavailable. Therefore, the June 1979 data are used instead to provide an indication of the prioritisation of the Tanga RIDEP in terms of funding and its sectoral allocation as perceived by

Table 6.9: A list of the Tanga RIDEP selected projects for implementation as at July 1975.

Activity/Project	Allocation (c)	
	Amount (Tshs'000)	%
A. Planning/Coordination		
1. Coordination Unit (a)	38,000	24.0
2. Service Unit (b)	800	0.5
3. Feasibility/Backstopping Fund	20,600	12.7
<u>Subtotal</u>	<u>60,000</u>	<u>37.2</u>
B. Directly Productive		
4. Construction Unit	10,300	6.4
5. Honey plant/beekeeping	2,200	1.4
6. Fisheries development (d)	1,600	1.0
7. Veterinary advisor	2,600	1.6
8. Rehabilitation of veterinary facilities	11,700	7.3
9. Agricultural extension	8,200	5.1
<u>Subtotal</u>	<u>36,600</u>	<u>22.8</u>
C. Economic infrastructure		
10. Handeni feeder roads improvement	14,100	8.7
11. Village stores	600	0.4
12. Pangani ferry	1,600	1.0
13. Aerial photography	5,100	3.2
14. Village bookkeeping & advisor to RUCDO*	6,100	3.8
<u>Subtotal</u>	<u>27,500</u>	<u>17.1</u>
D. Social infrastructure		
15. (a) Education facilities (classrooms & t/houses)	9,700	6.0
(b) Polytechnical education programme	5,400	3.4
16. (a) Water supply facilities	4,700	2.9
(b) Support to Regional Water Department	16,200	10.1
17. Meteorological/hydrological <u>observation network</u>	800	0.5
<u>Subtotal</u>	<u>36,800</u>	<u>22.9</u>
<u>Grand Total</u>	<u>160,900</u>	<u>100.0</u>

Source: (i) TIRDEP Annual Reports for 1976 and 1979.

(ii) Percentages are Author's computations.

Notes: (a) Includes allocations to 1980.

(b) Financing agreement project.

(c) Data as at June 1979 as data for 1975 is unavailable.

(d) Stopped in 1976 for lack of viability.

* Regional Ujamaa and Cooperative Development Office(r).

the donor. It is worth noting that this selection was a decision of the donor (and probably was made in West Germany) as the Tanzanian authorities (both at PMO and RC's Office) had hoped that the donor would provide funding for the whole package, because it was prepared

by its experts and therefore it was considered to be wholly feasible and implementable. It is not known what was the basis of this selection, but there is a belief that the Germans were unwilling to commit as large an amount of funds as proposed in the plan.

The 17 chosen from the identified 45 projects still cost Tshs 200 million which was close to the original budget shown in Table 6.1. There are several possible reasons for this. A close look at both tables (6.1, p. 287 and 6.9, p. 318) reveals substantial differences between what was estimated at appraisal and was actually allocated and spent for some of the projects. For example, the agricultural extension project was estimated to cost Tshs 500,000 at appraisal, whereas actual allocation was Tshs 8.2 million. Similar patterns apply for the small-scale irrigation, livestock and education facilities projects. Moreover, the allocation for Planning and Coordination activities (Table 6.9, items 1-3) depicts large amounts which are not included in Table 6.1. Furthermore, price escalation in the intervening period did affect actual allocations. In addition, TIRDEP continued to add new projects to this list as some of them were completed and handed over to the regional authorities (e.g. classrooms and teachers houses (1977) and the Handeni honey plant (1979)) or as more funds became available. For example, by October 1980 there were altogether 30 RIDEP projects, of which 10 had been completed, 15 were at various stages of implementation, while 5 were ready to commence implementation. This excludes the fisheries development project which had been stopped for lack of viability.

Table 6.10 presents the data on the extent of implementation of

some of the RIDEP projects as at October 1980. In the sections which follow, a review of the extent of the implementation of the projects is made in order to illustrate their achievements and non-achievements.

6.4.1 Agricultural production and productivity.

TIRDEP had selected two projects to improve crop production. These were the promotion of agricultural extension service project and the rehabilitation of the Mombo Irrigation Scheme. The agricultural extension project, which was launched in January 1977 i.e. during the second half of project year two, aimed at improving the working conditions and efficiency of extension staff in the RADO's Office. This was to be achieved through provision of funds for allowances, production and distribution of extension aids, provision of transport and extension packages. In terms of crop mix for attack, TIRDEP endeavoured to assist increasing production of all food and cash crops shown in Table 6.3 (p. 296) with the exception of cotton for reasons of marginality and sisal which is non-smallholder crop. Furthermore, the project envisaged improvement of technical know-how of the field extension staff through seminars, short refresher courses and retraining.

The project also planned to undertake training of selected farmers and village leaders in order to make them change agents, who would motivate farmers to adopt innovations. In this way, it was hoped that agricultural production would increase. Additional project inputs

Table 6.10: Extent of implementation of the Tanga RIDEP as at October 1980.

Project/Activity	Appraisal targets 1975	Achievements at Oct. 1980 Outputs	% (1975)
<u>Agriculture</u>			
(i) Agric. extension			
(a) Project coverage (villages)	unspecified	88	-
(b) Training of field staff	unspecified	110	-
(c) Study tour of middle & senior staff	unspecified	8	-
(d) Establishment of field & demonstration plots	500	250	50.0
(e) Purchase of vehicles	6	6	100.0
(ii) Rehabilitation of Mombo irrigation scheme (220 ha)	modification of intake reconstr. of main canal construction of irriga- tion channels land-levelling about 98,000 cu.m of earth	intake constructed canal of 913m reconstructed 17,000 m channels and 18,000 m drainage chan- nels constructed 115,000 cu.m of earth levelled	 117.3
<u>Livestock</u>			
(i) Rehabilitation of veterinary centres	17	8	47.1
(ii) Renovation of Tanga vety. clinic	1	1	100.0
(iii) Repairs of dips	41	20	48.8
(iv) Construct. of new dips	-	2	-
(v) Reconstr. of dips	16	5	31.2
(vi) Supply of vety equipment to vety centres	18	9	50.0
(vii) Establishment of a revolvi- ng fund for vety drugs (Tshs450,000)	-	Tshs 900,000	n.a.
(viii) Training of field staff	unspecified	312 f.staff trained	-
	unspecified	28 dip attendants trained	-
(ix) Purchase of vehicles	7	7	100.0
<u>Village infrastructure</u>			
Education facilities			
(i) Classrooms	300	214	71.3
(ii) Offices/stores	-	34	-
(iii) Teachers houses	150	64	42.7
(iv) School furniture for classrooms	230	120	52.2
(v) Materials/implements for polytech, education-schools -sets of agric. implements	unspecified	31	-

-reference literature for agriculture	unspecified	250	-
-carpentry workshops	unspecified	5	-
-agric.inputs	unspecified	141	-
<u>Health facilities</u>			
(i) Constr. of new RHCs	12	0	0
(ii) Constr. of new dispensaries	6	0	0
(iii) Constr. of nutrition centres	3	0	0
(iv) Provision of first aid boxes	unspecified	0	-
(v) Improvement of dispensaries	unspecified	0	-
(vi) Improvement of RHCs	unspecified	0	-
Village stores	12	5	41,7
Village multipurpose stores	40	5	12,5
<u>Water supplies</u>			
(i) Improve.of existing w/s	50	50	100,0
(ii) Boreholes	unspecified	25	-
(iii) Provision of transport to Department	unspecified	8	-
(iv) Establishm.of wind mills	2	uncompleted	0
<u>Other Infrastructure</u>			
Maize mill, Korogwe	2	-	0
Honey plant, Handeni			
-processing plant building	1	1	100,0
-carpentry workshop/store	1	1	100,0
-manager's house	1	1	100,0
-collecting centres	14	3	21,4
Small industries promotion unit	1	1	100,0
Ferry, Pangani	1	1	100,0
Aerial photography	whole region	whole region	100,0
<u>Meteorological/hydrological stations</u>			
(i) Meteorological stations	15	15	100,0
(ii) River gauges	18	18	100,0
<u>Rehabilitation of roads in Handeni district</u>			
(i) Local roads improvement	320 km	432,8 km	113,9
(ii) District/regional roads improvement	380 km	321,3 km	84,5
(iii) Placement of improved culverts	unspecified	1,075,0 m	-
(iv) Bridges constructed	unspecified	17	-
(v) Drifts constructed	unspecified	178,0 m	-
<u>Training of village leaders and functionaries (village management)</u>			
(i) Selected villages for attack	unspecified	195	-
(ii) Bookkeepers trained	unspecified	165	-
(iii) Leaders and functionaries trained	unspecified	246	-

Source: Various documents of TIRDEP and GTZ (1979-1986).

included five expatriate staff, six motor vehicles and a number of motor cycles and bicycles.

Achievements of the implementation of the agricultural extension project are shown in Table 6.10. The project covered 88 villages in the region: 41 villages in Muheza district, 14 villages in Lushoto, 13 villages in Handeni, 10 villages in Korogwe, 7 villages in Pangani and 3 villages in Tanga. In practice, however, this coverage was mainly directed towards Muheza and Tanga districts, presumably, for reasons of proximity.

One hundred and ten field extension staff were trained at the Mlingano MATI, while 8 middle-level and senior extension staff went on study tours, one in Ghana and 7 in Zanzibar, sponsored by the RIDEP. Although the RIDEP had intended to train some farmers in modern farming practices, this task was not undertaken during the whole period, 1977-80. Regarding the establishment of the trial and demonstration plots, 250 out of the original 500 plots were established in the project villages to enable village peasants to learn by seeing farming innovations. TIRDEP provided also support for the development of 5 horticultural nurseries with a total capacity to produce 250,000 seedlings (coconuts and citrus fruits) per annum. In addition, some pamphlets on modern farming were produced and distributed to the project villages.

On improving the delivery of the region's extension services, some funds were directly allocated to the RADO to meet the costs of staff allowances, fuel and maintenance of vehicles. The RADO received 6 four-wheel drive vehicles, two of which were retained at the

Regional Office and the remainder were sent one each to Muheza, Korogwe, Lushoto and Handeni districts.

Although considerable effort was made in the implementation of this project, tangible achievements were negligible. The main reason for this poor outcome was that the RIDEP was unable to overcome the major constraints facing the region's extension services as mentioned in the first paragraph of Section 6.2.1 (p. 293).⁶ These problems were undented by the RIDEP's endeavours to overcome them. Moreover, the RIDEP's endeavours concentrated mainly on the improvement of operational activities of the extension staff, thereby, leaving out or paying only a little attention to farm-level activities. In some instances, the RIDEP's solutions were simply inappropriate. Rodent damage of stored grain was correctly diagnosed as a problem, but the RIDEP's procurement of over 70,000 old-fashioned rat traps and dumping them at DADO's offices, which have hardly been able to sell them to villages, is an example. Rat poison is much more popular among the villagers in combatting the rodent menace than those old-fashioned rat traps. Fertilisers, insecticides and agricultural credit did not form part of this increased extension endeavour so that improved cultural practices (timely preparation of land, time of planting, spacing or plant population/hectare, weeding, timely harvesting, etc.) are not sufficient in bringing about the desired changes in the farming systems in the region.

The rehabilitation of the Mombo irrigation scheme, after a slow start, proceeded well and in some cases exceeded the appraisal targets as shown in Table 6.10. All the 220 ha were rehabilitated by

the end of the plan period. The scheme was planned to benefit some 800 smallholder farmers from Mombo minor settlement and the surrounding villages, so that on average each farmer had one quarter of hectare. However, actual production began during the second phase of the RIDEP.

Regarding the implementation of the projects of the livestock sector success was mixed (Table 6.10, p. 321). The appraisal objective was the improvement of livestock health through the provision or rehabilitation of veterinary facilities. By the end of the plan period only 8 of the 17 veterinary centres were rehabilitated, that is, 47 per cent of the appraisal targets. One veterinary clinic was renovated which was the appraisal target. Two new dips were constructed and completed during the plan period and these were not in the plan. The appraisal target of 41 dips to be repaired during the plan period was 48.8 per cent fulfilled, that is 20 dips were repaired. Of the 16 dips to be reconstructed only 5 or 31 per cent were reconstructed and completed by October 1980. The Tanga RIDEP planned to provide equipment to 18 veterinary centres. In the event, 9 veterinary centres or 50 per cent of total were provided with equipment.

A revolving fund of Tshs 450,000 was established in December 1977 to enable the Regional Livestock Development Office to buy veterinary drugs and essential equipment whenever they were needed. The idea was to create an alternative source of funds which could be used to procure veterinary supplies quickly when needed. By the end of 1980, the turnover had risen to Tshs 900,000 with a profit of Tshs 93,000 being realised then. However, this was not included in the

RIDEP design; it was an outcome of the acute shortage of veterinary drugs the region was at the time facing and indeed the fund proved useful.

Although the design did not specify how many veterinary field staff would be trained or retrained, success was achieved in this respect. Some 312 field staff and 28 new dip attendants underwent training funded by the RIDEP. The targets for purchase of motor vehicles were attained as planned at appraisal: 4 landrovers, 1 lorry and 2 tractors with their trailers were procured and delivered to the department.

6.4.2 Quality of Life Indicators.

The discussion in this section will examine the extent of implementation of the TIRDEP targets of the infrastructural developments. This examination will eventually reveal the accomplishments and non-accomplishments of the infrastructural developments.

(a) Education

As noted the Tanga RIDEP envisaged constructing 300 classrooms and 150 teachers houses during the plan period. Implementation commenced in January 1975. By October 1977 the RIDEP management was able to hand over to the regional authorities 214 classrooms, 34 teachers offices/stores and 64 teachers houses. In terms of

achievement of appraisal targets, these were 71 per cent for classrooms and 43 per cent for teachers houses.

Although the design embodied self-help contribution into the construction of these schooling facilities as a cost minimisation measure, TIRDEP entrusted this work to its construction unit. This unit was established by the TIRDEP management to undertake all construction works of the plan. The construction unit was established in order to ensure that all construction and building activities under TIRDEP were carried out according to German standards and regulations (Pilgram and Zils, 1980:74-8). As a result the classrooms and teachers houses built by the RIDEP differ enormously from comparable Tanzanian buildings. To be sure, the German constructed buildings are of a better quality than the Tanzanian ones, but much more costly.

In practice, the Tanzania government allocates Tshs 15,000 per classroom and Tshs 18,000 per teacher's house to cover the cost of materials and fundi's (craftsman's) labour. The rest of the work is undertaken by the villagers through self-help. The RIDEP spent Tshs 56,000 for the construction of a classroom, that is, money worth 3.7 classrooms, and Tshs 93,000 for a teacher's house, an amount which could enable the construction of 5 teachers houses. Given the high need for these facilities in the region, the option for a lower but acceptable standard (quantity first and quality later) would have been more appropriate than the one which insisted on quality first. Moreover, repair and maintenance of these structures are not only problematic, but also expensive.

TIRDEP had *ab initio* established the construction unit, which

undertook all construction work, such as the construction of classrooms, teachers houses, village stores, offices, workshops, staff houses of the honey processing plant in Handeni, etc. The establishment of this construction unit and its subsequent construction/building activities everywhere in the region had the effect of dampening the villagers' enthusiasm to offer their self-help. The evidence from Kigoma (Chapter 5) and from Tanga itself (see Appendix D) illustrates the point that self-help can be forthcoming, if it is properly handled. Villagers become reluctant to offer their self-help contribution, if some of their colleagues earned money for doing the same work. Moreover, once it is established that the work will after all be done by an outside agent (TIRDEP or government), any appeals to enlist self-help from the villagers will fall on deaf ears.

Other functions of the construction unit were to offer employment to sub-contractors and local fundis (craftsmen) and provide the latter with on-job-training. In the event, only a handful of fundis working directly with the unit did benefit from its activities. It is worth noting that, in practice, there are many craftsmen in the rural areas as demonstrated partly by Table 6.5, p. 299. The data in Table 6.5 are based on a random survey carried out by the GTZ expert in charge of small industries sector of the plan. The data are presumably reliable. Their major handicap, however, is availability of working tools and an organised and reliable marketing outlet for their products.

About 120 classrooms out of the 230 received furniture. This is equal to achieving 52 per cent of the original target.

One other point which deserves mention here is the implementation of the polytechnical education programme. The programme's objective was to support existing and new approaches of teaching technical subjects in primary schools, which are directly relevant to the schools' economic and social environment. The programme aimed at developing forms of recording and simple book-keeping of primary schools' economic activities and their popularisation. Furthermore, it intended supplying basic farm tools for working on the school farm, textbooks and pamphlets on agriculture, equipment and tools to be used in crafts and handicrafts in primary schools in the region. In addition, the RIDEP planned to provide financial assistance in the initiation of school projects in agriculture and crafts. As can be noted in Table 6.10 (p. 321) the design was unspecific on the actual quantities to be provided during the plan period.

Achievements were (i) procurement and distribution of standard sets of farm tools and implements to 31 primary schools, (ii) procurement and distribution of agricultural reference books to 250 primary schools, (iii) installation of carpentry workshops at 5 primary schools and (iv) procurement and distribution of agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilisers, insecticides and spraying pumps) to 141 primary schools. In 1974 there were 381 primary schools in Tanga region (see Table 6.6, p. 301). However, by December 1985 the region had 643 such schools.

(b) Health

As can be noted in Table 6.10 no implementation of the health sector projects was undertaken, although the RIDEP design had included targets and had selected them for implementation. This state of affairs can be explained partly by the fact that TIRDEP relied on the construction unit to carry out all construction activities and later it became evident that its capacity was limited, and partly by change of prioritisation within TIRDEP and GTZ. Over the years, it became increasingly evident that the RIDEP activities were predominantly favouring infrastructural developments and it was felt a change of emphasis was needed to remedy the situation. Undoubtedly, it must have dawned upon the donor and its experts in TIRDEP that, although the plan advocated top priority on productive sectors, in practice, it was assigning much greater priority to the infrastructural developments. This new thinking affected also the health component, especially after 1977 when the first generation infrastructural projects were completed and handed over to the regional administration.

(c) Rural Water Supplies

By October 1980 TIRDEP had assisted the Regional Water Engineer's Office in the improvement of 50 water schemes in the region, which included the supply of 50 stand-by water pumps. The plan had intended supporting 50 water schemes and therefore, implementation had achieved 100 per cent success in view of the appraisal targets (Table 6.10).

Table 6.10 (p. 321) presents information on the extent of implementation of the projects falling under this sub-heading. On the whole the implementation of these projects achieved their stated targets, with the exception of the 2 maize mills which were to be constructed in Korogwe. Tardy architectural designs and procurement of machinery from West Germany are some of the reasons for the non-implementation of this project. The honey plant, the small industries promotion unit (SIPU), the Pangani ferry, aerial photo cover of the region, meteorological/hydrological stations and the Handeni feeder roads projects achieved their output targets as planned. The village management project, which aimed at training village leaders and bookkeepers to run village shops and produce collection, achieved good results, although targets were not specified at appraisal. In all, 246 village leaders and functionaries were trained under the auspices of the RIDEP. Furthermore, 165 village bookkeepers received training in book-keeping.

(e) Popular Participation

The Tanga RIDEP design, like the Kigoma RIDEP (see section 5.4.2 (e), pp. 274-6), considered and took into account target population's participation as simply a cost-minimisation measure, especially in the construction and building activities. Thus, participation in identification and selection of development projects directly affecting the target population never appeared in the project design. The architects of the design were aware of the problem the

central and regional governments faced when villagers came up with so many self-help projects (schools, dispensaries, roads, etc.) that could not be matched up with promised aid from them (TIRDEP, 1975:377). Thus, the villagers' efforts were wasted in such cases and consequently affected future endeavours of self-help projects.

Nonetheless, the experts did realise the need and significance of popular participation in decision-making for effective implementation of development projects. For example, the design identified and decried the practice of relegating to the wayside women's rights and role in participatory decision-making processes in the village affairs: "Participation of women, particularly in decision-making in the village, is often undeveloped and men don't seem very enthusiastic about it." (ibid.:391) One would have expected that the RIDEP designers would have come up with concrete proposals to remedy this situation and, indeed, of the whole rural community, which formed their target group. Ordinary rural people hardly participate in decision-making in even matters affecting their welfare as this is a monopoly of the bureaucracy and the urban and rural elites. It seems evident, that the designers, rhetoric notwithstanding, were not different in this respect.

In summary of the discussion in this section, it can be stated that the Tanga RIDEP had limited implementation achievements. This situation is an outcome of both basic design and implementation issues. The design was in many respects flawed; it advocated agriculture as a leading sector, but it did not provide it with sufficient resources commensurate with its intended role. No or very

little provision was made in allocating resources to directly productive activities. In any case, the plan was somewhat vague in formulating a strategy that would have ensured an elaborate pattern of prioritisation and investment. In event, the RIDEP has no or only limited impact in the regional economy. To be sure, there are symbols of expenditure here and there; this is, undoubtedly, to be expected as the RIDEP was only an expenditure plan. For example, many departments had their stocks of equipment increased, some personnel received training in the region or overseas, etc.

Peasant agriculture as the intended focus of the RIDEP design did not benefit from the project. By implication, therefore, it can be stipulated that the RIDEP had very little influence on the households incomes of the rural people in the region. This conclusion is based on the documentary research and the village surveys. However, as it has been noted earlier, this area presents itself as a research frontier. In this respect, both techniques and instruments of data collection would require particular attention in terms of appropriateness and adequacy of resources.

Some tangible results were attained in animal health where the implementation of the planned (or unplanned) projects was noticeably better. With regard to livestock health, provision of veterinary facilities (veterinary centres, dips, veterinary drugs and transport) is an important indicator in the improvement of animal health. Another sector, in which discernible implementation results were achieved, is rural water supplies. In this regard, Handeni district seemed to have benefited more than the other

districts. And also in the improvement of the road network. This was planned, because the district is the most disadvantaged in the region. However, apart from these two components, the principle of most deprived to be given the highest priority was never followed in practice. In the end, it was Tanga, Muheza and Lushoto districts which received more resources than the least developed districts of Handeni, Pangani and Korogwe.

6.5 Conclusion

The Tanga RIDEP has been in the process of implementation for over 13 years now. The RIDEP's achievements in bringing about the realisation of its stated objectives were limited. The reasons for this state of affairs are located both within and outside the RIDEP. The RIDEP as a regional intervention had no or little influence on the macro-economic factors such as the poor state of the national economy, especially since 1980, or the irregular and sometimes much smaller local contributions, etc. These extraneous factors apart, one must look for some of these reasons within the RIDEP itself.

The RIDEP plan proposals correctly placed top priority of investment funds on the productive sectors, but a close scrutiny of the investment proposals (see Table 6.1, p. 287 and the discussion in section 6.2, pp. 286-92) clearly demonstrates the mere rhetoric of this stipulation. It is clear from these data and information that the non-productive sectors were getting the lion's share of investment funds by comparison with the productive sectors. Any analysis has to

technological packages to extend to the peasants the effort could not realise increased output as envisaged in the plan.

The objectives (ii) and (iii) (see p. 294) were not implemented throughout the RIDEF period. Similarly, it can be stated of the objective (iv) (p. 294), save, perhaps, for the efforts undertaken under the agroforestry project in Lushoto district where a few villagers received improved breeds of dairy cattle.

Even in the area of social infrastructure the RIDEF's contribution is limited in two sectors only, water supplies, and the improvement of the Handeni local roads. There was no implementation in the health component and the education sector received only little attention, save for the popularisation of the teaching of agriculture and organisation and supervision of farm activities in primary schools. The crafts component of this latter programme (PESP) was conveniently relegated to the wayside. Nonetheless, the RIDEF's contribution in agricultural education in the region and country was clearly remarkable.

All this notwithstanding the Tanga RIDEF has been a useful and helpful intervention. It has produced a wealth of knowledge on regional planning and implementation. It has kept some important services running, which elsewhere in the country had to cease or operated poorly because of the shortage of foreign exchange. It has provided continuity to some projects. There is still the problem of unsustainability of many of the projects, but probably this is a lesser evil, if the alternative is an immediate cessation.

FOOTNOTES

1. Discussions on technical cooperation between the FRG and Tanzania culminated in the establishment of the Tanga Integrated Rural Development Programme Office (TIRDEP) in December 1972. Later a Coordination Unit was set up to administer and manage the RIDEP. See TIRDEP, 1980, 'Annual Report for 1979 of TIRDEP activities', Tanga: TIRDEP, p. 1.
2. To be sure, this is an appropriate and noble task and it is more so when evidence continues to mount showing how the target populations are getting a bad deal and the bureaucrats and the rich peasants are capturing most of the intended benefits of these projects. Nevertheless, what is more worrying and perhaps objectionable is the insinuation that local officials and managers are always dishonest, venal, incompetent and insensitive to the needs of their fellow citizens. At any rate, it is highly doubtful that the salvation of the poor in these countries lies *only* in the goodwill of expatriate personnel and institutions.
3. These constraints have been a much discussed subject in Tanzania in recent years. See for example, J.K. Nyerere, 1982, 'A Keynote Address' to 2nd Ordinary Congress of *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* held in Dar es Salaam on 20-31 October 1982 and J. Ngasongwa, 1984, *Hali ya Chakula Nchini na Mbinu za Muda Mfupi na Mrefu za Kujitosheleza kwa Chakula* [The Food Situation in Tanzania and Short- and Long-term Strategies to Achieve Food Self-Sufficiency]. Paper presented at a seminar of the National Executive Committee of *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* held in Dar es Salaam on 20-22 August, 1984. Also see World Bank, 1983, *Tanzania Agricultural Sector Report*, Washington D.C.: IBRD.
4. For details on reduced planning in the context of regional planning see RC's Office, 1981, *Arusha Region Integrated Development Plan*, Vol. 2, p. 9.
5. The issue of budget and audit procedures of the Tanga RIDEP was so thorny that it became a matter of strong representations in the National Assembly during its budget session for 1985/86 [Personal communication with the Project Coordinator].
6. Many people have pointed out the inadequacy of the archaic practice of lecturing peasants on modern farming, because it enters in one only to come out through the other. Moreover, in Tanzania, where the meetings are attended by male peasants while the *real* peasants are the women, the lecture method is, undoubtedly ineffective. See for example, H. Hansel, J. De Vries and P.C. Ndedya (eds), 1975, *Agricultural Extension in Ujamaa Development*, Morogoro: Faculty of Agriculture and Forestry of the University of Dar es Salaam. Also see J. Ngasongwa, 1980, pp. 129-130.
7. Personal communication with the District Planning Officer of Handeni, June 1986. Also see the memorandum from the Factory Manager of the Handeni Honey Processing Plant, Ref. No. BP/A/1/183 of 21 June 1986.

Because the main aim of the development is to get more food and more money for our other needs, our purpose must be to increase production of these agricultural crops.

The Arusha Declaration, 1967.

What we call success in Tanzania is largely a success created by the peasants of Tanzania. They have been doing the production which underlies our advances in education, health, the building of factories and the establishment of a viable transport system.

Julius K. Nyerere, Report to the CCM National
Conference, October 22, 1982.

CHAPTER SEVEN

EVALUATION OF THE IRINGA RIDEP

7.1 Introduction

The Iringa RIDEP is known as the Iringa Region Agricultural Development Project (IRADEP). For the purpose of this study the IRADEP will be simply known as the Iringa RIDEP, because it was planned as an integrated rural development project. The funding agency, the EEC, decided to support projects in agriculture, livestock, forestry and village infrastructure (roads and village stores). The EEC has been supporting the Iringa RIDEP since its inception in July 1977. The IRADEP was based on the Iringa RIDEP plan proposals formulated by a technical assistance team from the Overseas Development Group (ODG) of the University of East Anglia and the staff of UN agencies present in Tanzania under the auspices of UNDP and FAO (ODG/UNDP/FAO, 1976). The architects of the Iringa RIDEP plan proposals had prepared them for inclusion in Tanzania's Third Five Year Plan (1976-81) which was launched in July 1976. In other words, the ODG/UNDP/FAO "integrated rural development proposals" were to form the basis of the Iringa Region's third five year plan. A separate Iringa Region Third Five Year Plan was prepared in 1974/75 by the Regional Development Committee. This plan consisted essentially of sectoral targets and optimistic budget allocations. This plan was, however, largely ignored by PMO because it was overambitious and unrealistic.

The ODG/UNDP/FAO "integrated rural development proposals" (hereinafter to be referred to as the RIDEP plan or proposals) covered

all the key production sectors of the regional economy. These were agriculture, livestock, forestry, fisheries, game and tourism, small-scale industries and handicrafts, mining and heavy industries. Others were social infrastructure, urban development, transport and communications, power and energy. The RIDEP proposals clearly elevated the role of the productive sectors with agriculture being assigned the critical role of a leading sector as the basis for increasing the overall regional output and personal incomes of the rural people.

The plan espoused a growth and equity strategy to accelerate agricultural development at the village level during the third five year plan (1976-81) period. It envisaged supporting both ujamaa and private (family) modes of farming in the villages as both have high development potential, if appropriate technological packages were developed and made accessible to the farmers. In addition, the plan proposals recognised the significant role to be played in the region's rural economy by the existing private medium and large scale farming for both increasing regional agricultural output and generating employment for some of the rural people.

The ODG/UNDP team's proposals hoped correctly to increase and sustain the production infrastructure since such an intervention would reduce the constraints confronting village development. Specifically, the plan proposals singled out for concerted endeavour feeder roads, domestic water supply and health programmes as crucial interventions for supporting productive activities and generally improving the quality of life of the rural people. Of equal significance was the efficiency of the marketing organisations in the distribution of

farm inputs and consumer goods and collection of agricultural produce.

The Iringa RIDEP plan was integrated both sectorally and areally as it covered all the key sectors of the regional economy and the proposed projects were spread across the then three rural districts (Iringa, Mufindi and Njombe) and the sub-district of Iringa town. [Currently there are six districts, one of which is an urban district; they are Iringa Rural, Iringa Urban, Mufindi, Njombe, Ludewa and Makete - see Map 1.7, p. 22]. Most of the proposed projects were village oriented and/or based. Of particular significance in spatial integration was the ODG/UNDP team's concept of "planning area" which was introduced for the first time in Tanzania's regional planning (ibid:8.1-5). The concept of "planning area" entails disaggregating a region or district into small parts which exhibit uniform or similar agro-economic or farming systems characteristics and a similar plan intervention mix or 'strategy'. The RIDEP plan designers proposed that between the wards as the smallest administrative areas and the divisions, which are larger than the wards, planning areas should be inserted. In their view, the planning area would (i) enable closer planning attention to the design of palliatives to the problems facing village development and the preparation of more accurate village plans, and (ii) provide manageable areas for effective supervision of the field projects (ibid:8.1).

Although UNDP/FAO were expected to provide the funding of the Iringa RIDEP, this funding never materialised. The main cause was the "internal crisis" within the UNDP in 1975. Furthermore, the UN institutions (i.e. UNDP and FAO) were to cover only a small share of

the total funds required to implement the RIDEP proposals. At the time the vogue was to seek funding for the whole package. Undoubtedly, the Tanzanian authorities were pleased to receive funding from the EEC.

IRADEP has been supported by the EEC since mid 1977. The first phase of implementation of the IRADEP took four years 1977-81 and was followed by one year (1981/82) of "interim phase". The second phase was launched in July 1982 and ended in June 1986. [There are plans to secure funds for a third phase 1987-91]. The first phase was allocated by the EEC with Tshs 60 million. Funds earmarked for the implementation of the second phase amounted to Tshs 201.2 million, of which the local contribution was to be Tshs 29.1 million or 14.5 per cent. For the purpose of the present study both these phases will be examined and their achievements and non-achievements determined.

Although the Iringa RIDEP plan was very comprehensive with project proposals covering all the key sectors of the region's economy, the donor agency selected projects for funding from mainly the agricultural sector (crop and livestock development, afforestation, small-scale irrigation, oxenisation and farm input distribution). In addition, development of production infrastructure (construction of warehousing facilities, extension staff houses, workshops and veterinary facilities, rehabilitation and maintenance of feeder roads) was undertaken in order to provide support to the productive activities. For this reason, the Iringa RIDEP was specifically known as the IRADEP as opposed to the other RIDEPs in the country.

The IRADEP was administered by an executing agency, Agrar-und

Hydrotechnik GmbH of Essen, West Germany, which established a Project Management Office in Iringa Town. This office was headed by a project manager who was assisted by a team of between eight and ten expatriate staff at any one time. Local staff were also engaged to assist the expatriate staff. In theory the project manager was responsible to the Regional Development Director of the region. In practice, however, he was quite independent in the region and was loosely responsible to the EEC Delegation Office in Dar es Salaam (see section 7.4, pp. 379-400 for details).

In the present chapter the discussion will concentrate on the examination of agricultural inputs, outputs and activities during the period 1976-86. A review will be made of the design of the RIDEP proposals for the purpose of determining (i) the likelihood of achieving the stipulated objectives and targets, (ii) their effectiveness in bringing about the realisation of the stated objectives and targets, and (iii) their appropriateness vis-a-vis the Tanzanian development philosophy as then espoused by the national leadership. Further, the analysis will attempt to show the implications of the donor's decision to support a few projects from an integrated development package in terms of effective integration in regional planning and grassroots-level problem solving and plan formulation. Moreover, the extent of the implementation of the various projects of IRADEP will be examined relative to the achievements and/or shortfalls of the stated targets.


It should be noted here, however, that Iringa region has been benefiting from some assistance from other donors as well. For

example, WHO and UNICEF have been supporting a joint WHO/UNICEF Nutrition Support Programme in 7 divisions of the region (see Map 7.1) during the period 1983-86. The programme was funded by the Italian Government. Its main thrust was a rapid and sustained reduction of rates of malnutrition, infant and child mortality. A recent review of this programme has shown remarkable improvement in the delivery of health services, especially MCH services, which has resulted, among other things, in the reduction of the infant mortality rate from 152 per 1,000 in 1978 to 107 per 1,000 in 1986 (Sunday News, 1987). DANIDA has been supporting the provision of rural water supplies since 1980 which was preceded with the elaboration of the region's water master plan. (Work on these lines was encouraged in the ODG/UNDP proposals). As a result by mid 1986 50 per cent of the region's population or 291 villages (there are 600 villages in the region) were getting clean water. Other donors were CONCERN and the Irish Foundation of Cooperative Development, whose assistance was also directed into the improvement of the rural water supplies in the villages.

7.2 The Iringa RIDEP design, objectives and targets

The design of the Iringa RIDEP was markedly different from the other RIDEPs in the country. While the other RIDEPs were prepared as regional *plans*, the Iringa RIDEP was designed as *proposals* for discussion by the people and leaders of the region. The Iringa RIDEP designers saw their role as one of assisting the regional authorities

Map 7.1: Iringa Region showing outreach of the WHO/UNICEF Nutrition Programme



come up with a viable and fundable regional development plan and providing feedback to PMO and sectoral ministries about the impact of current national policies and projects with a view of soliciting and directing their attention to the region's endowment for future accelerated development, especially in those areas that fall in their realm of decision-making (*ibid*:xxv). The ODG/UNDP team undertook a detailed analysis of the past experience in the region and country, on which it formulated its detailed project proposals as presented in one of the two-volume plan documents. The design deliberately concentrated more on some sectors than on others. Crop and livestock sectors and their production infrastructure received concentrated attention, because of the opportunities in these activities for rural family incomes. Iringa region is endowed with surplus land which can be used for both crop and livestock development. In addition, the region's climate is able to support tropical, sub-tropical and temperate agricultural activities.

Other productive sectors included in the RIDEP were forestry, fisheries, game and tourist development. The RIDEP proposals also included development projects in the mining and heavy industrial sectors. They further envisaged the development of the production and social infrastructure in the region. The bedrock of the ODG/UNDP proposals was the "integrated" approach to rural development, which was "envisaged as taking place at each planning level - the village, the sub-district planning area, the district and the region" (*ibid*).

The main objectives of the RIDEP proposals were twofold:

- (1) rapid increase of the regional output from all the

productive sectors and

- (ii) achievement of improved equity particularly in income distribution and accessibility to social services.

The ultimate aim was to eradicate extreme poverty in the rural areas through increased agricultural output in order to meet basic and improved food requirements and cash incomes which would enable the rural people meet their other needs. Hence the team's insistence on exploiting the potential of small-scale peasant agriculture. The designers underlined, in our view correctly, the necessity of arresting the decline in the rural-urban income terms of trade by maintaining incentive levels of prices for agricultural products. They also realised the need to improve the quality of the supporting production infrastructure particularly in the sectors of transport, marketing of agricultural produce and distribution of production inputs. In addition, the RIDEP design recognised the need for developing and delivering appropriate production techniques which were consistent with both the region's economic environment and national social policy.

The design proposed that these attempts to raise agricultural output at the village level should be targeted at both ujamaa and private family enterprises. The team was wary of the dangerous trend which was then occurring in the region when scarce resources were being concentrated on a few villagers engaged in ujamaa farming. Both the high costs and subsequent inequality were found unjustifiable and, indeed, contradictory to the declared intentions of the national

development philosophy. Thus, the designers considered it a necessary condition to bring the majority of the population into the mainstream of public sector interventions in the region. They realised the need for the rural population to be provided with a variety of profitable productive activities, systems and projects in which they would wish to voluntarily participate. Concretely, this entailed delivering to the majority of the rural population cooperative and democratic processes, in which popular participation could prosper and be sustained.

In Iringa region there was experience with expatriate medium and large scale farming. The design envisaged sustaining this form of farming with advantages in increasing overall regional rural output and employment opportunities especially for the rural people. Hence the design conceptualised the region's agricultural development as being three-pronged i.e. ujamaa, family and large-scale farming. The latter system would be undertaken by both private farmers and the parastatals. The key issue was the efficient use of scarce resources in order to achieve optimal results.

The ODG/UNDP RIDEF proposals were *sui generis* in Tanzania in two respects. Firstly, the design was based on an explicit planning methodology, which pivoted around four characteristics:

- (i) continuous or iterative planning, which was dictated by inadequacy of data at the time,
- (ii) as a result of the paucity of data the design did not include regional targets of areas and outputs for cereals and oilseeds for 1979 or 1981 - this gap, it was anticipated, would be filled by the annual planning exercise which was at the time being firmly institutionalised in the region,
- (iii) viewing regional planning as a framework not only for

- generating proposals for allocation of resources to the regions and districts, but also providing feedback to the national institutions on the effects and impacts of their policies and projects on the quality of life of the people in the region, and
- (iv) formulation of the proposals was mainly based on data generated through evaluation of the then recent public sector interventions in relation to the rural people in the region. (ODG/UNDP/FAO, 1976:27.6-8; also see D.G.R. Belshaw, 1979).¹

Secondly, the Iringa RIDEP proposals had a clear farming systems-cum-agroecological perception of integrated rural development as opposed to that of the general economist as exemplified by the World Bank or GTZ aided RIDEPs (Kigoma and Tanga). This perception of RIDEP planning is evidenced by the elaborate determination of planning areas which were based on the ecological specificity and the need to identify and adopt a farm system approach to rural change. Iringa region is characterised by differences in relief, climate, hydrological and soil types which call for specific agricultural activities in one particular area. In our opinion, this was a most appropriate and significant consideration in agricultural planning in Iringa region, and indeed for elsewhere in the country.

The authors of the RIDEP proposals adopted correctly a planning methodology which was rooted in a farming systems approach because at the time there was a body of evolving experience emanating from farming systems research on agricultural priorities and development. This approach, as noted in Chapter 2, pp. 54-5, aimed at improving the agriculture of small-scale farmers.

No work on farming systems research has been undertaken in Iringa region. This is in spite of the fact that the RIDEP proposals


recommended such an endeavour once implementation had commenced. However, work done in Morogoro region (see Keswani and Ndunguru, 1980), a contiguous region (see Map 1.1, p. 2), has indicated, in a preliminary way, the relevance and appropriateness of this approach in tackling some of the problems facing smallholder agricultural producers.

It is important to note that the farming systems approach presupposes an existence of homogeneous smallholder farming communities. One needs, therefore, to be wary of its applicability in conditions, in which the rural producers are differentiated in social and economic classes. In such a situation, conflicting interests and power relations are bound to constrain the effectiveness of this approach.

Map 7.2 shows the agro-economic/farming system zones of Iringa which summarise the different characteristics of the region's physical environment (i.e. rainfall, temperature, soils, etc - see Chapter 4 for details). The names of the zones are given in Table 7.2 (p. 358). These agro-ecological zones also represent the ODG/UNDP team's rural regional planning areas. A regional planning area (RPA) or planning area (PA) is derived from agro-economic/farming zones which are subdivided by district boundary and are made conformable to the nearest ward boundary (i.e. wards could be allocated to planning areas).

The discussion now turns to individual project proposals. Table 7.1 presents a list of the development projects proposed by UNDP/FAO for the Iringa region for the third five year plan period,

Map 7.2: Iringa Region showing Planning Areas and Planning Sub Areas



Source: Adapted from ODG/UNDP/FAO 'Integrated rural development proposals', Map 3.1

Table 7.1: ODG/UNDP Proposed Development Projects, Iringa Region, Third Five Year Plan, 1976-81

Sectors/Projects	Iringa	Mufindi	Njombe	Ludewa	Makete(c)
I Crop Production					
1. Maize; appropriate technology package (a)(b)	x	x	x	x	x
2. Wheat; appropriate technology packages (a)(b)	-	-	xx	x	xx
3. Legumes; beans, peas, cowpeas, pigeon peas incorporated into cereal systems (a)(b)	x	x	x	x	x
4. Horticulture:					
(a) temperate fruits and nuts (b)	xx	x	-	-	-
(b) village nutrition projects	x	x	x	x	x
5. Tobacco; block farming (if major price increase)	x	x	x	x	x
6. Pyrethrum; mainly family farms	x	x	x	x	x
7. Tea; block farms	-	x	xx	x	xx
8. Irish potatoes	x	x	x	x	x
9. Oilseeds:					
(a) Sunflower in maize/tobacco systems (b)	x	x	x	x	x
(b) Groundnuts, sesame, castor if major price increase (a)(b)	x	x	x	x	x
10. Soya beans; especially in Ujamaa farms (a)(b)	x	x	x	x	x
11. Cashewnuts; Ujamaa and family farms	-	-	-	x	-
12. Arabica Coffee; block farming in controlled settlements (a)(b)	-	-	x	xx	x
13. Irrigated crops (200-1,000 ha units):					
(a) sugar (a)(b)	x	x	x	x	x
(b) cotton	x	-	-	x	-
(c) rice (a)	xx	x	x	x	x
(d) fruit and vegetables	xx	x	-	-	-
(e) maize; especially Ujamaa farms on village irrigation plots	x	x	x	x	x
II Livestock Production					
Beef					
14. Breeding and fattening (MUDECO)	-	x	x	-	x
15. Growing out ranch (a)	?	?	?	-	?
16. Breeding and fattening (IDECO)	x	-	-	-	-
Dairy					
17. Large scale intensive (Kitulo)(N)	-	-	-	-	x
18. Ikanga Dairy Farm (NJODECO)	-	-	x	-	-
19. Ihibmo Dairy Farm (IDECO)	x	-	-	-	-
20. Smallholder projects (a)(b) (150)	x	x	x	x	x
Village projects					
21. Beef-breeding ranch (1,000 A.U. 10) (a)(b) (including goats)	x	x	x	x	x
22. Poultry-egg laying (300 birds x 200)(a)(b)	x	x	x	x	x
23. Dairy - (25 cow units x 30) (a)(b)	x	x	x	x	x

Table 7.1 (cont.)					
24. Goat ranches (500 doe x 12) (a)(b)	x	x	x	x	x
<u>III Natural resources development</u>					
Forests					
25. Sao Hill softwoods and sawmill (TWICO)(N)	-	x	-	-	-
26. Improved natural forest exploitation (b)	x	x	x	x	x
27. Mufindi pulpmill (preliminary investment)(N)	-	x	-	-	-
28. Tobacco fuel schemes	x	x	x	x	x
29. Wattle outgrowers scheme	-	-	x	-	-
30. Charcoal projects (b)	x	x	xx	x	x
31. Village timber schemes	x	x	x	x	x
32. Trial bee projects	x	x	-	-	-
33. Timber treatment plant	-	-	x	-	-
Fisheries					
34. Lake Nyasa inshore fisheries improvement (b)	-	-	-	x	-
35. Lake Nyasa deepwater trial project (N)	-	-	-	x	-
36. Mtera reservoir fisheries (b)	x	-	-	-	-
37. Fish ponds management campaign	x	x	x	x	x
Game and Tourism					
38. Iringa 'Treetops' Initial Study (N)	x	-	-	-	-
39. Ruaha National Park (N)	x	-	-	-	-
40. Improved vermin control	x	x	x	x	x
<u>IV Industrial Development</u>					
41. Coal: initial mining operations (pilot project or lease)(N)	-	-	-	x	-
42. Iron: Trials (N)	-	-	-	x	-
43. Pyrethrum processing plant (N)	-	x	-	-	-
44. Small-scale industry (a)(b)					
(a) Workshops on industrial estate (15)	x	-	-	-	-
(b) Other urban small units (53)	x	x	x	-	-
(c) Craftsmen in artisan guilds (32)	-	x	x	-	-
(d) Craft-based village industries (400)	x	x	x	x	x
45. Sugar processing; small-scale processing (N)	x	-	-	x	-
<u>V Production Infrastructure</u>					
Agricultural production infrastructure					
46. Agro-service centres (including Livestock centres) (a)(b)					
(a) District Agro-service centres (5)	x	x	x	x	x
(b) Zonal agro-service centres (16) (a)(b)	x	x	x	x	x
(c) Ward agro-service centres (56) (a)(b)	x	x	x	x	x
47. Multi-disciplinary farm systems 'R & D' team (a)(b)	x	x	x	x	x

Table 7.1 (cont.)

48, Intensified Agricultural Staff training (part N) (a)(b)	x	x	x	x	x
49, Animal health task force (a)(3)	x	x	x	?	?
50, Dip construction programme	x	x	x	x	x
51, Irrigation schemes					
(a) Kimande scheme	x	-	-	-	-
(b) Mtera reservoir (N) (a)	x	-	-	-	-
(c) Manda scheme (a)	-	-	-	x	-
52, Kilimo irrigation schemes (16)	x	x	x	x	x
53, Micro-irrigation plots (a)(b)	x	x	x	x	x
54, Agricultural credit programme (N) (a)	x	x	x	x	x
55, Ward-level distribution and produce collection centres (a)(b)	x	x	x	x	x
Natural Resources Infrastructure					
56, Forestry roads	x	xx	x	-	-
57, Fish receiving stations					
(a) Manda	-	-	-	x	-
(b) Mtera	x	-	-	-	-
58, Itungi boat yard: increased output (N)	-	-	-	x	x
59, Game Park roads (N)	x	-	-	-	-
Physical Planning					
60, Administrative boundary review (a)(b)	x	x	x	x	x
61, Network of rural service centres (a)(b)	x	x	x	x	x
62, Iringa sub-district planning	x	-	-	-	-
63, Urban Planning (a)(b)	x	x	x	x	x
64, Large-scale settlement schemes (N)	xx	-	x	xx	x
65, Village sub-division	-	-	x	x	x
66, New villages for population growth	x	x	x	x	x
Transport, Communication, Power, etc.					
67, New hotel/guest house accommodation (a)	-	x	x	x	x
68, Feeder roads					
(a) Planning studies	x	x	x	x	x
(b) Improvement/Construction	x	x	x	x	x
69, Trunk road tarmac surfacing					
(a) Iringa-Dodoma (N)	x	-	-	-	-
(b) Makanbako-Songea (N)	-	-	x	-	-
70, Main road improvement	-	-	-	x	x
71, Improved air services (N) (a)	x	x	x	x	x
72, Tazara lorry fleet (N) (a)	-	x	x	x	x
73, Posts and Telecommunications improvement (N) (a)	x	x	x	x	x
74, Large-scale electricity supply studies (N)	x	-	x	-	-
75, Pilot village power projects (a)(b)	x	x	x	x	x

Table 7.1 (cont.)

VI Social Infrastructure

76. Primary school expansion	x	x	x	x	x
77. Technical workshop expansion	x	x	x	?	?
78. Adult education projects	?	?	?	?	?
79. Regional Newsheet/Bulletin (a)	x	x	x	x	x
80. RHC/Dispensary expansion	x	x	x	x	x
81. New District Hospital (a)	-	-	-	?	?
82. Community Health Planning, Nutrition and Statistics Project (N) (a)	x	x	x	x	x
83. Malaria eradication project (a)(b)	x	x	x	x	x
84. Village water supply (b)	x	x	xx	xx	xx
85. Major urban water supply project	x	-	-	-	-
86. Regional water quality laboratory (N) (a)	x	-	-	-	-
87. Multi-purpose district stadia (a)	-	x	x	x	x
88. Regional Museum	x	-	-	-	-
89. District community centre	-	x	-	-	-
90. Inter-village and touring sporting and cultural events (a)	x	x	x	x	-

VII Data and Planning Studies

91. Village development plans (a)	x	x	x	x	x
92. Farm management surveys (a)	x	x	x	x	x
93. Rural income/employment surveys (a)	x	x	x	x	x
94. District planning area studies (a)	x	x	x	x	x
95. Project programming and evaluation; training courses (N) (a)(b)	x	x	x	x	x
96. Regional planning; training courses (N) (a)(b)	x	x	x	x	x

Source: ODG/UNDP/FAO, 1976, Integrated Rural Development Proposals for the Third Five Year Plan, 1976-81, Iringa Region, (for UNDP/FAO), Norwich, Appendix I.1.

Notes: (a) A new or substantially modified proposal arising out of the ODG/UNDP/FAO Planning Team's work,
(b) Regional follow-up technical and/or capital assistance is envisaged or has already occurred,
(c) Author's extrapolation based on data provided in the design and other sources,
xx Indicates special emphasis to be given in this case,
N Indicates a national project,

1976-81. The list is comprised of 7 major groupings of the proposed projects, four of which are devoted to the productive sectors, namely crops, livestock, natural resources and industries. The remaining groupings consists of proposed projects for the development of the

production and social infrastructure, and data and planning studies. The proposed projects did not include cost estimates and therefore, it is not possible to quantitatively represent the sectoral prioritisation. This was considered a rational option given the paucity of data in the region. However, in number terms there were 96 proposed projects, of which 24 (or 25 per cent) were in agricultural production, 16 (or 16.7 per cent) in natural resources development, 5 (or 5.2 per cent) in industrial development, 30 (or 31.3 per cent) in production infrastructure, 15 (or 15.6 per cent) in social infrastructure and 6 (or 6.3 per cent) for generating planning information. [The total does not add up correctly due to rounding]. There is also spatial allocation of the projects, i.e. the projects were distributed in all districts. This was consistent with Tanzania's commitment to income distribution as espoused by its national development philosophy.

The common element for the agricultural production projects was the insistence in the design of *appropriate technology packages* for all crop and animal production enterprises based on an integrated farming systems approach. The rationale of this approach stems from the realisation that agriculture in Iringa region, as elsewhere in the country, is based on the small-scale multi-activity family farm. The family farm produces various crop and animal products chiefly to meet both subsistence and cash income needs. Accumulated experience has taught the small producer to adopt this mode of production in order not only to meet his household food requirements, but also to "hedge against the risk of any one activity failing on account of

natural or man-induced hazards, to spread the use of overhead resources, such as oxen, over a wider range of activities, and to exploit the complementary relationships between certain activities e.g. the interplanting of a nitrogen-fixing legume in a cereal crop as in the case of maize interplanted with beans" (ibid:9.1-2).

In this way the architects of the design underlined the crux of understanding the rationale and potentialities of the peasant farming systems in the region so as to come up with appropriate and viable production techniques which are acceptable and adoptable by the farming community. Moreover, the RIDEP proposals correctly identified the fact that villagisation of the rural people in the nucleated settlements created an urgent need to develop more intensive farming systems. This is because the possibilities for shifting agriculture were rapidly becoming limited, and good farming land near the settlements in a nucleated village would over time become scarce.

The design decried the advanced technology employed under the then National Maize Programme - a World Bank/USAID assisted programme - pivoted around artificial fertilisers, capital-intensive irrigation projects, alternate husbandry with livestock on grass leys, etc as inappropriate, costly to both the individual farmer and society, and consequently unsustainable even on the short-term period (ibid:4&9). Thus, the design envisaged an intermediate technology, which stressed "low-cost sources of nutrients from interplanted legumes, nitrogen-fixing cereal varieties, rotations and composting; water conservation by mulching, trash lines, green manuring, etc and micro-scale irrigation" (ibid:9.3). In a nutshell, the appropriate technology

Table 7.2: The Proposed Farming Systems by Planning Area in Iringa Region.

Planning Area (Crop Ecological Zone)	Main Cropping Systems	Livestock	Irrigated or Village Crops
1. The High Rainlands Zone	<u>Tea</u> (a), <u>maize</u> , beans or <u>Pyrethrum</u> , <u>maize</u> or <u>wheat</u> , peas, Irish potatoes or <u>Arabica coffee</u> , <u>maize</u> , beans	Dairy cattle	Temperate vegetables Temperate fruit trees
2. The Upper Plateaux	<u>Maize</u> , sunflower, beans, soya	Dairy cattle	Temperate vegetables
3. The Medium Dry Intermediate Zone	<u>Virginia tobacco</u> , <u>maize</u> , beans, soya, groundnuts or <u>Maize</u> , beans, finger millet, oilseeds, cowpeas	Beef cattle, goats	Maize vegetables
4. The Dry Northern Fringe	Sorghum, finger millet, cassava, pigeon peas, castor, onion	Beef <u>cattle</u>	Rice, sugar, tropical vegetables and fruits
5. The Lake Nyasa Shoreline	Cashew, bananas, sweet potatoes	<u>Fishing</u>	Rice, sugar, tropical vegetables and fruits

Source: ODG/UNDP/FAO, 1976, Integrated Rural Development Proposals for Third Five Year Plan, 1976-81, Vol. 2, Table 9.1.1, p. 9.4.

Note: (a) The dominant crops or activities in the system are underlined.

packages and the integrated farming systems would fit into place in the agro-economic zones of the region as shown in Table 7.2).

The key element of this approach was the need to achieve an integration of farm activities and resources in order to increase agricultural production without depending too much on a foreign

inappropriate technology. However, the design did attach considerable importance to 'R & D' (research and development) activities, which would enable marriage of old and new experiences and knowledge for better results (ibid:17.87-96). Maize was given greatest weight in the design, because of its significance as a major staple both in the region and country. Iringa is a major producer of maize in Tanzania, accounting for 15-30 per cent of marketed surplus during the 1960s, but production had significantly declined in the early 1970s due to very poor yields obtained from the Ismani area - a major maize-growing area in the region. Part of the cause of this decline in Ismani maize production can be attributed to the inappropriate technology used there: excessive monoculture of maize and tractorisation with resultant loss of plant nutrients, damage of soil structure and weeding problems. The ujamaisation of peasant production based on this technology exacerbated the degradation of the soils of Ismani.

The design, as noted above, did not attach targets for the cereals and oilseeds output for the end of the plan period, because, as it was claimed, of poor statistical basis. Nonetheless, in our view, this is a shortcoming as it leaves the end-situation fluid or indeterminate. To be sure, one appreciates the difficulty one faces when one has to plan targets from a weak data basis. Having studied the past trends of agricultural production in the region and bearing in mind their criticism of the regional authorities' targets as over-ambitious - a well placed criticism - the authors of the RIDEP proposals should have attempted to come up with more realistic targets in relation to their devised/proposed technological packages. (See

ibid:9.6-11, especially Table 9.2.1 for the criticism mentioned above).

Other crops, which were considered for increased endeavour under the RIDEP plan proposals, were as shown in Table 7.2. It is evident that both food and cash crops were given attention in the proposals. Clearly, the farming system approach to agricultural development was envisaged as indicated by the emphasis given to dominant crops or activities in each agro-ecological zone or planning area. Maize is also a cash crop for most of the smallholders in the region and the design took account of this reality as well. In the Kigoma RIDEP, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, maize was simply considered as a food crop, thus ignoring the significance of multiple objectives in the smallholder's farm activities.

The major cash crops of Iringa region are tea, tobacco and pyrethrum. Iringa region was (and still is) a major producer of tea in the country, producing about 23 per cent of national production during the period of the second five year plan, 1969-74 (ibid:4.54). In recent years Iringa's contribution to national tea production has been around 40.3 per cent (MDB, 1985:3-5; Agrar-und Hydrotechnik, 1986:14). In contrast to other regions, the private estate sector dominates the region's tea production. The RIDEP proposals envisaged limited expansion of the private sector in area and intensification through the use of supplementary irrigation and fertilisers. On smallholder production the proposals visualised its expansion as a sound policy, since it would create an opportunity of spreading a potentially high-income and profitable employment. However, the design emphasised the

need for increasing producer prices and lowering production costs, especially those of artificial fertilisers through reduction of application rates according to research-based economic recommendations, if available, or by 50 per cent in the wake of the quadrupling of fertiliser prices in 1973/74.

On pyrethrum the RIDEF proposals centred on the proposed Technical Assistance Project for Pyrethrum, which was to be funded by UNDP/FAO. The project entailed undertaking a commercially oriented pyrethrum breeding programme and field extension activity to increase production in the region (and also in the neighbouring region of Mbeya, another major pyrethrum producing area). The project aimed at expanding and improving the bulking programme of high-yielding and nematode-free clones which would grow suitably in different areas, establishing and improving the supply of seeds of high-yielding planting material to farmers, improving the delivery of extension services, etc. Regarding the area to be expanded under smallholder pyrethrum, the RIDEF proposals modified the target of 30,000 ha by 1979/80 set out by the regional authorities for the third five year plan to 26,000 ha which would enable the region to produce about 10,000 metric tons by that time.

The RIDEF proposals envisaged the introduction of price incentives as imperative in order to boost production in the region and country. At the time pyrethrum production was declining and therefore, the architects of the RIDEF plan viewed it necessary to arrest this situation, especially when it was planned to establish another extracting plant in the country. In the event, the plant was

Table 7.3: Medium and Large-scale Irrigation Projects

Irrigation Project	District	River or Water Source	Irrigable Area (hectares)
1. The Kimande Scheme	Iringa	Little Ruaha	6,000
2. The Manda Project	Ludewa(a)	Ruhuhu/L. Nyasa	1,000 (plus 2,000 in Ruvuma)
3. The Igasiwalafu Project	Ludewa(a)	Ruhuhu	5,000
4. The Mtera Reservoir	Iringa	Great Ruaha	7,000 + (plus 14,000 + in Dodoma)
Total irrigable area in Iringa Region			19,000 +
Total irrigable area in adjoining Regions			16,000 +

Source: ODG/UNDP/FAO, 1976, Integrated Rural Development Proposals for Third Five Year Plan, 1976-81, Vol.2, Table 17.3.1, p. 17.58.

Note: (a) This area is in Ludewa district since the administrative division of Njombe district Njombe and Ludewa districts in mid-1976. Njombe was again divided into two districts of Njombe and Makete districts in mid-1977.

established at Mafinga in Iringa region, although the proposals recommended that it be established in Mbeya town for reasons of ideal location, since one-third of Tanzania's pyrethrum production came from that region, and it had good infrastructural facilities and good supply of local labour. [The plant started operations in April 1982. Currently, it operates at only 22 per cent capacity].

Regarding increased tobacco production in the region, the proposals enjoined the regional authorities about the importance of cost economies. The production of the crop was excessively dependent on artificial fertilisers, especially phosphate; the standard recommendation then was 15 bags of NPK compound per hectare, valued at Tshs 2,250 at 1974/75 prices, could hardly be affordable by the

majority of smallholder producers. The main problem was the monoculture production of tobacco which caused a relatively fast deterioration of soil nutrients, and therefore, the design proposed to establish an appropriate technology which would embody crop rotations, fallowing and integrated crop/livestock farming systems (see Table 7.2, p. 358). This prescription, especially for the smallholder tobacco growers, was, in our view, correct, even if the region had adequate supply of the two factors of tobacco production (water and fuelwood). Furthermore, the design recommended the institutionalisation of appropriate pricing and credit policies which would provide sufficient incentives to the farmers.

The proposals correctly called for expanded production of oilseeds as important crops in peasant agriculture for both earning cash incomes and their crucial role in crop rotation. These were sunflower, groundnuts, castor, sesame and soyabeans. Other crops planned to be given attention were Arabica coffee, Irish potatoes and cashewnuts. Arabica coffee and Irish potatoes were planned to be expanded in the high altitude areas of the region. The former as an alternative source of cash incomes, while the latter as both a subsistence and cash crop. Cashewnuts were considered a useful cash crop for the people living in the Lake Nyasa shoreline zone (see Table 7.2).

On irrigated agriculture, the proposals accorded priority to smallholder irrigation as distinct from medium and large scale irrigation projects. The reason for selecting this option was simply the fearsome capital and manpower outlays that such scale entails. Moreover, although in theory the presence of several river systems in

Table 7.4: Small-scale Irrigation Project Sites in Iringa Region

Projects (a)	Irrigable Areas (hectare)
1. Mapogoro - Tungamalenga	1,200
2. Milova	600
3. Mdoila - Magana	2,000
4. Mahenge	1,200
5. Njanzwa	800
6. Luganga	400
7. Mbuyuni	1,000
8. Idodi	800
9. Kalenga	200
10. Chimala	400
11-16. Six unidentified projects, assumed average size 300 ha	1,800
Total irrigable area	10,400

Source: ODG/UNDP/FAO, 1976, *Integrated Rural Development Proposals for the Third Five Year Plan, 1976-81, Vol.2, Table 17.3.2, p. 17.63*

Note: (a) This list includes projects started before the Appraisal period. At appraisal of the Iringa RIDEP there was a crash irrigation programme which was largely precipitated by the 1972-74 drought that hit most parts of the country including Iringa region.

the region offers a substantial opportunity for irrigated agriculture, actual potential is somewhat limited. The reasons include necessary demand of water in neighbouring regions or for other crucial uses (e.g. the Kidatu Hydro-electric Power Project) and lack or limited irrigable land due to topographical configuration. In all, the proposals identified one large- and three medium-scale irrigation projects (see Table 7.3) for development after feasibility studies had been undertaken to determine their economic viability. At the time of design the Region had identified and started implementing ten small-scale irrigation schemes. Table 7.4 presents details of these schemes which received support from the ODG/UNDP team. Map 7.3 shows

Map 7.3: Iringa Region: Large, Medium and Small-scale Irrigation Projects




Table 7.5: Livestock production priorities according to agro-ecological zones (a)

Zone 1A High Rainlands Zones	Mufindi Scarp-top) Dairying
	Dabaga Uplands) Beef fattening
	Ukinga Highlands) Beef breeding (exotics)
) Poultry
) Wool sheep

Zone 1B	Sub-Scarp Mufindi) Dairying
	Eastern Ubena) Beef fattening
	North-east Iringa) Poultry

Zone 2 Higher Plateau Zone	Ubena Plateau) Beef growing/fattening
	Central Mufindi) Beef breeding
	Mufindi Plateau) Meat sheep
	North Njombe Plateau) Goats
	Upangwa) Poultry

Zone 3 Medium-dry Intermediate Zone	Ruhuhu Basin) Beef breeding (indigenous)
	North Njombe Rim) Beef growing
	Western Mufindi Rim) Meat sheep
	Central Iringa Corridor) Goats
	Ismani Plains) Poultry

Zone 4 Dry Northern Fringe	North-west Iringa) Beef breeding (indigenous)
	(outside National Park)) Meat sheep
) Goats
) Poultry

Source: ODG/UNDP/FAO, 1976, Integrated Rural Development Proposals for the Third Five Year Plan, 1976-81, Vol. 2, Table 10.1.1, p. 10.2.

Note: (a) See Map 7.2 for the location of the agro-ecological zones.

the proposed sites of large, medium and small-scale irrigation projects in Iringa region.

The technical assistance team, however, insisted rightly on carrying out improvements in the organisation of the water supply and construction of the canals of the small-scale irrigation schemes so as to minimise wastage. The schemes operated in the day only and at night the water was left to run off instead of being collected in reservoirs and thus use it in the following or any other day. The team also recommended that in future emphasis should be on micro-irrigation

schemes ranging from 10-50 ha which are compatible with much lower cost outlays than those then prevailing in the region. The focus was on single village schemes for ease and simplicity of management and supervision. On the side of crops to be grown under irrigation, the proposals envisaged the production of sugar cane, maize, paddy, fruits and vegetables. A two-crop pattern per year was recommended for both paddy and maize. The design also envisaged small-scale sugar production for local consumption.

Since irrigation is a technical activity, the proposals included recommendations for training and recruitment of skilled irrigation manpower. At the time such manpower was in short supply in the country. These experts would undertake technical design and management of the schemes in the region.

Turning to livestock development, the RIDEP proposals envisaged a three-thrust livestock development strategy based on the traditional herd. Firstly, there would be the state and parastatal institutions, secondly, ujamaa villages and thirdly, individual family enterprises, all of which would participate in bringing about increased output in the sector. At the operational level, the strategy entailed focusing at improving the livestock extension services and developing directly productive projects to raise output. This emphasis was both desirable and appropriate as the improvement of animal health was conditional for maintaining production let alone raising it. The extension services were to concentrate on improving and strengthening the animal disease control services and raising the livestock peasants' awareness of improved husbandry and management techniques.

The design intended productive activities to focus on the use of improved breeds and new technology in order to achieve better results. Table 7.5 presents information on livestock production activities according to agro-ecological zones, whilst Table 7.6 summarises the proposed livestock projects according to priority ranking.

From the information presented in these two tables, it is evident that the design hoped to increase output of livestock and poultry products, namely, beef, mutton, goat meat, pork, milk, chicken meat, and eggs. The aim was to enable the people to improve the nutritional value of their food and earn cash incomes. Table 7.6 further presents an analysis of investment both in capital and recurrent expenditures and internal rate of return (IRR). For most of the projects the IRRs were quite attractive or rather generous, given the husbandry and management problems and inadequate supplies of livestock and poultry feeds coupled with distribution problems which were even then prevalent. The proposals anticipated, however, that the provision and improvement of the livestock in the first phase would create a framework conducive for the launching and sustaining of the productive activities. This would take place as a result of the fine-tuning and sequencing of the planned activities.

The proposals concerned itself with the development of forestry in order to provide the rural population with fuelwood, timber and building poles. At the time PMO had approved the Region's planting programme of 2,300 ha for fuelwood, poles and timber requirements. The design, however, recommended correctly that this entire area be devoted to plantings to meet fuelwood and building pole needs of the

Table 7.6: Priority ranking for the livestock projects for the Third Five Year Plan, 1976-81. (Tshs'000)

Project	Investment Cost(a)	Recurrent Cost(a)	Net Benefits(b)	Internal Rate of Return(%) (c)	Priority Ranking(d)	Risk Factor(e)
1, Mufindi DDC Beef Ranch	8,887.3	2,848.8	4,458.0	12	3	Moderate
2, DDC Beef Growing-out Ranch	7,465.0	1,424.0	1,025.0	7	2	Low
3, Kitulo Dairy Farm	2,078.7	3,090.8	(158)	10	1	Moderately low
4, Smallholder Dairy Project	945.0	892.0	173.2	14	1	Low
5, Mufindi DDC Poultry Unit	222.8	771.0	238.5	18	5	Very high
Ujamaa Villages(f)						
6, Poultry Units	800.0	3,981.0	1,334.0	50	3	High
7, Beef Ranches	1,219.5	1,685.0	(295.0)	9	4	Moderate
8, Dairy Farms	2,599.2	1,790.4	594.0	14	3	Moderately high
9, Goat Ranches	277.5	290.1	5.1	11	4	Moderate
Subtotal	24,495.0	16,773.1	7,374.8	-	-	-
Infrastructure Projects						
10, Dipping Programme					2	
11, Animal Health Task Force	647.7	874.8	-	-	2	
12, Livestock Improvement and Health Centres	647.7	874.8	-	-	2	
Subtotal	1,295.4	1,749.6	-	-	-	-
Total	25,790.4	18,522.7	7,374.8	-	-	-

Source: ODG/UNDP/FAO, 1976, Integrated Rural Development Proposals for the Third Five Year Plan, 1976-81, Vol. 2, Table 10.1, p. 10.23.


- Notes:
- Investment and recurrent costs incurred during the period of the Third Five Year Plan.
 - Sales revenue minus recurrent costs for five year period.
 - The internal rate of return was calculated for the full period of each project. For ujamaa village programmes the IRR was for each individual project.
 - UNDP recommended priority ranking.
 - UNDP judgment on approximate risk ranking. This was taken into account with priority ranking e.g. a project with a high IRR may have had high risk ranking and so merited only a ranking order of 3.
 - Investment, recurrent costs and net benefits for village projects represent aggregates of individual projects in each programme. The IRR was for each individual project.

rural population. In particular, it insisted that attention should be paid to meet fuelwood demand of the Virginia tobacco growers and villagers who had no or inadequate nearby forests. The design also recommended increasing the area (estimated to be over 2,000 ha in 1972/73) of wattle out-growers in central and southern Njombe District. Unfortunately, the proposals did not set up a quantitative target for this effort.

On fisheries the proposals were somewhat less forthcoming in providing recommendations for increased fish output in the region at the regional level. The Lake Nyasa fishing projects and even the proposed Lake Mtera scheme were considered as national projects, although the Region would benefit from spin-offs, etc. However, the proposals did recommend that the regional fisheries staff do concentrate their energies on ensuring that the village fish ponds already constructed and planted with fish attain their production potential.

The design, after correctly noting the under-utilisation of the game and tourist facilities in the region, recommended the development of a complementary southern game-viewing circuit which would become operational only after full capacity utilisation has been reached in the northern tourist facilities. The southern circuit would include Northern Selous Game Reserve, Mikumi and Ruaha National Parks (see Map 7.4).

As a final point in this section a brief discussion is made on the design's rationale in attaching importance to the development of the rural production infrastructure in the region. Table 7.7 summarises



Source: ODG/UNDP/FAO, 1976, Integrated Rural Development Proposals for the Third Five Year Plan, Map 13 (For details of Phase I, see Tourism in Tanzania, 2 vol., Arthur D. Little, inc. 1971)

Table 7.7: The hierarchical organisation of rural production infrastructure inputs to provided under the Iringa RIDEP.

Planning Level	Plan Document	Production Infrastructure Inputs
1. Region	Regional Development Plan(a)	Technical Assistance Team Rural Development Manpower Training
2. District	District Development Summary	Feeder Roads Units District Agro-service Centre Medium-level Manpower Training 'Zonal' Agro-service Centres Farmer Training
3. District Planning Area (crop-ecological zone)	DPA Rural Development Plan(a)	
4. Ward	Ward Development Summary	Ward Agro-service Centres Feeder Roads Crop-collection/distribution centres Advisory Staff Transport
5. Village	Village Development Plan(a)	Advice on Cooperative Organisation Small-scale Processing Plants Village Power Systems Multi-purpose Water Projects Farm Planning
6. Farms (i)Ujamaa Farm (ii)Block Farms (iii)Family Farms	Ujamaa Farm Plan	Demonstrations of innovatory enterprises Seasonal Inputs Animal-powered Mechanisation Tractor Hire Service

Source: ODG/UNDP/FAO, 1976, Integrated Rural Development Proposals for Third Five Year Plan, 1976-81, Table 16.1.1, p. 16.3.

Note: (a) The region, district planning area and village were the three key areas where higher level planning inputs were required.

the RIDEP's proposals for instituting a rural production infrastructure, village power systems and multi-purpose water schemes. This was a useful consideration, since critical levels of infrastructure are necessary to enable rural production to take place and to be sustained.

Moreover, the RIDEP design underlined the significance of tackling deficiencies in the human resources aspect (i.e. the adequacy

of official advisory services and the levels of managerial and technical competence of the villagers themselves) alongside the improvement of the physical inputs e.g. agro-service centres, feeder roads, warehouses, etc. To underscore the importance of the integrated approach to provision of physical and managerial and technical inputs for grassroots development, the design envisaged additional technical assistance staff to work in the region during the first phase of the project. Significantly, the design recommended that these staff should be integrated into the existing government organisational structure and be responsible to the Regional Development Director (ibid:16.3-4).

The proposals did not provide estimates of investment for the district agro-service centres, but provide them for the ones at the farming zone and ward levels. The agro-service centres were organised on a hierarchy with district centres at the top of the pyramid, whilst the ward centres formed the base of the pyramid. Sixteen agro-service centres were proposed to be established at the planning area/farming zone level at total investment and operating costs of Tshs 4.2 million, whereas 56 ward agro-service centres were to be established at total investment and operating costs of Tshs 3.6 million. An agro-service centre would perform functions that include crop and livestock production and farm mechanisation (largely oxenisation) support activities.

An important element in the provision of production infrastructure was the recognition of the need for the constitution of a multi-disciplinary farming systems research team. The team would be

charged, among others, with the function of undertaking research activities which produce recommendations fine-tuned and specific to the peasant agriculture of the region. In particular, the team would adopt a farming systems approach that would integrate different crops into inter-cropping, multi-cropping and rotation systems; crop and livestock activities into whole farm systems; ujamaa and family farms and irrigated and non-irrigated agriculture and technical, economic and social aspects into all recommendations and solutions.

On the other production infrastructure details can be noted in Table 7.1, pp. 352-5. We need to mention here the feeder roads programme envisaged in the design, because of its significance to the rural economy, particularly in the areas of marketing, produce collection and distribution of farm inputs and consumer goods. Moreover, the design correctly asserted that the feeder road network programme was a key component of integrated rural development planning (*ibid*:21.5). It is common practice for national crop development projects (e.g. tea, tobacco, forestry, etc) to include a component for road network construction. The proposals proposed new feeder roads to be constructed in eastern Mufindi District as a matter of high priority in order to open up the area of expanding human settlement and where pyrethrum could be a major enterprise.

The other area was the eastern Njombe District so as to link it more directly with the TAZARA (Tanzania-Zambia) railway. This area was envisaged for a major development of key cash crops i.e. coffee, tea and pyrethrum. A road linking the famous fruit and vegetable growing Dabaga area with Mngeta, the TAZARA station in Kilombero District, was

seen as desirable inasmuch as it was part of the southern tourist circuit (see above). Most of the produce from the Dabaga area, however, finds its way to the Iringa town, in which markets and a processing plant are located and therefore, the Dabaga-Mngeta road was not considered a priority.

7.3 Evaluation of the planning methodology, design and its appropriateness

As noted, the Iringa RIDEP plan proposals had a definitive planning methodology designed and used by its architects (see ODG/UNDP/FAO, 1976:27.1-14 and Belshaw, 1979). The key element in this planning methodology was viewed as a continuous or iterative process. Although the RIDEP plan was a single shot, blueprint-document type undertaking, its adoption and observance would have made it an appropriate tool for the design of palliatives of grassroots problems. The ODG/UNDP team's RIDEP proposals were designed with a view to experimenting on them to test the hypothetical formulations about solutions of rural development problems confronting the rural people. In this way, the ODG/UNDP proposals were markedly different from the RIDEP plans of both Kigoma and Tanga regions which espoused the "correctness" of their assumptions to such an extent that they, in some ways, constrained their implementation and consequently affected their accomplishments (see Chapters 5 and 6). In our view, the ODG/UNDP approach to designing a RIDEP was appropriate at the time, given (a) the paucity of data, then a prevalent problem, and (b) the

decentralised system of government administration was just being fitted into place and naturally, planning experience, let alone integrated planning experience, was still in its infancy and (c) the villagisation programme was taking place in the region.

The RIDEP proposals were built appropriately around a strategy which took account of both growth and equity objectives. They identified the imperative of increasing overall regional output in the productive sectors, especially in the agricultural sector for both food consumption and income. The proposals clearly elevated the region's agriculture as the leading sector in the rural economy. The proposals did not quantify the targets, because, as noted above, there was a separate "plan" which had over-optimistic and unrealistic targets. Nevertheless, the IRADEP Management and regional authorities set up targets for most of the IRADEP activities (see Tables 7.8, p. 380 and 7.9, p. 381) at the launching of the project implementation in 1977 just one year after the publication of the RIDEP proposals.

The RIDEP proposals in their general outlook were in agreement with the national development philosophy. The RIDEP planners' recognition of the need to formulate a strategy which embodied both growth and equity was in consonance with the Tanzanian development philosophy. They even went further to show their concern over the concentration of meagre resources on a few ujamaa villages, even if these were (are still) regarded as sacrosanct by the Tanzanian authorities for ideological reasons. This concern, in our opinion, was well placed. One cannot simply condone misuse or wastage of scarce resources. In any case, the concentration of resources on a few

villages was also antithetical to the very fabric of the Tanzanian development philosophy, whose main tenets include equality and self-reliance (see Nyerere, 1968:231-250). Such selective intervention would create an inequality for no consistent reason.

The planning methodology was particularly appropriate in its design and application of the concept of planning areas. Its significance is not only in designing and implementing appropriate plans for relevant and specific areas, but also in creating a framework for grassroots involvement. To be sure, the RIDEP proposals themselves had very little grassroots input, save for the close consultations between the regional officials and the ODG/UNDP experts. In fact, in our understanding, there was a marked flow and exchange of ideas between some local experts/officials and the technical assistance team when preparing the Iringa RIDEP proposals which make them somewhat different from the other two RIDEPs.² Nonetheless, this should not make us lose sight of this crucial point of participatory planning. It should be pointed out that, although the recommendation on reorganising the boundaries of the wards and divisions to be in agreement with the agro-economic zones was ignored by the regional authorities for cultural and customary reasons³, one cannot resist the temptation to lament that an opportunity was wasted, because advantages of implementing the recommendation in both economic (or specifically agricultural) planning and implementation, and ward/divisional administration were immense.

Of further interest, the RIDEP design insisted on adopting a farming systems approach to agricultural planning and implementation

particularly at the village level and the imperative to follow a three-pronged thrust approach in raising farm output in the region. It stipulated that ujamaa farms, family farms and private medium and large-scale farming activities should be encouraged. Equally significant was the recommendation to mount integrated research activities specific for the region's environment, agriculture and natural resources.

By and large, the RIDEF proposals appear to be capable of achieving increased outputs in the productive sectors and particularly in agriculture. The technological packages proposed in the RIDEF plan were sufficiently appropriate to the level of peasant production in the region. The proposals decried the use of artificial fertilisers as the only technology in raising peasant agricultural output, with which we are in agreement, for reasons of cost escalation both at the farm and national level (the latter especially because of the foreign exchange costs/implications). Thus, they offered instead low-cost technologies as the basis for increased agricultural output.

Since no benchmarks or levels of output were set at appraisal or at the time of writing of the RIDEF plan, there is very little one can say regarding the efficacy of the low-cost technologies (green manuring, rotations, mulching, composting, nitrogen-fixing legumes, etc.) to achieve set targets. Obviously, the proposals were simply concerned with raising farm-level outputs, since there was still enormous potential to tap. While this was true, certain areas and crops definitely needed additional plant nutrients, richly available from artificial fertilisers. In any case, some of the low-cost

technologies were in common use or application in most parts of the region and therefore, one understands that they had only marginal appeal to both the bureaucracy and peasants. This was so, because the proposals were wary of the prices of fertilisers (especially of nitrogen) which had quadrupled in 1973/74 as a result of the OPEC oil price hikes. As we shall see later in this chapter, artificial fertilisers and high-yielding varieties were in fact to play a crucial role in increasing agricultural production in the region during the period under review.

7.4 Extent of implementation of the RIDEP objectives and targets

It has been noted already in the preceding sections that the donor agency, the EEC, decided to fund only a small component of the ODG/UNDP team's RIDEP proposals. And this concerned agricultural, road and forestry projects. The discussion in this section will review the extent of the implementation of these projects and as well as the infrastructural projects which comprise the IRADEP. It should be noted here that no evidence can be traced on what basis the IRADEP projects for the Phase I (1977-81) were selected from the broad ODG/UNDP proposals (Table 7.1, pp. 352-5), since no appraisal document appears to have been made (Agrar-und Hydrotechnik, 1986:4).⁴ Nonetheless, Table 7.8, which shows also the IRADEP selected projects for implementation beginning in July 1977, presents the IRADEP targets and accomplishments during the Phase I period. Table 7.9 shows targets and achievements during Phase II, 1982-86. It is evident that the IRADEP

Table 7.8: Targets and Accomplishments of the IRADEP during Phase I (1977-81)

Activity/Project	Appraisal targets (1977)	Achievements	
		Quantity	% (1977 targets)
1, Training of extension workers	210	165	78.6
2, Procurement and distribution of inputs (tons)			
- fertilisers	9,200	9,360	101.7
- seed	1,000	265	26.5
3, Ox-training centres (OTCs)			
- construction/improvement	13	13	100.0
- construction of ox-training units	200	117	58.5
- train farmers in ox-cultivation and training	1,050	1,850	176.2
- train oxen (pairs)	12,000	9,060	75.5
- train farmers in using oxen	unspecified	9,000	-
- sell ox-implements	unspecified	4,000	-
- establish rural workshops at OTCs	unspecified	12	-
- establish centre of draught animal implements	1	1	100.0
4, Production of pyrethrum			
- establish nurseries	13	13	100.0
- expand area under pyrethrum (ha)	8,600	2,560	29.8
- construct pyrethrum driers	5	5	100.0
5, Irrigation			
- rehabilitation of irrigation canals	15	10	66.7
6, Dairy units			
- establish dairy units in villages	10	10	100.0
7, Poultry keeping			
- renovate one hatchery	1	1	100.0
- order parent stock (2x220)	1	1	100.0
8, Tree-planting-establish nurseries	13	13	100.0
9, Buildings			
- build village godowns	60	45	75.0
- build extension staff houses	108	98	90.7
- build workshops	4	5	125.0
10, Roads/bridges - rehabilitation (km)	3,400	1,180	34.7
11, Livestock services			
- construct/renovate dips	130	90	69.2
- construct dip testing centres	10	4	40.0
- construct veterinary centres	2	2	100.0

Source: Various IRADEP progress reports, Regional Commissioner's Office, Iringa.

Table 7.9: Targets and Achievements of IRADEP during Phase II, 1982-86.

Project/Activity	Targets (1982)	Achievements	
		Quantity	% (1982 targets)
1, Recruitment and posting of extension workers (AFAs)	100	151	151.0
2, Farm inputs (tons)			
- fertilisers	6,800	7,400	109.0
- seeds	930	200	21.5(a)
3, Oxenisation			
- new OTCs	4	3	75.0
- rehabilitation of OTCs	14	13	92.9
- distribution(b) of implements	3,550	1,600	45.1
ox-carts	unspecified	250	-
4, Irrigation			
- small-scale schemes	15	12	80.0
- feasibility/design studies for medium-scale irrigation schemes	unspecified	1	-
5, Livestock			
- Dairy units	9	8	88.9
- Dip testing centres	5	4	80.0
- Veterinary centres	2	1	50.0
- Dips - rehabilitation	100	66	66.0
- Dips - new	30	7	23.3
- Veterinary drugs (Tshs million)	unspecified	4.1	-
6, Reforestration (nurseries)	unspecified	38(c)	-
7, Buildings			
- godowns(d) (units)	30	14	46.7
- staff houses (units)	52	33	63.5
- workshops (units)	1	1	100.0(e)
- pyrethrum driers (units)	10	-	-
8, Roads/Bridges			
- roads (km)-rehabilitation	800	689	86.1
- roads (km)-maintenance	600	300	50.0
- bridges (concrete 3-30 m)	unspecified	13	-
- bridges (timber 3-15 m)	unspecified	13	-
- culverts (box)	unspecified	7	-
- drifts (concrete)	unspecified	18	-
9, Mechanical workshop (Ruaha)	1	1	100.0

Source: Agrar-und Technik (AHT), 1986, IRADEP: Annual and Financial Report for 1985/86, pp. iii-iv.

Notes: (a) Low supply due to unavailability of seed from TANSEED.

(b) Credit scheme through TRDB, which was transformed in 1984 into the CRDB (Cooperative and Rural Development Bank) a joint venture of the Government and Cooperative Unions of Tanzania.

(c) A yearly production of 1 million seedlings by 1986.

(d) Capacity of these godowns was not specified.

(e) For Makete District and sited at Makete town.

comprised many fewer projects than the original RIDEP plan as exemplified by Table 7.1. Our discussion on the extent of implementation of the IRADEP will centre on these two tables. Achievements, in addition to being shown in physical outputs, have also been calculated as percentages in order to clearly demonstrate the envisaged changes.

In terms of physical outputs, the IRADEP implementation results are good. Naturally, some people would like to see 100 per cent achievement of the targets, but, in our view, anything above 75 per cent is good and results below 40 per cent are seriously deficient. To be sure, such a stand is simply based on rule-of-thumb decision-taking. Its justification, however, will become apparent in the paragraphs which follow. Suffice to say here that implementation of the various components of the IRADEP encountered both extraneous and internal constraints which affected the final outcome. For example, the target for procurement and distribution of improved seed could not be met due to inadequate supplies at TANSEED. Shortages of building materials as discussed already (see Chapter 5, section 5.4, pp. 247-76) did affect the pace of construction activities and consequently the final outcome.

7.4.1 Management Structure and Monitoring and Evaluation Activities


The IRADEP management structure is an important factor in both the successes and the failures of the implementation phases. As noted, the RIDEP proposals had intended that the RIDEP plan would be managed

by the regional development directorate (i.e. by the regional management team, which is comprised of the RDD, as the Chairman, the staff officers and the regional functional managers. However, the executing agency (AHT) created a parallel management structure for the IRADEP. Chart 10 illustrates this management structure which is juxtaposed with the existing regional administrative structure. The IRADEP structure is on the right side of the chart, its command and communication links are signified by broken lines. The executive head of the IRADEP is the Project Manager who is responsible to the RDD at least on paper. The Administrator and the Regional Planner are his immediate assistants. The Administrator is responsible for all personnel and financial matters, while the Regional Planner is in charge of all planning, control, monitoring and evaluation activities of the project.

The Project Manager is also assisted by seven sectoral experts as shown in Chart 10: the Irrigation/Construction Engineer, Extension Agronomist, Pyrethrum Agronomist, Livestock Expert/Veterinarian, Oxenisation Expert, Mechanical Engineer and Land Use Planner. All these, including the project manager, administrator and regional planner, were expatriates. The chart shows the management structure as for the period 1984-86. During the period 1982-84 there were 10 expatriate experts over and above the top three position holders. The structure similar to this one was also in place during the first phase, 1977-81. They were also supporting staff working for the project and these were Tanzanian citizens.

An IRADEP attempt to establish an M&E system in 1982 as a regular

Chart 10: The Organisational Structure of the Tringa RIDEP.



LEGEND

- - - - RIDEP command/communication links

_____ Regional Administration command/communication links

management component of the project was not successful because of "a statement by the donor institution that, for the time being, no additional funds could be made available for M&E purposes" (AHT, 1982:3). And this was during the second phase, 1982-86, thus, demonstrating that the first phase, 1977-82, had passed without any M&E activity being instituted. The AHT-commissioned study for the establishment of M&E system for the IRADEP recommended that the M&E activities concentrate on three tasks:-

- (i) Project activities/inputs
- (ii) Project performance as a result of (i) above and
- (iii) Project impact, i.e. the effects of the project performance on the target group/population (ibid.:3-4).

Moreover, the same study suggested the use of sample village and crop-cutting surveys as key instruments for the measurement of the project impact in the region. All this was, however, not undertaken by the project because the donor would not provide extra funds for this purpose. The project had thus to rely on its normal control and auditing activities as the basis for gauging progress of its various components. This was presumably a handicap and could be one of the causes of non-achievement of the IRADEP targets.

7.4.2 Agricultural production and productivity

In this section the discussion will concentrate on procurement and distribution of farm inputs (seed and fertilisers), production of pyrethrum, irrigation schemes, ox-training, dairy and poultry

programmes and tree planting activities. These activities were expected either directly or indirectly to bring about increased agricultural production.

(a) Improved seeds

IRADEP aimed at improving the supply and use of improved seeds in the region through procurement (from TANSEED and other sources) and their timely distribution to the farmers. During Phase I the project planned to procure and distribute 1,000 tons of hybrid and composite maize seed. In the event, the project was able to procure and distribute only 265 tons of these improved varieties for the whole period of 4 years. This is equal to 26.5 per cent of the total envisaged amount at the commencement of implementation of the project. This poor performance is attributed to inadequate supplies with the national organisation, TANSEED, which distributes improved seed in the country.

During the second phase, 1982-86, IRADEP was able to purchase and distribute only 200 tons of seed or 21.5 per cent of the original target of 930 tons. The same story is the cause of non-achievement of the original target, in spite of the fact that TANSEED was paid in advance. Even the Project Management's attempt in 1984 to order 100 tons of SR maize seed (hybrid maize) from Zimbabwe for the 1984/85 season had little luck. The consignment was held up for six weeks in Victoria Falls for unknown reasons and by the time it was eventually delivered at the Makambako TAZARA station, there was very little

time left for distribution to the farmers. The seed, therefore, had to be sold to TANSEED who sold it elsewhere in the country.

b) Fertilisers

The project intended to purchase and distribute 9,200 tons of fertilisers during the first phase and actual implementation saw almost 2 per cent over and above the original target. The second phase also saw an overfulfilment of the planned targets, despite problems in the transportation of the fertilisers from Tanga or Dar es Salaam and the fact that no fertiliser was purchased in the agricultural year 1985/86. During the period under review 7,400 tons had been procured and distributed by IRADEP as opposed to 6,800 tons originally planned i.e. a surplus of 600 tons or 9 per cent of the original target. It should be noted that in June 1984 the Government had lifted subsidies on maize flour and fertilisers, so that the price of fertilisers had jumped from Tshs 100 per 50 kg-bag in 1983/84 season to Tshs 350 per bag in 1984/85 agricultural year, that is 3.5 times. Iringa is one of the priority regions in the nation's food strategy campaign (initiated in 1981/82) and therefore, it has received relatively more fertiliser and seed (maize hybrids and composites) supplies than ordinarily would have been the case, that is, Iringa farmers had more supplies than their counterparts elsewhere in the country.

(c) Production of pyrethrum

The project assisted the Tanganyika Pyrethrum Board (TPB) with an adviser, transport equipment and funds for extension, nurseries and drying tests. The achievements were 100 per cent for both nurseries and driers (see Table 7.8, p. 380). The 10 driers, which were to be constructed with IRADEP funds during Phase II, were never implemented, because the project had decided in 1984 to stop its assistance to the TPB due to loss of interest of the peasants in growing pyrethrum as a cash crop. Expansion of pyrethrum-grown area did not materialise as planned, for reasons stated above. Only 29.8 per cent of the original target was achieved, quite a poor performance. However, this performance must be seen against the unfavourable extraneous preconditions, including prices as discussed in Chapter 4, pp. 131-44.

Traditionally, pyrethrum has been grown by farmers in high altitude areas where there are limited opportunities for other cash crops. In recent years, farmers in these areas are increasingly growing maize and Irish potatoes as both food and cash crops.

Moreover, producer prices have slightly declined between 1979/80 and 1986/87 (in 1985/86 constant prices), so that pyrethrum compares unfavourably with these food crops (MDB, 1986:1, 15).

Nevertheless, pyrethrum still flourishes well in Matamba Division of Makete, which accounts for 70 per cent of of the total area under pyrethrum in the region (totalling about 5,000 ha) and for 80 per cent of the regional production. The area is ideal for pyrethrum: altitude (above 2,200 m above sea level), climate

Table 7.10: IRADEP-assisted smallholder irrigation schemes at June 1986 (at the end of Phase II)(a)

Scheme	District	Division	Actual Area (ha)	Potential Area (ha)
1. Nyanzwa	Iringa	Mahenge	60	150
2. Mgowero	Iringa	Mahenge	20	50
3. Mtandika	Iringa	Mahenge	65	120
4. Weru	Iringa	Kiponzelo	5	20
5. Kiponzelo	Iringa	Kiponzelo	20	100
6. Ulete	Iringa	Kiponzelo	20	40
7. Mgama	Iringa	Mlolo	20	60
8. Mbuyuni	Iringa	Mahenge	180	650
9. Kalenga	Iringa	Kalenga	120	250 (b)
10. Ugesa	Mufindi		5	20
11. Igomaa	Mufindi		5	120
12. Mfumbi	Makete		70	400

Total			590	1980

Source: Agrar-und Hydrotechnik, 1986, Annual and Financial Report 1985/86, Essen: AHT, Table 3.

Notes: (a) See Map 7.6 for location of the schemes

(b) IRADEP assistance started in 1985.

(rainfall above 1,200 mm per year and a usually high humidity) and soils are not too acidic and have a high humus content are near-perfect. Furthermore, the crop fits well into the existing farming system of the area - maize, sunflower and pyrethrum, proving the significance of the recommendations of the authors of the RIDEP proposals on the planning areas and a farming systems approach (*ibid*:8.1-9.7). In Matamba Division pyrethrum yields are good, averaging 250-270 kg/ha.


(d) Rehabilitation of smallholder irrigation schemes

The project envisaged assisting 15 smallholder irrigation schemes based on the proposals as shown in Table 7.4 (p. 364). Actual

implementation was carried out in only 10 schemes (see Map 7.5). In the latter phase the project continued with rehabilitation and even construction of new schemes in collaboration with the Regional Irrigation Unit (RIU). During this phase, 1982-86, the project had planned to assist 15 micro-irrigation schemes in feasibility studies, technical design and actual implementation (main diversion works, construction of main canals, etc.). In the event, IRADEP was able to accomplish 12 micro-irrigation schemes as shown in Table 7.10. In all 590 ha were made irrigable during the four-year period. This is equal to 80 per cent achievement and is an improvement of the previous phase. The original target did not include area to be brought under irrigation in the schemes, but according to the data presented in Table 7.10 the potential irrigable area is known to be around 2,000 ha. In other words, less than one third of this potential has been made irrigable through the assistance of the IRADEP during the eight years of its life.

This average to unsatisfactory performance of the irrigation schemes is blamed by the IRADEP management on irregular availability of construction materials (steel, cement and wood) and their excessively high prices especially in the open markets, and the villagers' reluctance to provide self-help. However, the most critical problem facing the irrigation schemes in the region is sedimentation, a phenomenon accentuated by the sandy structure of the catchments of most of the streams and rivers, especially in the drier parts of the region.

Map 7.5: Iringa Region: Small Scale Irrigation Schemes during IRADEP Phase II as at 30 June 1986



(e) Oxenisation

On the whole the oxenisation programme of the IRADEP had achieved very good results (Tables 7.8, p. 380 and 7.9, p. 381). One of the reasons for this *success* is that Iringa has some tradition in the use of draught animal power. Past efforts on oxenisation had left an indelible experience in the region. The other reason is that IRADEP offered farmers cash as an incentive to attend the ox-training and ox-cultivation courses. Needless to say that this was an odd way in luring peasants to adopt an innovation and surely it is unsustainable beyond the very short term. It was criticised by the evaluators⁵, because it was expensive. However, it proved to be effective on a short-term basis.

(f) Reforestation

As shown in Table 7.8 the project fulfilled its target. For the second phase no target was set, but at the end of the period 38 nurseries were established with a capacity to produce over one million seedlings per annum by 1986. This is a significant effort, because of the fact that some parts of the region are completely denuded of tree cover. One of these is the area of 40 km radius surrounding Iringa town. The main problems are fuelwood and building poles.

Twenty-nine of these tree nurseries were sited in the south of the region where the problem of poor tree cover is more critical than in the north. These nurseries have a total capacity of producing

800,000 seedlings per annum.

IRADEP efforts in raising seedlings in Iringa and Mufindi districts resulted in establishing 9 nurseries. In these IRADEP closely cooperated with the RNRO and DNROs, CONCERN and IFCD. These nurseries have a capacity of producing a total of 310,000 seedlings per year. Seedlings were mostly distributed to villages, schools, private individuals and institutions.

However, the Swazibed technique was used in raising the seedlings using paid labour and therefore, the tree-planting programme was very expensive. Villagers were hardly involved in the planning and implementation of this programme. Given the magnitude of this effort, it is desirable and, indeed, imperative that the beneficiaries are much more involved than hitherto. The emphasis on establishing woodlots for fuel and building poles, which at the same time provide tree cover to the concerned areas, was indeed well placed. It was as it had been recommended in the RIDEP proposals (ibid:11.8-10). Some tree/crop regimes have been initiated as part of the development of agro-forestry. Progress is still slow as villagers take time to learn, adopt and apply a new technique. Most progress seems to have taken place in the plots around the household residence.

At this point a summary on the discussion on the implementation of the IRADEP components for improved agricultural production is in order. The evidence from Iringa indicates that quite good results have been achieved in the implementation of the projects of this sector. In this respect, the Iringa project has attained more accomplishments than the Kigoma and Tanga RIDEPS, certainly much more than the latter.

True, some projects performed better than others, but overall this sector's projects achieved the majority of their original targets. One reason may be the size of the IRADEP when compared to the RIDEPS of Kigoma and Tanga. The IRADEP being small could be managed and guided much more easily than the RIDEPS. Secondly, the farming community in the region had prior knowledge and practice in new farming practices so that new technological packages were adopted more quickly than in the Kigoma region.

7.4.3 Infrastructural development

The discussion in this section concerns provision of production infrastructural facilities which include village godowns, feeder roads, veterinary facilities, extension houses and extension staff training and recruitment. This project component was seen as imperative in assisting the productive activities attain their potential, as had been pointed out in the RIDEP proposals. The aim of this section is to provide a discussion on the achievements as summarised in Tables 7.8 (p. 380) and 7.9 (p. 381).

(a) Buildings

IRADEP had planned to construct 60 village godowns, 108 extension staff houses and 4 workshops during Phase I. At the end of the implementation period accomplishments were 75, 90.7 and 125 per cent respectively. Construction of buildings for the second phase was

mostly undertaken during the first two project years so that by the end of the third year all structures had been completed. The exception was the Makete mechanical workshop which was completed during project year four. In terms of achievements of the IRADEP targets, the first phase fared a lot better than the second one. This was due to the decision made by IRADEP and the donor to de-emphasise the development of physical infrastructure. This decision was reached as a result of the recommendations made midway Phase II by an external planning mission which had been engaged by the executing agency to review the IRADEP activities (AHT, 1984). The Mission had recommended, among others, increased endeavour in directly productive activities with much more local and/or beneficiary participation (ibid:8).

One final point deserving mention is the construction of a mechanical workshop at Ruaha in the outskirts of Iringa town. This workshop was completed as scheduled.

The main constraint here was chronic shortages and high prices of building materials as has been the case with the other construction projects. This constraint hampered the smooth implementation of these activities.

(b) Provision of livestock facilities

The extent of provision of veterinary services was somewhat similar during both phases. Shortage of materials and poor transport to move building materials to the sites are some of the reasons that faced the implementation of these projects. But the de-emphasis

mentioned above is probably the key element leading to this turn of events. During Phase I 90 dips (out of 130) were renovated or constructed, 4 dip testing centres (out of 10) and 2 veterinary centres were constructed and handed over to the regional authorities. For the veterinary centres this implementation attained 100 per cent achievement.

During Phase II it was planned to construct 5 dip testing centres, 2 veterinary centres and 30 new dips. In addition, it was planned to rehabilitate 100 dips. Achievement was 4 or 80 per cent of the dip testing centres, 1 or 50 per cent of the veterinary centres and 7 or 23.3 per cent of the new dips, quite a poor performance; and 66 dips were rehabilitated out of the planned 100.

(c) Roads and Bridges

The target for the first phase was the maintenance of 3,400 km of rural road network, which was clearly over-ambitious. Moreover, the Financing Agreement did not specify the type of works to be undertaken. This problem too faced the targets of the second phase. In addition, criteria for choice of roads were unclear and so was the difference between rehabilitation and maintenance. The cost assumptions of Tshs 18,000 per km for rehabilitation and Tshs 11,000 per km for maintenance in 1983/84 prices proved inadequate for the type of work envisaged to make the roads passable all the year round. Even the planned equipment (2 graders, 1 wheelloader and 1 excavator) was not enough in undertaking the road works as envisaged in the


Financing Agreement especially when consideration of the region's topography is taken into account.

In both phases targets were not reached. However, the project did a remarkable job in the construction of permanent bridges in the region. Although the number of the bridges was not specified in the plan of action or the work plan, the construction of 13 concrete bridges, 13 timber bridges with concrete abutments, 7 box culverts and 18 concrete drifts was quite an important achievement. It is far too common in the country to see temporary bridges which keep being washed away during every rainy season. In the final analysis, it may be economical to have permanent bridges, even if this means much fewer of them. But such a decision must be made after careful consideration of all the trade-offs at one's disposal. Map 7.6 shows the roads rehabilitated during Phase II.

(d) Training and recruitment of extension staff

The targets of training and recruitment of extension staff for both phases totalled 310. In the event, a total of 316 were trained and recruited. The project envisaged assisting the region in strengthening the delivery of the extension services through training, retraining and recruitment of field staff, provision of transport equipment (landrovers, motor cycles and bicycles) and even payment of salaries and allowances. IRADEP established its own extension services with a regional agricultural extension officer, district agricultural extension officers and agricultural field assistants. It thus

Map 7.6: Showing Roads rehabilitated/maintained during Phase II (1986). Total 989km.



effectively created its own extension service structure in the region. We shall return to this issue later in this discussion, but suffice to say here that at the end of the second phase there were 3 district agricultural extension officers and 19 AFAs not in the payroll of Kilimo. IRADEP had hoped that its staff would eventually be absorbed into Kilimo's extension services.

(e) Land use planning

Although land use planning and planning areas were one of the key recommendations of the ODG/UNDP technical assistance team (1976), IRADEP began their incorporation in the project implementation only after 1984. This was one of the recommendations of the planning mission (1984) for the IRADEP implementation period 1984-86. The mission had proposed that village level land use planning should form the key to the Concentrated Action Zone (CAZ) programme. Other components would include extension and training, small-scale irrigation development and management, livestock intensification and destocking, input supply programme, baseline data surveys and a village development fund. The mission suggested the CAZ programme, testing a number of land use recommendations in spatially limited areas, should comprise eleven villages representing various agro-ecological zones (1984:7). Clearly this recommendation followed the path laid down in the RIDEP proposals (ODG/UNDP/FAO, 1976:8.1-5) with a modification that delineation of planning sub-areas was made to correspond with the existing division boundaries.

Delays in the delivery of equipment for the land use planning work from overseas, coupled with the fact that such work must be carried out during the dry season and that there were administrative procedures to be mounted, very little implementation had taken place by mid-1986, at which date Phase II of IRADEP came to a close.

Apart from this last item (e), provision of infrastructure as envisaged in the IRADEP plan achieved fairly good results. As with the productive activities, these infrastructural projects fared much better than their counterparts in the other two RIDEPS. Overall, IRADEP seemed to have performed better than the Kigoma and Tanga RIDEPS. This issue will be pursued in some detail in Chapter 8.

7.5 Conclusion

From the discussion in the foregoing section it is possible to discern the contribution of the IRADEP in the Iringa region's rural development. Maize production benefited most from the IRADEP interventions. And so has pyrethrum, though to much less extent. Maize is a major crop grown by villagers in the region and therefore, it was appropriate for the project to support it. Its support concentrated on procurement of inputs and ox-drawn implements and then making these available to the farmers on credit through the CRDB. The IRADEP's extension services were better equipped and organised and thus performed their duties more efficiently. In all, some improvement in the farmers' receptivity of technical knowledge has occurred as it has been demonstrated by the high demand of inputs (especially of

fertilisers) in the region. In addition, the popularisation of oxenisation has definitely been a significant activity.

IRADEP has also assisted the regional authorities to increase their stock of vital assets, such as office and drawing equipment (60 items), land use, soils and irrigation equipment (59 items), staff and guest houses (9 units) with furniture, 26 lorries, 45 light vehicles (including landrovers) and 16 motor cycles. In addition, there are other assets: one workshop, plant, tools and equipment, altogether totalling over 90 items; 6 godowns and a host of aerial photos and map sheets, the last two items are important for future regional planning. On many occasions, the project was the only source of fuel and spare parts or even mechanical expertise for the regional and district government departments.

In monetary terms, the IRADEP's contribution to the region's development budget was substantial. For example, during the period of the First Union Development Plan, 1981-86, the region's development budget was fixed at Tshs 207.4 million, though actual expenditure totalled Tshs 325.7 million, an overexpenditure of 57 per cent. The IRADEP expenditure during the four years 1982-86 was Tshs 201.2 million. Clearly, IRADEP was an important alternative source of development funds.

However, there were underlying weaknesses and shortcomings in the Financing Agreements (1977 and 1982), especially in the one which was the basis for the implementation of Phase II of the Iringa project. These weaknesses subsequently affected project implementation with ultimate results that dwarfed its accomplishments. The Financing

Agreement (1982) constituted the basis for the IRADEP operations during Phase II. Given the fact that there was no appraisal report, the Financing Agreement, one would have expected, would have defined the objectives and means to achieve them in some detail. As it turned out, the objectives were simply defined as "to increase agricultural and livestock production ... among smallholders and the population in Iringa Region". Although the document came up with infrastructural targets as can be seen in Tables 7.8 and 7.9, it was silent on projections of anticipated yield or production increases, number of farmers to be covered and expected to adopt particular innovations, crop priorities - with the exception of pyrethrum - and sectoral priorities particularly in the allocation of funds.

It is, therefore, not surprising that the IRADEP's infrastructural components were allocated 43.5 per cent of the total budget, despite the fact that this was an *agricultural* project. The implication for this is that IRADEP was putting too much faith in the assumption that infrastructural investment leads in itself to increased outputs in smallholder agriculture. True, some infrastructure is necessary in order to create the preconditions conducive to agricultural development. However, in this study it is felt as necessary to allocate resources to agriculture commensurate to its declared role and significance in an economy of a rural area.

In addition, the Financing Agreement was somewhat vague in defining the project's administration and management structure so that the basic relationships between the IRADEP management and the counterpart institutions of the regional and district administrations

were more or less left to chance. Significantly, the document was silent on popular or beneficiary participation. Even the most important agronomic recommendations contained in the RIDEP proposals such as the planning areas/agro-ecological zones, farming systems approach to agricultural planning and implementation, the need for an 'R & D' component for fine-tuning the blanket recommendations, etc were not undertaken. It is, therefore, with some relief, that the IRADEP evaluators have pointed out these shortcomings (AHT, 1984:1-6). Hopefully, their recommendations will be given appropriate consideration and their outcome will be evident in the course of Phase III implementation which is scheduled to commence in July 1987.

The discussion in the preceding sections has analysed the successes and shortfalls of the IRADEP. The original proposals clearly portrayed an integrated rural development approach (ODG/UNDP, 1976). The funding agency (EEC) had selected a few projects from the agricultural sector (crop and livestock production and forestry) and production infrastructure, which were considered supportive of the production efforts. In this way, the concept of *integrated* rural development suffered considerably. The original RIDEP proposals had some design shortcomings e.g. non-targeting, grassroots-level non-involvement, etc.; but they formed an important starting point for an integrated rural development project, which had both growth and poverty-alleviation objectives. That this was abandoned right from the start of the implementation of the IRADEP was indeed a major shortcoming and is highly likely to have consequential influence on

the final impact of the Iringa project and its contribution to rural development.

As if this was not bad enough the IRADEP commenced implementation without an appraisal study and the Financing Agreements were vague in the definition and/or elaboration of the project objectives and targets, apart those concerning infrastructural projects.

These flaws apart, the IRADEP achieved good results, especially in physical terms. A number of the infrastructural targets were attained, some of them with 100 per cent accomplishment of the original targets. This fact is demonstrated in Tables 7.9 and 7.10. Considering the fact that this has been a most difficult time for the national economy, especially from 1979 onwards (see Chapter 4), these accomplishments are significant.

In the event, the project management found itself in a situation, in which it had considerable decision-taking power and manoeuvring scope. The need to show results within a short period was felt to be a desirable objective; infrastructural projects show physical outputs better and are simpler to achieve than directly productive activities, which must involve the willingness of the beneficiaries to collaborate both in their identification and implementation. The latter were considered slow and thus the former were the logical proposition for the Project Management to pursue vigorously, even if this meant less grassroots participation. Surely, a commercial executing agency would be more likely to concern itself with showing results than be seriously be involved in the slow process of poverty-alleviation in a rural environment.

FOOTNOTES

1. The planning methodology of the Iringa RIDEP proposals was rooted on the systems approach which draws on experiences and works by McLoughlin (1969), Chadwick (1971) and Belshaw and Chambers (1973). For a detailed discussion on this issue see Chapter 2.
2. Personal communication with the Regional Planning Officer, Iringa region, who has been for many years an assistant commissioner in responsible for the Southern Highlands Zone (which included Iringa region) in PMO.
3. In the past the creation of wards and divisions in rural districts had been based on historical and/or ethnic reasons (e.g. a particular traditional administration had such a hierarchy or some ethnic group(s) is found in such area and for ease of administration at that level). In later years, these reasons have played a much less significant role and therefore, in our view, there is little inhibition in implementing the ODG/UNDP team's recommendation on the reorganising the ward and division boundaries to suit agro-economic specificity.
4. Personal communication with D.G.R. Belshaw who was at the time Regional Planning Adviser to PMO and had made the contact and follow-up with the EEC Delegation Office in Dar es Salaam and subsequently the EEC Head Office in Brussels. As result of this initiative EEC became the funding agency of the Iringa project.
5. See Minutes of the Round-up Meeting with IRADEP External Evaluation Mission held in Iringa July 1986.

We must do what we conceive to be the right thing, because if we don't do the right thing, we'll be doing the wrong thing and we'll just be part of the disease and not a part of the cure.

E.F. Schumacher, *Small is Beautiful*, 1973.

CHAPTER EIGHT

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE FOR TESTING OF THE HYPOTHESES OF THE STUDY: THE RIDEP IMPACTS AND EXPERIENCE IN TANZANIA AND CONCLUSIONS

8.1 Introduction

The discussion in this chapter is concerned with the testing of the hypotheses of the study detailed in Chapter 1, section 1.4 based on the evidence aggregated in the Chapters 5-7. Gaps in the available data presented in these chapters has hindered rigorous testing of some of the hypotheses. Nonetheless, it is felt that an adequate basis for drawing meaningful conclusions from the tests of the hypotheses is provided by the evaluations of the planning methodologies, project designs, extent of the implementation and initial effects of the three RIDEPs. The last section of the chapter embodies the conclusions of the Study.

Table 8.1 presents a schematic representation of the evaluation activities undertaken by the present study. For both Kigoma and Tanga RIDEPs the study's activities were partial *ex post* evaluations. The Kigoma RIDEP was officially ended in December 1982, but a terminal evaluation was carried out in November 1981. The TIRDEP's Phase I ended in June 1980 and the present study focused its analysis on this phase only. A terminal evaluation was carried out in October 1980. For the Iringa RIDEP both *ex post* and terminal evaluations were undertaken. For Phase I (1977-81) the study's activities were clearly

Table 8.1: Schematic representation of evaluation activities of the Study RIDEPs.

Region	Evaluation Activity		Technical Assistance Team			Remarks
	Type	Date Carried	Date	Objective	Type	
Kigoma	Ex post	July/Aug 1986	1973/4	Growth with equity	Village tech. development	Implementation ended in Dec 1982 - terminal evaluation undertaken in November 1981
Tanga	Ex post	Jan/May 1986	1972/5	Growth with equity	Sectoral	Implementation of Phase I (1975-80) ended in July 1980 - terminal evaluation undertaken in October 1980
Iringa	Ex post/ terminal	May/July 1986	1974/5	Growth with equity	Agriculture-leading sector, planning areas, agric. tech. and infrastru- cture	Implementation of Phase I (1977-81) ended in June 1981 and Phase II (1982-86) ended in June 1986. Project evaluation undertaken in June/July by an external evaluation team.

ex post evaluation, whereas for Phase II (1982-86) they were terminal evaluation. As the last column of Table 8.1 shows, the study's evaluation was carried out as an external evaluation team was in the region. Although by the time this thesis was being drafted their report was ready, the author had no access to it. The critical problem facing this study is the non-availability of baseline data in any RIDEP. Nonetheless, some data have been gathered, as shown in Chapters 5-7, to enable some important conclusions to be reached about the RIDEPs.

8.2 The testing of the hypotheses of the study: a review of the evidence

In the paragraphs which follow, a summary of the evidence on the

testing of each of the hypotheses of the study is presented. The main body of the evidence has been discussed in detail in the substantive Chapters (5-7) of the study. The evidence is summarised here in order to establish its linkage with the hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1

Given the ideological commitment by Government to the belief that socialist agricultural and rural development is the most effective way to raise rural incomes and improve the quality of life of the rural people, RIDEPs concentrated their efforts in, and fostered, socialist modes of production and distribution.

In both socialist theory and practice, the centrepieces of socialist agriculture are the state farms and collectives, i.e. the *sovkhoz* and *kolkhoz* in its various forms - low-level cooperative, high-level cooperative and the people's commune (see for example Selden, 1982:4-10; Dong, 1982:23-8). But in Tanzania transition to socialism was characterised by (a) voluntarist principle both in pre- and post villagisation phases, (b) pragmatic view of individual and communal production on grounds of both efficiency and costs and (c) recognition in Iringa case of need for research and training needs for communal or cooperative activities. In Tanzanian agriculture, socialised forms of production and distribution include the state farms and cooperatives. The latter are multi-purpose primary cooperatives. This includes all stage I-II registered villages - see

Chapter 3 and Appendix D - as well as ujamaa villages, stage III-IV registered villages). Our focus here is on the registered villages in their various levels of rural cooperativisation. The ujamaa villages as the units with more communal production are of particular interest. This meant examining the implementation of the RIDEPS in order to see how they promoted village development in such a way that more villages from stages I&II to III than would otherwise be the case.

In the overwhelming majority of the villages in Tanga region, as elsewhere in the country, production is organised on an individualistic basis. Only distribution, especially crop and livestock product marketing, is cooperativised. The highest form of rural cooperativisation is only to be found in the ujamaa villages, of which there are not more than 25 in the whole country. As noted, in Tanga region it is only Magamba/Kwalukonge which is officially recognised as an ujamaa village.

The evidence presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 suggests that, although the RIDEPS designs provided in principle for support of ujamaa development, in practice, this was not the case. The evidence from the three case studies shows that there was no, or very little endeavour on the part of the RIDEPS to assist higher level ujamaa (communal production) development in the villages. The practice has been to assist and encourage private enterprise. In this respect, the Tanga RIDEPS was more forthright in its interventions than the other two. For example, both the agricultural extension and horticultural extension projects clearly favoured better-off peasants and focused on development on an individual basis and on the better-off districts of

Tanga, Muheza and Lushoto in that order. There was no attention to the needs of (a) ujamaa villages and (b) poorest people, both being socialist aims and consistent with the Tanzanian ideology.

Further, the agroforestry project, particularly its improved cattle breeds component in Lushoto district, benefited the better-off peasants. Similarly, the extension and credit system, which was operated by the Small Industries Promotion Unit (SIDU), was directed towards individuals and the better-off ones too. This contrasted with the declared objectives of the RIDEP plan as illustrated in section 6.2 of Chapter 6. The RIDEP interventions in Magamba/Kwalukonge ujamaa village were insignificant in terms of both efficiency (production) and equity (provision of free social services) and therefore, they could not be said to have assisted significantly ujamaa development in that village.

In the case of the Kigoma RIDEP, the selection criteria for village inclusion in the project activities - with their emphasis on land availability and road accessibility - tended to militate against both socialist and equity objectives, especially during the first four years of its implementation. It is evident that the IBRD plan proposals were ostensibly most clearly geared to supporting a proportion of the new villages (to be established as part of the villagisation programme) but not explicitly communal production.

IRADEP, as opposed to the UNDP/FAO/ODG plan proposals, concentrated more on the efficiency objective and seemed oblivious of the 'thing called ujamaa or socialist agriculture' in the region.

It is worth noting, however, that it is the role of the entire

Party and Government bureaucratic apparatus in situ to carry on the reform of the basic rural/agricultural institutions. Given the lack of momentum in this regard, it was perhaps inevitable that the RIDEPS would go for individual forms of development, in line with the local political and technocratic reality and growing national-level pressures to increase marketed surpluses of food and export commodities from any source. The RIDEPS' role should have been to provide assistance to the local institutions to realise the objectives of socialist development in the villages. Given the resources at their disposal, they were in a better position to do this than the regional bureaucracy. Moreover, this was their commitment as stipulated in the design of each individual RIDEP and as well in the overall PMO's design for RIDEPS.

In a way, the information collected from the case studies seems to confirm the fact that the RIDEPS practised a 'hands-off policy' towards socialist or ujamaa development activities in the villages, in spite of the fact that the plan documents had commitment on their support. The RIDEP managements regarded ujamaa villages as more ideological than economic units of rural change in the regional economies of the study regions. But also this suggests lack of pressure by local bureaucrats on experts, and in turn lack of pressure from the party officials.

Nonetheless, in contrast, non-RIDEP interventions continued to be the only basis for support of ujamaa development in the villages in the regions. As has been demonstrated in the village sample, Magamba/Kwalukonge, as a stage III village, increased production, and

incomes, and have greatly improved provision of basic needs, resulting in improved quality of life of the villagers. The analysis lends itself to the conclusion that this improvement in the living levels of the villagers in Magamba/Kwalukonge ujamaa village is due mainly to their socialist organisation and production and increased resources.

However, this form of labour organisation is not predominant in the study regions and, indeed, in the country. This reflects weak or ineffective commitment to the implementation of communal production by the regional and district development committees as the major focus in regional development. In turn, this reflects lack of R & D and effective demonstration of high returns of communal production systems under normal capital and labour resource availability in the villages. This is not the place for engaging in the debate about socialist agriculture in Tanzania or elsewhere in the Third World. Our concern has been simply to examine the role of the RIDEP interventions in assisting ujamaa development in the study regions. Our conclusion is that, in this regard, the RIDEPs have been markedly wanting, in spite of their declared intentions on supporting ujamaa development in the plan documents.

Hypothesis 2

Development of the regions (a) depends on integrated rural development planning and implementation rather than on piecemeal projects or single sector programme improvements and (b) RIDEPs are a reasonably appropriate modality for achieving this.

The key element of the RIDEPs was their claimed capacity for plan integration and coherence. In this context, integration is construed to mean the design of a regional plan with mutually supporting and complementing components and/or activities (in practice area-level plan for an administrative region). This integration entails establishing sectoral and spatial linkages and complementarities with the aim of achieving optimal utilisation of resources available in terms of the set of regional development objectives. The rationale of a regional integrated development plan is the recognition that (a) rural people's needs and aspirations, and problems are multi-faceted and (b) inter-sectoral linkages and externalities are often very significant; both require an integrated approach to the design, selection and implementation of appropriate development plans.

The evidence derived from the case studies indicates that, rhetoric apart, integration of the RIDEPs was weak. This weakness manifested itself in lack of both sectoral and spatial integration. Also, both the design and implementation stages manifested this weakness, although in the latter disintegration was more marked and inimical to the effectiveness of the RIDEPs. This problem was caused by both inadequacy of the planning design and piecemeal implementation of the adopted plan. At the design stage, the most critical problem affecting plan integration was poor sequencing and fine-tuning of the various components. This was evident in both the Kigoma and Tanga RIDEPs. For instance, in the Kigoma RIDEP, as Chart 7 (p. 227) and subsequent discussion in sub-section 5.2.5 (pp. 230-5) demonstrated, sequencing of the various components was obviously weak. One clear

example was the intention but failure to adjust fertiliser recommendations to soil conditions obtaining in the region. This activity was to be undertaken by the ATTC whose construction was to start 18 months after the launching of the project, by which time fertilisers would have been distributed to farmers i.e. putting the cart before the horse. Similar problems were encountered by the Tanga RIDEP.

Perhaps, most damage to the RIDEP plan integration was caused by the selective funding of only a few of the identified projects in the RIDEP package. This piecemeal implementation of a plan which was designed as an integrated package led to the failure to test the utility of this key feature. In this respect, the Tanga RIDEP was the most deficient of the three projects. The parallel management structure established by the GTZ further compounded this problem. The project activities became organised along the sectoral fields with duplication at all levels (see Chart 9, p. 280). The Tanga RIDEP was extremely weak in the prioritisation of the objectives and formulation of an implementation strategy that would fit in with the aims of the plan. And this was in spite of its declared intention to concentrate on the productive sectors.

The problem of parallel institution-building characterised both the Tanga and Iringa RIDEPs with consequences which compromised the processes of strengthening local administrative and management institutions and sustainability of the RIDEPs and their experiences (for a similar view see, for example, Conyers and Warren, 1988:28-41; Birgegard, 1988:4-27). Local institutions should be entrusted with

these responsibilities in order to offer them the opportunity to learn by doing, which may also include making mistakes as part of the learning process, thus mature in, and as a result of, the process. The plans were also weak at the political level, especially during the implementation stage, in the sense that they ignored the recipient's (Government's) concerns and aspirations on political development of the rural community. Ujamaa village development was and is still a priority issue in the Tanzanian development philosophy. It is somewhat ironic to observe that on paper the RIDEPs declared their support for the policy, only to be at variance at the implementation stage. True, there are significant gaps in theoretical commitment and practice of socialist construction in many sectors in the study regions, as there are in the rest of the country. This is a blemish on the part of the Tanzanian authorities. Nonetheless, it is not a sufficient reason for the RIDEPs to do exactly the opposite of what they were planned to do.

One critical issue of technical significance was the concept of rural planning areas (RDA) advanced in the UNDP/FAO/ODG plan proposals (see UNDP/FAO/ODG, 1976:8.1-5) which IRADEP failed to use for coverage of the rural production systems. This concept has significance both in project integration and application of a farming systems approach in planning and implementation. On this the IRADEP review mission noted:

These design shortcomings of the Financing Agreement may be seen as underlying a situation where individual project components have often been implemented separately from each other ... the project conception of more to a 'shopping list' of aid items than the basis for an *integrated* set of development programmes directed to achieve sustained increases in food production and smallholder income in the region. At the heart of the problem is perhaps the *neglect* of the planning framework provided by the 1976-FAO/East

Anglia proposals, based, as it was, on carefully elaborated *agro-ecological zoning (planning sub-areas)* of agricultural potential in the region. (Agrar-und Hydrotechnik, 1984:2) (Italics ours).

In a nutshell, the RIDEP plans were unintegrated and lacking in coherence and therefore, were not able to take advantage of the qualities exhibited by an integrated development plan, namely unity of purpose and direction, inter-sectoral and intra-regional linkages and complementarities. These are clearly technical flaws emanating from poor or inadequate planning.

However, the PMO was also to blame in this aspect for not issuing planning guidelines which explained succinctly critical issues of evaluation of regional economic performance, strategy choice procedures, sectoral prioritisation, inter-sectoral and spatial allocation of resources, project administration and management and M&E, and the role and place of the equity objectives as means to reduce disparities between and within communities and areas. For example, there was the issue of the McKinsey procedures for decentralisation which were implemented, but had not been evaluated to pinpoint their strengths and weaknesses. Also the PMO's original guidelines treated RIDEPs as sectorally compartmentalised area-based projects, thus exhibiting weaknesses in both horizontal and vertical integration.

Moreover, the RIDEPs were deficient in the area of properly instituted and organised M&E activities which would have gone a long way in alerting both managements and the regional and national authorities about the progress of the implementation and resulting

effects of the various components of the RIDEPs. In this regard, the PMO, as a super ministry and the author of the RIDEP policy and strategy, was also very deficient in providing the requisite guidance to, and control of, the RIDEPs so as to enable them to be on course or in congruence with the stated national political and economic objectives.

The PMO missed an opportunity for training and raising planning skills of planning officers of PMO, regional and district planning officers and planning assistants as a result of the digression of the Institute of Regional Planning (IRP) from its original objectives and functions, which were pivoted on the principle of on-the-job training of serving officers. In this way, the planning cadres attending such training programmes would have benefited immensely from courses that merged theory and practice. In the event, the IRP became an institution of formal education, producing graduates with a diploma in regional planning, thus competing (ineffectively, because it is ill-equipped to do the job - it has no place or buildings of its own, now almost ten years after it was officially established, poor and inadequate manpower, etc) with the other well established para-professional training institutions such as the Institute of Development Management, Mzumbe near Morogoro, the Cooperative College, Moshi and the Institute of Finance Management, Dar es Salaam.

The IRP, as originally conceived, would have instituted learning procedures across the regions and thus have strengthened regional planning and implementation in the country.

In concluding this discussion, it seems obvious that the evidence is not available or sufficient to either falsify or support the first part of the hypothesis (a), because, although the RIDEPS were designed to be implemented as regional integrated development plans, in practice they were implemented as piecemeal projects or single-sector projects or programmes. In other words, a basis of comparison of the relative effectiveness of integrated and non-integrated approaches does not exist.

Further, the Tanga RIDEP, apart from the fact that it was the longest running project, had an advantage in that its planning and implementation were undertaken by the same donor agency so that there was continuity of purpose and focus. This virtue was not possible for the Kigoma RIDEP, because of its curtailment by the donor, while the case of the Iringa RIDEP is a clear example where there was a separation between the formulator and implementor of the plan. The effect of this discontinuity was the disintegration of a carefully worked out integrated regional development framework. It is possible, however, that the incoherence in practice was due to a design weakness of the RIDEPS such as too much complexity relative to management capacity. This is an important issue requiring further research. Of the three RIDEPS, Tanga was the most complex in the sense of lacking the discipline of a leading sector and institutional dimension.

Thus, the evidence before us indicates that piecemeal or single-sector approaches were the ones which were implemented. Their performance confirms that they are ill-suited to grapple with the

multi-faceted problems facing rural people. The evidence, therefore, has also failed to falsify the second part (b) of the hypothesis, which hence remains unproven.

Hypothesis 3

Externally funded RIDEPS tend to be less participatory in the planning and implementation processes than similar locally planned and implemented programmes/projects.

The evidence presented in Chapters 5 and 6 illustrates that the RIDEPS were deficient in the design and implementation of popular participation as a vehicle of grassroots-level involvement in project identification and formulation. In this context, popular participation is construed as a system or way in which the villagers are given the opportunity to air their views or give their perception of the way they face problems and suggest ways to solve them. In other words, they are involved in decision-making about the matters which must affect them, directly or indirectly.

The plans were only concerned with grassroots-level involvement as a tool for cost-minimisation, that is, the villagers were required to offer their self-help in all construction/building activities so that those projects cost less. This is an understandable approach, given the scarcity of resources and, in any case, it is unsustainable to develop and nurture "spoon-feeding habits" in a community. However, the main objection was to the commandism and self-righteousness of

bureaucrats which is characteristic of most, if not all, projects which are planned and implemented from above. At any rate, there is a body of evidence in the literature on integrated rural development which has demonstrated the importance of popular participation in decision-making (see Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion on this issue).

There was no involvement by the villagers in the preparation of the various project components of the RIDEPS in all three regions. The evidence also shows that even local experts were also not involved or only marginally so in the preparation and formulation of the Kigoma and Tanga RIDEPS. In fact, it seems evident that even in implementation local participation is somewhat circumscribed, because of the existence of parallel administrative and management institutions. The most extreme case is that of the Tanga RIDEP where certain projects - and the majority of the RIDEP projects - were a direct responsibility of a GTZ-appointed agency, the Coordination Unit. Only a few projects were implemented by the Regional Commissioner's Office, Tanga. In this case, a German watchdog, in the name of a service unit, was installed physically in the Regional Commissioner's Office, ostensibly to ensure propriety in the use of GTZ funds allocated to those projects.

The key problem was the belief (undoubtedly, a mistaken one) that the expatriate expert knew all the problems facing the rural people and could provide their solutions accordingly (for the erroneousness of their view see, for example, Chambers, 1983). This belief was manifested in the nature of the "heroic assumptions" contained in the

RIDEP plans which seriously compromised plan flexibility and policy experimenting (Rondinelli, 1983; and Belshaw, 1986).

To be fair, one must also recognise the difficulties imposed on the members of the technical assistance teams by the over-enthusiasm of the donors to produce quick results to appease home constituencies (Mushi and Kjekhus, 1982; Stokke, 1984; Price, 1986). In addition, the language problem barrier compounded the problem as communication was made more difficult in such circumstances. These problems are not, however, insurmountable. For the sake of effectiveness of the RIDEP implementation, beneficiary participation in the identification, formulation and implementation of the projects is essential and therefore, every effort should be made to involve the people in the decision-making processes.

Locally initiated projects were more participatory than externally planned ones and therefore, the hypothesis is supported.

Hypothesis 4

RIDEPs, because they focus on particular regions, have given greater regard to the natural resource base, local farming systems, and appropriate technology (including leading sector approach), all of which make them more likely to increase general production than national sectoral programmes.

The premise of this hypothesis is the capacity of decentralised planning for fine-tuning the project design to take account of the

specific natural resource base obtaining in a region or area. The localised natural resource endowments are critical in determining the pattern of investment and growth of productivity. They guide the adoption and application of technological packages which are essential in raising productivity. The appropriateness of technological packages is a necessary requirement, if profitability and coverage of the RIDEP interventions are to be achieved and enhanced. The evidence from the case studies seems to bear out this stipulation. Profitable use of agricultural inputs is more likely to be accomplished if their application is backed by research-proven recommendations. Blanket recommendations, as has been demonstrated in the case of the cotton-growing villagers in Muyama division of Kasulu district in Kigoma region (Loft *et al.*, 1982:106-7), are ineffective or even counter-productive. However, for a general analysis of the problem of blanket recommendations on fertiliser application in the country the following quotation is very illuminating:

Fertilizer recommendations are still blanket recommendations and for some crops these recommendations have caused yield declines. ... but it is important that plans must be made which will make it possible to increasingly depend less and less on blanket fertilizer recommendations. (Tanzania, Government of, 1980:2).

This situation has changed very little eight years later and even locally planned projects do not take sufficient account of local conditions.

The most important advantage of the farming systems approach lies in its recognition of the need to start from and build on the

household unit; identifying its needs and problems and designing solutions with its participation. Indeed, the rationale of regional/areal planning in agrarian regions is precisely because it offers a better advantage in addressing the specificity of the natural resource endowments than can national/central planning. Accordingly, it should have been possible to formulate projects and appropriate technologies with the aim of attaining optimal levels of investment and profitability, ultimately improving the people's living conditions. The RIDEP experience on this subject is scanty because it was implemented as intended.

Further, modern technologies, especially chemical inputs, are expensive and foreign-exchange intensive, and therefore, the majority of the Tanzanian peasantry can hardly afford them. Moreover, even if the farmers can afford to buy them, available supplies cannot meet demand. This calls for more appropriate and accessible technologies and, in this respect, the farming systems approach offers immense potentialities in raising the efficiency of peasant agriculture. This is not to say that modern appropriate technologies are much less wanted or ineffective or should wait for the right time. The principle of complementarity can be of immense benefit here too.

The evidence presented in this study has shown neglect or relegation to the wayside of the concept of the leading sector in the RIDEPS. This neglect can be explained by several reasons:-

- (a) Lack of PMO's emphasis;
- (b) The Third Five Year Plan placed emphasis on industrialisation;
- (c) Kilimo's loss of interest in regional agricultural development activities as a

- result of the transfer of its extension services to the PMO and regions;
- (d) Lack of training of regional and district planning cadres, and
 - (e) Possibly, in the absence of strong signals from the PMO for direction and focus and coupled with lack of sound training on evaluation and regional plan design, RIDEPs tried to give a share of resources to all sectors.

The consequences of this neglect or down-grading of agriculture as a leading sector in Tanga and Kigoma, certainly, have been documented in the preceding Chapters (5 and 6) and it is unnecessary to repeat them here. This is crucial in maintaining a simple yet effective package of interventions and to achieving both growth and equity objectives. Increased agricultural output and widespread improvement of rural incomes would eventually lead to the alleviation of absolute rural poverty and deprivation.

The evidence shows that, where RIDEPs applied appropriate technological packages (as in some instances in the Kigoma and Iringa RIDEPs - see Chapters 5 and 7), good results were achieved, thus underlining their significance in regional and area-based planning and implementation. The evidence is mixed; the successes in agricultural innovation and improved output point to the potential of the approach but it was not consistently secured in practice.

Hypothesis 5

The national RIDEP strategy has accelerated the reduction of rural poverty in Tanzania.

From the discussion in the substantive chapters it is possible to conclude that some reduction of rural poverty has taken place during the period under study. The most vivid cases are those of Kigoma and Iringa regions where increased agricultural production and rural incomes - as a specific result of the RIDEPS, not merely *post hoc ergo propter hoc* - have led to the improvement of living standards as exemplified by certain consumption patterns e.g. construction of good houses (bricks and corrugated iron sheets), and provision of social services (education, health and water supply facilities).

Thus, it is necessary to appreciate the role of the RIDEPS in cushioning the regional economies against macroeconomic effects tending to lower the levels of living of rural people. In these circumstances, even the reduction of the severity of an economic decline of the regional economy represents a positive gain or net benefit from the RIDEPS planned activities.

Undoubtedly, this is a very important area which needs further research in order to pinpoint the extent of increase of rural incomes and their contributions in bringing about improvement of the quality of life of the rural people in general and the rural poor in particular. Nevertheless, the evidence garnered by this study indicates some marked contribution of the RIDEPS policy and strategy to the study regions' rural development. This contribution has varied from region to region; for example, the Kigoma and Iringa RIDEPS have contributed more than their counterpart in Tanga. Thus, the evidence supports the stand as stipulated in the above hypothesis.

8.3 Inferences and Recommendations

The most conspicuous inference arising from this study is the confirmation that the RIDEP policy and strategy is a useful instrument of rural change, despite the many flaws in formulation and execution and other shortcomings. The RIDEP strategy is useful both as IRDP *per se* and IRDP as a *conduit* for external funding. The views of this study are (a) it has been serving a useful purpose and therefore, it has a continuing role to play in the Tanzanian rural development efforts and (b) it should be further improved through better evaluation, training and second-generation planning and implementation procedures.

Based on this first inference is the conclusion that the design flaws should be noted with a view to avoiding them in future regional planning. There is a need to choose an appropriate planning methodology that provides adequate flexibility in the light of new knowledge and experience emanating from the implementation process. The study has demonstrated the inadequacy of the one-shot blueprint planning methodology and has indicated the need to adopt reduced and iterative planning methods in regional planning in Tanzania. Rolling plans are more advantageous than blueprint plans, especially in the current situation in Tanzania, where due to economic difficulties, development resources are scarce and thus, planning is clouded with more uncertainty than usually is the case. In such a situation, forecasting is definitely a "hit and miss" affair.

Concomitant with the choice of the planning methodology in the RIDEP design is the imperative of installing an M&E component which

should be in place soon after implementation has been initiated and its results should be available to all concerned parties (management, the planners, decision-makers, donor agency administrators, etc.). The type of information needs of each of these audiences is dependent upon the purpose for which such information is needed, that is, there is a need to recognise the fact that there exists specificity in information needs. Evaluators must, therefore, decide from the outset the information needs of each audience, who must be consulted before embarking upon an evaluation activity.

The consequences of ignoring beneficiary participation have been underlined in this study. The need for grassroots-level participants' involvement in project formulation has been recognised as crucial in ensuring their commitment and successful implementation of the projects which demand their self-help contribution. Moreover, the study realises the importance of popular participation not only in its technical sense (cost-minimisation, efficient implementation, etc.), but also in its political sense i.e. it is the people's birthright to be involved in the decision-making process on matters affecting their wellbeing. Development efforts are too important to be left to the monopoly of the bureaucrats alone, be they in the Party, government or international aid agencies or even to the members of the academia.

There is a need to strengthen local institutions/organisations for administering and managing development projects in the recipient country. Perhaps this is an extension of popular participation. Local experts must be given the opportunity to learn by doing, including making mistakes. Learning lessons from one's own mistakes has a more

durable impact than drawn lessons from the mistakes of others. The evidence from the literature on integrated rural development indicates that rural development is a painfully slow process ("no shortcuts to progress" as Hyden's (1983) book title states) and it is quite understandable that some people, especially among the donor community, have shown dissipation of enthusiasm in supporting integrated rural development in the Third World (Conyers and Warren, 1988; Birgegard, 1988 and Cohen, 1987). Nonetheless, the evidence from this study has shown some positive results emanating from IRD interventions.

Further, the evidence shows a possibility of achieving even better results, had the design flaws, especially the ignoring leading sector concept, been dealt with early in the implementation process. The characterisation of these RIDEPS as pivoted around a leading sector and as having an appropriate technology base has been shown to be fallacious. The truth of the matter is that the bulk of the investments went into the development of infrastructure. This was not in itself a bad thing, as it is recognised that some infrastructure has the significance of the "critical mass", on the basis of which production can take place and be sustained. And this point has been amply demonstrated in the preceding chapters of the study. However, there is a need to create a balance of investments between the productive and infrastructural sectors. After all, as the recent Tanzanian experience indicates, it is ultimately the productive sectors (especially agriculture) which will ensure and sustain the continuous delivery of the social services to the mass of people.

Equally significant in the nurturing of popular participation is

the issue of the decentralised administrative structure of the government machinery. Clearly, the extent of popular participation, especially at the grassroots-level, is related to the extent of administrative decentralisation. Bureaucracy-induced constraints on decentralisation and popular participation are considerable and the need for their elimination or reduction is crucial so that popular participation can take firm root in the country. One critical question is the democratisation of the representative organs from the village to the regional level (the village councils, district councils and regional development committees (see Charts 3, p. 175 and 4, p. 190)). The regional development committee (RDC), as noted Chapter 4, needs further democratisation by expanding its directly elected membership in order to give the people more say over its deliberations than the bureaucrats (both in the Party and government).

The lesson from this is clear; agriculture must be assigned the leading-sector role and be backed up with commensurate resources so that it realistically plays its role in the development of the regional economy. Rural development is not an end in itself; it creates structural transformation on which to lay the foundation stone for industrialisation.

It is emphasised that one must take into account the preliminary nature of the research findings of the present study. The urgent need for more research in this area in order to throw further light on the key policy questions is stressed. In the past twenty five years various rural development interventions or even 'fashions' have been growing and slackening, leading demise of various development "fads":

community development of the late forties and fifties, the 'green revolution' of the sixties and integrated rural development projects and programmes of the seventies. The current climate is showing a growing loss of enthusiasm in the IRDPs, especially in the donor community. In Tanzania the evidence indicates that the RIDEPs still command official appeal and support as important instruments of rural development interventions (Sokoine, 1983). However, without donor support it is highly doubtful if they will continue to be effective policy instruments of rural change in the country. Given the country's commitment to equity and equalisation objectives (the latter as a measure to minimise or reduce disparities between areas, which random donor funding has exacerbated), it would be desirable to establish a general RIDEP fund on a pool basis similar to the one for the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) Project in Kenya, advocated by IFAD (see Belshaw, 1988). RIDEPs could then be funded from this pool fund based on need, that is, on the principles of absolute or relative deprivation.

The Tanzanian authorities seemed to have misplaced faith in the donor capability and commitment (Belshaw, 1982:301) both in terms of their technical capacities to produce sound regional plans (that had both growth and equity objectives in their appropriate combinations) and follow-up funding (in levels commensurate with the demands of effective implementation). The experience of the RIDEP study demonstrates the existence of significant gaps in both these aspects. In addition, the donors' commitment to either growth or equity objectives appeared to be random and lacking in the long-term view.

Finally, it is worth noting that line ministry back-up for the RIDEP interventions is both desirable and imperative, if they are to achieve their intended objectives and to have a unity of purpose and direction. The concept of a super ministry as in case of the Prime Minister's Office is the most appropriate one. However, the evidence from this study and others (for example, see Belshaw, 1977 and 1982) shows that PMO needs to be strengthened both politically and professionally. It must truly be in charge of all rural development in the country. In this respect, it would be necessary to subordinate the Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning to PMO both in theory and practice. Although currently PMO (or rather the Office of the Prime Minister and First Vice-President) is a super ministry, in reality it is so only in theory or perhaps in other less significant issues only. Real power on financial matters and planning is located in the Treasury. To achieve the potentials of regional planning for growth and equity objectives the PMO needs to be stronger both in theory and practice than any other ministry in the country except the Office of the President.

8.4 Outstanding issues

The purpose of this chapter has been to present a summary of the research findings and to relate them to the study hypotheses. Inadequacy of data apart, it has been possible to draw some preliminary conclusions concerning the hypotheses of the study. The study recommends more research in these issues in order to expand our

understanding of them. These may include questions regarding appropriate planning methodologies for regional planning, problems of plan integration and coherence (is the complexity of RIDEPs the only impediment? or conflict of interests which leads to fuzzy objectives and means to achieve them?), the impact of decentralisation on IRD, especially in respect of elimination or reduction of areal disparities, and on the role and place of the leading sector in IRD, why has it not been successful in the past.

Overall the RIDEPs have been important instruments in bringing about improvements in the regional economies of the relevant regions with concomitant pay-offs to the rural population. Design and implementation problems have had extenuating effect on the RIDEPs' initial effects on the target population. Some of these problems could have been avoided if the planning methodologies had been more appropriate and M&E components had been established and functioning effectively. Nonetheless, many of the problems have been exacerbated by the macroeconomic difficulties of the late 'seventies and eighties' with negative consequences on RIDEP implementation.

The study calls for improvement in the design and implementation procedures as prerequisites to the improved delivery of their planned objectives and targets. All in all, the study believes that given concerted improvements in the design and implementation procedures coupled with appropriate sectoral prioritisation (with agriculture truly given the leading role), RIDEPs could be crucially important modalities for regional and rural development in Tanzania.

8.5 General Conclusions

The present study had set out to investigate the extent of the implementation of the externally funded regional integrated development programmes and projects in three regions in Tanzania. To this end, it has been necessary to evaluate the RIDEPs in the light of their stated objectives. The RIDEP plans had to be analysed to identify their objectives in order to determine their likelihood of being achieved and whether they were congruent to the Tanzanian development philosophy as espoused by the Arusha Declaration and other public pronouncements of the national leadership. Further, the study examined the extent of implementation of various components of the RIDEPs with the aim of pinpointing their achievements and failures.

Tanzania has been implementing, with donor assistance, some 10 regional integrated development programmes and projects since the early seventies. These rural development interventions have been important public policy instruments of rural change in the country. They were an outcome of the RIDEP policy and strategy, which was initiated by the Prime Minister's Office, as one of the ways of attracting donor support for increased resources to be invested in the regions. At the time, the PMO was the super ministry responsible for all rural development matters in the country. Although by the late seventies all regions had a RIDEP plan "on the shelf", only ten of them attracted follow-up funding for the implementation of the plan proposals. The study chose three of these for investigation. These have been used as case studies to expand our understanding of the key

policy questions regarding regional and rural integrated development planning and implementation in Tanzania.

To achieve its objectives, the study undertook an evaluation of the RIDEPs of Kigoma, Tanga and Iringa regions. The study chose 'before and after' comparisons, 'with and without' comparisons and village surveys as the methods of evaluation, because they were relevant and appropriate to the purpose and objectives of the study. The 'before and after' method requires the existence of baseline data benchmarks for comparison with the end-situation data. In other words, time-series data must be available to enable the mounting of a comparative analysis. The 'with and without' method was resorted to in order to fill in the gaps left by the former method. In the present study information was collected as far as possible through documentary sources - plan documents, reports and other publications or written materials, and by means of interviews with the relevant officials and RIDEP experts.

The three regions chosen for investigation offered an opportunity for comparison of planning methodologies, appropriateness of designs and objectives, performance and impacts on the target population. These RIDEPs were some of the earliest and longest running ones, presenting differences in donor agency support (Kigoma - the World Bank, Tanga - West Germany and Iringa - the EEC), planning and implementation methodologies and procedures and levels of prior regional development. Whilst Kigoma was one of the least developed and most remote regions in the country, Tanga was one of the better developed ones, as the discussion in Chapter 4 indicates, and Iringa

fell somewhere in the middle of this developmental continuum.

Further, the village surveys provided more information for the study on the RIDEP and non-RIDEP interventions in Tanga region where they were undertaken. Apart from providing supplementary data in combination with the other chosen methods, they were essential in gauging the views and reactions of the RIDEP beneficiaries. The village surveys were important instruments for beneficiary participation in the evaluation activity of the study. Although the village sample was small and this was coupled with other limitations, the survey did throw light on the dynamics of the RIDEP planning and implementation in Tanga region.

The Kigoma RIDEP was the first to be planned and implemented in the country and was funded through a loan from the IDA. The main objective of the RIDEP was the doubling of the rural incomes within the plan period through greatly increased agricultural production which pivoted around intensification. The design hoped this would be achieved through an energetic agricultural input programme which was to be administered and managed by the TRDB and KCU. In the design agriculture was assigned the role of a leading sector.

Further, the design envisaged the improvement of levels of living of the rural people through the provision of social infrastructure such as education, health and rural water supply facilities. Other infrastructural developments included provision of village storage facilities, grinding mills and the construction or rehabilitation of the feeder roads which linked the project villages to the district and regional headquarters. The road network was part of the improvement of

the organisation and management of the marketing system in the region.

The study had identified a number of design flaws in the Kigoma RIDEF which had consequent effects on the achievement on its objectives. The most critical flaw was its emphasis of the "correctness" of its assumptions which was paradoxical in the circumstances of the region. Kigoma was a little known area in which planning data was scarce. Thus, the internal logic of the design would have required greater flexibility and experimentation so that the next step would have been to take on board the new knowledge and evidence emanating from the implementation process. In this respect, the plan proposals should have been regarded as a "hit and miss" affair and not a place for "heroic assumptions". Another serious flaw was the fact that agriculture was not backed by resources commensurate with its significance as intended in the design. Although on the surface the Kigoma RIDEF looked integrated and comprehensive, in reality integration was quite weak. Sequencing of project components was equally weak.

The design had recommended the establishment of an M&E component, but it was vague on the pattern and manner in which it was to be installed and on its relationship to the regional authorities, project management and PMO. This had in the end a negative impact on the running and implementation of the project. Clearly, some of the mistakes and problems which it faced could have been avoided or alleviated had a sound and active M&E unit been in place.

The implementation of the Kigoma RIDEF got off to a slow start

for several reasons, such as cumbersome bureaucratic procedures; shortages of building materials, fuel and spares; and lack and/or inadequacy of transport. Nevertheless, the agricultural input programme started quickly so that the target for fertilisers for the first project year was surpassed by over 1,200 per cent, but it ground to a complete halt three years later due to loan non-repayment. This also meant the end of the intensification programme which focused on increased use of agro-chemical inputs. In spite of all these difficulties, the peasants of Kigoma did increase their production during the period under review due to extensification. This was made possible by the villagisation programme that had resettled villagers in villages with more abundant and fertile land than in those they had come from and by improved organisation and management of marketing.

In the Tanga RIDEP, the study observed similar planning deficiencies to those of the Kigoma RIDEP, in spite of the fact that the former region had a larger multidisciplinary team which had stayed longer to prepare the plan than its counterpart in Kigoma. The Tanga RIDEP plan not only exhibited weaknesses in sectoral and spatial integration, but also in the sectoral prioritisation and allocation of resources. Moreover, its objectives were vague and tried to provide assistance to a multitude of projects spread across most sectors with the end result that it lost unity of purpose and emphasis. In essence, the Tanga RIDEP turned out to be simply an expenditure plan rather than a comprehensive plan capable of bringing about increased agricultural production in the villages and hence improving the living conditions of the target population.

The key problem, as the study has demonstrated, has been poor design of the various components of the RIDEP and their prioritisation. These were fundamental flaws. Although the planning and implementation of the RIDEP was supported by the same donor, its choice of less than 40 per cent of the original project proposals (a disappointing gesture in the eyes of the Tanzanian authorities who had hoped that the Germans would provide funding for the whole integrated package), eroded further whatever integration was in the plan. Piecemeal implementation was not conducive to the achievements of the RIDEP's stated objectives.

The GTZ's insistence on the establishment of a parallel administrative structure for the RIDEP and its division of projects between those (majority) directly under the expatriate responsibility (Coordination Unit, a GTZ-appointed organ) and those implemented and supervised by the Regional Commissioner's Office was inimical to the integration and sustainability of the RIDEP.

Iringa's IRADEP was a sectoral project intended to increase agricultural production and productivity in the region and therefore, it was not strictly a RIDEP in the sense defined for this study. However, the IRADEP was based on the RIDEP proposals formulated by a UNDP/FAO/ODG technical assistance team, especially those which concerned agricultural and infrastructural development (e.g. crop and livestock production activities, forestry, smallholder irrigation, feeder road network improvement and marketing). Here was an example where a donor funded a plan which was already "on the shelf". Although the choice of funding one part of an integrated regional development

plan eroded considerably its purpose and aims, IRADEP was in its own way integrated, because it included both productive and infrastructural activities (i.e. integrated in the sense that the selection and implementation of projects in different sectors which synergistically contribute to solving constraints and exploiting opportunities.

The IRADEP's objectives were somewhat vague and indeterminate in terms of their ranking. However, its agricultural input and extension programmes were energetically pursued resulting in increasing crop production, especially of maize in the region. The project achieved also some significant implementation results in smallholder irrigation, oxenisation and feeder road and bridge construction which helped to improve marketing and rural transport.

Turning to institutional structure of the IRADEP we observe similarities with the Tanga RIDEP. The study had observed similar problems which hindered the strengthening of local administrative and management institutions and their sustainability. Quick results are definitely a desirable goal, but they are in themselves not sufficient reason to duplicate institutional structures - administrative supplants as we would like to call them here - because they embody more costs than benefits, especially in the long term. RIDEPs must be also regarded and be seen as instruments which strengthen both the training and capacities of local administrative and management staff. The increasing resort to administrative supplants defeats the very objectives of local participation in the decision-making processes regarding development. As Nyerere once said,

"People cannot be developed, but they can be assisted to develop themselves." Arising from this dictum is the need to appreciate the fact that external resources are important in helping the local communities develop themselves i.e. they may have a catalytic influence.

This brings us to the general question of popular participation which the literature on IRD has recognised as a crucial component in the success of the IRDP interventions. This study has documented that the RIDEP designs were clearly deficient in this crucial area of popular participation. The only issue of people's involvement noticeable in the designs has been the requirement that the villagers offer self-help in all construction and/or building activities. The main, and perhaps the only, preoccupation of the architects of the RIDEP proposals was cost-minimisation. While this is an important concern, since resource constraints are familiar problems to everyone, there is no valid reason why they should totally eclipse the other virtues of popular participation. Thus, in all the case studies this aspect represented both a design and implementation shortcoming.

The analysis of the study hypotheses has indicated serious inadequacies in planning design, objectives and assumptions of the RIDEPs. The analysis has also shown that there is still much scope for improvement with a view to making them more effective instruments of public-sector intervention in the regional economies in the country. Thus, the considered view of this thesis is that RIDEPs are important tools of rural change in Tanzania, but certain improvements must be taken to make them more effective and appropriate to the country's development objectives. One such item on the agenda is their design

i.e. their planning methodologies, which must be both relevant and appropriate to the resource base of a particular region or district. An essential premise of all this is the need to have clearly and unambiguously stated development objectives which are easily understandable and implementable by those concerned.

Another critical issue is that concerning the leading sector in the RIDEP design. If agriculture is assigned this role, it is imperative that this should be manifest both in intent and practice by an allocation of resources which is commensurate with the intended role. The experience of the RIDEPs in Tanzania has shown a significant gap between intentions and actual implementation. This is really closely tied to the issue of prioritisation. Although regional integrated development plans must by their nature be multisectoral and multidisciplinary with horizontal and vertical integration as major features, sectoral and spatial prioritisation is necessary for both growth and equity objectives. Since agriculture's role in the rural regional economies is decisive because of its significance as the engine of development, it must be given the resources to enable it to play its part effectively. In this regard, it will normally be necessary to ensure that direct investment in the sector will be greater than investment in any other sector.

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APPENDIX A

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS OF KEY CONCEPTS USED IN THE STUDY

For the purpose of simplification and clarity in this section definitions of key concepts are made. This measure, so it is hoped, will assist the reader's understanding of the discussions in the various chapters of this study.

Socialism - a political and economic system in which the major means of production and distribution are collectively owned and managed by the 'working classes' (workers and peasants) and in which they, as the immediate producers, dominate over the products and surplus of their labour.

Socialist construction - all purposeful and conscious efforts to create a socialist economy or society by adhering to the principles of socialism, one of which is the collective and/or state ownership and management of the means of production and distribution.

Socialisation - a process by which privately owned and managed means of production and distribution are increasingly brought under public or collective/communal ownership and control for the benefit of the whole community.

Collectivisation - a process in which the peasantry is physically brought to live in communes (collectives) and that the major means of production (land and farm equipment and buildings) become communal property.

Socialist agriculture - a type of agriculture in which there is domination of collective/communal producers in the countryside.

Villagisation - a resettling of the rural people in planned designated villages for the purpose of cost-effective public sector interventions, especially in the provision of education, health and potable water.

Ujamaa village - a *socialist* village in Tanzania which is registered as such according to the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975 and after 1982 by the Local Government (District Authorities) Act of 1982. An ujamaa village is a higher stage of registered village in which there is dominance of communal activities over private/individual ones. During the period 1967-73 an ujamaa village meant a group of peasants/villagers cultivating together on a voluntary basis and the proceeds being shared between them.

Planning - a process of making choices about how best to use in relation to a set of objectives available resources (e.g. capital and manpower) within a specified time frame.

Development planning - a process of making choices and decisions on the most rational and feasible use of resources in order to bring about sustainable economic and social progress of a nation or country.

Planning method - a technique of doing planning which includes identification, appraisal, selection and design, monitoring, evaluation and

reformulation of projects, programmes and plans with the aim of achieving pre-set objectives and/or targets.

Objective - a desired outcome or result of a development programme and project.

Project - a planned undertaking which is a set of interrelated and coordinated activities designed to achieve certain specific objectives within a given budget and period of time.

Programme - an organised set of activities or projects which aim at achievement of specific objectives/targets within a predetermined budget and time horizon.

Integrated rural development project/programme - a project/programme covering several sectors integrated together both vertically and horizontally for a purpose of achieving improved levels of living standard of the rural people. It is an interdisciplinary approach to solving rural people's development problems.

Multi-sectoral rural development project/programme - a project/programme which comprises several sectoral projects which are not integrated to each other.

Plan - a set of policies projects and/or programmes. Plans may be short-term (e.g. annual plans), medium-term (e.g. five-year plans) and long-term (e.g. perspective plans, comprising of 15-20 year time horizon).

Input - a quantum of resources provided for an activity or process so as to produce a desired output or result and thus attaining the objectives of a programme/project.

Output - an outcome, a result or a product of an activity or process emanating from use or expending of inputs.

Effect - an outcome of the use of project outputs .

Impact - an outcome of project/programme effects, an ultimate observable change in the quality of life of a target population or a degree of achievement of developmental objectives for a country as a whole emanating from the project/programme activities.

Monitoring - a process of continuous or periodic review and surveillance by management at every level of the hierarchy of implementation of an activity to ensure that input deliveries, work schedules, targeted outputs and other required actions are proceeding according to plan. Monitoring is a project management tool for assessing, supervising and controlling project or programme implementation.

Evaluation - a process for determining systematically and objectively the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact of activities in the light

of their objectives. Evaluation is a tool for policy decision-makers and planners.

Subsistence producer - a smallholder farmer/cultivator who produces for his and family's consumption

Peasant - a smallholder producer, who produces mainly for his and family's consumption and for the market to earn cash for his other needs.

Peasantisation - a process by which subsistence producers become peasants, that is they begin to produce both for their consumption and the market.

Commodity - an agricultural product produced by peasant for the market.

Commoditisation - a process by which peasant farmers are forced to produce commodities for sale.

Peasant agriculture - farming undertaken by peasants.

Subsistence agriculture/traditional agriculture - farming undertaken by smallholder producers, which is characterised by very low technology and hardly any surplus.

Covkhoz - a state farm.

Kolkhoz - a collective farm.

Commune - a socialist village.

Household - a sociological unit comprising a family i.e. a husband, his wife or wives and their children plus relatives living with the nuclear family. A household may also be headed by a woman.

APPENDIX B

EVALUATION OF EXTERNALLY FUNDED REGIONAL INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES
(RIDEPS) IN TANZANIA: CASE STUDIES OF KIGOMA, TANGA AND IRINGA REGIONS.

QUESTIONNAIRE I:

(To be completed by peasants in the sample villages)

A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

1. Name of Peasant.....Age.....
2. Village.....Ward.....
Division.....District.....
Region.....Date.....
3. Do you know how to read and write? Yes/No.
If yes what standard of education did you attain? (include adult education).....
4. Have you always been resident in this village? Yes/No. If no, where did you come from before joining this village?.....
5. When did you join this village? (was it during the villagisation period).....
6. Show the number of your family/household

SEX	ADULTS >16 yrs!	CHILDREN		
		children infants/babies	children 2-11 yrs	children 12-16 yrs
Males				
Females				
Total				

7. Show how many times your family takes/eats the following types of foods.

Type of food	mount/day/gm/kg	frequency/day/week/month*
Maize (flour)		
Sorghum (flour)		
Rice		
Beans		
Cassava		
Bananas (plantains)		
Meat		
Fish		
Vegetables (mboga)		
Fruits		
Oil		

* Clearly explain the number of times your family takes the type of food.

B. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND PRODUCTIVITY:

8. Cultivation methods used/adopted (time of planting, spacing/plant population by unit area, seed variety and quality, operations carried out by whom) under RIDEP schemes: General.....

 Coffee:

 Cotton:

 Cardamom:

 Maize :

 Rice :

 Others:

9. Have you been using agricultural inputs? Yes/No.
 If yes, which ones and for which crops where were these inputs provided under the RIDEP.....

10. Do you fellow crop husbandry practices as advised by agricultural extension workers? Yes/No. If yes, mention them and for which crops

11. Do you use any oxenisation/tractorisation on your shamba? Yes/No.
 If yes mention hectarage and crop(s) and state which is more

frequently used: oxenisation or tractorisation? Did RIDEF provide them?

12. Crops grown and harvested.

Crop	1982/83		1983/84		1984/85	
	Area (ha)	Yields (Kg)	Area (ha)	Yields (Kg)	Area (ha)	Yields (Kg)
Coffee						
Cotton						
Cardamon						
Rice/Paddy						
Beans						
.....						
.....						

C. IMPROVEMENT OF WELL-BEING OF THE RURAL PEOPLE AS A RESULT OF RIDEF ACTIVITIES.

13. Income levels of the peasant villagers (Tshs)

- A 10,000 - 20,000 per year.
- B 5,000 - 10,000 per year.
- C 3,000 - 5,000 per year.
- D 1,000 - 3,000 per year.

- (i) State in which category of income are you in:
- (ii) Mention the sources of this income and indicate rough estimation of income increase/decrease:
- (iii) Has your income increased or decreased during the past 5 years (1980/81-1984/85)?
- (iv) What have been the causes of this increase/decrease of income?
- (v) Role of RIDEF in raising/increasing your income/wealth:
 - (a) Had a major influence: Yes/No
 - (b) Had some influence: Yes/No
 - (c) Had little influence: Yes/No
 - (d) Had no influence: Yes/No

14. For the years shown below how much income/revenue was obtained through the sale of crops?

Crop	1982/83		1983/84		1984/85	
	Amount (kg)	Income (shs)	Amount (kg)	Income (shs)	Amount (kg)	Income (shs)
Coffee						
Cotton						
Cardamom						
Coconuts						
Rice/Paddy						
Beans						
.....						
.....						

15. How much income/revenue was obtained through off-farm employment/activities?

Family member (husband, wife, son, etc.)	1982/83		1983/84		1984/85	
	Employment/activity	Income (shs)	Employment/activity	Income (shs)	Employment/activity	Income (shs)
1.						
2.						
3.						
4.						
5.						
6.						

16. Other wellbeing/quality of life indicators: (Food/nutrition, education, health, literacy, potable water supply).

- (a) (i) Has the status of food/nutrition improved in your household in the past five years (1980/81-1984/85)?
 Yes/No. If yes explain how?
- (ii) What has been the source of this food/nutrition improvement?
- (iii) This food/nutrition improvement can be attributed to the RIDEP activities? Yes/No. If yes state whether the RIDEP activities had:
 a major influence:
 some influence:
 little influence:
 (Delete whichever is inapplicable).
- (b) (i) Has the health status improved in your village during the past five years (1980/81-1984/85)? Yes/No. If

- yes state the causes of this improvement:
- (ii) Can this improvement be attributed to the RIDEP activities? Yes/No. If yes state whether the RIDEP activities had:
 - a major influence:.....
 - some influence:
 - little influence:
 - (c) (i) Has schooling/status of education improved in the last five years (1980/81-1984/85)? Yes/No. Explain how, if the answer is yes.
 - (ii) Can this change be attributed to the RIDEP activities? Yes/No. If yes state whether the RIDEP activities had:
 - a major influence:
 - some influence:
 - little influence:
 - (iii) Has the quality of schooling/education deteriorated in the past five (or ten) years? Yes/No. If yes can you state the cause of this deterioration?
 - (iv) Has the provision of school facilities (classrooms and teachers houses) improved in the last five years? Yes/No. If yes explain how:
 - (v) Who provided these facilities?
 - (d) (i) Has the status of adult literacy improved in the your village? Yes/No. Are all members in your household literate? Yes/No. If no, how many cannot read and write?
 - (ii) Can you state the reasons why these household members cannot read and write till today (1985).
 - (iii) Have RIDEP activities assisted in any way in improving the status of literacy in your village? Yes/No. If yes, state how:
 - Would you say the RIDEP activities had a major influence/some influence/little influence on the literacy status in your village. (Delete whichever is inapplicable).

17. Subjective view of impact of RIDEP on income/wealth, welfare/well-being of the rural people.

Has RIDEP had an impact on:

- (i) Income/wealth: major influence
- some influence
- little influence
- no influence

Why? (for each of these give an explanation on

- state of affairs).
-
- (ii) Welfare/well-being/quality of life of the rural people:
 - major influence
 - some influence
 - little influenceWhy? (for each of these give an explanation on state of affairs).
-
- (iii) Any other views/comments:
-

D. PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL.

18. (i) What have been important decisions made in the last five years?
-
- Year 1:
- Year 2:
- Year 3:
- Year 4:
- Year 5:
- (ii) Did you participate in each of these decisions: Yes/No.
- (iii) Did you participate in making others? Yes/No. If yes, name them:
-
- (iv) The last 3 meetings of the village assembly were on:
 - 1.
 - 2.
 - 3.
- (v) Did you attend any of the last 3 meetings of the village assembly? Yes/No. If yes, how many of these 3 meetings did you attend?
- If no, give reasons for not attending:
-
- (vi) If you attended all the 3 meetings did you speak at all or any of the 3 meetings of the village assembly? Yes/No. If yes, state whether in all or in one or two only?
-
- If no, give reasons for not speaking:.....
-
- (vii) Were votes held? Yes/No. If yes, did you vote at any of them? Yes/No. If yes, on what?
- (viii) Would you to participate more? Yes/No. If yes, on what issues or areas, and how would you like popular participation expanded?
-
- (ix) Did you encounter any problems in the decision-making activities? Yes/No. If yes, name them:
-
- (x) Are there any RIDEP projects in you village? Yes/No. If yes,

what are they, that is, list them below:

.....
.....
.....

(xi) Did you participate in the identification, formulation and implementation of these RIDEF projects in your village? Yes/No. If yes, which of the above mentioned RIDEF projects:

(xii) Of these above RIDEF projects, which did you agree with: ... and which you did not agree with:
Give reasons for not agreeing with the others on these RIDEF projects:

(xiii) Mention RIDEF projects on which you worked personally:

19. Benefits and disadvantages of the RIDEF programmes/projects:

(i) What are your views on the RIDEF programmes/projects:

(ii) Have the RIDEF programmes/projects helped to improve your well-being? Yes/No. If yes, how?

(iii) Are you better off now than you were before the implementation of the RIDEF programmes/projects? Yes/No. If yes, explain in what way(s):
If no, give reasons:

(iv) What are the problems/shortcomings of RIDEF programmes/projects?

(v) Can you suggest ways for overcoming these problems/shortcomings?

APPENDIX C

QUESTIONNAIRE II

(To be completed by village leaders and officials in the village sample).

PART I

BACKGROUND INFORMATION (VILLAGE HISTORY)

1. Village: Ward:
Division: District:
Region: Date of Interview:.....
2. Date of the village registration:
3. Village size (population):
Number of workforce:
4. When was village established (village history):
5. Number of villagers before villagisation:
6. Number of villagers after villagisation:
7. Where did the villagers come from during villagisation:
8. Traditional activities in the village (e.g. cultivating, rearing, fishing, hunting, etc.) and their significance to the village economy:
9. Which services are available/present in the village?
 - (i) Education facilities:
School: Yes/No. If yes, complete the follow:-
 - (a) Buildings:
- Classrooms: Demand:.....
Present:.....
Shortfall:.....
- Teachers houses: Demand:.....
Present:.....
Shortfall:.....
 - (b) Manpower: Teachers: Demand:.....
Present:.....
Shortfall:.....
Grade of Teachers: A:
B:
 - (ii) Health facilities: (a) Rural health centre []
(b) Dispensary []
(c) First aid box []
(Tick v as applicable)
- (aa) Availability of essential drugs*:
 1. Chloroquine tab.: good/average/scarce
 2. Penicillin inj.: good/average/scarce
 3. Thiazina tab.: good/average/scarce
 4. Mebendazole: good/average/scarce
 5. Ferrous sulphate: good/average/scarce

- 6. Phenobarbitone tab.: good/average/scarce
- 7. Aspirin tab.: good/average/scarce
- 8. Paracetamol tab.: good/average/scarce
- 9. Tetracycline tab/cap: good/average/scarce
- 10. Oral Rehydration Salts: good/average/scarce
- 11. Largactil tab.: good/average/scarce

(bb) Availability of essential equipment*:

- 1. Stethoscope: available/not available
- 2. Thermometer: available/not available
- 3. Microscope: available/not available
- 4. Bathroom scale: available/not available
- 5. Child scale: available/not available
- 6. Vaccination kit: available/not available
- 7. Blood pressure machine: available/not available
- 8. Delivery bed: available/not available
- 9. Faetalscope: available/not available
- 10. Stove: available/not available
- 11. Steriliser: available/not available
- 12. Refrigerator: available/not available

* Strike out which is not relevant.

- (iii) Rural water supply: Yes/No. If yes, indicate the state of operational utility in the last 12 months. Has it been operational all the time? Yes/No. Most of the time (8-12 months)? Yes/No. Some time (5-8 months)? Yes/No. Hardly ever/never (less than 5 months in aggregate)-Yes/No.
- (iv) Village warehouse: Yes/No. If yes, when constructed and how?
- (v) Village(s). Yes/No. If yes, when established and how many? By whom?
- (vi) Grinding mill/sheller. Yes/No. If yes, how many and state ownership and when established:
- (vii) Small-scale industries: Yes/No. If yes, name them showing their ownership and when established:
- How were these small-scale industries started? Under the RIDEP, local authority or individual entrepreneurs?
- (viii) Other services: (a) Bus stand: Yes/No.
(b) Market stall/place: Yes/No
(c) Village library: Yes/No.
(d) Post Office: Yes/No.
(e) Cattle dip: Yes/No.

13. Cash crop production trends (1980/81 - 1984/85)

Crop	1980/81		1981/82		1982/83		1983/84		1984/85	
	Area	Yld	Area	Yld	Area	Yld	Area	Yld	Area	Yld
Coffee										
Cotton										
Coconuts										
Cardamon										
Sisal										
.....										

14. Marketing of produce

Crop	1980/81		1981/82		1982/83		1983/84		1984/85	
	Amo- unt (kg)	Inc- ome (sh)	Amo- unt (kg)	Inc- ome (sh)	Amo- unt (kg)	Inc- ome (sh)	Amo- unt (kg)	Inc- ome (sh)	Amo- unt (kg)	Inc- ome (sh)
Coffee										
Cotton										
Coconut										
Sisal										
Maize										
Paddy										
Beans										
.....										

15. Village accessibility (road/railway network)

- (i) Pre-RIDEP:
- (ii) Change since RIDEP implementation started:
- (iii) Who produced these improvements:
- (iv) If deterioration of these facilities has occurred, can you explain why it is so?

16. Village political organisation for popular participatory decision-making. Does the village have:

- (i) A Party branch: Yes/No.
- (ii) A Village Assembly: Yes/No.
If yes, state number of meetings in the last 12 months:
- (iii) A Village Council: Yes/No. If yes, state number of meetings in the last 12 months.

- (iv) Village Council committees:
 - (a) Defence and security committee: Yes/No. If yes, state number of meetings in the last 12 months:
 - (b) Production and marketing committee: Yes/No. If yes, state number of meetings in the last 12 months:
 - (c) Planning and finance committee: Yes/No. If yes, state number of meetings in the last 12 months:
 - (d) Construction and transport committee: Yes/No. If yes, state number of meetings in the last 12 months:
 - (e) Education, culture and social welfare committee: Yes/No. If yes, state number of meetings in the last 12 months:

- 17. Village technical manpower:
 - (i) Villager manager: Yes/No.
 - (ii) Agricultural extension worker: resident/non-resident: If non-resident state number of visits during the last 12 months:
 - (iii) Livestock extension worker: resident/non-resident. If non-resident, state number of visits during the last 12 months:
 - (iv) Natural resources expert: resident/non-resident. If non-resident, state number of visits during the last 12 months:
 - (v) Cooperative assistant: resident/non-resident. If non-resident, state number of visits during the last 12 months:
 - (vi) Community development assistant: resident/non-resident. If non-resident, state number of visits during the 12 months:
 - (vii) Others: resident/non-resident. If non-resident, state frequency of visits in the last 12 months:

PART II

VILLAGE LEADERS/OFFICIALS INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONNAIRE

- 18. Name of village leader/official:
- Age:
- Position/Function:
- Qualification:
- Place of work/village:
- How long served/worked in the village:
- Previous experience:

19. Village development activities:

(a) List RIDEP projects in the village:

.....
.....

For each project state:

- (i) When initiated?
- (ii) Who initiated?
- (iii) How? (procedure for introduction):
.....
- (iv) Progress, success and/or failure of the project(s):
.....
- (v) Reasons for failure:
.....
- (vi) Loan/credit taken for implementation of the project(s), amount, use and repayment:
.....
- (vii) State benefits of RIDEP projects:
 - (a) In general:
 - (b) Which project has most benefits?
 - (c) Which project has least benefits?
 - (d) How has each project benefited the people?
 - (e) Discuss the merits of the RIDEP projects in respect of:
 - 1. Social benefits:
 - 2. Organisational and managerial benefits:
 - 3. Well integrated planning and implementation benefits:
 - 4. Participatory decision-making: Did villagers participate in the formulation of the RIDEP projects? Yes/No. If yes, explain how (the procedure in decision-making): ...
- (viii) State disadvantages of the RIDEP projects:
 - (a) In general:
 - (b) Which project has most disadvantage? ...
 - (c) Which project has least disadvantage? ..
 - (d) Which are the demerits of the RIDEP projects in terms of costs, breakdowns, unreliability, increased authoritarianism and commandism?
.....
- (ix) Suggest ways which would improve the formulation, identification and implementation of RIDEP projects:
.....
- (x) Have RIDEP projects improved the well-being of the rural people? Yes/No. How?
.....

- (xi) How have the women been involved in the RIDEP activities? (i.e. in decision-making and in identification and formulation of the RIDEP projects, especially those to benefit the village women):
 - (xii) Should RIDEP projects continue? Yes/No. If yes, what type of things/activities should RIDEP concentrate?
What should it not do?
- (b) List non-RIDEP projects in the village:
.....
.....
- For each project state:
- (i) When initiated?
 - (ii) Who initiated?
 - (iii) How? (procedure for introduction)
 - (iv) Progress, success and/or failure of the non-RIDEP projects:
 - (v) Reasons for failure:
 - (vi) Loan/credit taken for implementation of the project(s). Yes/No. If yes, state amount, use and repayment:
 - (vii) State benefits of non-RIDEP projects:
 - (a) In general:
 - (b) Which project has most benefits?
 - (c) Which project has least benefits?
 - (d) How has each project benefited the people?
 - (e) Discuss the merits of non-RIDEP projects:
 - 1. Social benefits:
 - 2. Organisational and managerial benefits:
 - 3. Well integrated planning and implementation benefits:
 - 4. Participatory decision-making: Did villagers participate in the formulation of these non-RIDEP projects? Yes/No. If yes, explain how (the procedure in decision-making):
 - (viii) State disadvantages of non-RIDEP projects:
 - (a) In general:
 - (b) Which project has most disadvantage?
 - (c) Which project least disadvantage?
 - (d) Which are the demerits of non-RIDEP projects in terms of costs, breakdowns, unreliability increased authoritarianism

- and commandism:
-
- (ix) Suggest ways which would improve the
formulation, identification of RIDEPs:
.....
- (x) Have non-RIDEP projects improved the wellbeing
of the rural people? Yes/No.
- (xi) How have the women been involved in non-RIDEP
activities? (i.e. in decision-making and in
identification and formulation of non-RIDEP
projects, especially those to benefit the
village women):
-
- (xii) Should non-RIDEP projects continue? Yes/No.
If yes, what type of things/activities should
non-RIDEP concentrate?
-
- What should it not do?

APPENDIX D
THE FINDINGS OF THE VILLAGE SURVEYS IN TANGA REGION

1. Introduction

The discussion in Chapter 3 presented a description of the methodology used in the study to investigate the effectiveness and efficiency of the RIDEP interventions as opposed to those undertaken under non-RIDEP activity. The purpose of these village surveys was to garner information from the grassroots level, that is, from the target population, the direct beneficiaries themselves, about the effects and impacts of the various components of the RIDEP. In particular, the village surveys sought to identify the extent of implementation, effects and impacts of the Tanga RIDEP projects on the quality of life of the target population. In addition, the surveys have been used to investigate the extent of popular participation in the identification, formulation and implementation of the RIDEP projects.

In this context, it has been found necessary to ask certain questions directly to the villagers about their agricultural production and welfare activities, and how these have been influenced by the RIDEP and non-RIDEP interventions. Further, the surveys sought information on the views of the village leaders and officials on the implementation, advantages and disadvantages of the RIDEP and non-RIDEP projects. This information was obtained with the aid of a questionnaire (Appendices B and C), which was designed by the author to test some of the hypotheses of the study (see Chapter 1).

The village surveys were designed to find out whether agricultural production and productivity have improved as a result of adoption of improved cultivation methods and cultural practices. These are essentially time of planting, spacing or plant population per unit area, use of improved seeds, commercial fertilisers and insecticides, agricultural mechanisation - that is "tractorialisation", because the tractors are usually used only for land preparation (cultivation/ploughing and occasionally harrowing) so that the rest of the activities are performed by hand - and oxenisation. The adoption and application of these improved methods and practices would have been made possible by the increased activity in the delivery of agricultural extension services and procurement and distribution of agricultural inputs funded by the RIDEP.

Moreover, the mode of agricultural production in the villages (communal and individual) was important to be examined in order to determine what influence the RIDEP activities had on it. As noted, one of the objectives of the RIDEP plan was to support communal production as part of plan's commitment to reduce inequalities among the rural people (TIRDEP, 1975:404-11).

The village surveys were also intended to glean information on the extent of improvement of the well-being of the target population during the past five years in terms of income, food and nutritional levels, delivery of health, education and water supply services. A peasant interviewee in a sample village was asked to state the amount of his income and its source (whether from sale of food or cash crops or both), indicating whether it has increased or decreased during the period 1980/81-1984/85. Further, he/she was asked to state the causes of the increase or decrease of his/her income and whether the RIDEP had any influence on it. Similar questions were posed about the delivery of welfare services and their quality. For example, it is not sufficient for a village to have its own dispensary or water supply, if such services were inoperational for, say, six to eight months per year for lack of drugs or fuel and spare parts respectively. Likewise the provision of the schooling facilities cannot be a sufficient service in itself to the villagers, if teaching staff and basic

equipment are not made available or are available in number and quantity, which affects the quality of the outcome.

The village surveys were used too to determine the extent of village-level participation in decision-making in general and in RIDEF activities in particular. The village institutions are the basis upon which popular participation in decision-making can take place and be fostered. In the Tanzanian context, the village institutions for participatory decision-making are the village assembly, village council and its standing committees as established by the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975 and recently incorporated in the Local Government (District Authorities) Act of 1982, whose application was effective from January 1984. The present study holds the view that popular participation in a village community can take place and foster effectively only through established and democratically organised village institutions such as those mentioned above.

However, it has been found necessary to find out whether these institutions existed and functioned in the study villages. Thus, questions about their existence, meetings and their frequency and nature/type of decisions taken in them were asked in order to determine the extent of popular participation. For example, a village interviewee was asked what important decisions have been made in the village institutions in the past five years and if he/she did take part in the meetings in which such decisions were taken. Further, the interviewees were asked whether they liked to participate more and on what areas/issues. Finally, they were asked to state their views on whether they had participated more or less in the formulation and identification of the RIDEF and non-RIDEF projects.

The surveys were also designed to collect information on the village history and existence of services and whether the latter were provided with assistance from the RIDEF. This information was solicited from the village leaders and officials, who also provided information on both RIDEF and non-RIDEF activities. Moreover, information was sought regarding various types/modes of agricultural production (ujamaa/communal farming, block farming and individual farming) and what significance each had in the village economy.

Village technical management was considered an important input in bringing about the improvement of the living conditions of the villagers. Therefore, its content and quality were important factors which needed to be determined as well. The village leaders and officials were also asked to list RIDEF and non-RIDEF projects and state their successes and failures. Such information could be useful in determining the role and significance of the RIDEF projects when compared with the non-RIDEF activities.

At this juncture, a discussion on the reliability of the findings if the village surveys is in order. The first handicap of this exercise was the size of the sample, that is, it was small - 8 villages (see Map A.1) out of 535 villages and 70 village respondents out of the total regional rural workforce of over 600,000 people. Although the issue of sample size has been dealt with in Chapter 3, one appreciates the fact that a sample size must be big enough to permit generalisability of results. Regarding the questions investigated in the questionnaires, it is worth noting that on the whole satisfactory answers were received from the respondents. Nonetheless, some questions were understood better than others and therefore, more appropriate answers were received than in those which were less understood. For example, questions regarding adoption and application (or non-adoption and non-application) of improved farming methods, income levels and whether these had increased or decreased, and popular participation were well understood and appropriate answers were recorded. In this regard, the approach was useful and appropriate in gathering the desired

information. In particular, income level groups, instead of precise income earned, seemed to encourage quick answers from the respondents. Generally, peasant villagers were well aware of the status of their recent income and whether it has improved or not. In addition, they would also describe causes for such state.

Some village respondents seemed confounded about RIDEP and non-RIDEP projects, because to them all were "government" projects, even if they knew that the Germans were in the region 'helping' the government provide them with services, etc. This group was, however, a minority and usually some explanation from the enumerators or the author tended to overcome this confusion. Of the two types of questionnaires (Appendices B (for the villagers) and C (for the village officials)) better answers were received in the second questionnaire (Appendix C), presumably because these respondents were better informed than the ordinary villagers. A clear shortcoming of the questionnaires is their length, that is, the number of questions being asked. This was exacerbated by the time limitation, which in turn was constrained by scarcity of funds and the transport bottleneck. It seems evident that one needs to be mindful of the time one can expect to obtain information from the peasant respondent without boring or inconveniencing him/her too much with consequences on its quality. Moreover, some rewording or rephrasing of questions was felt necessary in the course of administering a pilot survey. But on occasions it was felt still more could be done in order to gain maximum benefit from the exercise.

For the purposes of this study, the findings *ceteris paribus* are sufficiently reliable to permit both some generalisability within the area of study and a basis for future empirical research. Moreover, some questions raised in the study need further empirical evidence. For example, we need to know in more precise terms than hitherto on the impact of the rural development interventions on rural incomes, quality of life and popular participation. We need to establish causality of the effects and impacts with the project interventions. Such evidence can be forthcoming only through further research. The preparation of the questionnaires needs also careful consideration and experimenting in a pilot survey, before actual survey is undertaken.


In the next section we briefly describe each of the villages, in which the surveys were carried out. Map A.1 shows the geographical position of each village studied. The choice of the villages was based on the stage of development.

2. Background Notes on the Survey Sample Villages

The survey findings will be presented and analysed (Section 3) by reference to the main development objectives being examined in the Tanga case study, not by individual villages. Therefore, the characteristics of each village are first described briefly here.

2.1. Mkingaleo

Mkingaleo is a traditional village situated some 8 km into the hinterland from the Tanga-Horohoro (Kenya border) or some 36 km from Tanga town. It has a population of 1,950 people as at May 1986. Of these 539 people are able-bodied persons i.e. can work while the remainder are dependants, children and old people. Mkingaleo, perhaps, started at the beginning of this century. At the time, both crop cultivation and cattle rearing were practised (M. von Freyhold, 1979:17-8). In recent years, however, cattle rearing has almost disappeared due to frequent outbreaks of East Coast Fever and scarcity of



grazing land.

The village's population almost doubled during villagisation between 1974 and 1976. These people came from the adjoining areas where they were living in scattered homesteads. The village was registered under the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act in 1976. Its main enterprise is crop cultivation, major crops being cassava, cashewnuts and coconuts. Other crops include bananas, mangoes, beans, cowpeas, grams and pigeon peas.

There is a primary school, a dispensary and piped water supply. Other services are a village godown built on self-help, a village shop, a bus stop, a post office, a butchery, a cafe and village library.

2.2. Pongwe Kaskazini

Pongwe Kaskazini is one part of a big village, known as Pongwe. This village was divided in 1977 into two villages, Pongwe Kaskazini (North) and Pongwe Kusini (South). Pongwe is in Tanga urban district and is 16 km from the Tanga municipality on the Tanga-Korogwe road. It is also a railway station of the Tanga-Arusha railway. Pongwe is an old village, perhaps, spanning a century of existence.

Before villagisation Pongwe village had about 2,700 people, but after villagisation the population rose to over 4,000 people, of whom 1,100 comprise the village workforce.

Major economic activities are cultivation and rearing. Crops grown are cassava, coconuts, maize and sweet potatoes. Livestock kept by some villagers are cattle, goats, sheep and poultry.

There is a rural health centre in the village. There is also a primary school, a piped water supply and electricity, so that those villagers who can afford it have electricity brought into their houses. The village has two shops which were started by the villagers through their contributions. The first shop was started in 1979 and the second was established in 1984. A club was started also in 1984 through the villagers' contributions.

2.3. Kwamkono

Kwamkono village is in Handeni district about 50 km to the east of Handeni town. It is 20 km from Sindeni, another village (a divisional headquarters), which is situated on the Korogwe-Handeni road. At the time of the author's visit Kwamkono had a population of 5,000 people, of whom 1,900 formed the village workforce. Over 3,000 people joined the village during villagisation. These people came from the adjoining hamlets and scattered homesteads. Kwamkono is a very large village and, presumably, for this reason the RIDEP designers designated it as one of the central places. It has abundant land for both cultivation and grazing. Due to its size, distance to work is a problem, which needs addressing.

Major economic activities are crop production and livestock keeping. Crops grown include cassava, maize, cotton, bananas, cowpeas and pigeon peas. Coconuts and cashewnuts are also grown. Livestock kept by some villagers include cattle, goats, sheep and poultry, and to a minor extent some ducks and rabbits.

Kwamkono has two primary schools, because of its large population. One of these schools was constructed by the RIDEP. The other was constructed through funds made available by the government and self-help of the villagers. The village has one of the bedded dispensaries in the district (see Table 6.7, p. 302, especially footnote (a)). It is a mission dispensary with 35 beds and

drug availability was reported by the villagers and functionaries to be satisfactory. The village's water supply comes through the Handeni Trunk Main, but, as we shall see later, water availability averaged 5-8 months per year, mainly due to fuel and spares shortages.

Other services include 7 shops, 2 of which are owned communally by the villagers, one privately owned maize mill and a beer club. The village owns and runs a restaurant and a guest house. There is a bus stop, a market, a dip, a post office and a maintenance workshop owned by the bus operator.

2.4. Sangeni

Sangeni is 25 km from Handeni town, and 8 km from Msente village, which is a seat of the ward secretary. Msente is on the Handeni-Kiberashi road, which connects the western parts of the district with Handeni town. Sangeni is connected to Msente by a track, which is only passable by vehicles during the dry season. It has a population of 800 people, of whom 280 comprise the village labour force.

Main crops are maize, sorghum, pigeon peas and beans. The village is surrounded with vast bushlands, where the nomadic Masai graze their livestock. A few villagers also own livestock, especially cattle, disease incidence is frequent as there is no dip in the village.

There is a primary school, built through government assistance and self-help. At the time of the research visit the school had five permanent classrooms and one temporary classroom (a pole and mud structure). Thus, there is a shortfall of two permanent classrooms. Of 8 needed teachers houses, there were only 2, the shortfall being 6 houses. There were 9 teachers, total demand being 11 teachers. Sangeni has no reliable source of water; the villagers depend on traditional wells and a seasonal stream. These sources of water supply are a health hazard. The village has no dispensary nor any other service.

2.5. Viti

Viti village is in Shume ward of Mlalo division in Lushoto district. It is situated on the Lushoto-Mtae road, about 35 km from Lushoto town. This road is an all-weather gravel road frequently used by bus and lorry operators between Tanga and Mtae, as well as between Mtae and Dar es Salaam and Moshi. This road serves the famous area which grows vegetables, temperate fruits (e.g. apples, pears, plums and peaches), tea, coffee and rice (agro-ecological zones 5 and 10 in Map 6.3). Viti has a population of 3,900 people, of whom 1,440 form the village workforce.

The village is sited in a narrow valley so that most of the households are situated on mountain/hill slopes. Viti is a traditional village with one third of its population having joined it during villagisation. Most of these people came from the more steep slopes above the village. Many villagers are both land cultivators and livestock keepers. Common crops are maize, cassava, vegetables, temperate fruits and beans. A few villagers have coffee trees, but a recent trend is that many coffee trees are being replaced with temperate fruit trees such as apples and pears or Guatemala grass in order to meet conditions for loans to buy dairy cattle under the RIDEP's soil erosion control and agroforestry project.

Common livestock found in the village are cattle, goats, sheep and poultry. A few households keep pigs as well. At the time of the field research visit Viti had 1,058 head of cattle, of which 209 were improved dairy cattle, 430 goats and 506 sheep. Grazing land is a serious constraint.

Viti has a primary school, but no dispensary. It has to depend on a dispensary of a neighbouring village, Manolo, which is 5 km away on the Lushoto-Mtae road. There is no piped water supply. The villagers have to depend on traditional wells and a stream, which fortunately for them flows throughout the year. However, some villagers get their water from two shallow wells constructed by the RIDEP.

Viti is one of the 23 villages benefiting from the soil erosion control and agroforestry project, which has three components; crop production, livestock and tree planting. An agricultural extension worker has been posted at the village who supervises all three components of the project. This worker is a woman and has been in the village for about two years when the village was visited by the author. Project villagers are required to grow Guatemala grass in contour lines in their shambas. A minimum of 3,000 m (length) of Guatemala grass is required before a villager can qualify for a loan to buy a heifer and materials for the construction of a cow shed. During the first phase (1981-84) a loan totalled Tshs 10,400 per person and during the second phase (1984-88) it was raised to Tshs 12,400. A nursery was established in the village to raise tree seedlings (mainly pines and eucalyptus species) for distribution to the villagers to plant in their land.

2.6. Kimang'a

Kimang'a village is about 25 km north of Pangani town. It is situated at the fringes of the Bago sisal estate, belonging to the Amboni Group. This village came into being during the villagisation period. Most people came from the estate camps, in which they have lived for years as sisal estate workers. Because of this historical background, Kimang'a, like Mwanyumba, has a population of quite mixed ethnic groups. Some of these people came from Iringa, Ruvuma, Rukwa and Kigoma regions during the days of migrant labour of the colonial and early post-independence eras. At the time of the research visit Kimang'a had 1,130 people and its labour force comprised of 375 people.

Land cultivation is the only major economic activity of the village. The villagers grow cassava, maize, bananas, coconuts, beans and green grams. The village has 100 acres of communal farm, in which they grow maize and coconuts.

Key services in the village include a primary school built by the RIDEP in 1977 and completed in 1978, a dispensary and a piped water supply provided by the regional administration. In addition, Bago sisal estate constructed two shallow wells, which provide the villagers with an alternative source of clean water. In fact, at the time of the author's visit the piped water system was non-operational, because the pump was out of order and lack of fuel. Thus, the two wells were the only sources of water for the villagers. The wells are about half a kilometre from the centre of the village.

Kimang'a primary school is one of the early beneficiaries of the RIDEP's polytechnical education support programme (PESP). It was provided with agricultural implements (hoes, machetes, garden knives, forks, spades, slashers, rakes and wheel-barrows) and inputs (chemical fertilisers and insecticides) in 1978 when the school was handed over to the regional authorities. One teacher has received training in the teaching of agriculture as a subject and in supervision of farm activities.

Kimang'a was also included in the RIDEP's agricultural extension and village management/bookkeeping projects.

group of villagers, was called an "ujamaa village". Indeed, during the period 1967-73 most of the "ujamaa villages" were *working together* villages and not *living together* villages. Later, after villagisation, some confusion arose about calling some of the many villages, in which people have been moved in non-voluntarily as part of the government's mammoth effort to resettle the rural people. This new effort was dictated more by development imperatives - especially in the provision of social services which would take account of economies of scale - than the ideological requirement for rural socialisation. In an endeavour to clear this confusion a term "development villages" was briefly used to label these villages in order to distinguish them from the early "ujamaa villages". This attempt was equally futile, because in reality the distinction was very thin. The Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975 attempted for the first time since villagisation to remove this confusion by offering a better definition of an "ujamaa village". Somehow the confusion persisted because, partly, of interchangeable use of the term and partly, of the actual circumstances obtaining in the so-called ujamaa villages - communal activities were in most cases still rudimentary. Thus, in recent years as part and parcel of the elaboration of the *Siasa ni Kilimo* (Politics is Agriculture) competitions has the concept of "ujamaa village" undergone fine-tuning to include criteria that emphasise socialised production and management of economic and social activities in a village (CCM, 1984).


Magamba is 60 km from Korogwe and 20 km from Mombo, which is on the Tanga-Moshi road. The village has a population of 2,720 people with 1,110 of them forming the village labour force. The village started in the early sixties when a group of workers from the Kwalukonge sisal estate and their families settled in the site of the present village. In 1970 a group of 70 people decided to start a cooperative shop and in 1971 they started a communal farm of 20 acres. In this farm they grew maize and cotton. The shop was started with a capital of Tshs 248. By 1975 there were 267 cooperators, who owned and operated two shops which had a total turnover of Tshs 202,266, a farm of 260 acres and a maize mill which has earned them about Tshs 17,000 per annum.

In 1984/85 Magamba/Kwalukonge had 430 acres of communal farm and 3,000 acres of block farming. In that year the village earned Tshs 380,286 from sale of maize, sorghum, beans, groundnuts and finger millets from their communal farm.

The village earns revenue from other communal activities as well, such as from its three shops which had in 1985 a total capital of Tshs 468,930 with an annual turnover of over Tshs 1.8 million, two maize mills (earned them Tshs 148,500 in 1984/85) and two workshops (carpentry and tailoring) that earned them Tshs 600,000 in 1984/85. Other communally owned services include a local beer club, a hotel, a bar, a guest house, 3 tractors, a lorry, a bus and a butchery. These activities brought some Tshs 4.5 million to the villagers in 1984/85. In all these communal activities, it earned about Tshs 8.3 million in 1984/85, obviously quite a remarkable achievement by a village community. As a result, the village pays its cooperators a monthly allowance of Tshs 300 for those who work in the shamba, while those who work in non-farm ventures earn an average of Tshs 500-750 per month. All the villagers have each his or her own shamba in the block farming area (see Map A.2).

There is a primary school in the village with over 600 pupils and 14 teachers. There are 13 classrooms, which is the total demand, but there are 3 teachers houses, when the total demand is 15 houses. The classrooms and teachers houses have been built by the villagers, partly through self-help and partly through village government funds. The regional administration provided materials. There is shortfall of 3 teachers. The school also benefited from the

Map A.2: Layout of Magamba/Kwalukonge Ujamaa Village, Tanga Region



PESP programme. The school has 25 acres of school shamba. In 1984/85 the school earned Tshs 30,000. Part of this money was used to connect electricity to the school buildings and teachers houses. The village has electricity since 1974.

The village has a piped water supply and a dispensary, which was constructed with assistance from the Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF). Magamba/Kwalukonge has a programme of constructing good houses for its members. At the time of the field research visit in June 1986 there were 30 houses under this programme, of which 20 were completed and families were already living in them. The village uses communal funds to build these houses and then hands them to families in need who have to repay the village government at subsidised rates for a period of 15 years. The village also gets loan money from the Tanzania Housing Bank, usually offering its vast assets as colateral. Individual members cannot get loans from this bank, because they have no assets to offer as colateral, in other words they are viewed as uncreditworthy.

3. The Village Survey Findings

In this section the findings of the village surveys are presented. This analysis starts with agricultural production and is followed with a discussion of the infrastructural developments. Finally, the results of the investigation on popular participation are presented.

3.1. Agricultural Production and Productivity

Table A.1 presents results of responses of villagers on adoption and use of improved cultivation methods, mode of cultivation, income, food and nutrition status and influence of the RIDEP interventions on all these activities. Sections B and C of Questionnaire I (Appendix B) has questions which sought to determine the extent of improvement of agricultural productivity in the studied villages. In particular the villagers were asked whether their cultivation methods have changed and improved for both food and cash crops as a result of the RIDEP activities. The villagers responded that they still followed the traditional methods of cultivation, except in Magamba/Kwalukonge village where an overwhelming majority of interviewed villagers said that they followed better crop husbandry villages or 50 per cent of the total sample had only 10-17 per cent of the total number of respondents stating that they followed improved methods. Viti had 38 per cent, Kimang'a 25 per cent, Mwanyumba 30 per cent while Magamba/Kwalukonge had 80 per cent respondents who followed improved methods of cultivation.

These results are rather interesting when one considers the fact that in six of the villages (Mkingaleo, Pongwe Kaskazini, Viti, Kimang'a, Mwanyumba and Magamba/Kwalukonge) there was a resident agricultural extension worker. This substantiates the view that the region's extension services are ineffective. It also shows the ineffectiveness of the RIDEP interventions, under its agricultural extension project, which covered also Mwanyumba, Kimang'a and Magamba/Kwalukonge. Mwanyumba, Magamba/Kwalukonge, Kwamkono and Pongwe Kaskazini also benefited from the PESP programme. The programme purports to inculcate better farming methods in the pupils, who are the future village peasants. The impact of such endeavour can only be felt in the long-term, when the pupils become peasants and practice the knowledge learnt whilst at school. Nonetheless, at this stage one should, probably, look for signs that this is likely to take place or not. The evidence shows that good results have been achieved by the schools themselves in terms of output and income accrued from sale of school farm produce. Even in terms of the organisation and management of the school

Table A.1: Interviewees responses on agricultural production and productivity in sample villages of Tanga region

Activity	Mkingaleo	Pongwe Kaska- zini	Kvankono	Sangeni	Viti	Kimang'a	Mwanyumba	Magamba/ Kwalukonge
Percentages (a)(b)								
A, Adoption/use of improved cultivation methods & practices	13	10	10	17	38	25	30	80
B, Mode of cultivation								
-ujamaa farming	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	30
-block farming	0	0	30	0	13	25	30	70
-individual farming	100	100	70	100	87	75	60	0
C, Income								
-increased	13	0	0	0	49	13	20	70
-no change	25	10	10	0	38	25	20	20
-declined	62	90	90	100	13	62	60	10
D, Food/nutrition status								
-improved	13	10	10	0	62	13	20	70
-no change	25	30	30	17	25	38	30	20
-declined	62	60	60	83	13	49	50	10
E, RIDEP influence on A, B, C & D; Rank (c)	0	0	0	0	4	2	2	3
Respondent scores (d)								
-major influence	0	0	0	0	25	0	0	0
-some influence	0	0	0	0	38	13	10	0
-little influence	0	0	0	0	25	25	20	10
-no influence	100	100	100	100	12	62	70	90
No. of respondents	8	10	10	6	8	8	10	10

Notes: (a) Results are based on subjective judgement of interviewees and thus appropriate caution in the interpretation is needed.

(b) Percentages have been rounded to avoid decimalisation.

(c) Ranking of RIDEP strength has been done as follows:

Ranking: 4 points = 4 RIDEP projects and over.

2-3 points = 2-3 RIDEP projects.

1 points = 1 RIDEP projects.

0 point = no RIDEP project.

(d) These are percentages based on answers of respondents when asked whether the RIDEP had 'major', 'some', 'little' or 'no' influence on the activities A-D. In other words, the respondents' responses (c) have been expressed in percentages.

farms good results have been registered. However, there is no evidence to support the hope that receptivity of innovations and technological knowledge is being diffused into the larger community of the village.

Turning to the mode of cultivation in the study villages, the surveys show that ujamaa farming is a very small component compared to the other modes of cultivation. This component is small even in the Magamba/Kwalukonge ujamaa village itself, where it forms only 30 per cent of all cultivated land in the village. Individual and scattered shambas are the predominant form of farming in the majority of these villages. This seems to be in consonance with the general

concern sounded in a report to the President when on a tour of the region in early 1986. The report states: "In view of these targets, it is evident that the ujamaa sector was not given adequate emphasis commensurate with its significance in the economy. There is a need to give it a new push in its expansion, development and sustenance" (RC's Office, 1986:36). It is notable that there is no individual/private farming in Magamba/Kwalukonge (see Map A.2).

The two villages, which fared better than the others, are Viti and Magamba/Kwalukonge. In the former 49 per cent of the respondents said that their incomes have increased during the past five years, whereas 38 per cent felt that there was no change and 13 per cent said that their incomes had declined. The majority of the interviewed villagers in Magamba/Kwalukonge said that their incomes have increased in the past five years. Only 10 per cent felt that their incomes have declined, while 20 per cent spoke of no change of their incomes. This helps to confirm the report of the Village Secretary on the economic activities of the village in the past decade as summarised in section 2.8 (pp. 25-8).

Reasons frequently mentioned for increased incomes were increased crop production due to good weather, adoption and use of improved crop husbandry methods and practices, increased endeavour due to prevalence of incentives (implements, inputs, prices, effective agricultural advice, credit) and effective village leadership. The reasons mentioned for the declining agricultural production and incomes were bad weather and lack of inputs. At some occasions respondents cited old age or inadequacy of family labour as some of the reasons constraining their endeavour to increase agricultural production and consequently income.

Table A.2 presents information on nominal income levels of respondents in the study villages. This information does reveal noticeable variations of income levels within and between villages and indeed, between families. It is significant to note that the main source of income has been generally food crops i.e. revenue realised through the sale of part of farm produce such as maize, cassava and some grain legumes (e.g. beans, pigeon peas and green grams).² Even in Lushoto, where coffee, tea and vegetables and temperate fruits are the cash crops, and Handeni, where cotton is the cash crop, food crops are the major or the only source of household income. The significance of this point lies in the fact that official policy has for years treated crops in rigid terms of cash and food crop compartments. In this way peasants have been exhorted to grow cash crops for sale to earn cash incomes and food crops for their food requirements. Accordingly, sale of food crops is only accepted when it is a surplus.

In practice, however, rural households realise the main part of their incomes from the sale of food crops, these do not necessarily have to be surpluses. For example, the author was told by some respondents that they sold most of their maize crop to earn badly needed cash and their families had to depend on cassava for their food.

In villages, which are in the neighbourhood of sisal estates, wages are another source of income, especially earned by women and children from sisal weeding. These are Pongwe Kaskazini, Kimang'a and Mwanyumba villages. Although Magamba/Kwalukonge ujamaa village is surrounded by the Kwalukonge sisal estate, owned by Ralli Brothers Ltd, its residents rarely work there, presumably, because of lack of "need" to work as labourers in the estates.³ Other sources of family income have been an occasional sale of an animal or chicken or local brew or from running a small family business including crafts.

One additional point needs to be made here regarding the peasant statements about income. One must give them the necessary caveats when subjecting them to

Table A.2: Income levels of households in the sample villages in Tanga region
(in percentages)(a)

Income per head of family per year	Mkingaleo	Pongwe Kaska-zini	Kwamkono	Sangeni	Viti	Kimang'a	Mwanyumba	Magamba/Kwalukonge
Income levels								
Tshs 10,000-20,000	25	30	10	0	25	0	10	80
Tshs 5,000-10,000	0	20	40	0	50	25	20	10
Tshs 3,000- 5,000	13	20	20	33	13	25	30	0
Tshs 1,000- 3,000	62	30	30	67	13	50	50	10
No. of respondents	8	10	10	6	8	8	10	10

Note: (a) Some figures do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

analysis. Given the fact that Bwana Shambas with experience in enumeration and localities were used as enumerators in this study and that there was no cause for fear of taxes (these are called by their village leaders under the supervision or even the strong arm of the ward executive officer), these statements do represent an indication of absolute income levels attained by the respondents.

A similar pattern as that of income is revealed for the status of food and nutrition (Table A.3). The exceptions are again Viti and Magamba/Kwalukonge. Undoubtedly, there is an interdependence between income, food consumption and nutritional status of a household. When interviewees were asked about specific types of food their families consumed, their answers revealed that in the majority of families carbohydrate and starchy foodstuffs dominate the dishes they have daily. Interviewees were given a list of foodstuffs as shown in Table A.3 and were asked to state how many times per day/week/month they took a particular type of food. Ideally, quantities per gm or kg should have been used to measure food consumption. However, given the reality that our sample population is barely literate and nobody uses these unit measures anyway in a village situation, the use of this technique was considered most appropriate in gleaning this type of information (for details on alternative methods see F.J. Bennett in Sofoluwe and Bennett, 1985:47-54; Schofield, 1979:19).

Maize, cassava and "mboga" (see footnote b in Table 6.12 for a definition of "mboga") turned out to be the meals taken daily by most families in our sample. Grain legumes such as beans, peas and grams were the chief sources of proteinaceous foodstuffs. Nonetheless, their consumption was less frequent when compared to maize, cassava and "mboga". For example, beans were taken on average 3-4 times per week, and peas and grams were taken still less frequently. Fish and meat were generally rare dishes, averaging once weekly and fortnightly respectively. It is evident that the family had these dishes when there was extra cash to enable it to buy fish or meat. Significantly, the commonest type of fish was the "dagaa" from Lake Tanganyika, over 1,300 km away. The "dagaa" are the cheapest fish in Tanzania.

From these results it is clear that meat and fish are not the major sources of protein of the majority of the rural people in the region. In this respect, grain legumes are more significant sources of protein for these people. Even these are not taken frequently enough. Given these circumstances, it is little wonder that malnutrition among children is a serious problem in the region.

Table A.3; Pattern of food consumption/intake per family in eight villages of Tanga region as reported by interviewees [May-June 1986](a)

Type of food	Mkingaleo Pongwe Kaskazini	Kwankono	Sangeni	Viti	Kimang'a	Mwanyumba	Magamba/Kwaiukonge
Maize	daily	daily	daily	daily	daily	daily	daily
Rice	1-2/fort,	1-2/fort,	1/fort,	1/month	1-2/month	1-2/month	1-2/fort,
Sorghum	-	-	1/week	2/week	-	-	-
Cassava	daily	3-4/week	daily	daily	-	daily	daily
I.Potatoes	-	-	-	-	daily	-	-
Bananas	1-2/week	1-2/week	2-3/week	-	-	2-3/week	4-5/week
Beans	3-4/week	3-4/week	3-4/week	2-3/week	daily	2-3/week	4-5/week
Peas	2-3/week	1/week	1-2/week	2-3/week	-	1/week	-
Grans	1-2/week	-	-	-	-	-	-
Meat	1-2/fort,	1/week	1-2/fort,	1/month	1-2/fort,1/month	1/month	1/week
Fish	1-2/week	1-2/week	1-2/week	1/month	1/month	1/week	1/week
Vegetables	-	-	-	-	daily	-	-
Fruits	4-5/week	2-3/week	2-3/week	-	daily	4-5/week	2-3/week
Oil/coconut	daily	daily	4-5/week	-	2-3/week	4-5/week	4-5/week
"Mboga"(b)	daily	daily	daily	daily	daily	daily	daily

Notes; (a) Interviewees were asked to state how many times of types of food the family took per day/week/fortnight/month in order to capture the pattern of food intake and nutrition status. Asking them about quantities was found inappropriate given the fact that the majority of the interviewees were only literate and male. In the African tradition when food is available is always prepared in adequate quantities not only for the family, but also for the unexpected guest.

(b) "Mboga" is a dish taken with a maize, sorghum or cassava meal, popularly known as "ugali" or rice, usually as a substitute of meat, fish or grain legumes. "Mboga" includes amaranths, cassava leaves, sweet potato leaves and leaves of several plant species which grow in the wild.

(c) In Tanga region coconut is the main source of oil. In this village groundnuts are the main source of edible oil.

Item E of Table A.1 presents an analysis of the interviewees view of the RIDEF influence on agricultural production, mode of farming, income and food and nutrition in the study villages. Clearly, it is perceived to be of little influence of the RIDEF activities on these issues, which are some of the key objectives of the plan. The number and size of the RIDEF projects were too small to have the desired impact on the target community. It should be noted, however, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, macroeconomic conditions were deteriorating anyway and therefore, it may not be wholly correct to blame this situation on the RIDEF.

3.2. Education

Table A.4 presents data on status of primary school facilities and teaching staff in the eight villages. Construction of classrooms is far better than that of teachers houses; in all averaging 79 per cent of demand of classrooms as opposed to only 25 per cent of demand of teachers houses. The reasons for this discrepancy are similar as those mentioned in Chapter 5 and, therefore, there is no need to repeat them here.

The data presented in Table A.4 make an interesting comparison with data

illustrated in Table A.5, which shows status of primary school facilities and teaching staff as at 31 January 1985. In terms of meeting demand of classroom space, the regional average is 73 per cent of demand being actually met. Handeni district with 88 per cent of demand being met leads all the other districts. Korogwe with 52 per cent tails the rest. The situation is worse in the provision of teachers houses, where the regional average is only 27 per cent of demand. The eight villages in the sample have a similar average (25 per cent).

Handeni, with 79 per cent of demand of teachers houses being physically met, leads again the rest of the districts in the region. Interestingly again, Korogwe is at the bottom with only 9 per cent of demand of teachers houses being met. The implication of this is that housing conditions for teachers in the villages are unsatisfactory. It is no wonder that the Education authorities have to live with the problem of grade A teachers not wanting to stay and teach in the village schools.⁴ Teachers are usually accommodated in school houses, if available, and have to pay rent like any other civil servants. When school houses are not available, they have to rent in the private sector. In a village environment, this is not always possible. For this reason, it is a normal practice to build teachers houses as classrooms are built.

Returning to the village data in Table A.4 three villages have complied with demand of classrooms fully. These are Pongwe Kaskazini, Kimang'a and Magamba/Kwalukonge. Kimang'a classrooms were funded by the RIDEP, whereas those in the other are outcomes of non-RIDEP interventions. Viti with 50 per cent of demand of classroom space being met lags behind the other seven villages. All the seven classrooms of Viti primary school were funded by the RIDEP. The situation is very bad in provision of teachers houses in Mwanyumba village where no single house has been constructed. Oddly, the situation is not any better in the ujamaa village of Magamba/Kwalukonge in the construction of teachers houses. The village leadership claims that it can find suitable accommodation for the teachers posted to the village, which was confirmed by this study. In Kwamkono village the construction of the seven classrooms was funded by the RIDEP. The village has two schools because of it has a large population. Non-RIDEP had also provided seven classrooms and there is a shortfall of 5 classrooms. It seems evident that RIDEP's contribution in the provision of classrooms in the three villages has been significant.

As Table 6.10 (p. 319) shows these are some of the villages which were planned to benefit from some of 300 classrooms and 150 teachers houses in the plan. The evidence in the table illustrates the targets were not met, but these villages had their share fulfilled.

Table A.6 presents data on the status of furniture in the primary schools of Tanga region as at 31 January 1985. These data reveal a poor state of provision of school furniture in all categories in the region. The regional average of 46 per cent of total demand of desks implies that over half of the pupils, who were 214,140 in all as at January 1985, had no desk to sit at and work on. This was confirmed by the village surveys, during which cases were encountered when pupils, especially of Std I-III, sat on the floor or bricks and their teachers in the classrooms and staffrooms used desks instead of tables and chairs. In some occasions, desks were used as cupboards for storing textbooks, etc.

The implication of this state is that desks were not being used by the pupils, for whom they were made and provided for in the first place. Table A.6 also shows the situation of tables, chairs and cupboards in the region's schools. The regional averages of 18, 13 and 16 per cent of demand respectively denote unsatisfactory situation. Handeni, with averages of 3, 2 and 3 per cent

Table A.4: Status of primary school facilities and teaching staff in the sample villages in Tanga region as at the end of June 1986.

School facility	Mkingaleo	Pongwe	Kvankono	Sangeni	Viti	Kimang'a	Mwanyuaba	Magaaba/ Kwalukonge
	Kaska-	(a)						
	zini							
Classrooms								
Demand(b)	7	7	19	7	14	7	6	13
Actual(c)	5	7	14	5	7	7	4	13
Shortfall	2	0	5	2	7	0	2	0
%Actual)	71	100	74	71	50	100	67	100
Teachers houses								
Demand(d)	7	14	31	9	14	8	5	14
Actual	3	6	6	2	4	2	0	3
Shortfall	4	8	25	7	10	6	5	11
%Actual)	43	43	19	22	29	25	0	21
Teachers								
Demand(e)	14	16	29	11	16	9	9	17
Actual	7	14	31	9	14	8	5	14
Shortfall	7	2	+2	2	2	1	4	3
%Actual)	50	88	107	82	88	89	56	82
Teachers by grade								
Grade A	3	8	4	1	1	5	3	3
Grade B/C	4	6	27	8	13	3	2	11
Total	7	14	31	9	14	8	5	14
%Grade A)	43	57	13	11	7	63	60	27

- Notes: (a) Kvankono village has two primary schools, one of which was built by the RIDEP,
 (b) A full primary school (Std I-VII) requires 6 classrooms (Stds I&II share the same room as they alternate morning and afternoon). In this case total demand of classrooms is 6 rooms. If the pupil population is greater than standard practice, streams are established. A class has 45 pupils and therefore, each stream requires an extra classroom.
 (c) Temporary classrooms (pole + mud + grass thatch) have been excluded from these figures.
 (d) This established according to the number of teachers teaching at a school and eligible for school accommodation.
 (e) Demand for teachers is established using a ratio of number of school-age children and ideal classroom size which is 45 pupils per classroom. Thus, a full primary school (note b) should have minimally 7 teachers.

respectively, depicts pitiful sight. It is not surprising that teachers use desks instead. The repercussion of all these conditions on the quality of education cannot be over-emphasised. The design had envisaged provision of school furniture for 230 classrooms, that is, 70 classrooms short of the total planned classrooms to be funded by the RIDEP. The logic of planning would have

Table A.5: Status of primary school facilities and teaching staff in Tanga region as at 31 January 1985.

School facilities	Tanga	Pangani	Muheza	Korogwe	Handeni	Lushoto	Region
Classrooms							
Demand	529	173	1,050	960	825	1,394	4,931
Actual	395	123	754	497	725	1,091	3,585
Shortfall	134	50	296	463	100	303	1,346
%(Actual)	75	71	72	52	88	78	73
<hr/>							
Teachers houses							
Demand	178	234	750	931	876	1,297	4,256
Actual	21	32	141	86	690	167	1,137
Shortfall	157	202	609	845	186	1,120	3,119
%(Actual)	12	14	19	9	79	13	27
<hr/>							
Teachers							
Demand	711	219	1,239	1,676	1,195	1,905	6,945
Actual	711	219	1,008	1,099	1,006	1,301	5,344
Shortfall	-	-	231	577	189	604	1,601
Shortfall-grade A	-	-	202	454	189	604	1,449
-grade B/C	-	-	29	123	-	-	152
%(Actual)	100	100	81	66	84	68	77

Source: (i) Annual Report for 1984, Regional Education Office, Tanga,
(ii) Percentages are author's computations.

demanded that each planned classroom should also be furnished. In any case, the RIDEF was only able to accomplish only one half of the planned target for furniture (see Table 6.10, p. 321).

3.3. Health

It is pertinent to state at the outset that, although the RIDEF plan had elaborated targets for the health sector, no project of this sector was ever implemented during the period under review (see Section 6.2.2 (pp. 301-307), especially Table 6.8 (p. 305); also see Table 6.1 (p. 287)). The data garnered through the village surveys illustrate the extent of the non-RIDEF interventions. This information is useful for comparison of RIDEF (i.e. GTZ-funded projects) and non-RIDEF activities in the region. Undoubtedly, the situation would have been better if the RIDEF plan for the sector had been implemented as envisaged.

Table A.7 presents the data on the health facilities in the study villages and on availability of essential drugs and equipment as reported by the rural medical aides who man the village dispensaries. A word of caution is in order here when interpreting these data due to subjectivity of the questions and answers as recorded in Table A.7. Six out of the eight villages had a dispensary. Kwamkono has a bedded Mission dispensary. On availability of essential drugs it appears that only the supply of chloroquine and oral hydration salts was good in four out of five dispensaries. [Kwamkono dispensary was not included in surveys]. Penicillin injection and aspirin were in good supply in only one out of the five dispensaries. Paracetamol syrup, which is

Table A.6: Status of school furniture in Tanga region as at 31 January 1985.

Types of furniture	Tanga	Pangani	Muheza	Korogwe	Handeni	Lushoto	Region
Desks: Demand	12,845	3,956	19,179	20,022	18,975	34,739	109,720
Actual	6,181	1,767	5,725	13,872	7,099	15,531	50,175
Shortfall	6,668	2,189	13,454	6,150	11,876	19,208	59,545
% (Actual)	48	45	30	69	37	45	46

Tables: Demand	785	370	919	1,213	4,463	3,013	10,763
Actual	316	104	112	193	127	1,067	1,919
Shortfall	469	266	807	1,020	4,336	1,946	8,844
% (Actual)	40	28	12	16	3	35	18

Chairs: Demand	1,077	505	919	1,460	6,675	3,013	13,649
Actual	289	98	112	170	144	963	1,776
Shortfall	788	407	807	1,290	6,531	2,050	11,873
% (Actual)	27	19	12	12	2	32	13

Cupboards: Demand	785	525	304	1,132	3,696	1,561	8,003
Actual	178	97	100	102	105	683	1,265
Shortfall	607	428	204	1,030	3,591	878	6,738
% (Actual)	23	18	33	9	3	44	16

Source: (i) Annual Report for 1984, Regional Education Office, Tanga.

(ii) Percentages are author's computations.

used to relieve sick children, was recorded scarce in three dispensaries and average in the other two.

Regarding the availability of basic equipment, the situation is somewhat better than that of essential drugs. It was only one dispensary (Mkingaleo) which had no stethoscope and another (Kimang'a) which had no thermometer. These same dispensaries had neither a microscope nor a bathroom scale. Overall it is these two dispensaries which each lacked 4 out of the 12 items of essential equipment and were followed by Magamba/Kwalukonge dispensary which lacked 2 out of the 12 items of equipment.

It is necessary to observe here that the situation of essential drugs and equipment is a lot better, because of the existence of a nationwide programme of distribution of essential drugs and equipment funded by DANIDA. Rural dispensaries receive regularly essential drugs, thus arresting a deteriorating situation.

One final point in this section deserves mention. This is the expanded programme of immunisation (EPI) which is supported by the Italian Government and UNICEF. It is a nationwide intervention which is administered by the Ministry of Health and Health Departments of the Regional Administrations. This programme has helped to make a declining situation look less severe. Under the EPI programme, children of under one-year age receive vaccines for BCG, DPT, polio, measles and tetanus. In the region it was planned to reach about 46,190 children of that age in 1984. In the event, 60 per cent of this target was achieved.

3.4. Rural water supplies

Table A.8 gives information on the state of operational utility of the

Table A.7: Availability of essential drugs and equipment in dispensaries of sample villages in Tanga region as reported by rural medical aides

Item	Mkingaleo	Mwanyumba	Kinang'a	Kwankono	Sangeni	Pongwe	Magamba	Viti
	(e)				(e)	Kaska- zini	Kwaluko- nge	(Manolo)
Type of facility	dispens.	-	dispens.	dispens.	-	RHC	dispens.	dispens.
Availability of essential drugs (a)								
1. Chloroquine tab.	good	-	good	-	-	good	average	good
2. Penicillin inj.	average	-	average	-	-	average	average	good
3. Thiazina tab.	scarce	-	good	-	-	good	good	scarce
4. Mebendazole	good	-	good	-	-	scarce	average	average
5. Ferrous sulph. tab.	good	-	good	-	-	good	average	average
6. Phenobarbitone	good	-	scarce	-	-	average	average	good
7. Aspirin tab.	good	-	scarce	-	-	average	average	average
8. Paracetamol syrup	scarce	-	scarce	-	-	average	average	scarce
9. Tetracycline cap/tab.	good	-	average	-	-	average	average	average
10. Oral hydr. salts	good	-	good	-	-	scarce	good	good
11. Largactil tab.	scarce	-	good	-	-	average	good	good
Availability of essential equipment (b)								
1. Stethoscope	none	-	avail.	-	-	avail.	avail.	avail.
2. Thermometer	avail.	-	none	-	-	avail.	avail.	avail.
3. Microscope	none	-	none	-	-	avail.	avail.	avail.
4. Vaccination kit	avail.	-	avail. (d)	-	-	avail.	avail.	avail.
5. Bathroom scale	none	-	none	-	-	avail.	avail.	avail.
6. Child scale	avail.	-	avail.	-	-	avail.	avail.	avail.
7. Blood pressure machine	avail.	-	none	-	-	avail.	none (f)	avail.
8. Delivery bed	none	-	avail.	-	-	avail.	avail.	avail.
9. Faetalscope	avail.	-	avail.	-	-	avail.	avail.	avail.
10. Stove	avail.	-	avail.	-	-	avail.	avail.	avail.
11. Steriliser	avail.	-	avail.	-	-	avail.	avail.	avail.
12. Refrigerator	avail. (c)	-	avail.	-	-	avail.	avail.	avail.

Notes: (a) Availability shown as "good", "average" or "scarce".

(b) Availability shown as "available" or "not available (none)".

(c) Kerosene is sometimes not available.

(d) Some items not available.

(e) These two villages have no dispensaries of their own and there is none within 5 km of distance.

(f) Broke down six months before the author visited the village on 15 June 1986.

The rural medical aid in charge stated that there were little likelihood of getting a replacement in the near future.

village water supplies in the eight villages in the study. Five villages have piped water supplies, all operated by diesel-powered pumps. Mwan'yumba has two dug wells, but only one well is operational and is fixed with a hand pump. Sangeni and Viti villages depend on traditional sources of water.

In 1983 the region could claim that 46 per cent of the rural population and 85 per cent of its urban dwellers were being served with water supplies. As

noted in Chapter 5, in practice, much less people are actually being served by these clean water supplies. The situation is worse in the rural villages. The evidence from the village surveys confirms the prevalence of this difficulty. None of the sample villages had a water scheme operating throughout the year. Two villages, that is 25 per cent of the total number of the villages, had their schemes functioning for an average of 8-12 months per year. Three villages had their water supplies operating for 5-8 months per annum. The remaining three villages had their schemes operating for less than 5 months per year. In other words, this means that 75 per cent of the village water schemes operated for less than 8 months per year. The main problems facing these schemes are lack or inadequacy of fuel and lack of spare parts.

It is significant to note that Kwamkono village is one of the 66 villages in Eastern Handeni being supplied with water from the Handeni Trunk Main. The surveys reveal that Kwamkono was getting its water supply for 5-8 months per year. Although pump stations of the main pipe are operated on electricity, the booster stations have diesel-powered engines. Thus, they face the same chronic problem of lack or inadequacy of fuel and lack of spares. The solution would be the replacement of dieselisation with electrification of the system.

The discussion points out the fact that the mere existence of a service is not a sufficient guarantee that the people will benefit from it all the time. Operational utility should be determined in order to see how frequently and reliable is such a service available to the target population. It should be noted that maintenance and running costs are the responsibility of the regional authorities who must meet them from their annual budgetary allocation. Given the economic difficulties (see Chapter 4), the regional authorities have increasingly found it difficult to meet their obligations and commitments. One possible solution to this problem, in addition to resort to use of gravity, manually-operated pumps and electrification, is to ask the villages to meet part or full costs of maintenance and running of their schemes.

Table A.8; State of operational utility of water supplies in the sample villages in Tanga region

Operational utility	Mkingaleo	Pongwe	Kwamkono	Sangeni	Viti	Kimang'a	Mwanyumba	Maganba/ Kwalukonge
	(a)	(a)	(a)	(b)	(b)	(a)(c)	(c)	(a)
Water supply type								
Operational all the time(12 months)								
Operational for most of the time (8-12months)		v						v
Operational for some time (5-8 months)			v		v		v	
Hardly operational (less than 5 months)	v			v		v		

Notes: (a) Piped water supplies,
 (b) Traditional wells,
 (c) Shallow wells.

At this point, a recapitulation of the discussion on the RIDEP's intentions and achievements (and/or shortcomings) on the productive and infrastructural sectors is in order. The evidence from the village surveys demonstrated little influence of the RIDEP on agricultural productivity. This was, perhaps, to be expected as the only project purported to assist village peasants to increase production - agricultural extension project - collapsed three years after its commencement due to lack of tangible results. However, the evidence does show too that where peasants were "reached" (to borrow from Leonard's (1977) terminology) better crop yields and increased incomes were achieved. This evidence shows that local/village leadership is crucial in "reaching the peasant".

On social infrastructure, it seems evident that the RIDEP's contribution was much more significant in the provision of water supplies, especially in Handeni district, than in the other sectors. Tangible results have undoubtedly been accomplished in the sector. Probably, still better results would have been achieved, if there was no problem of the scarcity of fuel and spares. This is both a planning and non-planning problem. It is a planning problem in the sense that the planners should have foreseen the problem of fuel shortage, particularly after the first oil price shock of 1972/73. It is a non-planning problem, because the planners could not have foreseen the macroeconomic difficulties which the country began to face since the late seventies. The evidence collected in the villages show only a small contribution by the RIDEP in the provision of education facilities. There was no RIDEP contribution in the health sector.

3.5. Popular participation

The present study holds the view that popular participation in decision-making can take place through some form of institutional framework. The RIDEP design, as noted, did not recognise popular participation as an important component in plan identification and formulation, except in its implementation. However, this was later recognised as a shortcoming and a change in policy was initiated in 1979 when the village development programme was started.

Table A.9 presents the data on the existence of the participatory decision-making institutions and frequency of their meetings. The 1972 Decentralization Act gave for the first time power to the Party organs in the regions, districts and villages to scrutinise development plans before they are forwarded to a higher level. For example, a district plan had to receive an approval from the appropriate Party organ (in this case the District Executive Committee) before it is forwarded to the RDD for inclusion in the regional development plan and subsequent presentation before a meeting of the Regional Development Committee (RDC). At the village level, as mentioned already, the appropriate Party organ for scrutinising the village plan is the Branch Executive Committee, which is comprised of 15 members elected by the Branch Conference once in every five years. According to the CCM constitution, the Branch Executive Committee meets once in every three months. The village assembly meets once in 12 months, while the village council and its committees must in law meet once per month.

It is evident from Table A.9 that the decision-making organs do exist in all the sample villages. The data show that the frequency of meetings of the Branch Executive Committee averaged only 25 per cent of the required number of meetings for six of the eight villages. Only two villages, Mwanyumba and Magamba/Kwalukonge had meetings as required by the constitution, although the latter had in fact more than provided for in the constitution. Meetings of the

Table A.9: Existence and annual frequency of decision-making institutions in eight villages of Tanga region from June 1985 - May 1986.

Institution/Organ	Mkingaleo	Pongwe Kaska-zini	Kwankono	Sangeni	Viti	Kimang'a	Mwanyu-mba	Magamba/Kwalukonge
Branch executive committee(a)	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	6
Village assembly(b)	-	4	1	-	-	-	1	12
Village council(c)	1	4	7	2	3	6	12	12
Village council committees(d)								
-Plan.&finance	-	6	3	1	2	5	12	12(e)
-Prod.&marketing	-	6	2	-	2	1	12	8
-Constr.&transport	-	4	1	-	2	2	-	4
-Edu., culture & welfare	-	3	3	-	2	4	12	6
-Def.&security	-	12	12	-	3	3	3	4
Frequency index(f)	3	52	40	5	19	29	73	83

Notes: (a) The CCM constitution requires it to meet once per 3 months.

(b) The law (the Villages Act, 1975) requires it to meet once per year.

(c) The law requires it to meet once per month.

(d) The village council committees should meet once per month prior to the meeting of the village council, to which their proceedings are reported.

(e) This village has decided that this committee should meet every work day to deliberate on every work/activity planned for the day or the following one. The leadership told this author that this action was necessitated by exigency of work in the village.

(f) Frequency index = $\frac{\text{Total no. of meetings of all committees convened/year}}{\text{Total no. of scheduled meetings of all committees/year}}$

$$I = 100,$$

village assembly were convened in four of the eight villages. Pongwe Kaskazini and Magamba/Kwalukonge village assemblies met more frequently than required by law, while those of Mwan'yumba and Kwamkono met as required in law.

Regarding meetings of the village council it is only Mwan'yumba and Magamba/Kwalukonge, which had 12 meetings in 12 months as directed by law. These two villages were followed by Kwamkono and Kimang'a with seven and six meetings respectively. Mkingaleo, Sangeni and Viti had the lowest frequency of meetings of the village council. Committee meetings took place according to the law in some villages, and did not in others as illustrated in Table 6.18. A frequency index ($I = 100$) of the meetings has been calculated and shows that only 30 per cent of the sample villages had $I = >50$. [The total number of meetings required per year is 77 meetings of all committees]. In this regard, Magamba/Kwalukonge village with the frequency index of 83 leads the rest. It is followed by Mwan'yumba with the index of 73. Mkingaleo tails with its index of 3 and is immediately followed by Sangeni whose $I = 5$.

It appears that the frequency of the meetings depends upon the enthusiasm of the individual leaders (the chairmen and secretaries) of these organs. Where the leadership was dynamic and honest, meetings are frequently

convened as required in law to discuss various issues concerning village economic and social development. This condition may sometimes affect the type of topics raised at such meetings. On some occasions the enumerators and the author were informed by respondents that meetings were sometimes not called, if there were controversial issues in the agenda. For example, the villagers of Kimang'a claimed that meetings were not called by the leadership, because they could not explain satisfactorily the reason why the village shop was making losses. This problem was also encountered in other villages as well, such as Mkingaleo, Sangeni, Kwamkono and Viti. It appears that the management of village economic ventures (or rather their mismanagement) is a problem constraining convention of meetings with negative consequences on popular participation.

The survey evidence indicates that ordinary villagers were very enthusiastic in participating in the decision-making processes and therefore, blamed their leaders for not calling meetings as required by law. When respondents were asked whether they would like to participate more in decision-making in their villages, they all said yes. The majority of them felt that all topics concerning village life should be discussed freely in the village assembly or branch conference. One implication of this is that villagers want their leaders to involve them in democratic decision-making.

This now brings us to the analysis of the minutes of the meetings, which was necessary in order to examine the types of decisions made in village organs. On the whole, minutes of proceedings existed in the village offices, especially of the branch executive committee, village assembly and council. Analysis of the minutes revealed that the topics discussed covered all aspects of village life: development projects, services and welfare, security and defence. For example, in Magamba/Kwalukonge, which had the most systematic and properly organised meeting records of the eight villages, important decisions made in the last five years included the expansion of their communal farm and types of crops to be grown, organisation of the workforce, contributions for the establishment of the village shops, bar, hotel and guest house, procurement of the grinding mill, tractors, the lorry and bus. Other issues concerned the construction of classrooms and teachers houses, and "good houses" for some most needy villagers on loan. In other words, almost all subjects of village life are discussed in the meetings of the village decision-making organs. Presumably, this contributed to their success as involvement raised the enthusiasm and commitment to the village development activities.

However, the evidence garnered in the villages show that villagers had no or very little say in respect of the RIDEP projects. It was claimed that usually the TIRDEP experts accompanied with district officials visited the villagers to inform them what project(s) have been planned to be implemented in their village and what was expected of them to do for its (their) execution. There was no prior consultation to determine the villagers aspirations and priorities. This was the style of the GTZ-sponsored activities. Naturally, the villagers are expected to accept such a project(s) and to contribute to its implementation. In the eyes of the concerned villagers these are projects designed from above and village support or compliance is subject to how the projects are in tune with the villagers concerns and prioritisation. A good example of this is the construction of classrooms and teachers houses. Villagers accord more emphasis to the construction of classrooms than that of the teachers houses. Table A.5 illustrates this point quite clearly.

In this respect, even priorities between men and women in the same village were found to differ substantially. As noted, women tended to give top priority to projects which made their work simpler and easier such as a grinding mill, pump-operated water supply, tractor, dispensary, kindergarten, etc. While men

tended to require outside assistance for most construction activities where self-help was needed so that they do not have to offer themselves for the work. Most men would prefer projects that maximise their leisure time. This is presumably one of the reasons why construction activities are less enthusiastically accepted, if they embody a self-help component. These are usually men's responsibility and are likely to make large claims on their leisure time.

4. Concluding Remarks

The village surveys were a method for seeking out the views and perceptions of the beneficiaries on the implementation of the Tanga RIDEP and its impacts on agricultural production, provision of education, health and water supply facilities, status of food and nutrition and extent of popular participation. The evidence from the surveys shows that there was no or very little influence of the RIDEP interventions on agricultural production/productivity, rural incomes, health, food and nutrition status and popular participation. Villagers reported observing some impact from the water component, especially in some villages in eastern Handeni district. Regarding the education component the village interviewees reported only little impact, especially in Kimang'a and Kwamkono villages.

The village surveys has helped the study to gather additional evidence regarding the implementation of the RIDEP and its impacts and thus has enabled it to expand its understanding of the TIRDEP's successes and failures.

FOOTNOTES:

1. This confusion led some commentators of Tanzanian development to talk about de-emphasis of ujamaa/communal production in the villages in the country. See, for example, J. Boesen, 1979, 'From Ujamaa to Villagisation' in B.U. Mwansasu and C. Pratt (eds), 1979, *Towards Socialism in Tanzania*, Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, pp. 125-45 and also A. Coulson, 1977, 'Agricultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania' in *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 10, September-December, 1977, pp. 74-100. The Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975 provided the first definition of an "ujamaa village". Nonetheless, a still better one was emanated from a CCM publication issued in 1984 (CCM, 1984, *Maelekezo juu ya Mashindano ya Siasa ni Kilimo* [Guidelines on the organisation and administration of *Siasa ni Kilimo* Competitions], Dodoma: CCM National Headquarters Office.
2. The Regional Planning Office estimates that the share of food crops in the region's total income was 90 per cent as opposed to a mere 10 per cent from cash crops in 1983 (see RC's Office, 1985, *Regional Development Strategy*, p. 2.
3. Hassan Kaya holds the view that local people in Tanga region rarely like to work as wage labourers in sisal estates because of low wages, poor housing facilities and working conditions (see H.O. Kaya, 1985, *Problems of Regional Development in Tanzania: A Case Study of Tanga Region*, PhD Thesis, Free University of Berlin-West, pp. 211-2. The present study found out too that the local people do not want to work in the sisal estates, because they find it degrading and disrespectful. In fact, the recent experience attests to the fact that many people of all ethnic groups in the country are



constrained by this latter reason. The recent preference of estate managers to employ women and children to men is probably an outcome of this problem.

4. The regional and district education authorities find grade B and C teachers, and especially the grade C teachers, more willing to stay and work in the villages than their senior colleagues, the grade A teachers. [Personal communication with the Regional Education Officer, Tanga and District Education Officers of Handeni, Korogwe and Muheza districts May 1986]. This was further born out by the evidence garnered during the village surveys. Generally, it was the grade B/C teachers who prolonged periods of time in the villages, especially in the remote ones.

